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STUDIES
IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

EDITED BY A COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE DEPARTMENTS
OF GREEK, LATIN, ARCHAEOLOGY, AND
COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY

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THE Departments of Greek, Latin, Archæology, and Comparative Philology in the University of Chicago purpose to publish, at intervals of about one year, a collection of papers, written by instructors and graduate students of the University, upon subjects within the general domain of classical philology. The price will be \$1.50 (6 shillings, or 6 marks). Subscriptions may be sent to any of the addresses upon the cover.

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THE ANTICIPATORY SUBJUNCTIVE IN GREEK AND LATIN:
A CHAPTER OF COMPARATIVE SYNTAX.¹

BY WM. GARDNER HALE.

FOR many years no one has thought of pursuing the study of Latin sounds and inflections by any but the comparative method. Latin has not been supposed to be able, by and of itself alone, to afford sufficient light for the solution of the problems which it offers. Yet students of the syntax of the Latin verb have been content to work with eyes fixed upon Latin only.² The result has been, that, in my judgment, though in this and that detail much and most excellent work has been accomplished, especially by the younger school of German syntacticists, many details yet remain in an unsatisfactory condition, while the general ground-plan of the whole final structure of the syntax of the Latin verb is yet to be drawn.

A complete treatment of the Latin verb would of course deal at the same time with all the languages of the Indo-European family. A task of this sort is possible only for a worker like Delbrück, who, in addition to what he himself can do, can command the help of specialists in many fields. My only hope had been to deal with Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. Even of this hope, however, I am now obliged reluctantly to surrender a part. In order to use Sanskrit with independence and facility, one must have been introduced early to Sanskrit studies, and have devoted a generous amount of time to them for many years. My own power over the language (which was not taught in America in my undergraduate days) is not that of an independent worker, and cannot be made so without the sacrifice of what is now of greater consequence.

¹ First published, as a preprint from these studies, in October, 1894.

² The popular manual of King and Cookson is based upon a sound conception, but involves no searching study of either Greek or Latin syntax. Miles's bold and somewhat whimsical "Comparative Syntax of Greek and Latin" has not yet advanced to the methodical treatment of the verb.

When this reservation is made, however, it may at once be added that comparative work of considerable importance for the whole family of related languages may be done within the field of two languages only. The main lines of Delbrück's treatment in his forthcoming volume on the Comparative Syntax of the Verb will in all probability prove to have been laid down in his book of the year 1871, in which he treated the subjunctive and optative within the field of Sanskrit and Greek only. Fortunately for me, too, the language which I can employ in addition to Latin — the Greek — is clearly, from the point of view of the syntax of the verb, the most important of the entire family. Others, like Sanskrit, possess distinct subjunctive and optative forms; but no other possesses, in full and regular use, a system of further subdivision of modal forces through the use of accompanying (or not-accompanying) particles like *ἄν* and *κε*. The Greek may fairly be said to have two subjunctives and two optatives. Accordingly, while I am sure that, in not a few of their details, and perhaps even in some of their main features, the results reached by the student of Greek and Latin will have to be modified in the light of those which shall be reached by workers like Delbrück, yet I also believe that, — supposing the procedure to be itself sound, — the main results will stand, and that they even will be found to give the basis for the decision of many questions in the syntax of languages not included in the material studied.

For Latin itself, the results will, I am convinced, be of considerable moment. Under the light of a comparative treatment, if Greek be included in the comparison, much that now stands in our grammars will disappear; and, — perhaps more important still, — where we now have masses of particulars of which the relations are dim or wholly dark, we shall then have clearly related parts of an organic whole.¹

¹ The objection may possibly be urged that the study of other languages will not enable us to draw conclusions with regard to the nature of the Latin modal constructions, since the so-called Latin subjunctive is a congeries of modes, at one moment subjunctive, at another optative, without corresponding distinction of modal uses. But the inference does not follow from the premises. Most of the Latin modal uses, *e.g.*, the expression of a wish and the expression of an exhortation, are unquestionably inherited from the parent speech. There is no reason why the confusion of forms, which took place after the separation, should in itself have changed the character of the modal feeling

Such a piece of work, conceived in such a spirit of hope, I have myself desired to put forth. My plans have been shaping themselves, and my material has been accumulating, for some fourteen years; and in the five years since the publication of the second part of my *Cum*-Constructions, I have devoted all the time at my command to this end. Much of the result has long been in nearly finished form; and the whole would before this time have appeared in print, had it not been for the fact that, in the last three years, my available time has, through special causes, been temporarily diminished. It seems to me best, therefore, to put out a chapter without further delay,—even though a part of a structure necessarily appears imperfect if seen out of connection with the rest.

In this paper my great indebtedness to Delbrück will be evident. Indeed, though my impulses to the study of Latin syntax go back to a time that antedates my knowledge of his studies, my work would have been of a different character had Delbrück never written. His book upon the Subjunctive and Optative in Sanskrit and Greek contains no word of Latin; yet I distinctly recall that, at my first reading of it, I recognized that no other book was of equal consequence to the student of Latin syntax. If a formal dedication were to be made, I should dedicate this chapter, and the chapters to be published later, to Berthold Delbrück,—for many years my teacher through his writings, and in recent years my friend.

Yet it by no means follows that my own work has been that of a mere translator of Delbrück's categories into terms of Latin. On the contrary, the reader who is really familiar with Delbrück's book of 1871, and his more recent book of 1888 upon Early Vedic Syntax, will find that my treatment differs at many points from his. For example, I have not adopted the division of dependent clauses into prior and posterior, since such a division seems to me

in either of these constructions. Further, if, after this confusion of forms, constructions peculiar to the Latin were developed, yet clearly betraying certain modal feelings, of precisely the same types as those which are indicated by certain modes in existing constructions in Greek, Sanskrit, etc., it is a sound scientific method to group these later novelties with the constructions through which the modal feelings in question have been kept up, instead of treating them as unclassifiable particulars.

to cut across the lines of more important divisions founded upon more vital relationships. At many points, I have explicitly defined the functions of types of dependent clauses which Delbrück has only grouped, without such definition of function, under general families. At other points, I have adduced types not noticed in his work. At others, I have set up conceptions of dependent clauses opposed to his conceptions. I have emphasized the presence of a drift in the province of the subjunctive which seems to me of great consequence in the study of the history of the mode, but which he does not notice. And even in the matter of the general subdivision of the optative uses into families I differ from him, in that I do not accept his category of a "futurischen Optativ," and in that I find it necessary to divide the so-called potential optative into two divisions, the true potential, and the optative of ideal certainty.

With this general introduction, we may proceed to our specific task.

In Greek we are able to distinguish, for the subjunctive, two families of constructions. One of these is undoubtedly the parent of the other, since it is not credible that the mode, when first used, had the power of conveying both of two ideas so considerably removed from each other. It may even seem,—as indeed to me it does,—that an extremely probable genesis can be shown for one of these meanings out of the other. But, however that may be, the fact is sure that, in historical times, the two families of meanings existed. In one of these families the mode indicates an action as willed, demanded, required, planned, aimed at, etc. (Delbrück's "Subjunctive of Will"). The subjunctives of this family may, then, be called *Volitive*. In the other family, the mode indicates an act as predicted, counted upon, foreseen, looked forward to, and the like (Delbrück's "futurischer Conjunctiv"); and the subjunctives of this family may, then, be called *Anticipatory*, or *Prospective*.¹

¹ My earliest notes show the use of both of these words. Both have their advantages. The second is briefer, and accords in form with the words "volitive," "optative," and "indicative." The first, however, seems to me to have a distinct superiority to its competitor in being accompanied by a corresponding abstract noun ("anticipation"), indicating the state of mind under which the mode is used.

For the optative, three families at least may be shown. Only two are recognized in the grammars ; namely, the family known as the true optative, in which the mode indicates a wish, and the family known as the potential. The second is really made up of two families, — the strict potential, in which the mode asserts that something *may possibly* take place, etc., etc., and the optative of ideal certainty, in which it is asserted that, under conceivable circumstances, the act *would (surely)* take place. The latter family asserts with a completeness as great as that of the indicative itself, and differs from it only in that it asserts, not an actuality, but a mental certainty.

The potential in the strict sense and the optative of ideal certainty are, in the larger part of their range, entirely distinct. They have, however, their points of contact with each other ; for there are examples obviously belonging to the one or the other, but not easily to be assigned to either to the sure exclusion of the other. We may well believe that one of these families is descended from the other ; and we may also believe that the true optative of wish was likewise descended from one of these, or was the parent of both. As yet no satisfactory solution of the problem of the earliest force of the optative and of the genesis of the other forces has been reached. The future may yield the solution. I shall myself, in another chapter, make certain proposals. All that is sure, however (and all that will be sure, after my proposals are made), is that three distinct families of the Greek and Sanskrit optative may be shown.¹

The larger part of the treatment of the syntax of the two modes in Greek and Latin would fall under the following heads, each constituting the title of a chapter in the treatment :—

1. The Volitive Subjunctive.
2. The Anticipatory Subjunctive.
3. The (true) Optative.
4. The Potential Optative.
5. The Optative of Ideal Certainty.

¹ It is a question, not to be argued here, whether the Prescriptive Optative is not important enough to deserve to be regarded as constituting a family by itself.

To these five chapters would be added others upon

6. Constructions resulting from a fusing of similar uses of differing modal origin; and

7. Constructions resulting from the influence of a set or sets of modal uses upon some other modal use.¹

My study of the *Cum*-Constructions (in the Cornell University Studies in Classical Philology, Ithaca, N. Y., Andrus and Church, 1888-89, and, in a German translation by Neizert, Leipzig, B. S. Teubner, 1891) contains, in addition to a good deal upon indicative *qui*- and *cum*-constructions, and a few things, in passing, upon certain volitive and potential *qui*-constructions, a nearly complete treatment of Chapter V. (the Optative of Ideal Certainty) upon the Latin side, with sufficient indication of what the general nature of a treatment upon the Greek side would be.

In the present study, it is my purpose to put forth the second

¹ For Latin, in which the so-called subjunctive is a conglomerate of subjunctive and optative forms, the scheme of division would be: —

1. The Volitive Subjunctive.
2. The Anticipatory Subjunctive.
3. The Optative Subjunctive, or Subjunctive of Wish.
4. The Potential Subjunctive.
5. The Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty.
6. Constructions resulting from Fusion.
7. Constructions due to the influence of one or more usages upon another.

A Latin Grammar, or a Latin "Modes and Tenses," arranged upon this scheme, — so that the very place of the treatment of a construction would show its essential original or still-remaining force, and its relationship to other constructions, — would gain greatly in organic unity, in clearness, and in the power of awakening interest and developing intelligence. And this would be true even if, in an elementary book, the constructions the history of which is more difficult to grasp were left without explanation, and merely, by their placing, associated in the young mind with other constructions, their relations to which would be made clear in due time in more advanced books.

For something like eight years I have given to my students an outline treatment based upon this plan; but, though I have received many requests for it from outsiders, I have not printed it, my desire being first to publish my comparative treatment of the syntax of the verb in Greek and Latin, and my projected larger "Latin Modes and Tenses." The same delays, however, that have led me to put out the present chapter will lead me to publish my "Outlines" without further waiting (from the press of Ginn & Co., Boston).

chapter. I am especially minded to do this, for the reason that there belong under this head, in my opinion, a number of Latin constructions, the nature of which, simple though it is, has been misunderstood.¹ Among these are the construction with *antequam* and *priusquam*, the construction with *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad*, and certain constructions with *cum* and other relatives.

In a paper in the *Classical Review* for February, 1893, Professor Sonnenschein discussed some of the Latin constructions mentioned above, treating them as "prospective." He expressed himself as having held and taught this doctrine for a number of years. It gratified me to find his agreement with a doctrine which I also had taught, with the same proofs which I give here, for many years (at least, as notes in the possession of pupils show, since 1886),² and which I had for some time been on the point of publishing; indeed, the present study, so far as concerns the constructions with which his paper dealt, has not been materially changed from the shape in which it already stood in writing at the time when the latter appeared. Professor Sonnenschein has anticipated me in publishing the doctrine. He has, however, divined, rather than established, the nature of these constructions; for, as I have said in the article cited, he has not supported his propositions with definite proof, such as the Greek might have afforded, if a study had been made of the significance of the presence or absence of the particle *ἄν* (or *κε*). He has left it for me, therefore, even in that part of the field which he has touched, to show the strength of the argument to be gained by the comparative method.³

¹ I have given a sketch of my scheme in an article entitled "The 'Prospective' Subjunctive in Greek and Latin," in the *Classical Review* for April, 1894.

² The phrases "an act in view" and "an act looked forward to from a certain time," which I employed in 1887 and 1888 in dealing with the tenses of the clauses with *antequam*, *priusquam*, *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad* in articles upon the "Sequence of Tenses in Latin" (*American Journal of Philology*, VIII. 1 and IX. 2) were chosen to be in accord with this teaching, and to be still correct when I should take up the problem of the mode in a general comparative treatment of the Greek and Latin verb.

³ It of course lay within the power of any student of Latin, since the appearance of Delbrück's book in 1871, and, indeed, since the appearance of Bäumlein's "Untersuchungen über die griech. Modi" in 1846, to find the key to the nature of the Latin constructions here placed under the head of the anticipatory subjunctive, and to bring evidence to support his findings. No one, however, so far as published records show,

I shall pass over, in the present paper, the question of the historical relation of the volitive and the anticipatory subjunctives, and simply deal with the latter as an existing force.

The treatment will fall into three parts. In the first, those types will be taken up in which the sentence stands by itself, independent not only in outward form, but in thought, of any other sentence. In the second, those types will be taken up in which the sentence is independent so far as its outward form is concerned, but nevertheless is evidently connected in thought with another, and subordinate to that; in other words, in which the construction is *paratactic*. In the third, those types will be taken up in which the sentence is subordinated, both in meaning and in outward form, to another; in other words, is *hypotactic*.

In Latin and in Sanskrit, as indeed in languages generally, there is no means of distinguishing by the outward form whether a given subjunctive is volitive or anticipatory. We are fortunate in that, even as early as Homer, Greek generally marks the anticipatory subjunctive through the use of the particles *ἄν* or *κε*. It is true that the feeling of futurity is expressed by the verb itself, and that the *ἄν* or *κε*, if employed, is only an additional note in harmony with that feeling. Nevertheless, while the absence of the particle proves nothing with certainty about the force of the mode in a given subjunctive, its presence is positive evidence that the force is that of anticipation, not that of will,—or, at the least, is proof that the construction has been under the influence of constructions of the anticipatory type. And, on the other hand, we may at times, from the necessary force of a sentence

has done it. It is of course true that, in individual subjunctive uses, as, *e.g.*, in a command, the mode has been recognized as possessing a future force. But this conception is a very different one from that which is to be attached to the anticipatory subjunctive. The distinction on which the whole matter of classification turns does not lie between a present sense and a future sense,—it lies between a *volitive* future sense and an *anticipatory* future sense; in other words, between the conception of an act as willed, and the conception of an act as expected or imminent. Even the use of the subjunctive in conditions referring to the future has not sufficed to set grammarians on the track of a generalization, perhaps because of the existence of an independent subjunctive condition which is clearly of what is called a jussive (*i.e.*, volitive) nature. For this reason, Mr. Inge's attitude of mind toward Professor Sonnenschein's paper (expressed in the *Classical Review* for April, 1893) is certainly a different one from that in which, under similar circumstances, I should have found myself.

in its context, draw a sure inference that the subjunctive is anticipatory, even though *ἄν* is lacking.¹

It is an interesting and significant fact that, except in the first person singular, the formula by which English expresses the volitive idea is, just as in Latin, Sanskrit, and Greek (barring the matter of the use or non-use of *ἄν*), identical with the formula by which it expresses, or may express, the anticipatory idea; namely, the use of the auxiliary "shall." "You *shall*," "he *shall*," and "they *shall*," etc., express the speaker's will; but that which the speaker expects may, in older English, equally well be expressed, even in main sentences, by the same auxiliary; while in modern English the use still holds in dependent clauses, — in some of which, in fact, the auxiliary of the future indicative, the neighboring mode of prediction, cannot possibly be employed.

Examples of the independent use may be found in abundance in the King James translation of the Bible, *e.g.*, in Psalm xxxiv. 22: "The Lord redeemeth the soul of his servants: and none of them that trust in him shall be desolate."

Examples of modern use in dependent clauses may be seen in such sentences as "let us wait till every member of the party shall be here," for which the substitution of the future indicative form, "till every member of the party will be here," is simply impossible.

In my translations of examples I have used the auxiliary "shall" without farther hint, wherever our feeling for the English word would make it quite sure that it would be taken in the anticipatory sense, and not in the volitive. Where this is not the case I have either translated by the nearest English equivalent, the "will" of the second and third persons of the future, or have given the word "shall," with the interpreting word "will" alongside of it.

As regards the way in which, in my translations, main and subordinate sentences are connected, I should premise that I have occasionally, where the paratactic form would better express the essential character of the modal mechanism, employed this form, though in the original the clause was hypotactic.

We are ready, now, to pass to the detailed treatment of our subject, under the three heads that have been mentioned.

¹ I purposely omit, for the present, all discussion of the primitive force or forces of *ἄν* and *κε*.

A.

THE ANTICIPATORY SUBJUNCTIVE IN INDEPENDENCE.

1. In independent sentences in Homeric Greek, the subjunctive of anticipation, when declarative, expresses a confident expectation of a future occurrence; or, when interrogative, inquires with regard to such expectation. Its function may then be defined as the conveying of

Simple Expectation, Declarative or Interrogative.

In the isolated sentence, the expectation is always that of the speaker.

The negative is *οὐ*. As has already been said, the subjunctive form may stand alone, or it may be accompanied by *ἄν* or *κε*.

οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι. — A 262.

“I never beheld such warriors, nor *shall* behold.”

καί ποτέ τις εἴπησι καὶ ὀψυγόνων ἀνθρώπων. — H 87.

“So *shall* one say even of men that be late born.” Cf. *ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει*, four lines below.

*ἰστὸν δὲ στήσας ἀνά θ' ἰστία λευκὰ πετάσσας
ῥῆσθαι· τὴν δὲ κέ τοι πνοιὴ Βορέας φέρησιν.* — κ 506.

“But set up the mast, spread the white sails and take thy seat; and the breath of the North Wind *shall* (= *will*) bear the ship along.”

Οὐκ ἄν τοι χαλίσμη κίθαρις. — Γ 54.

“The lyre *shall* (= *will*) not avail thee.” (A warning prophecy.)

In Latin, the strictly independent construction has been entirely displaced by the future indicative, before the time when Latin literature begins, — as, indeed, it had been in Greek before Attic times.

The phenomenon is not an isolated one. Again and again, in the present chapter, the onward movement of the future indicative into the earlier field of the anticipatory subjunctive will be seen.

This movement is, of course, connected with the fact that the future indicative in Greek and Latin is largely of subjunctive origin; but, as is always likely to be the case where enough differentiation has once been set up to afford a starting-point for the play of diverging needs, there is undoubtedly also, in spite of a community of origin, a tendency toward a real differentiation of force. The receding of the anticipatory subjunctive from the independent uses must have been accompanied by a loss of the power of complete assertion.

2. A confident assertion that something will not happen may amount to a

Virtual Expression of Impossibility.

οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐδ' ἔσσεται οὐδὲ γένηται,
ὅς . . . — π 437.

"The man lives not, nor will live, nor *shall* live (= *ever can* live) who," etc. Similarly ζ 201.

πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,
οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλώσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἴην,
φωνὴ δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη. — B 488.

"But the common sort *shall* I (= *can* I) not number and name, — not if ten tongues were mine and ten mouths, and a voice unwearied, and the heart were bronze within me." The same phrase occurs in δ 240, λ 328 and 517.

3. In the interrogative form, so far as I have noticed, the construction, though taking the shape of a question with regard to what is to be expected, is in reality a

Virtual Expression of Anxiety or Distress.

ὦ μοι ἐγὼ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται; — ε 465.

"Alas for me! what *am* I *going to* suffer?¹ What now is my end to be?"

¹ The mode of γένηται cannot possibly, in spite of the absence of ἄν, be taken as volitive; and this fact warns us against resorting to any forced conception of the meaning of πάθω (viz. as "what shall I *do*?" in the desire to make it volitive. The natural meaning appears, e.g., in τί κακὸν τόδε πάσχετε; υ 351; οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι, T 321. The familiar τί πάθω of Attic Greek should then be regarded as a survival of the anticipatory subjunctive in the independent interrogative sentence (cf. the forms ἔδομαι, πίομαι, and χέω). Yet undoubtedly the line of distinction between this

4 The announcement, by the speaker, of his future action, or of the action of others asserted by him without reference to their attitude of mind, may be the practical equivalent of the expression of his will, and may therefore be named a

Virtual Resolve.

τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ σὺν νηὶ τ' ἐμῇ καὶ ἐμοῖς ἐτάροισιν
πέμφω, ἐγὼ δέ κ' ἄγω Βρισηίδα καλλιπάρηον
αὐτὸς ἰὼν κλισίῃνδε. — A 183.

"And her I shall send back with my ship and comrades; but I *shall* myself go to thy tent, and take Briseis of the fair cheeks."¹

ὦ Ὀδυσσεῦ πολύαινε, δόλων ἄτ' ἡδὲ πόνοιο,
σήμερον ἢ δοιοῖσιν ἐπεύξεαι Ἴππασίδῃσιν,
τοιῶδ' ἄνδρε κατακτείνας καὶ τεύχε' ἀπούρας,
ἢ κεν ἐμῷ ὑπὸ δουρὶ τυπεῖς ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσης. — A 430.

"Renowned Odysseus, insatiable of wiles and toils, to-day shalt thou either boast over two sons of Hippasos, having killed two men like these and stripped them of their armor, or *shalt* thyself be slain, under the blow of my spear."

οὐ γάρ τίς με βίῃ γε ἐκὼν ἀέκοντα δίηται,
οὐδέ τι ἰδρεΐη. — H 197.

"No one by force *shall* (=will) chase me against my will, nor yet by skill."

and *τί ποιῶ* in time became blurred, as appears in Soph. O. C. 216, where *τί πάθω* follows *τί γεγώνω*, is answered by the imperative, and then followed by the future indicative of resolve.

¹ The earliest expression of the will of the speaker for his own act, *i.e.*, the statement of a resolve, is of course made by the volitive subjunctive, corresponding to the emphatic English "I will" and the German "ich will." A good many instances of this are recognized in Homer, as, *e.g.*, *χεύω* β 222, *ἴδωμαι* ζ 126, *ἐλίσπω* ι 37, *φαινώ* μ 383, *δῶ* ν 296. I strongly suspect that we have relics of the same thing in Latin, not only in simple statements of the will, as in *enarrem* Ter. Haut. 273, *sic agamus* Cic. Verr. I, 51, 133, *neu morer* Ov. Met. 7, 520, but in certain phrases in which a subjunctive is combined with *credo* or *opinor* (cf. the English phrases "I think I'll do so and so," "I believe I'll do so and so"); *e.g.*, *sed maneam etiam, opinor* Plaut. Trin. 1136, *ad precatorem adeam, credo* Ter. Phorm. 140 (in which the thought is of course ironical), *sed opinor quiescamus* Cic. Att. 9, 6, 2, *sed opinor excipiamus et expectemus* Cic. Att. 2, 5, 1.

In general, however, both Greek and Latin take the same course, and come to express resolve for one's own action by the future indicative, as in α 397 (*ἔσομαι*) and Ter. Heaut. 607 (*ibo*).

Compare the future indicative of similar feeling in the following :—

οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο
σοὶ κοίλης παρὰ νηυσὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει
συμπάντων Δαναῶν. — A 88.

“For while I live and have my sight upon the earth, no man of all the Achaeans *shall* lay heavy hands upon you by the hollow ships.”

The negative is to be noticed in both sentences (cf. the volitive *κιχρίω*, with the volitive negative *μή*, in A 26).

5. The statement by the speaker that an action to which he would naturally be opposed will take place may, in certain contexts, be equivalent to an expression of

Acquiescence, Willingness, Consent.

πολλοὶ ἐν ἀμφιάλφῃ Ἰθάκῃ, νέοι ἡδὲ παλαιοί,
τῶν κέν τις τόδ' ἔχῃσιν, ἐπεὶ θάνε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οἶκοιο ἀναξ ἔσομ' ἡμετέροιο
καὶ δμῶων, οὓς μοι λήισσατο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς. — a 395.

“But there are many other kings of the Achaeans in sea-girt Ithaca, both young and old, some one of whom *shall* (= *will*) have this kingship, now that noble Odysseus is dead. But as for myself, I will be king of my own house and servants, which noble Odysseus won for me as the prize of war.”¹

The construction is rare ; whereas the optative (without *ἄν* or *κε*) in the same force is very common.

6. When, in any of the types that have been given, the sentence as a whole contains some expression of that upon which the expectation hinges, *i.e.*, of the circumstances upon the fulfilment

¹ Monro's translation in his *Homeric Grammar*, p. 252 (“let one of them have this”), is too like the proper rendering for a volitive.

of which the expectation is conditioned, the main sentence is called a

Conclusion.

τόν γ' εἰ πως σὺ δύναιο λοχησάμενος λελαβέσθαι,
ὅς κέν τοι εἴπησιν ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου
νόστον θ', ὥς ἐπὶ πόντον ἐλεύσεται ἰχθυόεντα. — δ 388.

"If thou canst in any way lie in ambush and take him, he *shall* (= *will*) tell the way and the measure of thy path, how thou shalt go over the teeming sea."

εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι,
ἦ τεὸν ἦ Αἴαντος ἰὼν γέρας, ἦ Ὀδυσῆος. — Α 137.

"And if they do not give it, I myself *shall* go and take a prize, or thine, or Ajax's, or Odysseus'." (Resolve conditioned.)

B.

THE ANTICIPATORY SUBJUNCTIVE IN PARATAXIS.

It would be easy to show, from hypotactic examples, what, in the case of many constructions, the original paratactic form must have been (see, for example, under the head of the characterizing clause and the construction of plan below).¹ My actual collection, however, includes illustration of only three types. These are:

I. The Substantive Clause of Direct Quotation.

ἀλλ' ἔκ τοι ἐρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τελέεσθαι οἶω.
ἦς ὑπεροπλήσι τάχ' ἄν ποτε θυμὸν δλέσση. — Α 204.

"But this I tell you, and I deem it will come to pass: by his own insolence *shall* he soon lose his life."

¹ For any modal usage whatever, the paratactic constructions are relatively infrequent. It is not strange, therefore, that few examples of parataxis are to be found for this particular mode, which, except in dependent clauses, is by Homer's time already rare.

2. The Assumption,

upon the fulfilment of which the act of the main sentence is conditioned.¹

οὐ μιν ἐγὼ γε
 φεύξομαι ἐκ πολέμοιο δυσηχέος, ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἄντην
 στήσομαι, ἥ κε φέρῃσι μέγα κράτος, ἥ κε φερόιμην. — Σ 306.
 ἀλλ' ἥ τοι κείνον μὲν ἐάσομεν, ἥ κεν ἴῃσιν
 ἥ κε μένῃ. — I 701.

"Yet will we suffer him, he *shall* go or he *shall* stay"
 (= "whether he *shall* go or whether he *shall* stay").

ἀλλ' ἥ τοι κείνον μὲν ἐάσομεν, ἥ κεν ἀλώῃ
 ἥ κε φύγῃ καὶ κέν οἱ ὑπέρσχη χεῖρα Κρονίων. — ξ 183.

"But we will let him pass, he *shall* be slain, or he *shall* escape
 and the son of Kronos hold his hand over him" (= "whether he
shall . . . or . . . *shall*"). Similarly Σ 308.

3. A possible instance of the paratactic construction occurs in
 Ω 551, in which the *πρίν*-sentence stands to the main sentence,
 so far as the mere mechanism goes, in the relation of a loose

Time-determinative Clause.

οὐ γάρ τι πρήξεις ἀκαχήμενος υἱὸς ἐῆος,
 οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις· πρίν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθησθα. — Ω 550.

"Thou wilt accomplish nothing by grieving for thy son, nor
 wilt thou bring him back to life. Ere this *shall* (= *will*) a new
 evil come to thee" (thine own death). The meaning is "never in
 all the days before thy death, — in all the days of thy life, — wilt
 thou," etc.

The same feeling is more clearly seen, because the thought is
 simpler, in the case of the future indicative in ν 427 :

¹ I use the word "assumption" in preference to the word "condition," both because
 it more accurately describes the state of mind under which the grammatical mechanism
 is originally employed, and because it is matched with a verb "to assume" of exactly
 corresponding force; whereas the verb "to condition" does not correspond to the noun
 "condition."

of which the expectation is
called a

C.

τόν γ' εἴ πως σὺ δύναιο
ὅς κέν τοι εἴπησιν ὁδὸν ἅ-
νυστον θ', ὥς ἐπὶ πόντοι

"If thou canst in any way
shall (= *will*) tell the way and
shalt go over the teeming sea."

εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ
ἦ τεὸν ἦ Αἴαντος ἰὼν γέρα

"And if they do not give it,
or thine, or Ajax's, or Odysseus'.

B.

THE ANTICIPATORY SUBJECT

It would be easy to show, from
the case of many constructions, that
have been (see, for example, under
clause and the construction of plan
however, includes illustration of only

1. The Substantive Clause

ἀλλ' ἔκ τοι ἐγὼ τὸ δὲ καὶ τελέ-
ῃς ὑπερβύσσου τάχ' ἂν ποτε θύ-

"But thou, O thou, and I deem
insulted *shall* he soon lose his life

the paratactic construction of a few exam-
ples of dependent clauses.

There are over three hundred patents on electric conduits and machinery pertaining thereto. In none of them is there a solution of the problem of vehicle propulsion which *will be* at once safe, economical, and easy of repair.

Characterizing clauses are especially frequent after indefinite negative antecedents, for the reason that nothing can be predicted of such an antecedent except behavior, experience, plight,

In other words, *any predication* after a negative or indefinite antecedent must be of the nature of an adjective.¹

οὐκ ἔσθ', ὅς κέ σ' ἔλθοι μετ' αὐτόν, οὐδὲ παρέλθοι. — Ψ 345.

There is none that *shall* overtake thee from behind, or pass by."

ἔσται ἡμῶν, ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρή. — Ζ 448 (= Δ 164).

day will come when sacred Troy *shall* (= *will*) fall." Similarly without ἂν, in Φ 103.

αἶμαί μιν, ὅτ' ἂν αὖτε φίλῃ γλαυκῶπιδα εἴπῃ. — Θ 373.

only a day will come when he *shall* (= *will*) again call me blue-eyed darling."

This idiom still appears in New Testament Greek (but see page 3, on the next page).

ἔσται δὲ ἡμέραι ὅταν ἀπαρθῇ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τότε ἔσται ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. — Mark 2, 20.

This construction shows the same movement toward the future which has been noted above, and the tendency is already present in Homer.

αὖτε μάλιστα με φίλοι, Ἀθήνη,
ἴλιν ἐπὶ νῆας ἐυκλείας ἀφικέσθαι,
μέγα ἔργον, ὃ κε Τρώεσσι μελήσει. — Κ 280.

will be done a great work, which *will* be a sorrow to them.
Cf. also the following examples: —

The word "characterizing" must be understood merely as a single word adopted in a full statement would require many. The only word which would give the complete ground would be the word "qualitative," employed in the same sense. This is, to my mind, the one that should be used; but I have used "characterizing" on account of its over-technical air. Possibly the word "descriptive" might be more applicable with exactness.

νῦν δ' ἀξιωθεὶς εἶσι κακούσας γ' ἐμοῦ
τοιαῦθ' ἂν τὸν τοῦδ' οὐ ποτ' εὐφρανεῖ βίον. — Soph. O. C. 1352.

ὣς οἱ τεύχεα καλὰ παρέσσεται, οἷά τις αὐτε
ἀνθρώπων πολέων θαυμάσσεται, ὅς κεν ἴδῃται. — Σ 466.

νύξ δ' ἔσται, ὅτε δὴ στυγερὸς γάμος ἀντιβολήσῃ
οὐλομένης ἐμέθεν, τῆς τε Ζεὺς ὄλβον ἀπηύρα. — σ 272.

μὴ γὰρ ὃ γ' ἔλθοι ἀνὴρ, ὅς τις σ' ἀέκοντα βίηφιν
κτήματ' ἀπορραΐσει, Ἰθάκης ἔτι ναιετοώσης. — α 403.

οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων οὐτ' ἔσσεται οὔτε πέφυκεν
ὅστις πᾶσιν ἀδὼν δύσεται εἰς Ἀΐδεω. — Theog. 801.

οὐ γὰρ τις ἔστιν ὃς πάροιθ' αἰρήσεται. — Eur. Heracl. 57.

ἔσται γὰρ καιρὸς ὅτε τῆς ὑγαινούσης διδασκαλίας οὐκ ἀνέξονται.
— II. Tim. 4, 3.

The construction is especially interesting to a Latinist, as affording a probable key to a group of difficult examples.

Veniet lustris labentibus aetas,
cum domus Assaraci Phthiam clarasque Mycenae
servitio premet ac victis dominabitur Argis.
nascetur pulchra Troianus origine Caesar,
imperium Oceano, famam qui terminet astris,
Iulius, a magno demissum nomen Iulo. — Verg. Aen. 1, 283.

"There *shall* (= *will*) be born a Trojan of noble origin, Caesar, who *shall* (= *will*) make the ocean the boundary of his power, the stars the boundary of his fame, — called Julius, a name descended from great Iulus."

The example is often explained as one of purpose (so by Allen and Greenough, Frieze, Sidgwick, — the last of whom says "subjunctive expressing purpose, viz. the purpose of destiny"). But it is forcing the meaning to say that Caesar shall be born "for the purpose of" . . . ; and the moment one recedes from this strict interpretation of the clause, one is driven toward the idea of simple prophecy. Further, the construction is evidently closely parallel to that of the clause *cum premet* above, which is clearly anticipatory (the future indicative is the nearest neighbor and the successor of the anticipatory subjunctive), and to the independent

prophetic indicatives *accipies, vocabitur, mitescent, dabunt, claudentur, fremet*, which immediately follow.

Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae vehat Argo
delectos heroas. — Verg. Ecl. 4, 34.

“There shall be a second Argo, that *shall* bear a chosen band of heroes.” (The example might be taken as expressing purpose, but, in view of the previous one, and of the fact that the whole of this passage also is loaded with prophetic future indicatives, it seems better to regard it as anticipatory.)

His te cogitationibus recrea et interim epistulis nostris vacando.
veniet aliquod tempus, quod nos iterum iungat et misceat. — Sen. Ep. 10, 2, 28.

“A time will come that *shall* (= *will*) again unite us and make us one.”

Veniet iterum, qui nos in lucem reponat dies. — Sen. Ep. 4, 7, 10.

“There will come again (after death) a day that *shall* bring us once more into the light of life.”

Huius unius rei usum qui exigat dies veniet. — Sen. Ep. 8, 1, 18.

“A day will come that *shall* demand the exercise of this one thing.”

Venient annis saecula seris
quibus Oceanus vincula rerum
laxet et ingens pateat tellus
Tethysque novos detegat orbes
nec sit terris ultima Thule. — Sen. Med. 378.

“A time will come in years remote when Ocean *shall* relax the bonds that bind the world, and the great globe lie open, and Tethys *shall* disclose new realms, and Thule be no more the last of earth.”

Compare the following, from Matthew Arnold’s “Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse”:—

Years hence, perhaps, may dawn an age
* * * * *
Which without hardness will be sage,
And gay without frivolity.

I am strongly inclined to put in the same category examples like the following, which ordinarily are reckoned as "consecutive," *i.e.*, derived from the subjunctive of ideal certainty (see my *Cum-Constructions*, p. 88 of the English edition, 98 of the German).

Veniet de plebe togata
qui iuris nodos et legum aenigmata solvat. — Iuv. 8, 49.

Siquid vacui sub umbra
lusimus tecum, quod et hunc in annum
vivat et pluris . . . — Hor. Carm. I. 32, 1.

However that may be, the construction of our category, put as from a past point of view, may certainly be seen in the first example following: —

Progeniem sed enim Troiano a sanguine duci
audierat, Tyrias olim quae verteret arces. — Verg. Aen. I, 19.

"But she feared for Carthage, for she had heard that a race was springing from the Trojan blood that *should* (= *would*) some day lay low the Tyrian citadels." Cf. Aen. 4, 229.

I find the same meaning, rather than that of purpose, in the next example: —

Sic alid ex alio peperit discordia tristis,
horribile humanis quod gentibus esset in armis,
inque dies belli terroribus addidit augmen. — Lucr. 5, 1305.

The force here is that of "historic prevision," — which *was to* affright" (see p. 87).

Finally, it seems to me that a somewhat difficult example from Terence may be explained more satisfactorily under this general head, than under the head of ironical purpose: —

Si quid velis,
huic mandes, qui te ad scopulum e tranquillo auferat. — Phorm. 688.

"If you want anything, put yourself in the hands of this man, who *will* bring you on a rock out of a smooth sea."

The clause in question is in logic independent (= "and he will"), but is in form dependent, and so might take this subjunctive in Terence's time, though the usage had disappeared from the

independent sentence. The relation of the two clauses will then be somewhat as in the following, in which the second is likewise in strictness of thought independent:—

τόδε φάρμακον ἐσθλὸν ἔχων ἐς δώματα Κίρκης
ἔρχευ, ὃ κέν τοι κρατὸς ἀλάλκησιν κακὸν ἡμαρ. — κ 287.

“As thou goest to Circe’s house, take in thy hand this herb: it *will* keep from thy head the evil day.”

2. In the examples that have preceded, the act of the subordinate verb is not in any way dependent upon the agency of the speaker or actor in the main sentence.

But it is of course perfectly possible that the speaker or actor should himself, through the choice of a suitable person, thing, etc. (the antecedent), set in motion agencies the working of which he foresees and reckons upon, and so carry out a plan, — fulfil a purpose, — accomplish an aim. Such a combination of ideas appears in the following example, which is taken from a private letter:—

“Will you please send me publications of the University, — calendars, bulletins, etc., — *which will give* information about the organization of the work?”

In sentences of this kind, character, aim, and anticipated effect flow together, and the construction may therefore be called the

Clause of Character and Plan (or Clause of Character chosen for its Foreseen Working).

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ Πριάμῳ μεγαλήτορι Ἴριν ἐφήσω
λύσασθαι φίλον υἱὸν ἰόντ’ ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν,
δῶρα δ’ Ἀχιλλῇ φερέμεν, τά κε θυμὸν ἰήνῃ. — Ω 117.

“But I will send Iris to set free his son for great-hearted Priam, going to the ships of the Achaeans, and to bear to Achilles gifts that *shall* (= *will*) cheer his soul.” (The clause expresses both the character of the gifts and the aim of the sender.) Cf. Hes. Op. 57: δώσω κακὸν ᾧ κεν ἅπαντες | τέρπωνται.

καί μοι τεὸν οὖνομα εἰπέ
αὐτίκα νῦν, ἵνα τοι δῶ ξείνιον, ᾧ κε σὺ χαίρης. — ι 355.

“And tell me now your name, that I may give you a gift, in which you *shall* (= *will*) be glad.”

σοὶ δέ, γέρον, θωὴν ἐπιθήσομεν, ἣν κ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ
τίνων ἀσχύλλῃς · χαλεπὸν δέ τοι ἔσσεται ἄλγος. — β 192.

“And on you, old man, we shall put a fine, which it *shall* (= *will*) grieve you to the soul to pay; and hard will be your distress.”

ἄμφι δὲ λαῖφος
ἔσσω, ὃ κε στυγέησιν ἰδὼν ἄνθρωπος ἔχοντα. — ν 399.

“And I will put a cloak about you, which a man *shall* (= *will*) shudder at seeing you wear.” (The construction is parallel with a clause of plan with ὥς ἄν, immediately attached to it.)

3. The clause of anticipation may also be employed to express mere aim (without suggestion of character). The actor chooses means through which, as he foresees, the ends he desires will follow. Such a construction may bear the simpler name of the

Clause of Plan¹ (Purpose).

The introductory words in Greek are ὅς, ὥς, ἵνα, ὅφρα. These are all originally demonstratives, and, like German “der” and English “that,” have come to their relative power through being used in sentences in which they take up again a person, act, etc., mentioned in the sentence immediately preceding. The antecedent of ὅς is a person, the antecedent of ὥς, ἵνα, ὅφρα an act, with or without modifiers.

As to derivation, it is uncertain whether ὥς is to be associated with *fo-*, Greek ὅς, Skt. *yas*, or with *spo-* (the FOTI of a Locrian inscription, upon which the question turns, is contradicted by HOTI, HOTO, HOTOΞ of another inscription of the same dialect. Wackernagel, Rh. M. XLVIII., p. 301, suggests the emendation ἡ ὅτι; J. Schmidt, K.Z. XXXIII., p. 455, argues against this, and in favor of FOTI). Nor is it certain whether the form is an instrumental or an ablative. In any case, however, ὥς means “in

¹ In not a few examples, especially, perhaps, of the volitive type, the common title “clause of purpose” is too narrow. The main act does not exist merely in order to bring about the subordinate one (as must be the case where the idea is strictly that of purpose), but exists independently and for its own sake. The better word, therefore, would be the word “plan,” which covers both cases, and which has also the advantage that it can be used of the original independent aim.

consequence of this" or "through this," and so "thereby," — and then, with relative power, "whereby."

"Ὅπως, to which we shall need to allude (though it does not occur with *ἄν* or *κε* in this construction), is involved in the same doubt with *ὥς*, but is in any case a relative plus an indefinite; viz. *ὡδ-* plus an indefinite *πως*, or, on the theory based upon the inscriptional FOTI above, *σφοδ-* plus *πως*. Either derivative would give, for the earliest meaning, "thereby (whereby) in some way or other."

"*Ἰνα* is an instrumental (originally sociative) form of the demonstrative relative, meaning "by this means," and then "by which means." The demonstrative force still appears, though not the original case force, in K 127.

"Ὅφρα is more difficult. It is probably an accusative relative from **δ-φρα* (Brugmann, Gr. Gramm., § 201). The *-φρα* is connected (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wörterb.) with I.-E. root *bher*, not infrequently found in adverbs of time: cf. *ἄφαρ*, Lith. *dabār*, "now," Skt. *tatah prābhṛti*, "from this time on." Its original force probably appears in the many passages where it is found in company with an antecedent *τόφρα*, and is therefore "so long as," "while."

Examples follow, arranged in the order of the connectives now discussed:—

ἀλλά μοι εἴθ' ὑπόθευ καὶ ἄμ' ἡγεμόν' ἐσθλὸν ὄπασσον,
ὅς κέ με κείσ' ἀγάγη. — ο 310.

"But counsel me wisely, and send a good guide with me, who (originally *he*) *will* lead me thither."

ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι δότε νῆα θοὴν καὶ εἴκοσ' ἑταίρους,
οἳ κέ μοι ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διαπρήσσωσι κέλευθον. — β 212.

"Come, then, give me a swift ship and twenty comrades, who *will* help me make a journey up and down the sea."¹

The indicative construction, toward which the clause of plan with the relative pronoun tends, and which completely triumphs in Attic prose, is already to be seen in Homer:—

¹ The subjunctive without *ἄν* or *κε* appears only in Γ 287 and its duplicate Γ 460. The discussion of these passages belongs to the chapter upon the volitive.

μηδέ τί οἱ θάνατος μελέτω φρεσὶ μηδέ τι τάρβος ·
τοῖον γάρ οἱ πομπὸν ὀπάσσομεν ἀργεῖφόντην,
ὅς ἄξει, εἴως κεν ἄγων Ἀχιλῆι πελάσση. — Ω 152.

"Let not death be in his thoughts, nor fear; such a guide will we give him in the slayer of Argos, who *will* lead him till in his leading he bring him to the tent of Achilles."

πείθεο δ', ὥς τοι ἐγὼ μύθου τέλος ἐν φρεσὶ θείω,
ὥς ἂν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κῦδος ἄρῃαι. — Π 83.

"Obey . . . ; whereby (originally *thereby*) thou *shalt* win great honor and glory in my sight" (= "in order that thou mayest win").

Μυρμιδόνες, ἔταροι Πηληιάδῳ Ἀχιλλῆος,
ἀνέρες ἔστε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς,
ὥς ἂν Πηλεΐδην τιμήσομεν. — Π 269.

"Myrmidons, comrades of Achilles, Peleus' son, be men, my friends, and bethink you of impetuous valor; thereby *shall* we (= that we *may*) do honor to the son of Peleus."

ἀλλ' ἐρέω μὲν ἐγὼν, ἵνα εἰδότες ἢ κε θάνωμεν
ἢ κεν ἀλευόμενοι θάνατον καὶ κῆρα φύγοιμεν. — μ 156.

"But I will tell you; thereby knowing we *shall* either die, or we may perhaps escape, avoiding death and destruction" (= "in order that," etc.). (The only case of this construction with *ἵνα*.)

I shall presently give reasons for believing that the oldest type of all the subjunctive final constructions, whether with *ὅς*, *ὥς*, *ὅπως*, *ὅφρα*, or *ἵνα*, is the true volitive. The way in which, according to the conception which commends itself to my mind, the volitive introduced by *ὅφρα* originally served to express plan may be seen in the following:—

ἀμφίπολοι, στήθ' οὕτω ἀπόπροθεν, ὅφρ' ἐγὼ αὐτὸς
ἄλμην ὥμῳ ἀπολούσομαι. — ζ 218.

"Women, stand here aside: the while I *will* myself wash the brine from my shoulders" (= "that during that time I may wash," "that I may have time to wash," "that I may wash").

The corresponding early point in the development of the anticipatory construction is to be seen in an example of similar form with *ἄν*.

άνερες ἔστε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς,
 ὅφρ' ἂν ἐγὼν Ἀχιλλῆος ἀμύμονος ἔντεα δύω
 καλὰ. — P 185.

"Be men, my friends, and bethink you of impetuous valor, the while I *shall* put on the goodly arms of noble Achilles" (= "that I may the while," "that I may have time to," "that I may").

Before Homer's time, however, the original temporal force of ὅφρα has given way in this construction. The following illustrates the ordinary type:—

τὸν ξεῖνον δύστηνον ἄγ' ἐς πόλιν, ὅφρ' ἂν ἐκεῖθι
 δαῖτα πτωχεύῃ. — ρ 10.

"Lead the poor stranger to the city, that there he may earn his portion by begging."¹

It is not surprising to find that the construction with ὥς, the connective nearest in form to ὅς, approaches the construction with ὅς, in outward form, in that it shows an ἄν or κε with greater relative frequency than either ὅφρα or ἵνα. The one particle or the other appears in 29 cases with ὥς out of a total of 41.

"Ὅπως does not occur in Homer with ἄν or κε in this construction, though it occurs once without ἄν or κε, and 7 times with the optative representing a subjunctive after a past tense. "Ὅπως ἄν with the subjunctive makes its appearance first in Aeschylus, and becomes afterward a common Attic mechanism. In the Attic inscriptions of the fifth, fourth, and third centuries, there are 75 cases of ὅπως ἄν to 3 of the bare ὅπως. After this, the proportion

¹ The general opinion, held, *e.g.*, by Goodwin and Weber, is that the clause of purpose with ὅφρα was in its beginning a mere temporal clause, meaning "until." The behavior of the ἕως-clause certainly proves that such a shift of meaning is possible; but I find the conception which I have given above to be indicated, if the original meaning of ὅφρα is as I have taken it, and if the construction, which certainly is a very old one (see the statistics on p. 30), began at a time when this original meaning still remained. Further, if the construction began in a true temporal clause, it ought to be parallel in feeling to the one seen in μίμνετε πάντες . . . αὐτοῦ, εἰς ὃ κεν ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἔλωμεν, B 331. In that case, the clause would in the great mass of instances show ἄν or κε; whereas, in fact, the ὅφρα-clause of purpose takes ἄν or κε in only 12 out of 183 instances. If it be answered that these particles disappeared because a clear feeling of purpose sprang up, that very statement is equivalent to a waiving of all objection to the volitive as the original starting-point of the construction.

is about three to one the other way, though the total number of examples is small. (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschriften, p. 212.)

*Οφρα takes ἄν or κε in 12 out of 183 Homeric examples, and ἴνα in 1 out of 194.

All such examples are treated by Delbrück (Synt. Forsch. I. pp. 35, 85, and 130), and in agreement with him, by Monro (Homeric Grammar, p. 257), and Weber (Entwicklungsgeschichte d. Absichtssätze, p. 63, and *passim*), as expressions of the will.

In a paper upon "The Origin and Later History of the Clause of Purpose in Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit" (Proceedings of the American Philological Association for 1892), I have advocated the conception of two types of the clause of purpose, the first being volitive, the second anticipatory, as said above. My reasoning was as follows : —

Delbrück regards the future force of the subjunctive as having been developed out of an earlier force in which it expressed the will of the speaker, the change being brought about through a fading away of the sharpness of the feeling of will. The presence of ἄν or κε marks a given example as expressing expectation, not will. This canon Delbrück applies rigorously in the independent sentence; but when he comes to the relative clause of purpose, expressed regularly by ἄν or κε with the subjunctive, he treats it as a construction of the will, and accounts for the apparent anomaly on the ground that in the dependent clause the force of the will is weakened. But this is precisely the reason which Delbrück has given before, in the treatment of the independent sentence, for the passage of the subjunctive of will into the subjunctive of futurity. His own doctrine, then, if fully carried out, should lead him to regard the mode in the Homeric relative clause of purpose as the subjunctive of futurity.¹

¹ As has been seen and will be seen again later (pp. 14 and 32), I grant a secondary development of the anticipatory subjunctive and the future indicative, by which they virtually come to express will, through a use in which they state what is going to happen without regard to the mental attitude of any one but the speaker. There is no reason, however, for resorting to this secondary power in the present case, and abandoning for the moment the stricter and entirely sufficient force of the anticipatory subjunctive, to which one is immediately forced to return to explain the great mass of subjunctive constructions with ἄν or κε. In other words, the secondary power is not to be resorted to except under absolute necessity.

Delbrück's conception, then, is not consistent with itself, and, in addition, it leaves an unbridged gulf between the commoner Homeric construction and the Attic; whereas the conception which I have advocated places the Attic construction close to the Homeric and in the natural line of succession to it, in the regular drift of the anticipatory constructions into the future indicative form.

The subsequent fate of these various constructions of plan is instructive.

The construction which in Homer is already overwhelmingly of the anticipatory type, namely, the $\delta\varsigma$ -clause, takes in Attic the future indicative. The clause with $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, which in a majority of instances in Homer takes the anticipatory form, maintains itself in this form in the Attic poets, and also appears in prose in Xenophon, and (in one passage, VI. 91, 4) in Thucydides, but occurs with the future indicative only once (Eur. Bacch. 784). The clause with $\delta\phi\rho\alpha$, which in a relatively small number of cases takes the anticipatory form (and even, in three cases, Θ 110, δ 163, and ρ 6, the future indicative), loses the accompanying particle in Attic, and shows no future indicative; and $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$, which appears in Homer but once with the particle (μ 156), likewise never appears with it in Attic, and likewise shows no future indicative.

It would seem, then, that a tendency toward the use of the future idea, showing itself first by the use of the anticipatory subjunctive, established itself in overwhelming force in the $\delta\varsigma$ -clauses, and was even strong enough to carry them over, for good and all, into the future indicative; that this tendency influenced the $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ -clauses to the extent of carrying them into the anticipatory form, and was powerful enough to hold them there in Attic, though not to carry them over, in any considerable numbers, into the indicative form; that the younger clauses with $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ (only just beginning to be used in Homer's time) shared the fate of their obvious relatives, the $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ -clauses, in being carried into the anticipatory form, and even, under the influence of the $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ -clauses after verbs of striving (originally, as I think, interrogative; see pp. 35-57, below) took on the future indicative, which shows itself already with these clauses in Homer; that the tendency, though strong enough in Homer's time to affect the $\delta\phi\rho\alpha$ -clause slightly,

and even, in one instance, the *iva*-clause, was not sufficiently powerful to carry them further, or even to hold them at this point, but died out, and allowed them to go back to what was presumably the earlier form.

Two interesting questions concerning these clauses of plan are yet to be answered. The first has been already suggested by the closing sentence of the last paragraph; viz. what was the form of the final clause, as inherited by Greek from the parent speech?¹

The great majority of the final clauses with conjunctions in Homer are introduced by *ὅφρα* and *iva*, viz. 277 cases out of 318. This makes it appear probable that the clause with *ὥς* (as certainly the clause with *ὅπως*) was of later origin. Further, in this presumably earlier type, 264 cases out of the 277 are without *ἄν* or *κε*; and of the 13 cases with *ἄν* or *κε*, 10 are in the younger book, the *Odyssey*. The original mode of the clause of purpose with conjunctions in Greek would seem, then, to have been the volitive subjunctive, not the anticipatory.

What was the case with the clause of purpose introduced by the relative pronoun? It is unlikely that clauses of purpose with the relative pronoun and clauses of purpose with the relative conjunction took from the beginning different constructions. It is more probable that they began at the same point, and that the one afterwards experienced a development which the other shared but slightly. Did they begin together as volitive constructions, or did they begin together as anticipatory constructions? If our inference for the clauses with conjunctions is sound, then we see that the relative clauses also must have begun with the volitive. Further than this, looking at the general drift of things in Greek once more, one sees clearly enough that it is a current moving from the anticipatory constructions toward the future indicative constructions. The only place in which one can put the volitive construction in an historical scheme is therefore back of the anticipatory construction. We come again, then, to the probability that the volitive was the original construction in Greek for clauses with relative pronouns and conjunctions. And this conclusion accords perfectly with the certain fact that the clause introduced by *μή* was originally volitive, and always remained so.

¹ The reasoning here given is from the paper referred to just above.

The other question is a more difficult one, but of consequence in the discussion of a construction to be treated elsewhere (the construction with $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ and $\theta\pi\omega\varsigma$ after such verbs as $\phi\rho\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$); viz. did the final clause with the future indicative keep the true anticipatory feeling, or did it take on the feeling of the volitive clauses with $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ and $\theta\phi\rho\alpha$?

At first sight, it would seem as if the use of the negative $\mu\acute{\eta}$ would decide the question in favor of the second alternative. But I doubt the soundness of such an inference. The use of $\mu\acute{\eta}$, to my mind, points only to the conclusion that the original final clause was volitive. In the $\theta\varsigma$ -clauses there is, in the nature of things, no room for a negative of any kind. We send a man (to adopt a common example) *to do* something, not *not to do* something. The $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ -, $\theta\phi\rho\alpha$ -, and $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ -clauses of the anticipatory type are relatively so few that they would be likely simply to accept the established negative, not to force a new one into the construction.¹ In general, too, Greek tends toward uniformity in the use of particles in constructions apparently related.² The established $\mu\acute{\eta}$, then, would be likely to remain, and I see, in consequence, no evidence for supposing that the distinction between subjunctive and indicative would be obliterated. It seems more probable that the indicative continues to express the feeling of expectation with which the construction began ("expecting that . . . will," "counting upon so-and-so"), while the subjunctive expresses will ("determining, intending, that . . . shall"). The force of the indicative, then, will be as in the following, from the *Chicago Herald* of June 14, 1894:—

Members of the Apollo Club hope to make an arrangement with Leader Tomlins, whereby he will remain as director.

¹ In the clauses after verbs of planning and striving the feeling of the deliberative idea is so strong as to crop up at times, and show itself in the use of an undoubted interrogative form, even after so uninterrogative a verb as $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\omega$; and the Greek deliberative question, unlike the Latin, has kept the negative of the declarative sentence. The idiom after verbs of striving seems, then, to afford no evidence in favor of a volitive feeling in the future indicative.

² So in the case of the generalizing assumption (the general condition), which often appears in Homer without $\delta\iota$ or $\kappa\epsilon$, but in Attic prose never. The original construction must have been a true volitive, with the same feeling as in the English "let A happen: B always happens"; but, since the great mass of dependent clauses with the subjunctive take $\delta\iota$ for inherent reasons, this also came to take it as a matter of form.

Yet I hold this opinion subject to correction, distinctly recognizing, as I do, that the anticipatory subjunctive and the future indicative gain in certain constructions a virtually volitive power.

So much for the Greek. As for the Latin, it is possible to say in this chapter only that no sign exists, such as we have seen in Greek in the drift of the final clauses into the future indicative form, that a departure had ever been made from the true volitive construction. At any rate, it is sure that the anticipatory final clause, if it did make its appearance in Latin, at least played no important part in the development of the type ultimately reached.¹

4. In Latin, the anticipatory subjunctive introduced by *ut* may stand, after certain verbs, as a

Substantive Clause.

Nisi exspectare vis,

ut eam sine dote frater nuptum conlocet. — Plaut. Trin. 734.

“Unless you wish to wait for her brother to give her in marriage without a dowry.”

Rusticus exspectas ut non sit adultera Larga
filia. — Iuv. 14, 25.

“You stupidly look to see Larga’s daughter not turn out an adulteress.” (For the force of the mode, compare *rusticus exspectat dum defluat amnis*, Hor. Ep. 1, 2, 42.)

Similarly Cic. Cat. 2, 12, 27; Rosc. Am. 29, 82; Caes. B. C. 1, 6, 6; Liv. 23, 31, 7; 26, 18, 5; 35, 8, 5; Quintil. 7, 10, 14; Sen. Ep. 13, 1, 11.

Hoc quoque te manet, ut pueros elementa docentem
occupet extremis in vicis balba senectus. — Hor. Ep. 1, 20, 17.

“This, too, awaits you: lisping old age *will* find you teaching boys their A B C’s on the outskirts of the town.”

¹ In Sanskrit, which does in a few cases show the future indicative in final clauses, the anticipatory feeling may have played a part of some consequence; but there is no outward mark of its presence, such as Greek affords us by the use of the two extremely helpful little particles.

For the part which the potential may have played in the Latin clause of plan, I can only say without argument, in advance of the chapter dealing with that mode, that the potential feeling likewise seems to have been, at the least, an unimportant factor.

The use of *ut* as a conjunction of course did not arise in this construction, which is evidently a secondary one, but in the construction of plan.

5. The anticipatory subjunctive may be attached to another sentence as a

Dependent Question of Fact.

The connectives are the interrogatives and *ei* and *si* (see p. 60 below, for the transition of these particles from the conditional force to the interrogative).

εἶδομεν, ὅποτέρῳ κεν Ὀλύμπιος εὖχος ὀρέξῃ. — X 130.

"Let us know upon which of us two the Olympian *shall* bestow glory."

τίς δ' οἶδ', εἴ κέ ποτέ σφι βίας ἀποτίσεται ἐλθών; — γ 216.

"Who knows if he *shall* yet some day return and recompense their outrages?"

*τίς δ' οἶδ', εἴ κε καὶ αὐτὸς ἰὼν κοίλῃς ἐπὶ νηὸς
τῇλε φίλων ἀπόληται ἀλώμενος ὥς περ Ὀδυσσεύς;* — β 332.

In the following, as in many examples, the idea of possibility has attached itself to the mode, from its use in cases where the thing inquired about is the thing desired.

*τίς δ' οἶδ', εἴ κέν οἱ σὺν δαίμονι θυμὸν ὀρίνω
παρειπών;* — O 403.

"Who knows whether, with Heaven's help, I *shall* (= *can*) arouse him with my words?"

*νῦν αὖτε σκοπὸν ἄλλον, ὃν οὐ πῶ τις βάλεν ἀνὴρ,
εἴσομαι αἶ κε τύχωμι, πόρῃ δέ μοι εὖχος Ἀπόλλων.* — χ 6.

"And now as to another mark, which no man ever yet struck, I shall know whether I *shall* (= *can*) hit it, and Apollo grant me glory."

For the potential force compare the actual potential mode in Λ 792:

τίς δ' οἶδ', εἴ κέν οἱ σὺν δαίμονι θυμὸν ὀρίναις
παρειπών ;

"Who knows whether, with Heaven's help, you *may* rouse him with your words?"

The anticipatory subjunctive is already giving way before the future indicative in Homer, as in ο 523 : Ζεὺς οἶδεν . . . εἴ κε . . . τελευτήσῃ, A 83 and α 401, κ 192, and frequently elsewhere.

In Latin, the construction seems to betray itself in questions in which the verb, instead of being in the periphrastic form, as the regular idiom would require,¹ is in the present or imperfect.

Exspectant veluti, consul cum mittere signum
volt, omnes avidi spectant ad carceris oras,
quam mox emittat pictis e faucibu' currus. — Enn. Ann. 82.

"They wait, just as, when the consul is at the point of giving the signal, all gaze eagerly at the front of the enclosing gates, watching to see how soon they *shall* set free the chariots from the painted passages."

Exspecto quam mox recipiat sese Geta. — Ter. Phorm. 606.

Quam timeo, quorsum evadas. — Ter. And. 127.

Quid exspectas quam mox ego Luscium et Manilium dicam ordine esse senatores? — Cic. Rosc. Com. 15, 44.²

Quid hostes consilii caperent, exspectabat. — Caes. B. G. 3, 24, 1.
"He waited to see what plan the enemy would form."

6. (a) The anticipatory subjunctive may be attached to another sentence as a

Dependent Question of Deliberation.

The construction, as we find it in the examples which are first to be given, is derived from the secondary stage of meaning of

¹ *E.g.* exspecto, quo pacto meae techinae processurae sient, Plaut. Poen. 817; itaque exspectante Antonio quidnam esset actura detractum alterum mersit et liquefactum obsorbuit, Plin. N. H. 9, 35, 58, 121; nisi sane curaest, quorsum eventurum hoc siet. — Ter. Hec. 193.

² The construction after the phrase *quam mox* may, of course, be merely the subjunctive of the O. O. replacing the present indicative, in a future sense. — Cf. Plaut. Truc. 208.

the declarative anticipatory subjunctive, in which it has come to express a Virtual Resolve, seen in such sentences as ἐγὼ δέ κ' ἄγω Βρισηίδα, A 184 (given under A 4, p. 14). The direct form of the question, which has disappeared before Homer's time, would bear the same relation to the declarative form that the deliberative future indicative in Greek and Latin (as in *negabon*? Ter. And. 612) bears to the declarative future (as in *negabo*).

αὐτὸς σὺ μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆσι νόησον
Αἰνεΐαν, ἥ κέν μιν ἐρύσσαι ἢ κεν εἰσῆς. — T 310.

"But do thou thyself with thine own mind take counsel, whether thou *shalt* save Aeneas or *shalt* abandon him."

ἄμα δ' ἡοὶ φαινομένηφιν
φρασσόμεθ', ἥ κε νεώμεθ' ἐφ' ἡμέτερ' ἢ κε μένωμεν. — I 618.

"And at break of day will we take counsel, whether we *shall* depart unto our own, or shall abide."

ἐνθεν δ' ἂν μάλα πᾶσαν ἐπιφρασσαιμέθα βουλήν,
ἥ κεν ἐνὶ νῆεσσι πολυκλήισι πέσωμεν,
αἳ κ' ἐθέλῃσι θεὸς δόμεναι κράτος, ἢ κεν ἔπειτα
παρ νηῶν ἔλθωμεν ἀπήμονες. — N 741.

"Then we may take all counsel carefully, whether we *shall* fall upon the benched ships, if Heaven wills to give us victory, or *shall* return unharmed from the ships."

The independent construction of the anticipatory deliberative has already in Homer's time been superseded by the construction with the future indicative.

(b) I am inclined, in view of the evidence as a whole, to place under the same head of the deliberative subjunctive the genesis of the subjunctive clauses with ὥς ἂν and ὅπως ἂν, after such verbs as φράζομαι, σκοπέω, and πράσσω.

The general tendency of grammarians¹ seems to have been toward this view, and the commonness of the formula "how," "wie," etc., in translations of the idiom, shows the same leaning in those who have approached the question from the side of inter-

¹ So Goodwin (M. and T. § 342) and Kühner (Griech. Gramm., § 552, 1, Anm. 3). Krüger (Griech. Sprachl., § 84, 8, 6) puts the construction under the final relative clause.

pretation only. On the other hand, Delbrück (Synt. Forsch. I., p. 61) objects that, while *ὅπως* is an interrogative as well as a relative, *ὥς* is only a relative, and accordingly finds the origin of both the *ὥς*-clause and the *ὅπως*-clause in the relative clause expressing will. Weber, whose paper ("Entwicklungsgeschichte der Absichtssätze," in Schanz's Beiträge) is the fullest treatment that has appeared upon the general subject of the group to which our construction, if it originates in a relative clause, is to be assigned, follows Delbrück, though dealing with the subject in greater detail. His view is that the construction is an incomplete ("unvollständig") final clause, *i.e.*, a relative clause which expresses a purpose, but lacks an antecedent stating the exact means chosen to accomplish this purpose. The connectives employed, viz. *ὥς* and *ὅπως*, are, in his opinion, suited to this indefiniteness of the antecedent, as *ὥνα* and *ὅφρα* would not be.

The antecedent objection to a theory of deliberative origin, on the ground that *ὥς* cannot be interrogative, seems now to be removable.

It is well known that the relative *ὅς* practically gains interrogative power, through being used in cases where the antecedent, though possible to insert, is not necessary; as in *γνώσῃ ἔπειθ' ὅς θ' ἡγεμόνων κακὸς ὅς τέ νυ λαῶν*, | *ἡδ' ὅς κ' ἐσθλὸς ἔησι* (B 365; cf. N 278, Φ 609, Ψ 498, γ 185). In this way an interrogative power is developed which makes it possible to use *ὅς* in co-ordination with *ὅστις*, as in *γνοίῃ θ', οἳ τινὲς εἰσιν ἐναίσιμοι οἳ τ' ἀθέμιστοι* (ρ 363; cf. O 664). The full interrogative power is likewise found in other writers; *e.g.*, Sophocles (*ἐξοιδ' ἀκούων τῶνδ' ὅς ἐσθ' ὁ προστάτης*, O. C. 1171; cf. Ai. 1259), Herod. 6, 124; 9, 71; Plat. Euthyd. 283 D. Other relative words like *ὅσος*, *οἶος*, *ἡχι*, and *ὥνα* (in the sense of place) are also used interrogatively (*e.g.*, *ὅσος* in π 236, A 186; *οἶος* in δ 689, Φ 108, Λ 653, Plato, Rep. 329 A, Soph. El. 334; *ἡχι* in γ 87; *ὥνα* in Soph. O. T. 687).

It would be surprising, then, if *ὥς* did not also gain such a power, even if we could account for the existence of its use in the sense of "that" ("dass") in introducing quotations, without supposing it first to have gone through the stage of "how?" ("wie?"). In point of fact twenty-six clearly interrogative cases are found by Schmitt (Schanz's Beiträge, 8, "Über d. Ursprung d. Substan-

tivsatzes mit Relativpartikeln im Griech.," p. 53) to occur in Homer after verbs of knowing and saying. No objection, then, need be made on antecedent grounds to an examination of the question whether the evidence points rather to an interrogative than to a relative origin of the clause after *φράζομαι*.

At first sight, a more serious objection (I don't know that it has been advanced by any one) would appear to lie in the fact that such a construction as an independent deliberative subjunctive with *ἄν* or *κε* is not recognized as existing. The objection has, however, no real weight. There are two other types of subjunctive sentences with *ἄν* or *κε*, viz. the question of fact and the quasi-volitive question (seen just above in 5 and 6, *a*), the interrogative character of which is unimpeachable, yet for which no corresponding direct questions are to be found.

There is, in fact, nothing surprising in the absence of examples of the independent construction. The *tendency* of the anticipatory subjunctive in all its uses, independent and dependent alike, is to pass over into the future indicative. The dependent construction, however, constantly lags behind the independent; so that in Attic times, for example, though no instances of the independent construction occur, the corresponding dependent construction is in regular use in many kinds of clauses. It is entirely in accordance with these facts, that, while the regular form of the independent deliberative in Homer, when not in the volitive subjunctive (the subjunctive without *ἄν* or *κε*), has already passed over into the future indicative, the dependent construction, when not in the volitive, still remains in the anticipatory subjunctive (with *ἄν* or *κε*).

These antecedent objections being removed, two concessions may at once be made on both sides.

At whichever of the two points the construction originated, the power attributed to it upon the theory of the other origin would surely in time be gained. This Weber recognizes, so far as his side of the matter is concerned, in saying (I. 61), "das bei engerer Verbindung das *ὥς* fast wie ein Fragewort gefühlt werden muss, liegt in der unbestimmten Natur des Hauptsatzes," and (I. 63), "bei der relativischen Natur des *ὥς* kann aber der Ausdruck der Absicht zurücktreten; das fast als 'wie' gefühlte *ὥς*

kann mehr die Art und Weise der Vollziehung der Absicht hervortreten lassen, z. B. *a* 205 *φράσσεται ὥς κε νέηται*, 'er wird sich überlegen, wie er etwa fortgehen kann,' während *φράσσεται ὥς νέηται*, er wird sich überlegen, er will fortgehen," and (footnote on same page), "ob eine Absicht vorhanden ist, kann nur aus dem Gedanken erschlossen werden. So liegt keine mehr vor in der Formel *φράζω ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα* Ξ 3 u. a." On the other hand, it is equally easy to see that a formula originally conveying the idea "I am planning how he shall get well" would come in no long time, even if the growth were not helped by the use of the same particles *ὥς* and *ὅπως* in final clauses, to be capable of suggesting the idea "I am planning that he shall get well," and so would be employed after other main verbs with which it would not naturally have been used if the force had always remained that of a pure question.

Further, whichever may have been the starting-point, both of the stages already exist in Homer. In certain examples the force is, on a fair interpretation, that of a question, while in others it is that of an object-clause in the ordinary sense of the phrase.

It still remains, however, before taking up the examples in detail, to ask the question whether each of the two theories can really yield a satisfactory starting-point for the construction.

Our discussion of this question will deal primarily with the examples that have *ἄν* or *κε*. The difficulties which the presence of these two particles raises do not exist in the case of the subjunctive examples without *ἄν* or *κε*. On the other hand, whatever conclusion is reached with regard to the former set will be held for the latter, since the latter are satisfactorily accounted for on either theory, and since the two are probably of the same origin.

We have already seen reason to dissent from Delbrück's conception of the genesis of the purpose-clause with the subjunctive and *ἄν* or *κε*. For the same reason Weber's conception of the genesis of the *ὥς ἄν* clauses with *φράζομαι* cannot be accepted; namely, the conception that the earlier stages may be shown in the formulæ "er sinnt nach, er will gesund werden," and "er sinnt nach, so will er gesund werden." The independent subjunctive with *ἄν* or *κε* cannot be regarded as a volitive. It is also worth remarking, in passing, that in the paratactic stage the

will, the wish, etc., must be the will, the wish, etc., not of a second or third person, but of the speaker.¹ The languages with which we are dealing never developed a form which, in an independent use, could express the idea "it is *his* will to do so and so." The formula for the paratactic starting-point of the construction without *äv* or *κε*, as Weber conceives it, should be "I am planning: it is *my* will that I (or you, or he, etc.) get well." When, however, such a construction had passed into the hypotactic form ("I am planning that I, you, he, shall get well"), a transference to the planning of a second or third person would of course follow, so that in the end Weber's general conception of this class might be justified.

For the examples with *äv* or *κε*, Weber's doctrine would need to be thrown into a form in which the construction should be regarded as never having had an independent or paratactic stage, but as having been built up, in the hypotactic stage, on the general model of the complete ("vollständig") purpose-clause with *äv* or *κε* and the subjunctive. And even on this theory Weber's conception "er *will*" can be justified only on condition (see the discussion on p. 31, above) that the anticipatory purpose-clause is believed finally to have given up its original feeling, and to have gone over to the force of the volitive purpose-clause, which expressed the will of the speaker. If, on the other hand, the anticipatory subjunctive did not gain this force, then no satisfactory origin in the relative clause can be found. Such sentences as "I am planning: I shall get well," "I am planning: thereby I shall get well" (which would be consistent with the force of the anticipatory subjunctive) do not represent a natural attitude of the human mind, which, in the very act of weighing things, is precluded from an expression of *certainty* ("I shall get well," "ich werde gesund werden") about the result, and driven rather to a consideration of the question *what means, being set in operation, will bring about the desired result, i.e.*, to such a thought as "I am planning: by the taking of what means shall I get well?" or, as we should more naturally express the idea in our English idiom, "I am planning: what means, being taken, will make me

¹ This very obvious fact is again and again overlooked in important investigations and commentaries.

well?" Compare the following, from a newspaper report of an interview with Zola: "*To tell the truth, I think all the means tried insufficient to stop the rising tide of anarchistic doctrines. What, I am asked, will be a preventive?*" and, again, the following from Pliny, N. H. 18, 6, 39: *quonam igitur modo utilissime colentur agri, "In what way, then, will the culture of the fields be most successful, — how may we best cultivate the fields?"* The natural emphasis, in other words, would lie upon the *way*, the *method* ("die Art und Weise") of bringing about the desired end; and this is precisely what the anticipatory subjunctive in its strict force, coupled with an interrogative of manner, would mean. Moreover, in a number of examples which we have seen above (pp. 13 and 33), the anticipatory subjunctive has shown itself capable of conveying the idea of *possibility*. In effect, then, the force of the mechanism in the paratactic stage would be "I am considering: by what means, in what way, *can* I do so and so," and, in the hypotactic stage, "I am considering how I can do so and so," — a force perfectly suited to nearly all of the actually occurring examples of our disputed idiom in Homer. Further, the association of this feeling of possibility with the construction accounts for the frequent later use of the true potential form in place of the subjunctive, as in *τί οὖν οὐ σκοποῦμεν, πῶς ἂν αὐτῶν μὴ διαμαρτάνοιμεν* (Xen. Mem. 3, 1, 10), *σκοπῶ ὅπως ἂν ὥς ῥᾶστα διάγοιεν* (Xen. Symp. 7, 2). Compare also the frequent form illustrated in Latin sentences like Liv. 22, 7, 14, *consultantes quonam duce aut quibus copiis resisti victoribus Poenis posset*, and in English sentences like "in considering how we might best satisfy a want," Paley and Stone, "Introduction to Martial."

On the other hand, as has already been shown above (p. 34), there existed a deliberative anticipatory subjunctive, corresponding to the deliberative future indicative in Greek and Latin, and closely approaching in force the deliberative volitive. Such a construction would at once yield a perfectly satisfactory starting-point for our idiom, upon the theory of an interrogative origin.

The conclusion, then, of the discussion under this head is that, while the theory of an interrogative origin is free from difficulty on the score of the inherent meaning of the mode, the theory of a relative origin may or may not be. So far, consequently, as

regards an immediate settlement, the way cannot be regarded as barred against either theory.

We pass, therefore, to the consideration of the examples. For convenience' sake, I give them in full, instead of by citations, as Weber's general plan required him to do. In a number of cases (which I have specified), I add examples not cited by him.

Optatives after secondary tenses are of course included with subjunctives after primary tenses. The text is Dindorf's. The purpose of the division into four classes will appear in the discussion.

A.

1. ὥς ἄρ' ἔφη, ποταμὸς δὲ χολώσατο κηρόθι μᾶλλον,
ὥρμηνεν δ' ἀνὰ θυμόν, ὅπως παύσειε πόνοιο
δίον Ἀχιλλῆα. — Φ 136.
2. ἀλλ' οὐχ Ἑρμείαν ἐριούνιον ὕπνος ἔμαρπτεν,
ὀρμαίνοντ' ἀνὰ θυμόν, ὅπως Πρίαμον βασιλῆα
νηὼν ἐκπέμψειε λαθὼν ἱεροὺς πυλαωρούς. — Ω 679.
3. ἀλλ' ὃ γε μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα, ὥς Ἀχιλλῆα
τιμήσῃ, ὀλέσῃ δὲ πολέας ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.
ἦδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή,
πέμψαι ἐπ' Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι οὐλον ὄνειρον. — Β 3.
4. μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη,
ὅππως ἑξαπάρφοιτο Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο.
ἦδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή,
ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἰδην ἐν ἐντύνασαν ἐ αὐτήν,
εἴ πως ἰμείραιτο παραδραθέειν φιλότῃτι
ἦ χροίῃ. — Ξ 159.
5. ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμπάζετο ἱρών,
ἀλλ' ὃ γε μερμήριζεν, ὅπως ἀπολοίατο πᾶσαι
νῆες εὐσσελμοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρίηρες ἑταῖροι. — ι 553.
6. τοῖσι δὲ Νεστορίδης Πεισίστρατος ἤρχετο μύθων·
“φράζεο δὴ, Μενέλαε διοτρεφές, ὄρχαμε λαῶν,
ἦ νῶιν τόδ' ἔφηνε θεὸς τέρας ἦε σοὶ αὐτῷ.”
ὥς φάτο, μερμήριξε δ' ἀρηίφίλος Μενέλαος,
ὅππως οἱ κατὰ μοῖραν ὑποκρίναιτο νοήσας.
τὸν δ' Ἑλένη τανύπεπλος ὑποφθαμένη φάτο μῦθον. — ο 166.

7. ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν
φραζώμεσθ', ὥς κέν μιν ἀρεσσάμενοι πεπιθώμεν
δώροισιν τ' ἀγανοῖσιν ἔπασσ' ἑτε μιλχιόισιν. — I 111.
8. αὐτόν σε φράζεσθαι ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄνωγεν,
ὅπως κεν νῆάς τε σόφς καὶ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν. — I 680.
9. κεῖθεν δ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ φράσομαι ἔργον τε ἔπος τε,
ὥς κε καὶ αὐτίς Ἀχαιοὶ ἀναπνεύσωσι πόνον. — O 234.
10. ἄλλ' ἄγετ', αὐτοὶ περ φραζώμεθα μῆτιν ἀρίστην,
ἡμὲν ὅπως τὸν νεκρὸν ἐρύσσομεν, ἡδὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
χάρμα φίλοις ἐτάροισι γενώμεθα νοστήσαντες. — P 634.
11. ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτοὶ περ φραζώμεθα μῆτιν ἀρίστην,
ἡμὲν ὅπως τὸν νεκρὸν ἐρύσσομεν, ἡδὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
Τρώων ἐξ ἐνοπῆς θάνατον καὶ κῆρα φύγωμεν. — P 712.
12. ἄλλ' ἄγεθ' ἡμεῖς οἶδε περιφραζώμεθα πάντες
νόστον, ὅπως ἔλθῃσι.¹ Ποσειδάων δὲ μεθήσει
δὴν χόλον· οὐ μὲν γάρ τι δυνήσεται ἀντὶ πάντων
ἀθανάτων ἀέκητι θεῶν ἐριδαινέμεν οἶος. — a 76.
13. φράσσεται, ὥς κε νέηται, ἐπεὶ πολυμήχανός ἐστιν. — a 205.
14. σὲ δὲ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα,
ὅπως κε μνηστῆρας ἀπώσσαι ἐκ μεγάροιο. — a 269.
15. φράζεσθαι δὴ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,
ὅπως κε μνηστῆρας ἐνὶ μεγάροισι τεοῖσιν
κτείνῃς ἢ δόλῃ ἢ ἀμφιδόν. — a 294.
16. πολέσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοισιν κακὸν ἔσται,
οἳ νεμόμεσθ' Ἰθάκην ἐνδείελον. ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρὶν
φραζώμεσθ', ὥς κεν καταπαύσομεν. — β 166.
17. οἳ δέ τοι αὐτίκ' ἰόντι κακὰ φράσσονται ὀπίσσω,
ὥς κε δόλῃ φθίγῃς, τῷδε δ' αὐτοὶ πάντα δάσσονται. — β 367.

¹ Cf. the following: —

τόν γ' εἴ πως σὺ δύναιο λοχησάμενος λελαβέσθαι,
ὅς κέν τοι εἴπῃσιν ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου
νόστον θ', ὥς ἐπὶ πόντον ἐλεύσσαι ἰχθυόεντα. — δ 388.

εἶρεσθαι δέ, θεῶν δὲ τίς σε χαλέπτει,
νόστον θ', ὥς ἐπὶ πόντον ἐλεύσσαι ἰχθυόεντα. — δ 423.

18. ἔνθ' ἢ τοι εἴως μὲν ἐγὼ καὶ δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
οὔτε ποτ' εἰν ἀγορῇ δίχ' ἐβάζομεν οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ,
ἀλλ' ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε νόφ καὶ ἐπίφρονι βουλῇ
φραζόμεθ' Ἀργεῖοισιν, ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο. — γ 126.

19. τίς νύ τοι, Ἀτρεὺς υἱέ, θεῶν συμφράσσατο βουλάς,
ὄφρα μ' ἔλοις ἀέκοντα λοχησάμενος; — δ 462.

20. ἀλλὰ χρήματα μὲν μυχῶ ἄντρον θεσπεσίοιο
θειόμεν αὐτίκα νῦν, ἵνα περ τάδε τοι σόα μίμνη·
αὐτοὶ δὲ φραζώμεθ', ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένηται. — ν 363.

21. ὥς φάτο, Νεστορίδης δ' ἄρ' ἐὼ συμφράσσατο θυμῷ,
ὅππως οἱ κατὰ μοῖραν ὑποσχόμενος τελέσειεν.
ὦδε δὲ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι. — ο 202.

(Cf. Νεστορίδη, πῶς κέν μοι ὑποσχόμενος τελέσειας | μῦθον
ἐμόν, seven lines above.)

22. ἡμεῖς δὲ φραζώμεθ', ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένηται.
— ψ 117 (= ν 365, with slight change).

23. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλευσας νόον αὐτή,
ὥς ἢ τοι κείνους Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀποτίσεται ἐλθών; — ε 23 (= ω 479)

24. νύμφη ἐνπλοκάμφει πείν νημερτέα βουλήν,
νόστον Ὀδυσσῆος ταλασίφρονος, ὥς κε νέηται
οὔτε θεῶν πομπῇ οὔτε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. — ε 30.

25. Ἑρμείαν μὲν ἔπειτα διάκτορον ἀργεῖφόντην
νῆσον ἐς Ὀλυγίην ὀτρύνομεν, ὄφρα τάχιστα
νύμφη ἐνπλοκάμφει πῆ νημερτέα βουλήν,
νόστον Ὀδυσσῆος ταλασίφρονος, ὥς κε νέηται. — α 84.¹

26. αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον, ὅπως ὅχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο,
εἴ τιν' ἐταίροισιν θανάτου λύσιν ἢ δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ
εὐροίμην· πάντας δὲ δόλους καὶ μῆτιν ὕφαινον
ὥς τε περὶ ψυχῆς· μέγα γὰρ κακὸν ἐγγύθεν ἦεν.
ἦδε δὲ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή. — ι 420.

27. αἰ δ' ἄμφ' αἶμα κελαινὸν ἀολλέες ἠγερέθοντο,
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον, ὅπως ἐρέοιμι ἐκάστην.
ἦδε δὲ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή.

¹ Not cited by Weber, though he cites the substantially identical example ε 30.

σπασσάμενος τανύηκες ἄορ παχέος παρὰ μηροῦ
οὐκ εἶων πίνειν ἅμα πάσας αἷμα κελαινόν.
αἱ δὲ προμνηστῖναι ἐπήισαν, ἥδὲ ἐκάστη
δν γόνον ἐξαγόρευεν· ἐγὼ δ' ἐρέεινον ἀπάσας. — λ 228.

28. τὸν δ' ἐς Δωδώνην φάτο βήμεναι, ὅφρα θεοῖο
ἐκ δρυὸς ὑψικόμοιο Διὸς βουλὴν ἐπακούσῃ,
ὅπως νοστήσῃ Ἰθάκης ἐς πτόνα δῆμον,
ἥδη δὴν ἀπεών, ἥ ἀμφαδὸν ἦε κρυφιδόν. — ξ 327 (= τ 297).¹
29. ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ Πηλῆος υἱέ, μέγα φέρτατ' Ἀχαιῶν,
ἦλθον Τειρεσίαο κατὰ χρέος, εἴ τινα βουλὴν
εἵποι, ὅπως Ἰθάκην ἐς παιπαλόμεσαν ἰκοίμην. — λ 478.
30. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλευσας νόον αὐτή,
ὥς ἦ τοι κείνους Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀποτίσεται ἐλθών; — ω 479.
31. τοῖσι δὲ πόλλ' ἐπέτελλε Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ,
δενδύλλων ἐς ἕκαστον, Ὀδυσσῆϊ δὲ μάλιστα,
πειρᾶν, ὡς πεπίθοιεν ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα. — ι 179.
32. σὺ δὲ θᾶσσον Ἀθηναίῃ ἐπιτεῖλαι
ἐλθεῖν ἐς Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν φύλοπιν αἰνήν,
πειρᾶν δ', ὡς κε Τρῶες ὑπερκύδαντας Ἀχαιοὺς
ἄρξωσι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια δηλήσασθαι. — Δ 64.
33. αἶψα μάλ' ἐς στρατὸν ἐλθὲ μετὰ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς,
πειρᾶν δ', ὡς κε Τρῶες ὑπερκύδαντας Ἀχαιοὺς
ἄρξωσι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια δηλήσασθαι. — Δ 70.
34. τοῦ δὴ νῦν λαοῖσι φέρεις χάριν, οὐδὲ μεθ' ἡμέων
πειρᾶ, ὡς κε Τρῶες ὑπερφίαλοι ἀπόλωνται
πρόχῃν κακῶς σὺν παισὶ καὶ αἰδοίῃς ἀλόχοισιν. — Φ 458.
35. πειρήσω, ὥς κ' ὕμμι κακὰς ἐπὶ κῆρας ἰήλῳ,
ἥ ἐ Πύλονδ' ἐλθὼν ἢ αὐτοῦ τῷδ' ἐνὶ δήμῳ. — β 316.
36. ἀλλὰ τάχιστα
πεῖρα, ὅπως κεν δὴ σὴν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἴκηαι. — δ 544.
37. ἀλλ' ἄγε μῆτιν ὕφηνον, ὅπως ἀποτίσομαι αὐτούς. — ν 386.

¹ This example is not cited by Weber (p. 61), but should of course be added. Its resemblance to ε 30 is interesting. Cf. also λ 478, here given.

38. *ρέξομεν ἱερὰ καλὰ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ περὶ πομπῆς
μνησόμεθ', ὥς χ' ὁ ξείνος ἀνενθε πόνου καὶ ἀνίης
πομπῇ ὑφ' ἡμετέρῃ ἦν πατρίδα γαίαν ἵκηται
χαίρων καρπαλίμως, εἰ καὶ μάλα τηλόθεν ἐστίν,
μηδέ τι μεσσηγὺς γε κακὸν καὶ πῆμα πάθῃσιν,
πρὶν γε τὸν ἧς γαίης ἐπιβήμεναι. — η 191.*

B.

39. *αὐτὸν μὲν σε πρῶτα σάω, καὶ φράζεο θυμῷ,
μή τι πάθῃς. — ρ 595.*

C.

40. *λίσσεσθαι δέ μιν αὐτός, ὅπως νημερτέα εἴπῃ·
ψεῦδος δ' οὐκ ἐρέει· μάλα γὰρ πεπνυμένος ἐστίν. — γ 19.¹*
41. *λίσσεσθαι δέ μιν αὐτός, ἵνα νημερτὲς ἐνίσπῃ·
ψεῦδος δ' οὐκ ἐρέει· μάλα γὰρ πεπνυμένος ἐστίν. — γ 327.*
42. *ὥς ἔφατ', ἐν δὲ γέλωι ὦρτ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν.
οὐδὲ Ποσειδάωνα γέλωι ἔχε, λίσσετο δ' αἰεὶ
Ἵφαιστον κλυτοεργόν, ὅπως λύσειεν Ἄρῃα. — θ 343.*

D.

43. *ὥς οἱ μὲν τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγόρευον,
αὐτὰρ Ἀπόλλων Φοῖβος ἐδύσετο Ἴλιον ἱρήν·
μέμβλετο γὰρ οἱ τείχος ἐνδμήτοιο πόληος,
μὴ Δαναοὶ πέρσειαν ὑπὲρ μόνον ἥματι κείνῳ. — Φ 514.*
44. *εἰ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐπέεσσ' ἐπιπίεσται, ἀλλ' ἀλογήσει,
φραζέσθω δὴ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,
μή μ' οὐδὲ κρατερός περ ἐὼν ἐπιόντα ταλάσῃ
μῆναι, ἐπεὶ εὖ φημι βίῃ πολὺν φέρτερος εἶναι
καὶ γενεῇ πρότερος. — Ο 162.*
45. *τῷ νῦν Τυδείδῃς, εἰ καὶ μάλα καρτερός ἐστιν,
φραζέσθω, μή τίς οἱ ἀμείνων σείο μάχῃται,
μὴ δὴν Αἰγιάλεια περίφρων Ἀδρηστίνη
ἔξ ὕπνου γοῶσα φίλους οἰκῆας ἐγείρῃ,
κουρίδιον ποθέουσα πόσιν, τὸν ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν. — Ε 410.²*

¹ Not cited by Weber.

² Not in Weber, but having as good a right in his list as any of the others of this particular type except ρ 595 (No. 39).

46. φράζεο νῦν, μή τοί τι θεῶν μῖνιμα γένωμαι. — X 358.

47. αἶ κε ζῶν πέμψης Σαρπηδόνα ὄνδε δόμονδε,
φράζεο, μή τις ἔπειτα θεῶν ἐθέλῃσι καὶ ἄλλος
πέμπειν δν φίλον υἷον ἀπὸ κρατερῆς ὑσμίνης. — II 445.

48. οἷς δ' ὁ γέρων μετέησιν, ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω
λεύσσει, ὅπως ὄχ' ἄριστα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται. — Γ 109.

49. ἔνθ' αὐτ' ἄλλ' ἐνόησε θεά, γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
ὥς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔγροιο ἴδοι τ' ἐνώπιδα κούρην,
ἧ οἱ Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν πόλιν ἡγήσαιο.
σφαῖραν ἔπειτ' ἔρριψε μετ' ἀμφίπολον βασιλεία·
ἀμφιπόλου μὲν ἅμαρτε, βαθείῃ δ' ἔμβαλε δῖνῃ·
αἰ δ' ἐπὶ μακρὸν αὔσαν· ὁ δ' ἔγρετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς. — ζ 112.

50. οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω,
ὅππως οἱ παρὰ νηυσὶ σόοι μαχεοίατ' Ἀχαιοί. — A 343.¹

The examples of the clause introduced by ὥς or ὅπως after ὁρμαίνω, μερμηρίζω, φράζομαι, βουλεύω, βουλήν εἰπεῖν, μῆτιν ὑφαίνω, and μνήσομαι are unimpeachable. The scrutiny of the individual cases, though not conclusive for either theory, is instructive.

In some the meaning is clearly interrogative, as in the case of the two examples with ὁρμαίνω, and the five with μερμηρίζω. Lang, Leaf, and Myers translate in each case by "how" ("sought how," "pondered how," "was devising how," "took thought how"). And in two of the cases with μερμηρίζω, viz. B 3 (No. 3) and Ξ 159 (No. 4), the following line ἦδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή fits no interpretation but the interrogative one. In α 269 (No. 14, with φράζομαι), the clear emphasis is upon the method, so that the construction is interrogative. The same is the case with α 294 (No. 15); and this interpretation is strengthened by the sentence ν 376, φράζευ, ὅπως μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσεις, which cannot mean "plan to lay hands upon the suitors,"

¹ Not cited by Weber, but given here as parallel to Γ 109 (just above), which he does cite.

but must mean "plan how" this may be done.¹ In γ 126 (No. 18), ν 363 (No. 20), ψ 117 (No. 22), and ι 420 (No. 26), with βούλεον), the force "plan that all shall be for the very best" is less probable than the force given by Butcher and Lang, "advise us how all may be for the very best," "but I advised me how all might be for the very best"; and this meaning is borne out by the line ἦδε δέ μοι, etc., in ι 425 (No. 26). In general, all the examples with ὥς and ὅπως after φράζομαι seem to me best taken as interrogative. In λ 228 (No. 27, with βούλεον), the meaning "planned to ask each one" would be impossible, even if the sentence ἦδε δέ μοι, etc., did not immediately follow. Similarly βουλὴν . . . ὅπως in λ 478 (No. 29) must mean "a plan *how* I should come," not "a plan *that* I should come." On the other hand, though it is possible to take the examples with πειράω in the interrogative sense (Lang, Leaf, and Meyers translate Φ 458 (No. 34) "essayest how"), yet the more natural interpretation seems to me to be "try to bring it about that" (the same translators render Δ 64 (No. 32) "essay that," and β 316 (No. 35) "seek to"). In ε 23 (No. 23) ὥς ἀποτίσεται looks like an object-clause, and, in ε 30 (No. 24), ὧς κε νέηται. These facts simply show that each theory has something to urge for itself on the score of the actual usage in Homer, but prove nothing else except that, as already stated, the construction, wherever it started, had by Homeric times come to cover both stages.

The examples introduced by μή after φράζομαι and μέμβλετο, and those which are introduced by ὥς or ὅπως after λίσσομαι, νοέω, and λεύσσω, require discussion.

The first μή-clause after φράζω (No. 39, under B) is a sound case of the substantive clause, probably developed, as we shall see later, from the clause of "apprehension" or "fear." The force is clearly "see to it that you suffer no harm."

The examples after λίσσομαι are undoubtedly substantive clauses developed out of a true clause of purpose. But if such examples are to be reckoned as belonging to the construction under discussion, then other examples with other verbs should be

¹ Cf. ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, θεά, κατὰ μοῖραν ξείπες·
ἀλλὰ τί μοι τόδε θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει,
ὅπως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσω
μοῦνος ἑών. — ν 37.

added; *e.g.*, A 133, ἐθέλεις ὄφρ' αὐτὸς ἔχης γέρας, A 558, κατανεύσαι . . . ὥς Ἀχιλλῆα τιμῆσης,¹ Z 361, θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται, ὄφρ' ἐπαμύνω, Π 652, δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι, ὄφρ' . . . ὥσαιτο; ρ 362, ὦτρυν', ὥς ἂν πύρνα κατὰ μνηστῆρας ἀγείροι,² χ 51, ἄλλα φρονέων, ὄφρα . . . βασιλεύοι, and perhaps Δ 465, λελημένος ὄφρα τάχιστα τεύχεα συλήσειε, and E 690, λελημένος ὄφρα τάχιστα ὥσαιτ'. Such ideas as those of "asking," "urging," and "granting" are certainly too close together to be separated.

In the five examples of the *μή*-clause after *φράζο*, etc., in D, it is evident that the conception is not that of striving, but that of anxiety, or of anxious consideration, with the factor of consideration subordinated to that of anxiety. In O 162 (No. 44) such a rendering as "let him plan not to venture to encounter me" evidently jars with the necessities of the passage, as also would, in Π 445 (No. 47), the rendering "plan that some other god shall not desire," and, in X 358 (No. 46), the rendering "plan that I shall not be a curse to thee" (from the mouth of a speaker who has already received his death-stroke). The aim in each of these sentences, as probably also in E 410 (No. 45), is to awaken *apprehension* in the person to whom, or for whom, the command is given; and similarly the meaning is evidently that of apprehension in the construction with *μέμβλετο*, Φ 514 (No. 43). A very easy test may be applied. To the question "could *ὅπως μή* have been used in these clauses if they belonged to a later writer who had the construction *ὅπως μή* in his repertory?" the clear answer is "no." These clauses are, then, simply what are commonly called "clauses of fear," and English translators are right in regularly rendering *μή* in these five examples by "lest." This explanation finds corroboration in two facts. First, the construction of the bare connective *μή*, though relatively so frequent with the two verbs that are capable of the force "take heed to yourself" and "be concerned," not once appears in Homer with verbs which, while they cannot convey this meaning, *can* convey the meaning of planning or striving; *e.g.*, βουλεύω, πειράω, μνήσομαι, μήτιν

¹ So the codd., except D. The subjunctive is defended by Pindar, Pyth. 1, 72 νεύσον . . . ὄφρα . . . ἔχῃ. See Goodwin, M. and T., § 359.

² The construction of the optative with *ἄν* in clauses of purpose is comparatively rare, but the clause given may none the less be substantive.

ὕφαινω. Secondly, the particle *ἄν*, though used in 15 out of the 27 subjunctive examples in the clause with *ὥς* and *ἕπως* (or 15 out of 29 of Weber's examples) does not appear in these clauses. Such an absence is in harmony with the theory that they are clauses of apprehension.

As to the remaining examples, it seems to me that they should follow the last five with *μή* in being omitted from the list. The fact that *λεύσσει* in Γ 109 (No. 48) is modified by *πρόσσω* and *ὀπίσσω* shows that it has its original sense, and consequently that *ἕπως . . . γένηται* is a plain clause of plan, and not a substantive clause ("looks both before and after, to the end that"). The exact parallelism of this example with A 343 (No. 50) makes it strange that the latter (to which the reasoning just given also applies) should be omitted by Weber.

We have now reduced our inquiry within narrow limits. The examples under D have been set aside as neither substantive-interrogative nor substantive-final. The example with *μή* under B has been classed as substantive, though probably more closely connected with the clause of apprehension than with the true final clause. The examples under C, with *ἵνα* and *ἕπως*, have been classed, together with a number of others not given by Weber, as clearly substantive and of final origin. Our inquiry, then, is solely with regard to the origin of the clauses under A with *ὥς* and *ἕπως* after verbs like *φράζομαι*, *πειράω*, *βουλεύω*, etc.

The evidence which appears to decide the question turns upon the following points:—

(a) The rarity of the substantive final clause in Greek outside of the disputed construction.

(b) The rarity of the use of *ἕπως* in true final clauses.

(c) The rarity of the negative in the Homeric examples.

(d) The character of the connectives employed in the disputed construction.

(e) The character of the introductory words in Homer.

(f) The character of the introductory words in later Greek.

(a) In general, the substantive final clause in Greek (outside of the clause of fear, which has a recognized special history) is

rare.¹ The Greek, unlike the Latin, avoided a final clause, and preferred the infinitive. This fact establishes a presumption in favor of the origin of our construction in any commoner idiom that might offer an equally good starting-point.

(*b*) But not only is the substantive final clause rare in Greek in general, — the final clause itself, though it appears frequently enough with *ὥς* in the same texts which yield our examples under A, is with *ὅπως* a comparative rarity. *Ὡς* occurs 73 times in the true final clause in Homer, and 26 times in the undoubted interrogative clause after verbs of knowing and telling. In the disputed idiom it occurs 16 times. There is nothing in these figures to forbid our associating the disputed idiom with either kind of clause as its starting-point. But *ὅπως*, while it occurs with great frequency in the interrogative clause, occurs only 9 times in the true final clause. In the disputed idiom (under A) it occurs 21 times. There is much here to forbid our associating the disputed idiom with the final clause, and to lead us to associate it with the other claimant.

(*c*) The interrogative subjunctive, for obvious reasons, rarely takes a negative. The clause of purpose takes a negative in Homer in 147 cases out of 606.² In the 37 cases of the disputed idiom with *ὥς* and *ὅπως* in A, the negative occurs only once (in η 191, No. 38), and even here is found only in the turn to the second member, which is to be contrasted with the first. This fact seems to favor the theory of an interrogative rather than a final origin. Not too much reliance is to be placed upon it as an argument; for, of the 11 cases which we have seen of the undoubted substantive clause developed from a clause of plan (3 cases in C and 8 in the discussion on pp. 47–8), none takes the

¹ I may mention, — though it is probable that my collection for this point is incomplete, — that I have noted from Homer only the examples which I have cited on pp. 47–8, together with the possible example *θελγει, ὅπως Ἰθάκης ἐπιλήσεται*, α 57. It is sure, at any rate, that the total number of Homeric examples must be small as compared with the number (37) of examples of the disputed idiom under A.

² *ἵνα* without a negative occurs 145 times in the final clause, *ἵνα μή* 26 times. *ὅφρα* without a negative occurs 237 times, *ὅφρα μή* 3 times. *Ὡς* (apart from the cases which we are now trying to place) occurs 63 times, *ὥς μή* 10 times, *ὅπως* 9 times (*ὅπως μή* not occurring), *ὥς* final 5 times (*ὥς μή* not occurring). *Μή* occurs alone 108 times.

negative. In a large survey, however, the phenomena of the use and non-use of the negative do possess weight. It will at once be recalled that the combinations *ὥς μή* and *ὅπως μή* are common enough in Attic Greek. Now the growth of the interrogative idea cannot possibly have brought about the use of these combinations, while this is precisely what the growth of the final idea would naturally have done.

(*d*) I have quoted Weber above as saying that *ὥς* and *ὅπως* are used with *φράζομαι* and the like because the idea of those verbs is an indefinite one, and these are indefinite particles. I do not find such a differentiation between the two sets of particles. In Sophocles, while we have *ἴωμεν ὥς μάθης*, Ph. 533, *Κρέοντά γ' ἴσθι . . . ἥξοντα . . . ὅπως τί δράσῃ*, O. C. 396, we have also *προσκόμοι μόνον, ἵν' ἐκδιδαχθῇ*, Tr. 1109; and while we have *λεγ' αὐθις, ὥς . . . μάθω*, O. T. 359, *φράσω . . . ὥς . . . δηλώσω* O. C. 783, *γέγωνέ μοι πᾶν τοῦθ', ὅπως εἰδῶ τίς εἶ*, Ph. 238, we have also *εἶπω . . . ἵνα ὀργίξῃ*, O. T. 364. Surely, too, the main act is definite enough in such examples as *αὐτὰρ θεῖος αἰοιδὸς ἔχων φόρμιγγα λίγειαν | ἡμῖν ἡγείσθω φιλοπαίγμονος ὀρχηθμοῖο, | ὥς κέν τις φαίῃ γάμον ἔμμεναι ἐκτὸς ἀκούων* (ψ 133), and *δεξιάν ὄρεξον, ὥς ψαύσω*, O. C. 1130.

To my mind, the natural statement, at the point which we have now reached, would rather be that the use of the set of particles which *can* be interrogative, and the avoidance of the set that cannot, points to an inquiry whether the introductory verbs themselves, as we find them in the oldest literature, are not in their nature interrogative, and, in case they are, to an acceptance of the theory of the origin of the disputed construction in an interrogative clause.

(*e*) And this certainly is, in itself, a necessary inquiry. In endeavoring to decide as between two possible origins of a construction, one of the most important hints that can be had will lie in the character of the introductory words. Are the words that introduce our idiom such that they naturally require a question to complete their meaning, or are they such as to require rather a clause of purpose? Or, possibly, are some of the one kind, others of the other, and others of both?

Light may be had upon this point by a look at the construc-

tions which these same verbs take in clauses other than those which we are studying.¹

Φράζομαι is followed by 23 (or 24) questions in Homer, as follows: By a question of past fact in ο 167, by a question of present fact in Ξ 482, Φ 410, χ 158, and (in company with ἐνίσπες) Ξ 470, by a question of future fact in π 260 (combined here with a deliberative subjunctive), in π 238 (combined here with a clear deliberative of neutral form), and in τ 557, by a question of present intention about the future in Α 83 (future indicative), by a question of future fact involving possibility in κ 192 (future indicative), by a question (in the future indicative) exactly corresponding in force to the deliberative subjunctive questions, but emphasizing the point of the *method* to be employed, in Δ 14 (where it is coupled with a disjunctive deliberative question), Ξ 3 and 61, Ι 251, Ρ 144, Τ 116, ν 376, ρ 274, by the disjunctive deliberative subjunctive with κε in Ι 618, Ν 741, and without ἄν or κε in Χ 174, by the deliberative subjunctive without ἄν or κε, balancing an indicative question of future fact, in π 260. In ψ 139 the ὅττι-clause may be relative, but seems to be best taken as interrogative.² (B. and L. translate by "What gainful counsel the Olympian may vouchsafe us" = "what good counsel, with the help of the Olympian, we may frame.")

ὀρμαίνω is followed by questions 7 times, as follows: By a question of present fact in ζ 118, by a question of future fact (expressed by an optative in connection with a past tense) in δ 789, by a potential future question in ο 300, and by deliberative subjunctives or optatives after secondary tenses in γ 169, Ξ 20, Π 435, and ψ 86. I give one of these examples, which is interesting because the sentence that follows, viz. ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι, is the same as after the ὅπως-clause with συμφράσσατο θυμῷ in ο 202 (No. 21), and shows how we are naturally to interpret the cast of thought in that passage and similar ones:—

ὧς ὁ γέρων ὥρμαινε δαϊζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν
διχθάδι, ἥ μεθ' ὅμιλον ἴοι Δαναῶν ταχυπώλων

¹ The figures here given are made up from Gehring's "Index Homericus."

² In π 257, δ . . . τ is probably the relative.

ἦε μετ' Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν.
 ὦδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δόσσαντο κέρδιον εἶναι,
 βῆναι ἐπ' Ἀτρεΐδην. — Ξ 20.

Μερμηρίζω is followed by 17 questions, as follows: By a paratactic potential question after a primary tense in *ν* 43, by an optative question with *ὅτι* after a secondary tense in *K* 503, by a deliberative question in the future indicative in *ν* 38, by a disjunctive question with the deliberative subjunctive or the corresponding optative after a past tense in *A* 188, *E* 671, *K* 503, *N* 455, *Π* 646, *δ* 117, *κ* 49, *ζ* 141, *π* 73, *ρ* 235, *σ* 90, *υ* 10, *χ* 333, and *ω* 235 (the optative in the last example being coupled with an infinitive). The sentence *ὦδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι*, etc., follows in *N* 455, *Π* 652, *ζ* 141, and *σ* 90.

It hardly needs examples, however, to prove that *ὀρμαίνω* and *μερμηρίζω* can take questions after them, since their force is so plainly interrogative that one cannot imagine their taking anything else.

Πειράω, on the other hand, might be thought to be purely a verb of effort, of trying to bring about something. Yet this also is shown by the other uses in Homer to have the power of introducing a question, its sense being that of "try whether." It is followed 12 times by questions, as follows: by a question of past fact in *K* 444 ("make trial whether I have spoken truth or no"), by a question of present fact in *φ* 282 ("make trial whether I still have strength"), *ι* 174, and *π* 305, by a question of future fact in the anticipatory subjunctive with *κε* in *Σ* 599, *T* 70, *Φ* 224, *ω* 216, and *Σ* 601 (the last being a question taking the form of a condition), by an optative of the same force after a secondary tense in *N* 806 (in *T* 384 the force may be future or may be present), and by the anticipatory subjunctive with *κε* ("shall" = "can") in *E* 279 (translated by Lang, Leaf, and Myers "so now will I make trial with my spear *if* I *can* hit thee"). The allied word *πειρητίζω* is also followed by an optative representing an anticipatory subjunctive of future fact in *ξ* 459 and *ο* 304.

As for *βουλεύω* and *βουλή*, though no evidence appears from the outside, yet *ι* 420 (No. 26) and *ξ* 327 (No. 28) prove clearly that they also are capable of the interrogative idea.

For the two remaining phrases, *μητιν ὑφαίνω* and *μνήσομαι*, each of which takes the deliberative construction once in Homer, no evidence appears from the outside; though it is clear that the latter, at any rate, could be followed by a question.

It appears, then, that the verbs and phrases which are employed in 35 out of the 37 Homeric cases in A, making, even upon Weber's somewhat different classification and count, a very large majority, are verbs or phrases which, on the evidence of actual examples in Homer, are shown to possess the interrogative power; and two of these, indeed, possess no other power.

Now these figures are, upon Weber's theory, unnatural. Unless it can be shown that the tendency in Homer's time was away from the interrogative-minded introductory verbs, the heavy preponderance of these over final-minded verbs must be accepted as pointing to an origin of the construction in the interrogative subjunctive.

(*f*) But what can actually be shown with regard to the tendency is precisely the opposite. I give in two columns the introductory verbs in Homer's time and the introductory verbs in common use in Attic times, classifying them according to their ability or inability to suggest the interrogative idea.

	HOMERIC.	ATTIC.
Capable only of the interrogative idea.	<i>μερμηρίζω</i> <i>ὀρμαίνω</i>	
Suggesting naturally either idea.	<i>φράζομαι</i> <i>βουλεύω</i> and <i>βουλὴν εἰπεῖν</i> <i>πειράω</i> <i>μνήσομαι</i> <i>μητιν ὑφαίνω</i>	<i>φράζω</i> (rare) <i>βλέπω</i> <i>βουλεύομαι</i> <i>πειράω</i> <i>σκοπέω</i> <i>σοφίζομαι</i> <i>φροντίζω</i>
Capable of either idea, but more naturally suggesting that of the object-clause.	Possibly, but not probably, <i>νοεω</i> , with two examples. Possibly, but not probably, <i>λεύσσω</i> , with one example.	<i>προνοέω</i> and <i>πρόνοιαν ἔχω</i> and <i>ποιέομαι</i> <i>προσέχω τὸν νοῦν</i> <i>ὀράω</i> , <i>προοράω</i>

	HOMERIC.	ATTIC.
Capable only of the idea of the object-clause.	λίσσομαι ¹ ὄτρύνω	διασπουδάζω and σπουδὴν ποιέομαι ἐπιμελέομαι εὐλαβέομαι μέλει μελετάω μηχανάομαι πάντα ποιέω παρασκευάζομαι ποιέω πράσσω προθυμέομαι προκαταλαμβάνω προτιμάω σπουδάζω, διασπουδάζω, and σπουδὴν ποιέομαι τηρέω φρουρέω φυλάσσω ὤνέομαι

It seems to me that no more conclusive proof could be desired that the construction originates in the interrogative idea, and takes on the coloring of the final clause later.

My general interpretation of the phenomena which we have had, under this section, to consider, is accordingly as follows:—

Subjunctive substantive-clauses in Greek are, on historical grounds, to be divided into three classes.

One originated in a dependent deliberative subjunctive (“debate *how*,” “take counsel *how*,” “plan *how*”), sometimes volitive, sometimes anticipatory. The rise of the substantive-final idea was due to the fact that some of these verbs, *e.g.*, *πειράω* and *βουλεύω*, suggested also the idea of “aiming at” something (“plan *that*”),—

¹ I give this word here only because Weber gives it. It is not properly a verb of planning or striving, but, as I have indicated above, belongs in the same category with the later verbs of asking, commanding, urging, etc. (like *αἰτέομαι*, *ἀξιώω*, *δέομαι*, *παραγγέλλω*, *παρακελεύω*. See below, p. 57).

a force to which no resistance would be offered by the connecting particles, which were final as well as interrogative. This extension had already taken place by Homeric times. In consequence of it, the construction came into use with verbs which had never had an interrogative power, such as *πράσσω*, *φυλάσσω*, *διασπουδάζω*, and *παρασκευάζομαι*, and, in natural connection with the same cause, the negative of the final clause came to be freely employed. So strong, however, did the underlying consciousness of an interrogative power in the dependent clause remain, — a consciousness maintained by the large use of verbs like *σκοπέω*, which is very frequently employed with undoubted dependent questions of other kinds, — that *ὥς* and *ὅπως* are often replaced by an interrogative phrase after *σκοπέω* and its equivalents (*e.g.*, *οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο σκοποῦσιν, ἐξ οὗ τρόπου τοῖς δεομένοις βίον ἐκποριοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως τοῖς ἔχειν τι δοκοῦντας τοῖς ἀπόροις ἐξισώσουσιν*, Isocr. 8, 131), and even occasionally after so uninterrogative a verb as *πράσσω* (*e.g.*, *ἔπρασεν ὅτῃ τρόπῃ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβήσεται, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλάξεται*, Thuc. 4, 128, 5).

This underlying consciousness, too, was the reason why the variation of particle seen in *συμφράσσατο βουλὰς ὄφρα*, δ 462 (No. 19), always remained rare.

The second kind of subjunctive substantive clause is represented in Homer by only a single sure example, viz. ρ 595, *φράζεο θυμῷ μή τι πάθῃς* (No. 39).

This is probably, as it happens, an outgrowth of the clause of apprehension (a construction which appears in four other passages with the same verb in Homer), though it might, of course, have been directly begotten from a paratactic expression, "take thought . . . : let not . . ." The construction maintains itself alongside of the *ὥς*- and *ὅπως*-constructions, occurring frequently after the same verb *φράζεο*, etc. (so in Ar. Pax 1099), after many of the new verbs which came into use to introduce *ὥς*- and *ὅπως*-clauses in post-Homeric times, such as *εὐλαβέομαι*, *μέλει*,¹ *ὁράω*, *σκοπέω*, *τηρέω*, *φρουρέω*, *φυλάσσω*, and also after *ἀθρέω*, *ἀντιάζω*, and *ἰκνέομαι*.

The third kind of subjunctive substantive clauses originated in a true final clause. The connectives are *ἵνα*, *ὄφρα*, and *ὅπως*.

¹ *Μέμβλετο γὰρ οἱ τείχος*, followed by a *μή*-clause of apprehension, occurs, as we have seen above, in Homer.

The introductory verbs and phrases have such meanings as "beg," "urge" (possibly "will"), "promise," "seem better." This construction maintains its existence, and is found with a greater variety of verbs, *e.g.*, αἰτέομαι, ἀντιβολέω, ἀπαγορεύω, δέομαι, ἰκετεύω, παραγγέλλω, παρακελεύομαι; yet it never gains a large use, successful resistance being made by the older construction with the infinitive. The connective after Homer is generally ὅπως,¹ though sometimes ἵνα, as in Dem. 16, 28 (οὐκ ἵνα Θεσπιαὶ κατοικισθῶσι μόνον ποιούμενοι τὴν σπουδὴν), Antiphon, Tetr. A δ 3, περιεργαστέον ἵνα . . . ἐπιδείξω, and Polyb. 108 (ἔφη πειρᾶσθαι φροντίζειν ἵνα μηδὲν ἀδίκημα γένηται Ῥωμαίοις ἐξ Ἰλλυριῶν). Goodwin, M. and T., § 357, points out that this latter type becomes commoner in the later language, and gives examples from the New Testament (John 13, 34; Luke 9, 40).

I therefore classify the *μή*-clause after φράζομαι and the clauses with ἵνα, ὅφρα, ὥς, and ὅπως after λίσσομαι, κατανεύω, etc., with the volitive declarative sentences,² and the ὥς- and ὅπως-clauses without ἄν or κε with the volitive interrogative sentences, while I place in the present chapter and section the

(Originally Interrogative) **Clause with ὥς and ὅπως after Verbs of Pondering, Contriving, and Endeavoring.**

φράσσεται, ὥς κε νέηται, ἐπεὶ πολυμήχανός ἐστιν. — *a* 205.

"He will take counsel how he *shall* (= *may, can*) return. For he is full of shifts."

(*c*) A peculiar usage, by which a sentence that was once deliberative becomes a dependent relative clause, appears in the volitive

¹ Pindar has ὅφρα in Pyth. 1, 72 (νεῦσον . . . ὅφρα . . . ἔχη, — the only case in Pindar, and interesting for its resemblance to the solitary Homeric example A 558).

² The separating of this third type from the second is not without good reason. It is a common error of the manuals of Latin syntax, *e.g.*, not to make the similar separation, but to treat all substantive clauses as developed either from a clause of purpose or a clause of result. In point of fact, there are two distinct classes of volitive substantive clauses, the first (much commoner than the other) directly descended from a paratactic substantive sentence, and entirely free from any earlier history as a final clause, except in so far as it may have come in time to borrow a connective *ut*, which owed its own origin to the final clause (so, *e.g.*, in *impero ne eas, impero eas*, and a later *impero ut eas*), the second descended from a true clause of purpose (so, *e.g.*, in *conatur quo minus, nihil impedit quin, nulla causast quin*, etc.; λίσσομαι ἵνα, cf. etc., etc.).

form in a good many examples of the type seen in Soph. Ai. 514: *ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι βλέπω, πλὴν σοῦ*. I know of only one instance with the anticipatory mode, but this one seems to me sure, and is especially interesting as being still outwardly in the paratactic stage. I place it here, however, for the reason that, though the outward look remains, the nature of the passage shows clearly that the true paratactic feeling is gone. The construction, since it has been extended from the interrogative to the relative form, may be called

The Extended Deliberative.

ἄλλου δ' οὐ τευ οἶδα, τεῦ ἂν κλυτὰ τεύχεα δύω.—Σ 192.¹

"Other man know I none, whose noble armor I *shall* (= *might*) put on."

7. Thus far, our verbs have been declarative (as in the case of the Characterizing Clause, the Clause of Character and Plan, and the Clause of Plan) or interrogative (as in the case of the Indirect Question of Fact, and the Indirect Question of Deliberation).

But the anticipatory subjunctive, like its neighbor and successor, the future indicative, may be used not only in statements and questions, but in assumptions. To this category we now come. It falls naturally into two divisions,—the clause of generalizing assumption, in which the application is to any person, thing, etc., and the clause of individual assumption, in which the application is to a single person, thing, etc. Both of these clauses of course have their parallels in clauses of the volitive type.

The connectives in Greek are the relatives *ὅς*, *ὅστις*, *ὅτε*, *ὁπότε*, *εἵτε*, and the non-relative *εἰ* (probably originally a demonstrative locative, meaning "in that case," and then transferred from

¹ The question whether the construction without *ἄν* is of deliberative or of relative origin has been much debated in recent years, especially by Jebb (in his *Philoctetes*, ad v. 281), Sidgwick (in a review of the same in the *Classical Review* for April, 1891, and incidentally in articles in the *Cl. R.* for March, 1893, and October, 1893), Tarbell (*Cl. R.*, July, 1891), Earle (*Cl. R.*, March, 1892), "J. D." (*Cl. R.*, December, 1892, and October, 1893), Sonnenschein (*Cl. R.* for February, 1894), and myself (*Cl. R.* for February, 1894, and, more fully, in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association* for 1893, Vol. XXIV, pp. 156-205).

the main to the subordinate sentence, with the meaning "in case that," "in case").

The assumption introduced by *εἰ* may be either generalizing or individual. The assumption introduced by a relative has not this range, for the following reason:—

The relative clause must necessarily be of one of four kinds. If the antecedent does not refer to a particular individual, but to *any* individual, the relative clause that completes its meaning must be generalizing. If, on the other hand, the antecedent does refer to a particular individual, then this antecedent must either be self-explained (*e.g.*, a proper name), in which case the relative clause is really an independent sentence (generally a statement of fact), or not self-explained, in which case the relative clause is either characterizing (as under 1, p. 18) or determinative (see under 8, p. 61). In other words, if the relative clause is an assumption at all, it is a generalizing assumption.¹

(a) Clause of Generalizing Assumption.²

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης ἐθέλοντα νοήσω
μιμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὗ οἱ ἔπειτα
ἄρκιον ἐσσεΐται φυγέειν κύνας ἢ δ' οἰωνούς. — B 391.

"But whomsoever I *shall* see wishing to stay from the battle beside the beaked ships, there will be no hope for him thereafter to escape the dogs and birds of prey."

ὃν τινα μέν κεν ἔᾱς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων
αἵματος ἄσπον ἵμεν, ὁ δέ τοι νημερτὲς ἐνίψει.
ὃ δέ κ' ἐπιφθονέης, ὁ δέ τοι πάλιν εἰσιν ὀπίσσω. — λ 147.

¹ Vid. "Cum-Constructions," p. 87 of the English edition, 96 of the German.

² A careful distinction must be made between the generalizing clause and the determinative clause referring to a particular, though not fully defined, individual. In the following. *e.g.*, ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι refers to a single, though as yet undefined, person ("the one — I will not say which — to whom I shall come"), not "to any one whatever," nor even "to all of the three persons" mentioned. This example, accordingly, belongs under the head of 8, 1, below.

εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι
ἢ τεδν ἢ Διαντος ἰὼν γέρας, ἢ Ὀδυσῆος
ἄξω ἐλὼν. ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται, ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι. — Α 137.

" . . . that one, whosoever it shall be . . . "

ὁπποῖόν κ' εἵρησθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσαιοις.—Τ 250.

Similarly O 348, Δ 306, Σ 271 and 467, Φ 103, and often.

(b) **Clause of Individual Assumption.**

εἰ μὲν κεν Μενέλαον Ἀλέξανδρος καταπέφνη,
αὐτὸς ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην ἐχέτω καὶ κτήματα πάντα,
ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν νήεσσι νεώμεθα ποντοπόροισιν·
εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτείνῃ ξανθὸς Μενέλαος,
Τρῶας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην καὶ κτήματα πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι.—Γ 281.

"If Alexandros *shall* slay Menelaus, then let him have Helen to himself, and all her possession; and we will depart in our sea-faring ships. But if fair-haired Menelaus *shall* kill Alexandros, then let the Trojans give up Helen and all her possessions."

εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω παρανήξομαι, ἣν πον ἐφεύρω
ἡϊόνας τε παραπλήγας λιμένας τε θαλάσσης,
δεῖδω, μή μ' ἐξαυτὶς ἀναρπάξασα θύελλα
πόντον ἐπ' ἰχθυόεντα φέρῃ βαρέα στενάχοντα.—ε 417.

"But if I swim still further along the coast, if perchance I *shall* (= *may*) find a sloping shore and harbors of the sea, I fear a sweeping storm may bear me yet once more along the swarming deep, loudly lamenting."

The negative for assumptions, which is *μή*, is probably unoriginal, and due, as will be said in a later chapter, to a unifying of type in several mechanisms.

In many cases the clause, though an assumption in form, suggests at the same time a question and a purpose, as in the last example, in which "if perchance" is almost the equivalent of "to see if," or "in order that." In the following example such a clause is in fact actually coupled with a clause introduced by *ἵνα*:—

πέμψω δ' ἐς Σπάρτην τε καὶ ἐς Πύλον ἡμαθόεντα
νόστον πευσόμενον πατρὸς φίλου, ἣν πον ἀκούσῃ,
ἥδ' ἵνα μιν κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔχῃσιν.—α 93.

"And I will send him to Sparta and to sandy Pylos to seek

tidings of his father's return, *if* haply he *shall* (= *may*) hear, and *that* he may have a noble name among mankind."

It is through such uses that the particle of assumption comes to gain also a simple interrogative power, as in the examples under 5, above.

In Latin, the subjunctive construction of the future assumption is probably of mixed origin, the anticipatory subjunctive being but a single factor in it; and consequently no sure instance of this subjunctive in the ordinary assumption can be given. But it may be confidently believed, on account of the general attitude of mind naturally involved, to be present in examples with the locative *si* in the derived interrogative sense.

Aspectabat virtutem legionis suai,
expectans si mussarent. — Enn. Ann. 369 (Müll.).

"He watched the valor of his legion, waiting if perchance (= whether) they *should* murmur" ("= waiting to see whether they would").

8. One of the commonest of the constructions of the anticipatory mode, so far as Greek is concerned, is the determinative clause, the primary office of which is to make clear, to determine, *what* person, *what* thing, *what* time, etc., is intended by the incompletely explanatory pronoun of the main sentence. Such a clause answers the question, *which* man, *which* thing, etc., *do you mean*, in contradistinction to the characterizing clause, which gives the answer to the question, *what kind of a man*, *what kind of a thing*, etc., *do you mean?*¹

The general name for this construction would be the

Determinative Clause.

It will be convenient, however, to divide our examples according to the nature of the antecedents, — with which of course the

¹ This construction of the determinative clause, which in the indicative is extremely common (see my "*Cum-Constructions*," pp. 85, 125, and 171 of the English edition, and 94, 152, 206 of the German), I find also, as I shall show in other chapters, in the volitive, the potential, and the optative of ideal certainty. Its importance is not recognized in our text-books.

introductory words and phrases will correspond. They will fall into two general classes, according as the determination is exact or inexact.

I. CLAUSES OF EXACT DETERMINATION.

(a) Clause Determining a Person or Thing (introduced by a Relative Pronoun).

The construction is frequent in English, as in the following:—

“Which of the Misses Trevellyn it is *that* Vernon *shall* marry,
Is not a thing to be known.”

— Clough, *Amours de Voyage*, V. vi.

“The man who *shall* invent such a system has a fortune awaiting him.” — Chicago Herald, March 12, 1894.

“Because of limit of time and space it was thought best to have no more than twelve men on the team. These will be: (1) The four men who were in the semi-finals of the Fall tournament. (2) *The* four men who *shall* be in the semi-finals of *the* tournament which *shall* commence January 25,” etc., etc. — The University News, Jan. 18, 1893.

“The Dreibund may not last. The peace of Europe may be broken at any time. But meanwhile it certainly looks as if the peace league of the three monarchies were a precursor of *the* universal peace league that *shall* relegate war, with slavery, to the limbo of dead barbarism.” — H. P. Judson, from Chapel Address before the University of Chicago, The University News, Dec. 8, 1892.

κείνος δ' αὖ περὶ κῆρι μακάρτατος ἔξοχον ἄλλων,
ὅς κέ σ' ἐέδνοισι βρίσας οἰκόνδ' ἀγάγηται. — ζ 158.

“And happy *he*, again, exceedingly, above all others, who *shall* prevail with gifts and lead you to his home.”

σοὶ δὲ γάμος σχεδὸν ἐστίν, ἵνα χρή καλὰ μὲν αὐτὴν
ἐννυσθαι, τὰ δὲ τοῖσι παρασχεῖν, οἳ κέ σ' ἄγωνται. — ζ 27.

“But the wedding time is near, when you must wear fine clothes yourself, and furnish them to *those* that *shall* attend you.”

γαμβρὸς ἐμὸς θύγατέρ τε, τίθεςθ' ὄνομ', ὅττι κεν εἴπω. — τ 406.

"My son-in-law and daughter, give him *the* name that I *shall* tell you."

In Greek, this determinative construction with the relative pronoun gives way, in a considerable degree, before the general advance of the other mechanism for expressing something looked forward to from the present point of view, namely, the future indicative. In Latin, it gives way to such a degree as to be very rare in the primary tenses (I find it, as a sure construction, only in a few examples under the substantially similar class (*d*) below¹), but maintains itself in connection with the past, for the reason that the Latin possessed no other means of expressing an act looked forward to from a past point of view.

Cum ad unum omnes ferrum pugnamque poscerent, et deiecta in id sors esset, se quisque eum optabat, quem fortuna in id certamen legeret. — Liv. 21, 42, 2.

"To a man they asked for the sword and battle, and, when the lot was cast to this end, each wished himself *the* one whom fortune *should* choose for this contest."

The example may not be a sure one as illustrating the Roman consciousness at the time when it was written, for it may well be that a Roman would have referred the subjunctive to the Oratio Obliqua; but it at any rate illustrates an original force which must have contributed largely to the building up of the construction afterwards recognized as the Oratio Obliqua, and the construction afterwards recognized as Assimilation.²

¹ It is my belief, however, that in such a case as *di tibi dent quaequomque optes* ("the gods grant you whatever your heart *shall* wish"), Plaut. As. 44, we have the descendant of an original determinative anticipatory clause. See footnote on next page.

² In my "Sequence of Tenses," American Journal of Philology, VIII, 1, p. 54, and American Journal of Philology, IX, 2, pp. 175-6, I have spoken substantially as follows of one of the factors that combine to bring about the phenomenon known as assimilation of mode: —

"In complex sentences made up of a main sentence with subjunctive verb and one or more subordinate sentences, the modal feeling in the speaker's mind which expresses itself in the main sentence is, in the nature of things, very likely to continue in the speaker's mind in the subordinated sentence or sentences, either quite unchanged or but slightly shaded. If, for example, I say in Latin, Let him send whom he will, *mittat*

There are certain examples which, though closely approaching the force of the characterizing clause, as we have seen it under 1, are yet for the sake of rhetorical effect put as determinative. This may be seen from the English form (though the Greek does not exactly correspond) given by Jebb to his translation of Soph. O. T. 1493: "But when ye are now come to years ripe for marriage, who shall *he* be, who shall be *the* man, my daughters, that *will* hazard taking unto him such reproaches, etc.?" The answer would be "*that* man — *the* man, namely, that will hazard — does not exist." In the same way, the *form* is determinative (*the* man that shall come does not exist), though it might, less rhetorically, have been characterizing (*no* man exists that shall come), in ζ 201:—

οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ διερός βροτὸς οὐδὲ γένηται,
ὅς κεν Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν ἐς γαίαν ἵκηται
δηιοτῆτα φέρων.

"*That* mortal breathes not, and never will be born, who *shall* come with war to the land of the Phæacians, for they are very dear to the gods." — (Translation of Butcher and Lang.)

The corresponding future indicative is seen in π 438.

quem velit, the mode in *velit* is not a case of 'attraction' or 'assimilation' at all. *Velit* is as much a jussive as *mittat* is. The meaning is, Let him choose his man, and send that man; or, in older English, Choose he his man and send him. In *sei quæ esent quæi sibi deicerent necesus esse Bacanal habere* (C. I. L. I. 196), the *deicerent* is as much a future condition (= *sei quæ deicerent*) as *esent* is."

I have long believed that the anticipatory subjunctive supplies a large factor to the development of this construction. Especially in Plautus and Terence, a considerable proportion of the subjunctives "by assimilation" after primary tenses seem easily to be accounted for as simply anticipatory, if we assume that the anticipatory power still remained to the mode at that time. This has been shown to be the case for Terence, in a paper written for the degree of Bachelor of Arts by Mr. F. O. Bates, a student of mine at Cornell, in the year 1891-2.

As for the syntax after secondary tenses, it will appear in the course of the treatment, that, in every category in which the determinative expression can occur, there is only one possible way of putting it; namely, by the anticipatory subjunctive (imperfect or, rarely, pluperfect, *i.e.*, future perfect).

Now the frequent recurrence of such examples in dependence upon a subjunctive would give rise to the feeling that the dependent clause ought ordinarily to be put in that mode, and so would bring about the habit of "assimilating."

- (b) **Clause Determining the Kind** mentioned in the main sentence ; introduced by οἷος and ὅποῖος.

ἀλλ' ὅτε κεν δῇ σ' αὐτὸς ἀνείρηται ἐπέεσσιν,
τοῖος ἑών, οἷόν κε κατευνηθέντα ἴδῃσθε,
καὶ τότε δὴ σχέσθαι τε βίης λῦσαί τε γέροντα. — δ 420.

“But when he shall question thee in his own shape, being such as thou *shalt* have seen him when he laid him down, then hold thy strength and let the old man go.”

πρὸς ταῦτα πράξεις οἷον ἂν θέλῃς. — Soph. O. C. 956.

“Thou wilt therefore do such a deed as thou *shalt* please to do.”

- (c) **Clause Determining the Manner**, etc., in which the main act is to take place ; introduced by ὥς and ὅπως.

ἀλλ' ἄγεθ', ὥς ἂν ἐγὼ εἴπω, πειθώμεθα πάντες. — Ξ 74.

“But come, let us all obey as I *shall* speak.”

- (d) **Clause Determining an Antecedent**, expressed or implied, **Denoting Time** (generally the time at which the main act is to take place); introduced by ὅτε, ὁπότε, ἐπεὶ.

φράξεο νῦν, μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι
ῥήματι τῷ ὅτε κέν σε Πάρις καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
ἐσθλὸν ἐόντ' ὀλέσωσιν ἐνὶ Σκαιῇσι πύλῃσιν. — X 358.

“Take heed now to thyself, lest I draw upon thee the wrath of the gods, on that day when Paris and Phoebus Apollo *shall* slay thee, for all thy valor, at the Scaean gate.”

ἐκ γὰρ Ὀρέσταο τίσις ἔσσεται Ἀτρεΐδαο,
ὁππότε' ἂν ἡβήσῃ τε καὶ ῥῆς ἰμείρεται αἵης. — α 40.

“For on account of the son of Atreus vengeance will come from Orestes, when he *shall* be grown and shall desire his land.”

αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν ἀγάγησιν ἔσω κλισίην Ἀχιλλῆος,
οὗτ' αὐτὸς κτενέει ἀπὸ τ' ἄλλους πάντας ἐρύξει. — Ω 155.

“But when Hermes *shall* lead him within the tent of Achilles, Achilles will not slay him, and will hold all others back.”

ἀλλ' ὁμοσον μὴ μητρὶ φίλῃ τάδε μυθήσασθαι,
πρίν γ' ὅτ' ἂν ἐνδεκάτῃ τε δωδεκάτῃ τε γένηται. — β 373.

"But swear that you will not tell my dear mother, (before when =) till the eleventh and twelfth day *shall* come."

Hic est ille dies quom gloria maxuma sese
nobis ostendat, seu vivimus sive morimur. — Enn. Ann. 414.

"This is the day when the supreme glory *shall* manifest itself to us, whether we live or whether we die."

Expectandus erit qui lites incohēt annus
totius populi. — Iuv. 16, 42.

"I shall have to wait for the year (namely, the coming one) that *shall* (=is to) start afresh upon the suits of the whole people."

Visne igitur, dum dies ista venit, qua magno conatu exercitus moveatis, interea tu ipse congredi mecum? — Liv. 8, 7, 7.

"Will you, while waiting for the coming of the day when, with great effort, you *shall* set armies in motion,¹ meanwhile meet me in single combat?"

With these examples, compare the following, from a letter of Cowper to John Newton, dated Nov. 11, 1792: —

"Oh for the day when your expectations of my complete deliverance *shall* be verified!"

En erit umquam
ille dies, mihi cum liceat tua dicere facta? — Verg. Ecl. 8, 7.²

"Will the day ever come, when I *shall* be allowed to sing thy deeds?"

In the following, again, the subjunctive may, to the Roman consciousness, be due to the Oratio Obliqua, but the sentence at

¹ It is of course possible that the construction here is volitive, — "on which you mean to move. . . ."

² It is of course possible that the construction here is the ordinary Latin characterizing construction, developed from the mode of ideal certainty ("*Cum*-Constructions," p. 140 of the English edition, 170 of the German).

any rate illustrates what must once have been one of the factors in the building up of the construction of the *Oratio Obliqua*; and this explanation likewise accounts for the use of the so-called present tense in place of a periphrastic future form:—

Diditur hic subito Troiana per agmina rumor,
advenisse diem cum debita moenia condant. — Aen. 7, 144.

“Suddenly the rumor runs through the Trojan ranks, that the day has come when they *shall* (= are to) build the walls that Fate has granted.”

In general, however, the anticipatory subjunctive has given way in these constructions, after primary tenses, before the future indicative.

Videre videor iam diem illum, quom hinc egens
profugiet aliquo militatum. — Ter. Ad. 384.

“Methinks I already see the day, when, in his need, he *will* run away somewhere to a soldier’s life.” Cf. Virgil’s *ille dies cum*, above.

Quam felix tempus illud quo mihi liberos illius, nepotes tuos, ut meos vel liberos vel nepotes ex vestro sinu sumere et quasi pari iure tenere continget. — Plin. Ep. 6, 26, 3.

When, on the other hand, the point of view lies in the past, the subjunctives of anticipation from the past point of view, namely, the imperfect and pluperfect, maintain themselves completely, there being, as has already been said, no other form that could possibly supplant them, or even occasionally replace them.¹

Aderat iam annus, quo proconsulatum Africae et Asiae sortiretur. — Tac. Agric. 42.

“The year was now at hand in which he *was to* draw the proconsulate of Africa and Asia as his lot.”

Cf. the following, from the *Morte d’Arthur*, I. 3:—

“Then the time came that the Queen Igraine *should* bear a child.”

¹ The periphrastic past future (*-turus erat* or *-turus fuit*) of course *asserts* intention or imminence, and therefore is incapable of replacing the very different dependent anticipatory subjunctive.

Ibi, quamquam nondum periculo adpropinquante, conspicuo tamen et cum cresceret proximò, sarcinas contulerat in naves.

— Plin. Ep. 6, 16, 12.

"There, since the danger, though not yet approaching, was palpable, and, the moment it *should* increase, very great, he had got his baggage on board."

(e) **Clause Determining the Time up to which** the main act is to go on (Clause of Anticipated Limit).

The connectives in Homer are εἰς ὃ (κε), ἕως (κε), ὅφρα (κε), and, rarely, ὅτε.

The origin and force of the first phrase, = *up to what time*, are obvious.

"ἕως (the correlative of τέως) is, like Skt. *yāvat* (the correlative of *tāvat*), a formation from the relative stem, with a termination (-*vant*, -*fes*) indicating quantity. Its primary meaning must then have been "how long," "so long as"; and this meaning is actually found frequently in Homer. A secondary meaning derived from the primary is "so long as until," or briefly, "until."

The original force of ὅφρα, as we have seen, was probably "during the time during which," "so long as," "while." The meaning "until," then, would seem to be secondary, as in the case of ἕως.

"Ὅτε originally meant "when." An example that follows (the last of the Greek examples) will show how easily, under the force of the context, it may come to suggest the idea "till when," "till." Such a context, however, did not occur frequently enough to establish this as one of the fixed powers of the word.

The connectives in Latin are *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad*.

Dum is a case-form (probably accusative, possibly, according to a recent theory, instrumental) of the demonstrative stem *dʰ/o*, which appears in numerous particles in Latin and elsewhere, e.g., *quam-de*, *quan-dō*, *dē-ni-que*, ὅδε, δέ, ἤδη, Skt. *ya-dā*, *ka-dā*, *ta-dā*, *i-dā*. Its original meaning was therefore "at" or "during that time," = "the while."

This original meaning is still occasionally to be seen, as in Catull. 62, 45: *sic virgo dum intacta manet, dum cara suis est* (cf.

Plaut. Truc. 232). A rendering for such a passage at the time when *dum* was still in the demonstrative stage would be "So the maiden, the while she remains unwedded, the while she is dear to her people." It is easy to see how, from such a combination, the force "so long as" arose; and out of this force, as already observed in the cases of *ἕως* and *ὅφρα*, arose the secondary meaning "until."¹

Dōnec is of very uncertain origin. Zimmermann, in Archiv, V. 567-571, explains the form *dōnicum* as having arisen from *dōne-cum*, of which the first part is, in his opinion, a preposition, otherwise lost in Latin, meaning "until" (cf. Keltic *do* and *du*, "until," English "to"), while the second is the familiar *cum*. The word would then originally have meant "till when" (cf. *εἰς ὃ κε*). This *dōnecum* may have given rise, through a misapprehension, to *dōnec cum*, after which the *cum* fell away, leaving *dōnec* alone (just as if from the phrase "till when," the word "when" had been lost). From *dōnec* the form **dōneque* would easily be derived, under the analogy of the familiar pair *nec* and *neque*, and this **dōneque* would then become *dōnique*.

Schmalz (Lat. Gramm., § 277) adopts the theory that *dōnecum* is made up of a demonstrative, a negative, and a relative, and meant originally, therefore, "da nicht wo," or *up to the time of ceasing*, and so came to be used in clauses fixing an end.

Upon either of these theories, the early meaning must have been "until," and the meaning "all the time until," or "so long as," must have arisen later. The evolution of meaning would accordingly cover the same ground as in the case of *ἕως*, but in the reverse order.

Per Persson (Indg. Forsch. II, 218 ff.) regards the *dō-* as a demonstrative of the stem *d^e/o*, seen above, *ne* as the asservative particle, and *-que* as an indefinite, weakened in force as in *ita-que*, *τό-τε*, *ὅ-τε*. The forms in historical order would then be **dōneque*, **dōnique*, and with apocope, *dōnec*. The form *dōnicum* he thinks may be from **dō-ne-quom* (the *quom* being indefinite, like *-que* in **dō-ne-que*), or, after Thurneysen's suggestion, K.Z. XXVII, 175,

¹ The same transition from the meaning of "so long as" to the meaning of "until" which has taken place in the case of *ἕως*, *ὅφρα*, and *dum* shows itself in late Latin in the case of *quamdiu* (Stolz and Schmalz, Lat. Gram., § 264).

the result of the addition of the particle *-om* (cf. Oscan *pid-um* "*quidquam*") to *dōnec*. The meaning, according to Persson's view, was originally that of a strong demonstrative ("dann eben"). On this supposition (and I may add that Persson's view seems to me the most probable of the three¹) the subsequent shifts must have been, as in the case of *dum*, *ēws*, and *ōφpa*, to the meaning "during that time" = "so long," and then to the meaning "so long as until" = "until."

Quoad is made up apparently of the adverb *quō*, in its locative sense, and the preposition *ad* (Stolz and Schmalz, Lat. Gramm., § 293), and must therefore originally have meant, "till what time."

¹ I am less inclined, however, to think it possible (Persson says no more than this) that we have relics of the oldest force ("dann eben") of *donec* in XII Tab., VI, 8 ("quandoque sarpta, donec dempta erunt"), and in Petronius 55 ("ab hoc epigrammate coepit poetarum esse mentio, diuque summa carminis penes Mopsum Thracem memorata est, donec Trimalchio 'rogo' inquit 'magister, quid putas inter Ciceronem et Publilium interesse') and 40 ('sophos' universi clamamus et sublatis manibus ad cameram iuramus Hipparchum Aratumque comparandos illi homines non fuisse, donec advenērunt ministri ac toralia praeposuerunt toris"). Whatever might be thought to make the best sense for the passage from the Twelve Tables (which, as Ulp. Dig. XLVII, 3, 1 indicates, must be understood in connection with "tignum iunctum aedibus vineaeve e concapi ne solvito"), the syntactical usage of the other fragments does not permit us to take the meaning as "wenn (die Schösslinge) einmal abgeschnitten sind, zu der Zeit (dann) sollen sie auch entfernt sein," as Zimmermann would translate. The commands of the law are laid down in the XII Tab. by the imperative, and (once each) with *oportet* and *oporteat* (?), not by the future indicative. As for the other passages, it can hardly be claimed that the demonstrative force of "darauf" which Englaender finds in them (Archiv, VI, p. 467) is a survival of an original force; and, in fact, Englaender, seeking to discover the ancestor of Italian *dunque* and Old French *dunc*, himself offers these sentences only as illustrating a combination in which the hypotactic force (contrary to the ordinary order of development) has given rise to a different paratactic force. They are therefore not to the point, further than as showing—what every one knows—that demonstrative and relative ideas may in actual continued speech be closely connected. I must add, however, that I should myself substitute the phrase "may in time have given rise" in place of the phrase "has given rise" which I have used above; for in these sentences the force of "till" is still a reasonable one ("for a long time the talk ran on, till," and "we all shouted 'bravo,' and swore that Hipparchus and Aratus couldn't hold a candle to these men, till in came the servants, etc.>"). These clauses may be compared to the well-known clauses with *cum-inversum*. The corresponding main sentences differ, in that the one preceding *cum* expresses a state of affairs into which the act of the *cum*-clause breaks, while the one preceding *donec* summarizes a continued act into which the act of the *donec*-clause breaks; but the relation of the dependent clause to its main clause is the same in both cases, and, though undoubtedly loose, has hardly yet reached the point of a demonstrative force.

ἐς τί ἔτι κτείνεσθαι ἐάσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιοῖς ;
ἢ εἰς ὃ κεν ἀμφὶ πύλης ἐνποιήτησι μάχωνται ; — E 465.

"Up to what time will ye yet suffer your host to be slain of the Achaeans? Will it be up to what time (= till) they *shall* be fighting about our well-built gates."

ἐνθα καθεζόμενος μεῖναι χρόνον, εἰς ὃ κεν ἡμεῖς
ἄστυδε ἔλθωμεν καὶ ἰκώμεθα δώματα πατρός. — ζ 295.

"Thus sit and wait awhile till when (= till) we (*shall*) come to the town."

μάστιγε νῦν, εἴως κε θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας ἵκηαι. — P 622.

"Now lay on the whip, till you *shall* come to the swift ships."

ὦκα μάλα μεγάροιο διελθέμεν, ὄφρ' ἂν ἵκηαι
μητέρ' ἐμήν. — ζ 304.

"Quickly pass through the hall until you *shall* find my mother."

ἤδη γὰρ Πηληϊά γ' οἶομαι ἦ κατὰ πάμπαν
τεθνάμεν, ἢ που τυτθὸν ἔτι ζώντ' ἀκάχησθαι
γῆραί τε στυγερῶ καὶ ἐμὴν ποτιδέγμενον αἰεὶ
λυγρὴν ἀγγελίην, ὅτ' ἀποφθιμένοιο πύθεται. — T 334.

"For Peleus, I believe, already must be dead and gone, or else in feeble life he sorrows of hateful age and of waiting ever for bitter news of me, what time he *shall* hear" (= "till he shall hear"). Cf. the English idiom in the following:—

Under which bush's shade
A lioness, with udders all drawn dry,
Lay crouching, head on ground, with cat-like watch,
When that the sleeping man *should* stir.

— Shakespeare, As You Like It, 4, 3.

At tu apud nos hic mane,
dum redeat ipsa. — Ter. Eun. 534.

"But you are to stay here with us, till she *shall* herself return."

Si plausoris eges aulaea manentis et usque
sessuri, donec cantor 'vos plaudite' dicat,
aetatis cuiusque notandi sunt tibi mores.

— Hor. Ars Poet. 154.

"If you want an applauder who shall wait for the curtain and keep his seat till the player *shall* say 'Give us your applause,' you must observe the character that belongs to each period of life."¹

Itaque exercebatur plurimum currendo et luctando ad eum finem, quoad stans complecti posset atque contendere.

— Nep. 15, 2, 5.

"And so he gave himself abundant exercise in running and wrestling, up to the point at which he *should* be (= till he *should* be) able to stand and grapple with his adversary and hold his own."

The idiom maintains itself completely in Latin when the point of view is in the past, there being, as has been said before, no other available anticipatory form.

Lupus observavit, dum dormitaret canes. — Plaut. Trin. 170.

"The wolf waited until the dog *should* go to sleep."

The English idiom for the past corresponds exactly.

"Till other passengers *should* come, the conductor lounged against the guard of the platform in a conversational posture."

— Howells, Lemuel Barker, cap. 13.

With primary tenses, too, the Latin subjunctive in the main maintains itself successfully against the futures, but less completely, being occasionally replaced by the future perfect, and (rarely) by the future.

. . . quandoque sarpta donec dempta erunt. — XII Tab. VI. 8.

Ibi manens sedeto, donicum videbis

me carpento vehentem en domum venisse.

— Liv. Andron., translation of § 295.

Coquito usque donec conmadebit bene. — Cat. Agr. 156, 5. Item linito usque adeo, donec omne caseum cum melle abusus eris. — *Ibid.* 76, 4. Similarly usque adeo donec cremor crassus erit factus. — *Ibid.* 86.

¹ The present indicative, which also occurs in the same general sense as the subjunctive (e.g., *dum dies ista venit*, p. 66), is probably a relic of a very early use, in which it expressed almost any modal or temporal idea. See p. 91, below.

Hic iam ter centum totos regnabitur annos
gente sub Hectorea, donec regina sacerdos
Marte gravis geminam partu dabit Ilia prolem.

— Verg. Aen. I, 272.

English is even more conservative of the anticipatory modal form than Latin is. We say always "let us wait till he shall come," or "till he comes," never "let us wait till he *will* come." The future of confident prediction (future indicative) seems out of place in this relation.

In a number of examples with *ἕως* and *dum* a secondary meaning appears.¹ The main act is to go on until the subordinate act, which is both anticipated and desired, shall take place. The subordinate clause, consequently, approaches closely to a clause of plan. This transitional stage may be seen in *θ* 317 and Trin. 170, given on the page preceding, and in *Γ* 291. Greek goes still farther, and shows in Homer a number of examples (of the optative standing for a subjunctive after a secondary tense) in which the temporal force has wholly disappeared, leaving a true final force in complete possession. Latin also seems to possess the same extreme construction, though it is very rare.

πέμπε δέ μιν πρὸς δώματ' Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο,
εἵως Πηνελόπειαν ὀδυρομένην γοῶσαν
παύσειε κλαυθμοῖο γόοιό τε δακρύνοντος. — δ 799.

"And she sent it to the house of god-like Odysseus, that it *might* make Penelope, the mourner and sigher, cease from her grief and tearful lamentations."

Similarly in *ε* 386, *ζ* 80, *ι* 376, *τ* 367.

Videto ut bene et otiose percoquas. Aperito, dum inspicias, bis aut ter. Ubi cocta erit, eximito et melle unguito. — Cato. Agr. 76, 4. Be sure to give it a good slow cooking. Open it two or three times *to look* at it. When it is done, take it off and dress it with honey.

¹ The common doctrine is the opposite of this; viz. that the temporal *dum*-clause began as a clause of purpose. So forced a doctrine would never have been reached if Latin had not been studied as an isolated language, in which, owing to the late point at which we get the earliest remains of it, no trace of the subjunctive in a simple future sense is to be found in independent sentences. (Cf. footnote on p. 27.)

(f) **Clause Determining the Time during which** the main act is to go on (Clause of Anticipated Duration).

The connectives in Homer are εἰς ὃ (κε), ἕως (κε), ὅφρα (κε), as before.

The last two originally, as we have seen, meant "during what time," "so long as"; and the first came to the meaning "so long as" through the conception "all the time till when."

The connectives in Latin are, again, *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad*, together with *quamdiu*. For *dum*, as we have seen, "so long as" is the original meaning as soon as the relative stage has been reached. *Quoad* and *donec*, if either of the first two explanations cited above for the latter is correct, meant originally "till when," and got the secondary meaning of "so long as" in the same way in which εἰς ὃ κε got it; while, if Per Persson's theory is correct, *donec*, like *quamdiu*, meant "so long as" from the outset.

φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ,
ἥ μ' ἔξει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, εἰς ὃ κ' αὐτμὴ
ἐν στήθεσσι μένη καί μοι φίλα γούνατ' ὀρώρη. — I 608.

"For I deem that I have been honored by the judgment of Zeus, which shall abide with me amid my beaked ships, so long as my breath *shall* dwell in my body and my knees move."

τόφρα γὰρ οὖν βίότον τε τὸν καὶ κτήματ' ἔδονται,
ὅφρα κε κείνη τοῦτον ἔχῃ νόον, ὃν τινά οἱ νῦν
ἐν στήθεσσι τιθεῖσι θεοί. — β 123.

"For they will devour your life and substance so long as she *shall* retain the mind which now the gods put in her breast."

χρήματα δ' αὐτε κακῶς βεβρώσεται, οὐδέ ποτ' ἴσα
ἔσσεται, ὅφρα κεν ἦ γε διατρίβῃσιν Ἀχαιοὺς
δν γάμον. — β 203.

"So now again his substance shall be miserably devoured, and no return be made, so long as she *shall* delay the Achaeans in her marriage."

In Plaut. Men. 90, I find a relic of an old Latin construction of the same kind, rather than a proviso. The proviso is less

natural in the context ; and the line following (*facile adservabis, dum eo uinclo uincies*), even if it is the work of a later hand, seems also to indicate what to a Roman the feeling of *dum praebeas* was.

Dum tu illi, quod edit et quod potet, praebeas
suo arbitratu usque ad fatim cottidie,
numquam hercle effugiet. — Plaut. Men. 90.

“As long as you *shall* give him to eat and to drink every day to his heart’s content, he’ll never run away.”

In classical Latin, the anticipatory subjunctive has entirely given way, after primary tenses, before the general onward movement of the future indicative.

Dum capitolium
scandet cum tacita virgine pontifex
dicar * * * * *
* * * * *
princeps Aeolium carmen ad Italos
deduxisse modos. — Hor. Carm. III. 30, 8.

“So long as the priest *shall* climb the Capitol in the company of the silent virgin, it will be said of me” . . .

It is easily seen how perfectly adapted the future indicative, which in the previous construction seemed out of place, is to the construction before us. The verb conveys a statement of future fact (“the priest shall climb . . .”), and the main statement is to be true for all the time during which this future fact continues. It is not strange that so natural a construction should wholly have displaced the anticipatory subjunctive after primary tenses.

After a secondary tense, however, as we have already seen for the other constructions under this head, no way existed for the expression of a future idea except the anticipatory subjunctive (here the imperfect); and this mode accordingly remained in full possession here, and contributed to the building up of the idioms of the Oratio Obliqua and of Assimilation.

Dum is ibi bellum gereret, Cornelio prorogatum imperium.

— Liv. 41, 21, 2.

“So long as he *should* be carrying on the war in this region, the command of Cornelius is continued.”

Edixit . . . neu quis militis, donec in castris esset, bona consideret aut venderet. — Liv. 2, 24, 6.

“He gave orders that none of the soldiers, so long as he *should* be in camp, should have property or sell it.”

II. CLAUSES OF LESS EXACT DETERMINATION.

The determinative clauses thus far dealt with express an exact determination of the antecedent ; so, *e.g.*, the *ὅς*-clause (*the* person who), the clause with *εἰς ὃ κε*, *dum*, etc., meaning until (“during *all the* time until when”), the clause with *εἰς ὃ κε*, *dum*, etc., meaning so long as (“during *all the* time during which”). There remain the clauses with *πρίν*, *πρίν γ’ ὅτ’ ἄν*, *antequam*, *priusquam*, etc., which express the vaguer idea of a limit at *any or some* time before which the main act is not to take place, or is to take place, etc.

Of these constructions, the *πρίν*-clause presents the greatest difficulty.

The history of opinion with regard to the nature of *πρίν* itself, and the character of the constructions which it introduces, has been fully given by Sturm, in his study upon the “Geschichtliche Entwicklung der Konstruktionen mit *πρίν*” in Schanz’s *Beiträge*, and need not here be sketched.

Sturm’s article is a notable one, not simply for its historical survey, but also for its orderly presentation of examples. Yet I do not find myself able to accept its conclusions.

In brief, we may summarize Sturm’s view as follows, after premising that the subjunctive construction is used only after a negative main verb, and that the *ἄν* which always accompanies the *πρίν* in Attic prose is not found in any of the seven¹ subjunctive examples in Homer.

(1) The construction expresses the will (pp. 242 and 251 of the continuously paged Volume I. of the *Beiträge*, or 26 and 35 of the separately paged study). The examples selected to illustrate this force are Σ 134: *ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν μὴ πω καταδύσῃς μῶλον Ἀρηος, | πρίν γ’ ἐμὲ δεῦρ’ ἐλθοῦσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδῆαι*, “go not down into the battle: first see me coming,” and Ω 551:

¹ The number is commonly given as six. So by Sturm and Vogrinz.

οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις· πρὶν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθησθα, "nicht wirst du ihn zum Leben erwecken; eher sollst du noch ein anderes Leid erdulden" (Sturm's translation).

That Sturm really has in mind the full volitive idea is shown by the illustration which he chooses, viz., A 522: ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν αὖτις ἀπόστιχε, μὴ τι νοήσῃ | Ἥρη, "go now, Hera must not see you" ("gehe jetzt, Here soll dich nicht sehen").

(2) In Homer, the particle *ἄν* is necessarily lacking, the reason being the originally paratactic character of the relation of the two sentences concerned. ("Bei Homer fehlte notwendigerweise die Partikel *ἄν*, was sich aus der ursprünglich paratactischen Fügung der Periode erklärte," p. 287 or 71.)

(3) The construction is closely related to a condition, being replaceable by *ἐάν μὴ πρότερον*. Hence the *ἄν* of the condition came over into the *πρίν*-clause (p. 286 or 70).

In criticising these points I shall take them up in the inverse order.

(3) To many minds the idea that the *πρίν*-clause and the conditional clause with *ἐάν* are near relations will, I concede, have weight. To mine it does not. A relationship that requires the insertion of a negative into the one construction to make it like the other (*πρίν* = *ἐάν μὴ πρότερον*) is a very remote relationship. The reasoning, too, if carried as far as this, would have to be carried a good deal farther. *E.g.*, "I shall stay until he comes" (*ἕως ἄν, dum*, etc.) might be regarded as the equivalent of "I shall stay *if* he does *not meanwhile* come." "I shall stay so long as he shall be absent" (*ἕως ἄν, dum*) might be taken as an equivalent of "I shall stay *if* he shall *meanwhile* be absent." These clauses should then, with equal reason, be treated as conditions. But such an explanation substitutes a forcing process in place of the simple and easy recognition in these constructions of a perfectly natural and suitable meaning of the subjunctive, independently known to exist. If, further, the idea of futurity is sufficient for the future condition ("if . . . shall"), it is also, directly and independently, sufficient for the *ἕως ἄν* clause in the sense of until ("until . . . shall"), and in the sense of so long as ("so long as . . . shall"); and it is also, directly and independently, sufficient for the *πρίν ἄν* clause. No reason can be assigned for limiting

the strict applicability of the idea of futurity to that one kind of clause referring to the future, which we call the condition.

(2) The statement that the particle *ἄν* was necessarily lacking in Homer on account of the originally paratactic character of the relation of the two sentences concerned is overdrawn. The *origin* of the construction, *i.e.*, the earliest history, would remain for ever the same; and there would be no more necessity on this ground for the omission of the particle in Homer than for its omission in Attic, unless evidence can be shown that the construction in Homer is, to a considerable extent, still paratactic. But this is not the case. On the contrary, every one of the examples, if, as Sturm thinks, they are volitive, is demonstrably hypotactic. Monro (*Homeric Syntax*², p. 269), has noticed that this is the case with *πᾶθῃσθα* (No. 8, below), since Greek does not express a command in the second person singular by the subjunctive;¹ and the same holds for *ἴδῃαι* (No. 1). Further, the will expressed in parataxis must necessarily be the will of the person speaking; whereas in all the examples except these two the will is that of some one else. If, then, the construction is already completely hypotactic, there was no necessity for the omission of *ἄν* in Homer. Sturm's doctrine, to be consistent with itself, should be that, though the construction is in Homer already completely hypotactic, and though in Homer *ἄν* is used in the majority of cases with the future condition, still the use was not yet sufficiently carried through in the latter construction to make the fact seem remarkable that the *πρίν*-clause does not yet begin to feel its influence.

(1) Sturm's method deals with things too much in the large. In quoting (p. 251 or 35) Delbrück's principle that *κεν* never appears with the subjunctive of the will, and generally does appear with the subjunctive of expectation, and in forthwith concluding that in accounting for the subjunctive after *πρίν* we must go back to an original parataxis of two sentences, the second of which, introduced by *πρίν*, contained a subjunctive of the will, Sturm is simply employing what might be called the supposed general laws of the game of syntax, and handling his examples in the

¹ Monro is wrong, however, in saying also that the construction could not be paratactic if the meaning is that of a future. The existence of the independent anticipatory subjunctive without *ἄν* or *κε* in Homer is beyond question.

mass, without bestowing any scrutiny upon the individual case, further than the preliminary notice that none of the seven contains *ἄν*.

If this scrutiny had been given, Sturm would have found two classes, not one. Of the two examples which he uses as a model for the original paratactic state, the first, viz. Σ 134, suggests volitive feeling ("do not go down into the moil of battle: first see me coming," = "do not go down until you see me coming"). But the other, Ω 551, cannot possibly be volitive. The attitude of Achilles toward Priam from 507 on (the passage is a long one) has been sympathetic. Near its end Achilles says, "Keep courage, and lament not unabatingly in thy heart. For nothing wilt thou avail by grieving for thy son, neither shalt thou bring him back to life." I cannot believe that the poet meant his hero, in his closing words (immediately following), to threaten Priam with death, — which, in this connection, would be the only possible force of an expression of the will. Our example must be a case of the anticipatory subjunctive without *ἄν* or *κε*, seen on p. 12. And the same must be the case with the subjunctive in κ 174 (see No. 7, on p. 80 below). The meaning cannot be "we shall not yet go down to the house of Hades: it is our will that ere that time the day of fate shall come." Whatever the case may be with the remaining examples, these two must be classed at once as anticipatory.

Let us, then, endeavor to construct a theory based upon a scrutiny of the individual examples, as well as upon general considerations independently reached.

The complete list down to Aeschylus is as follows: —

1. ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν μὴ πω καταδύσῃς μῶλον Ἄρης,
πρίν γ' ἐμὲ δεῦρ' ἐλθούσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἶδῃαι. — Σ 134.
2. μήτηρ δ' οὐ με φίλη πρίν γ' εἶα θωρήσσεσθαι,
πρίν γ' αὐτὴν ἐλθούσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἶδωμαι. — Σ 189.
3. οὐ γάρ μιν πρόσθεν παύσεσθαι οἶω
κλαυθμοῦ τε στυγεροῖο γόοιό τε δακρυόεντος,
πρίν γ' αὐτόν με ἶδῃται. — ρ 7.
4. σοὶ δ' οὐ πω φίλον ἐστὶ δαήμεναι οὐδὲ πυθέσθαι,
πρίν γ' ἔτι σῆς ἀλόχου πειρήσῃαι. — ν 335.

5. ὥς Ἀντήνορος υἱὸς ἀγανοῦ, δῖος Ἀγήνωρ,
οὐκ ἔβλεν φεύγειν, πρὶν πειρήσaiτ' Ἀχιλλῆος. — Φ 579.
6. ἦ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς
πέμπων μ' ὧδ' ἐπέτελλε μελαινάων ἀπὸ νηῶν,
μὴ πρὶν πημανέειν, πρὶν δωδεκάτῃ μόλῃ ἧς. — Ω 779.
7. ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ πω καταδυσόμεθ' ἀχνύμενοί περ
εἰς Ἀἶδαο δόμους, πρὶν μόρσιμον ἡμᾶρ ἐπέλθῃ. — κ 174.
8. ἄνσχεο, μῆδ' ἀλίσστον ὀδύρεο σὸν κατὰ θυμόν·
οὐ γάρ τι πρήξεις ἀκαχήμενος υἱὸς ἑῆος,
οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις· πρὶν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθῃσθα. — Ω 549.
9. οὐδέ ποτε λήγουσι θεαὶ δεινοῖο χόλοιο
πρὶν γ' ἀπὸ τῷ δώωσι κακὴν ὄπιν, ὅστις ἀμάρτη.
— Hes. Theog. 221.
10. μῆδέ ποτ' ἀενάων ποταμῶν καλλιῖρροον ὕδωρ
ποσσι περᾶν, πρὶν γ' εὕξῃ ἰδὼν ἐς καλὰ ῥέεθρα.
— Hes. Op. 737.
11. μῆδὲ δίκην δικάσης, πρὶν ἄμφω μῦθον ἀκούσης.
— Pseudophocylidea 87.¹
12. μὴ ποτ' ἐπαινέσης, πρὶν ἂν εἰδῇς ἄνδρα σαφηνέως,
ὄργην καὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ τρόπον ὅστις ἂν ᾖ. — Theogn. 963.
13. κέντρον δ' ἄλλος ὥς ἐγὼ λαβῶν
κακοφραδῆς τε καὶ φιλοκτῆμων ἀνὴρ
οὔτ' ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον οὔτ' ἐπαύσατο,
πρὶν ἂν ταραξᾶς πῖαρ ἐξέλῃ γάλα. — Solon 36, 18.²

In two examples, viz. 7 and 8, the mode is clearly anticipatory. In view of the smallness of the number, the omission of *ἂν* is not striking.

In all the other cases, if judged in the light of later usage, the subjunctive might, so far as the meaning is concerned, be anticipatory. But it would be overbold to assume that *ἂν* has been omitted in every one of so large a number of examples. The presumption is, therefore, in favor of a volitive origin. We accord-

¹ Probably an early proverb, which has here kept its original form.

² The subjunctive in Simonides of Amorgos, 1, 12, is rightly held to be corrupt, since, unlike other instances in Greek, it does not follow a negative. See Sturm, p. 273.

ingly need to examine each case, to see whether, in the nature of the contents, the volitive interpretation can, without forcing, be accepted.

In 1, 10, and 11, we have cases in which the hypothesis that the mode expresses the will of the speaker is perfectly reasonable. The construction is already hypotactic, but illustrates what the paratactic stage must have been (*e.g.*, "do not yet go down into the moil of battle: first see me coming" = "until you see me coming").

In 2 we have the same sentence as in 1, but thrown into the indirect form. It expresses not the will of the speaker, but that of the subject of the main sentence. The power to express the will of another than the speaker had been gained long before Homer's time in all the dependent constructions of the volitive; so that no objection to the theory of a volitive origin can be raised upon this score.

In 3, 4, 6, and 9, as well as in the indirect optative (after a secondary tense) in 5, the same interpretation is a reasonable one. In four of these cases an indication of the attitude of mind of the subject of the principal sentence is found in the words *οὐ φίλον* (4), *οὐκ ἔθελεν* (5), *ἐπέτελλε μή* (6), and *οὐδέ ποτε . . . λήγουσι χόλοιο* (9).

From the examples themselves, then, it seems clear that there are in Homer two types of *πρίν*-clauses, one with a volitive feeling, the other with an anticipatory.

Can any further proof of the existence of either feeling be had from examples of related force, but differing phraseology? I cite from Homer such as are apposite.¹

14. ἀλλ' ὄμοσον μὴ μητρὶ φίλῃ τάδε μυθήσασθαι,
πρίν γ' ὅτ' ἂν ἐνδεκάτῃ τε δυωδεκάτῃ τε γένηται. — β 373.

15. οὐ γάρ τοι πρίν μοῖρα φίλους τ' ιδέειν καὶ ἰκέσθαι
οἶκον ἐνκτίμενον καὶ σὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν,
πρίν γ' ὅτ' ἂν Αἰγύπτῳ διππετέος ποταμοῖο
αὐτὶς ὕδωρ ἔλθῃς ῥέξῃς θ' ἱερὰς ἑκατόμβας
αθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν. — δ 475.

¹ In A 29 (*τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω · πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν*) the force of the present indicative *ἔπεισιν* is probably volitive rather than anticipatory. (Cf. footnote on p. 92.)

γένναν, οὐδὲ λήξει, πρὶν ἂν ἡ κορέση κέαρ, ἡ παλάμα τινὶ
τὰν δυσάλωτον ἔλῃ τις ἄρχάν. — Aesch. P. V. 162.

20. καὶ μ' οὔτε μελιγλώσσοις πειθοῦς
ἐπαιδαῖσιν
θέλξει, στερεάς τ' οὔποτ' ἀπειλὰς
πτήξας τόδ' ἐγὼ καταμηνύσω,
πρὶν ἂν ἐξ ἀγρίων δεσμῶν χαλάσῃ
ποινάς τε τίνειν
τῇσδ' αἰκίας ἐθελήσῃ. — Aesch. P. V. 172.
21. ἦξεις δ' Ἑβριστὴν ποταμὸν οὐ ψευδώνυμον,
δν μὴ περάσῃς, οὐ γὰρ εὖβατος περᾶν,
πρὶν ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸν Καύκασον μόλῃς. — Aesch. P. V. 717.
22. νῦν δ' οὐδέν ἐστι τέρμα μοι προκείμενον
μόχθων, πρὶν ἂν Ζεὺς ἐκπέσῃ τυραννίδος. — Aesch. P. V. 755.
23. οὐκ ἔστιν αἰκισμ' οὐδὲ μηχανὴμ' ὅτφ
προτρέφεταί με Ζεὺς γεγωνῆσαι τάδε,
πρὶν ἂν χαλασθῇ δεσμὰ λυμαντήρια. — Aesch. P. V. 989.
24. τοιοῦδε μόχθου τέρμα μή τι προσδόκα
πρὶν ἂν θεῶν τις διάδοχος τῶν σῶν πόνων
φανῇ, θελήσῃ τ' εἰς ἀναύγητον μολεῖν,
Ἄιδην κνεφαῖά τ' ἀμφὶ Ταρτάρου βάθῃ. — Aesch. P. V. 1026.

With the exception of number 24 and the second verb in number 19, where the volitive idea would be out of place, these examples might have been put either with the volitive feeling or with the anticipatory. In number 21, indeed, the general sense of the sentence is very similar to that of the Homeric examples number 1 and (indirectly put) numbers 2 and 3 (see also 10 and 11), in which the absence of *ἂν* led us to the theory of a volitive origin. The usage of Aeschylus, accordingly, seems to support the conclusion reached above, that, whereas the earlier constructions had been of two kinds, the one volitive and the other anticipatory, the Greek mind, discovering that a single conception, namely the anticipatory, would answer in every case, settled down upon that.

Aristophanes, like the Attic prose writers, always uses *ἂν*. The frequent omission of *ἂν* in Sophocles and Euripides is prob-

ably to be assigned to the same love of archaisms that brought about the omission of this particle in generalizing conditions and in individualizing future conditions, and that brought about the use of *ἐς*, *νιν*, etc.

Our examination of the general question, then, has brought us to the result that, in our chapter upon the volitive subjunctive, the existence in Homer of a volitive type of the *πρίν*-clause ought to be recognized, and that similarly the existence of an anticipatory type, in Homeric as well as in later Greek, is to be recognized in the present chapter.

This anticipatory clause, inasmuch as it specifies a time before which something is *not* to be done, may be called the

Clause of the Earliest Possible Date.

ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ πω καταδυσόμεθ' ἀχνύμενοί περ
εἰς Ἄϊδαο δόμους, πρὶν μόρσιμον ἡμᾶρ ἐπέλθῃ. — κ 174.

"O friends, for all our sorrow, we shall not yet awhile go down to the house of Hades, before the day of destiny *shall* come."

Similarly Ω 549.

μή ποτ' ἐπαινίσης πρὶν ἂν εἰδῇς ἄνδρα σαφηνέως.

— Theogn. 963.

(The first extant example with *ἄν*.) "Never praise a man before knowing him thoroughly."

The Latin clauses obviously corresponding to the *πρίν*-clauses (though possessing a much wider range) are introduced by *antequam*, *priusquam*, etc. These connectives are clearly relatives, and leave us without knowledge of the state of the sentences in the paratactic stage. We may conceive them to have been probably of two types, as in the case of Greek, — namely, the volitive and the anticipatory. These types may be illustrated by the sentences that follow : —

My will is to see Pistoclerus ; do not suffer me before that to meet Nicobulus (modelled on Plaut. Bacch. 174).

Day will dawn ; I want to get out of the city first (modelled on Plaut. Amph. 533).

The construction follows either a negative, as in Greek, or a positive. In the former case, the clause expresses the time before which something is not to be done, will not be done, etc. ; in the latter, the time before which something is to be done, will be done, etc. The construction may then bear the name of the

(a) **Clause of the Earliest Possible Date, or Latest Possible Boundary.**

Manus vetat priusquam penes sese *habeat* quicquam credere. — Plaut. Truc. 901.

“My hand forbids my crediting anything *before* (until) it *closes* over something.”

Exire ex urbe prius quam luceat volo. — Plaut. Amph. 533.
“I want to be out of the city before dawn *shall* come.”

(b) The sharp determinative idea seen in the citations above pales or disappears in many examples, and the act of the clause simply indicates something *in prevision of which* the main act takes place, — something counted upon and provided for.

In this vaguer stage of its development, the construction may be named the

Clause of an Anticipated Act in preparation for which the main act takes place.

The introductory phrases are *antequam*, *priusquam*, and *pridie quam*.

After primary tenses the construction may be replaced by the present indicative (see foot-note on p. 91). After secondary tenses it of course remains firmly fixed.

Ego enim ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam, equos sustinebo. — Cic. Ac. Pr. 2, 29, 94. “For, like a shrewd driver, I shall hold up my horses *before* (in anticipation of) *coming* to the end.”

Priusquam ab Roma profiscisceretur, litteras Praeneste misit, ut . . . — Liv. 42, 1, 7. “*Prior to* (in anticipation of) *leaving* Rome, he sent on instructions to Praeneste, that ” . . .

Cottidie, antequam pronuntient, vocem cubantes sensim excitant. — Cic. De Or. 1, 59, 251.

. . . sicut medico diligenti, priusquam conetur aegro adhibere medicinam, non solum morbus eius, cui mederi volet, sed etiam consuetudo valentis et natura corporis cognoscenda est. — Cic. De Or. 2, 44, 186.¹

The construction, becoming familiar in the case of a regular anticipation of one act by another, is then employed even where the circumstances make prevision impossible.²

Discunt haec miseri, antequam sciant vitia esse. — Quintil. 1, 2, 8.

"Unhappily, children learn these things *before knowing* that they are vices."

Transferred from man to nature, the same formula is used in the case of any regularly recurring precedence of one act by another.

Cornua nata prius vitulo quam frontibus extent
illius iratus petit atque infestus inurget. — Lucr. 5, 1034.

"Ere the horns of a calf are formed and project from his forehead, he butts with it when angry and pushes out in his rage." (Monro's translation.)

Huius folia sicuti labruscae, priusquam decidant, sanguineo colore mutantur. — Plin. N. H. 14, 37.

It follows from what has been said, that in narration, in the strict earlier use, the subjunctive is employed of an act represented as *looked forward to* by some person mentioned in the main clause, and seen by him as the expected limit, etc., for that act; while the indicative is used of an act *looked back upon* by the speaker or writer, and seen by him as the actual limit, etc., of the main act.

¹ In such sentences the construction is practically an equivalent for the future participle. Cf. with *priusquam proficisceretur* above the participle *acturus* in the following: cum vocem praepararet *acturus* in consulatu principi gratias . . . — Plin. Ep. 2, 1, 5.

² The indicative, however, is also used in Ciceronian and later, as well as in earlier Latin, contrary to the opinion of Riemann (Gramm. Lat.² § 213 (2)), "l'emploi de l'indicatif paraît être ici archaïque."

Membris utimur prius quam didicimus cuius ea utilitatis causa habeamus.

— Cic. Fin. 3, 20, 66.

Ideo non est ante edendum quam illa (fames) imperat. — Sen. Ep. Mor. 22, 6, 2.

For the indicative in similar sentences in early Latin, cf. Varro, L. L. 7, § 58, and Plaut. Mil. 709 (cited by Riemann), Enn. Ann. 224.

This original difference, however, breaks down, and the subjunctive comes to be used with freedom where an earlier syntax would have demanded the indicative, as in the following :—

Ducentis quippe annis antequam Clusium oppugnarent urbemque Romam caperent, in Italiam Galli transcederunt. — Liv. 5, 33, 5.

“Two hundred years, in fact, before the time when they *were* to besiege Clusium and take the city of Rome, the Gauls came into Italy.”

Ante triennium quam Carthago deleatur, M. Cato, perpetuus diruendae eius auctor, L. Censorino M' Manilio consulibus mortem obiit. — Vell. Pat. 1, 13, 1.

“Three years before Carthage *was to* fall, Marcus Cato, the constant advocate of its destruction, departed this life, in the consulship of Lucius Censorinus and Manius Manilius.”

The grounds of this change are obscure, but I surmise (and by my choice of examples and my translations have endeavored to suggest) a confusion between the prevision of the narrator and the prevision of the actor, — what may be called a kind of historical prevision.

This attitude of mind frequently appears in English, as in the following :—

Six or seven years after that, she had, as it were, given him his crown, which only a year later than this she *was to* take from him. — N. Y. Post, Jan. 22, 1887.

The year after his death, was born the *future* leader of the party which . . . — N. Y. Nation, Oct. 14, 1886.

She had brought him a son who *was to* be one day famous. — Capes, Early Empire.

Not a long time was to pass away before the most lawless outrage on the order and life of a peaceful city *was to* be perpetrated by the special command of the man who, etc. — Justin McCarthy, History of Our Own Times, cap. 18.

The last example, it will be observed, closely approaches the type of the Latin examples in question.

(c) Among acts foreseen as imminent may, of course, be acts which are in their nature undesirable, and which, if suitable prior

action be taken, may not themselves take place, or may take place too late to do injury. A clause expressing such an act may be called a

Clause of an Act Anticipated and Forestalled (after a positive main clause) or **Insisted Upon** (after a negative).

Inspice hoc facinus! prius quam fiat, prohibesceis scelus! — Enn. Fab. 293. "Look upon this deed! Ere it (*shall*) be done, forbid the crime!"

Haerens in tergo Romanus prius quam fores portarum obicerentur, velut agmine uno irrumpit. — Liv. I. 14, 11.

This secondary association of the idea of complete prevention brings about the occasional use of a form of *possum* as a fuller exposition of the thought.

Prius in hostium castris constiterunt quam plane ab his videri aut quid rei gereretur cognosci *posset*. — Caes. B. G. 3, 26, 3. Similarly B. C. 2, 34, 6, and often.

In an occasional variation, the clause expresses something forestalled in the sense of not being waited for.

Priusquam castra videat aut hostem, insanit. — Liv. 22, 39, 6.

"*In advance of seeing* the camp or the enemy, he is already in a state of madness."

A negative in the main clause gives to the dependent clause the character of something insisted upon, secured, or accomplished.

Inde non prius egressus est, quam rex eum data dextra in fidem reciperet. — Nep. 2. 8. 4.

"He did not (would not) come out of the sanctuary until the king *should* give him (gave him) his right hand and the promise of protection." Similarly Verg. Aen. 1, 192.

(*d*) Closely allied to the conception conveyed by this last clause when it follows an affirmative main clause (act forestalled) is the conception of an act not as in any strict temporal relation to the main act, but only as imagined and deprecated. At the extreme, the time relation is entirely lost, as in Andr. 797, below.

The passage to this idea may be seen in the following:—

Senex sum ; utinam mortem obpetam, priu' quam evenat,
quod in pauperie mea senex graviter gemam. — Enn. Fab. 195.

"I am old ; may death come upon me, *before* it . . . *shall* befall me . . ." ("rather than that it should befall me . . .").

Clauses expressing this conception have for introductory phrases *antequam*, *priusquam*, *citius quam*, *potius quam*, and *libentius quam*, and, after *malo* (as in Iuv. 8, 269), simply *quam*. *Citius* must originally have expressed priority in time, like the Latin *prius* and *ante* and the English "rather than" (= "earlier than") and "sooner than," and have come to its ordinary force by a process parallel to that through which the English phrases passed. The phrases *potius quam* and *libentius quam* probably came into use through being felt to be equivalents for *ante quam* and *prius quam*, after those phrases had come to their secondary meaning.

To this construction we may give the name of the

Clause of an Act Anticipated and Deprecated.¹

Animam omittunt prius quam loco demigrent. — Plaut. Amph. 240. "They die sooner than (= rather than) leave their post."

Potius quam id non fiat, ego dabo. — Plaut. Pseud. 554. "Rather than see it not come off, I'll give the money myself."

Eripiet quivis oculos citius mihi quam te
contemptum cassa nuce pauperet. — Hor. S. 2, 5, 35.

Quae sese inhoneste optavit parere hic ditias
potius quam in patria honeste pauper viveret.

— Ter. Andr. 797.

Similarly Ter. Ad. 108 and 240, Eun. 174, Phorm. 407 ; Cic. Brut. 3, 11 ; Fin. 2, 20, 66 ; Tusc. 2, 22, 52 ; Nep. 18, 11, 4.

By the use of a statement of an extremely improbable future event in the main sentence, the act of the dependent clause may itself be represented as extremely improbable, as in Verg. Ecl. 1, 61 : —

¹ The distinction between this sub-category and the preceding is not an imaginary one. While *prius quam* and *ante quam* may be substituted for *potius* or *citius quam* in the examples under (d), the reverse cannot be done in the examples under (c).

Ante pererratis amborum finibus exul
aut Ararim Parthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim,
quam nostro illius labatur pectore voltus.

"The Parthian shall drink the Saone and the German the Tigris, each roaming in exile over the other's boundaries, before the image of his countenance *shall* pass from my heart."

Cf. Hor. Carm. I, 33, 7.

A still further building up of the introductory phrases takes place through the addition of *ut*.

Multi ex plebe spe amissa, potius quam ut cruciarentur tra-
hendo animam, capitibus obvolutis se in Tiberim praecipitaverunt.
— Liv. 4, 12, 11.

It is quite possible that, under the mental attitude of aversion which is expressed in the dependent clause in the present category, a volitive feeling should come to associate itself with the mode, such as is seen in the following English examples :—

But let
The frame of things disjoint, both the worlds suffer,
Ere we will eat our meal in fear, and sleep
In the affliction of these terrible dreams.
— Shakespeare, Macbeth, III. II.

I will do anything, Nerissa, ere I will be married to a sponge.
— Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, I. II.

Pay him six thousand, and deface the bond ;
Double six thousand, and then treble that,
Before a friend of this description
Shall loose a hair through my Bassanio's fault.
— Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, III. II.

The force is of course not that the subordinate act is really willed, but that the main act is willed in preference to it. The feeling might be paraphrased by the sentence "my will is that A should happen rather than (it is) that B should happen." This practically amounts to a denial of the will in the subordinate member, which is thus left in the same position as the second of two

infinitives connected by *magis quam* after a verb like *malo*. The same explanation holds for a future indicative like *carebo*, given below (p. 92).

In general, the anticipatory subjunctive maintains itself firmly against the corresponding future or future perfect indicative¹ in these constructions. Yet breaks occasionally occur:—

¹ The so-called present indicative may replace the anticipatory subjunctive in any of these constructions after a primary tense, except with the phrases *potius quam*, *citius quam*, etc., but not of course after a secondary tense,—where, as before, the anticipatory subjunctive was a necessity, and contributed to the building up of the idioms of the *Oratio Obliqua* and *Assimilation*.

Examples follow:—

Earliest date or latest boundary: *necumquam hercle hodie hic prius edes, ne frustra sis, quam te hoc facturum quod rogo adfirmas mihi*. — Plaut. Pers. 140. *si quemquam nactus eris qui perferat, litteras des antequam discedimus*. — Cic. Att. 10, 15, 4.

Act in preparation for which: *nunc, antequam ad sententiam redeo, de me pauca dicam*. — Cic. Cat. 4, 10, 20. In this clause, the present indicative is much commoner than the subjunctive.

Act forestalled: *heus, Nausistrata, priusquam huic respondes temere, audi*. — Ter. Phorm. 1037. Act forestalled in the sense of not waited for: *pergin istuc prius diiudicare quam scis quid veri siet?* — Ter. Heaut. 237.

Act deprecated: *omnia experiri certumst priusquam pereō*. — Ter. And. 311. *sed mihi vel tellus optem prius ima dehiscat, | vel Pater omnipotens adigat me fulmine ad umbras | . . . ante, Pudor, quam te violo, aut tua iura resolvo*. — Verg. Aen. 4, 24.

This indicative, however, must be regarded, not, like the future indicative, as the final point reached in a natural drift, but as a separate construction of an entirely different history from the future. My view of this history has been expressed by Mr. C. P. Deane, in a paper entitled “Deliberative Questions, Indicative and Subjunctive, in Terence,” written for the degree of Bachelor of Arts at Cornell University, and published in the Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1890 (Vol. XXI.). I quote a short passage:—

“The explanation of the use of the present Professor Hale offers with less confidence, but in the belief that it is reasonable enough to be proposed for discussion.

“We are accustomed to think of the verb in Greek and Latin as having always possessed the complete development of apparatus which we find in the literature. Yet it can be shown that various forms, *e.g.*, the future indicative and the imperfect subjunctive, are of comparatively late origin. There must, in all probability, have been a time when that which finally came to be called the present indicative was the sole modal form existing, serving in a rude way to express all forces of mode and tense, just as in Anglo-Saxon, *e.g.*, it is actually found to be fulfilling the function of a future indicative. It is a reasonable proposition that some of the early uses of this primitive omni-modal and omni-temporal indicative may have survived into classical times alongside of more developed forms of expression. Certainly Latin offers a striking number of constructions of the present indicative in which such an explanation would dispose of difficult anomalies,

Clause of earliest date: si minus, [non veniam] antequam necesse erit. — Cic. Att. 13, 48, 1; de qua vereri non ante desinam quam illam excisam esse cognovero. — Cic. Sen. 6, 18.

Clause of act in preparation for which: priusquam pugnabo. — Plaut. Pseud. 524; priusquam quouiam convivae dabis. — Pseud. 885; priusquam messim facies. — Cat. Agr. 134, 1. Similarly, priusquam immolabis (ibid.), with an exactly corresponding subjunctive *condas* intervening; priusquam ages, ibid. 72.

Clause of act not waited for (variation of clause of act fore-stalled): criminum invidia pro reo est, priusquam probabitur. — Quintil. 4, 3, 6. To express something insisted upon, the future perfect comes into good and frequent use: neque prius quam debellavero absistam. — Liv. 44, 39, 9; respondeam . . . neque desitutum ante invictum vestrum inperatorem incusare, quam finitum aliqua tolerabili condicione bellum videro. — Liv. 23, 12, 10.

Clause of act deprecated: perdam operam potius quam carebo filia. — Plaut. Cist. 358. With force of extreme improbability: maria ante exurere Turno, | quam sacras dabitur pinus. — Verg. Aen. 9, 115.

— viz. conditions in a future sense (a very common construction; cf. the habitual use of the tense in modern English, as in Anglo-Saxon); clauses with *dum* alongside of subjunctive clauses; clauses with *antequam* and *priusquam* alongside of subjunctive clauses; declarations exactly corresponding to indicative deliberative questions, seen in abundance in Plautus and Terence, and occasionally later; e.g., *nihil do* = *I won't give a thing*, Phorm. 669; *non sto* = *I won't stay*, Trin. 1059; *non audio*, Phorm. 486, *non eo*, 893; *non emo*, Heaut. 611; and, finally, the constructions of the present indicative which are the subject of our paper."

I may add that the same use of the present indicative occurs in Sanskrit, according to Monier Williams, Sanskrit Grammar, §§ 873-876, and Speijer, Sanskrit Syntax, § 324, 1, in expressions of expectation or intention, in deliberative questions and exhortations (probably strictly resolves), in narration, and with *yāvat*, "so long as (shall)." It also occurs (Speijer, § 476) with *yāvat*, "until (shall)" and "in order that," with *yad* and *yathā*, "in order that" (Speijer, §§ 468, 471, and 478), with *purā*, "before" (Speijer, 324, Rem. 1).

VITRUVIUS AND THE GREEK STAGE.¹

BY EDWARD CAPPS.

THE discussion of the past ten years on the subject of the stage in the Greek theatre has made substantial progress towards a definite settlement. It was begun by Höpken,² who held that, during the classical period, actors and chorus performed their parts together in the orchestra, which was brought up to the level of the low proscenium by the erection of a large semicircular platform, the proscenium being used almost exclusively for the support of the heavy scenic appliances. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff³ soon after attempted to prove that the four earliest extant plays of Aeschylus were given in a circular orchestra about which the spectators sat or stood, there being no scena of any kind. The first to raise distinctly the issue of the existence or non-existence of an elevated stage in the classical Greek theatre was Dr. Dörpfeld, who has been the leading representative of the new theory ever since. By him arguments⁴ were advanced, drawn from extended investigations of the ruins of ancient theatres recently excavated, which up to this time have baffled all attempts to overthrow them, and which will necessitate an entire revision of previously accepted opinions upon the subject. The following

¹ First published as a preprint from the *Studies*, in June, 1893.

² *De theatro attico saeculi a. Chr. quinti*. Bonnae, 1884. Höpken was treated with considerable severity by his early reviewers (Müller, *Phil. Anz.* XV, 525 ff. and Petersen, *Wien. Stud.* VII, 179 ff.), but his views have been steadily gaining ground of late, in spite of his somewhat faulty method.

³ *Die Bühne des Aeschylus*, *Hermes* XXI, 607 ff.

⁴ First made public in the appendix to A. Müller's *Bühnenalterthümer*; stated more fully by Kawerau in Baumeister's *Denkmäler s. v. Theatergebäude*, and by Dörpfeld himself in his review of Haigh's *Attic Theatre* in *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1890, 467. The completest statement of the archaeological side of the question is found in Pickard's *Der Standort der Schauspieler und des Chors*, Part I, Munich, 1892. The report of Dörpfeld's lectures in the Athens *Ἐφημερίς* of Oct. 27 and 29, 1891, contains additional valuable matter. Cf. Harrison's *Mythology and Monuments*, 285 ff.

statement is a summary of his views so far as they have been made public :

None of the scena-buildings now standing in the theatre of Dionysus were built until the fourth century before Christ. The present cavea and the oldest part of the scena-buildings were completed by Lycurgus in the second half of the fourth century. The proscenium now standing was erected in the reign of Nero and altered during the time of Phaedruss, about 290 A.D. Of the theatre which preceded the theatre of Lycurgus a few traces are found. The orchestra was somewhat to the right of the present orchestra, and considerably farther back. Its forward line rested on the slope of the Acropolis, and the space behind was built up to the same level, making the rear line about six feet above the solid earth. There is good evidence for concluding that there was no permanent scena-structure or proscenium whatever connected with this orchestra. The character of the scene changed with each play, and a suitable proscenium was probably built for each occasion. The position of the cavea may be fixed by a few fragments of wall still remaining. The seats for the spectators were of wood. It was in this theatre that the plays of the great dramatists were presented. During the time of Lycurgus a stone scenae frons was built. It probably reproduced in shape and position the temporary scenae frons which preceded it. No permanent proscenium was erected at Athens until some time after Lycurgus, and the time was correspondingly late at Epidaurus and elsewhere. This was during the period of the New Comedy, when, except for revivals of old plays, only one scene was needed. The proscenium was about twelve feet high, and its front was decorated with columns. A door in its centre opened directly into the orchestra without a change of level. Sometimes, as at Athens, there were two other doors, one on each side of the central door. In some theatres there was a large underground passage leading from behind the scena-buildings to the centre of the orchestra and terminating in a flight of steps.

In view of these facts Dörpfeld has been led to the following conclusions :

In the earliest theatre there was no proscenium and no stage for actors. Actors and chorus were both in the orchestra and

on the same level. Their relations were not changed on the introduction of the scena-buildings and the proscenium. The decorated proscenium was simply the house front before which the action of the piece was laid. Entrances from the house were made through the doors in the proscenium; from elsewhere, both by actors and chorus, through the *πάροδοι*. In the centre of the orchestra was the thymele, consisting of both *βωμός* and *βήμα*. The *βήμα* could be mounted by actors when necessary. The top of the proscenium was used only as the roof of the house. In further support, Dörpfeld shows that the top of the proscenium could not have been a stage for actors, first, because of its narrowness,¹ and secondly, because of its height above the orchestra.² Not the slightest evidence can be drawn from the ruins that steps ever existed leading from the orchestra to the top of the proscenium. Such steps would have marred the architectural effect of the proscenium front, would have rendered useless a large portion of the orchestra, and above all would not have allowed that free intermingling of actors and chorus which the dramas demand.

Both Höpken and Dörpfeld recognized from the first the value of corroborative evidence from the plays themselves. That abundant evidence was to be obtained from this source was at once apparent. Scholars had for a long time felt the incongruity between the natural suggestions of the dramas and the traditional arrangements for their presentation. Jebb,³ Furley,⁴ and Verrall⁵ each made some contributions to the material already presented. Professor John Williams White⁶ then made a searching examina-

¹ At Epidaurus it was less than ten feet wide, at Athens about seven and one-half feet, and still less in smaller theatres; about two feet of this would have to be given up for scenery.

² It was to meet this difficulty that G. Hermann suggested, on the strength of some ancient notices, a platform in the orchestra built up to within a few feet of the top of the proscenium. See *Opusc.* VI, 2, 153 ff., and Müller, *Bühnenalt.*, 129. His view was universally accepted until recent years, but may now be regarded as completely demolished. See Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, 154; Pickard, 17. Oehmichen, however, still adheres to it. See p. 242 of his *Bühnenwesen*.

³ *Class. Rev.* I, 298.

⁴ *Class. Rev.* III, 85.

⁵ *Class. Rev.* IV, 223. Verrall suggests that the high Vitruvian stage was not introduced till about 431 B.C. It has been shown, however, that Aristophanes will admit of a high stage no more than Aeschylus. See p. 96 of this paper.

⁶ *The 'Stage' in Aristophanes*, *Harvard Studies* for 1891.

tion of Aristophanes, first refuting the arguments that had been raised by Müller and Haigh¹ in favor of an elevated stage on the strength of some passages in Aristophanes; then producing abundant evidence in favor of the proposition that "the comedies of Aristophanes could not have been performed on the stage of Vitruvius." One must now regard this point as definitively settled. At about the same time I undertook to prove² from an examination of the extant plays of all the great dramatists, (1) that a Vitruvian stage is highly improbable, if not impossible, during every period of the drama and in almost every play, as is shown by the movements of actors and chorus and by numerous scenes and situations; (2) that there is a total failure of positive evidence in favor of a stage, the few passages that may be adduced readily admitting of another interpretation; and (3) that there is no scene in any of the extant dramas that could not be set in a stageless theatre, always easily and generally much to the advantage of the play. Haigh's hypothesis, that during the classical period the stage was only five or six feet high, and was raised to the height required by Vitruvius only after the disappearance of the chorus from the drama, had previously been attacked by Verrall; by the two writers last mentioned it was shown to be untenable. Within the past year the dramas have again been searched for evidence on the question by two candidates for the higher degree at Munich, Pickard and Bodensteiner.³ Though their results have not been published at this writing, it is understood that they reaffirm and reinforce from different points of view those already obtained by others, and that they are entirely favorable to Dörpfeld's theory.

But from the first there has been no lack of serious opposition to the new view. The arguments of Todt,⁴ directed against

¹ *Bühnenallerthümer*, 108 ff. and *The Attic Theatre*, 144 ff.

² *The Stage in the Greek Theatre according to the extant Dramas*, published in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association* for 1891.

³ Part II of the dissertation of Pickard, adducing the evidence derived from the dramas. The writer has very kindly sent me pages of his manuscript, showing me the line of argument and his conclusions. The work of Bodensteiner is promised in the second Heft of Fleckeisen's *Jahrbücher* for 1893, and is entitled *Szenische Fragen über den Ort des Auftretens und Abgehens von Schauspielern und Chor im griechischen Drama*.

⁴ *Noch einmal die Bühne des Aeschylus*, *Philologus* XLVIII, 505 ff. His main arguments are presented and discussed by Müller, *Die neuen Arbeiten auf dem Gebiete des griechischen Bühnenwesens*, *Philologus* 1891.

Wilamowitz's theory of the scenic arrangements of the early drama, seem to have established the fact that there must have been some kind of scena or dressing-room in the earlier plays of Aeschylus at least, and that therefore the spectators at this time no longer sat in a circle on all sides of the orchestra. He argues strongly in favor of an elevated stage, insisting that wherever in the drama we find an actor sinking through the floor, *e.g.*, Prometheus and the ghost of Darius, there must have been either a corresponding elevation or a hollowing out of the ground beneath. The latter he regards as impossible. But this objection is met, for some theatres, by the discovery of the underground passages opening into the orchestra; while at Athens the Prometheus scene could have been managed by means of the declivity behind the orchestra. Oehmichen,¹ disregarding the evidence against a stage already adduced from the dramas, again cites a few scenes that had been satisfactorily explained on the new theory, again appeals to the grammarians and scholiasts, and finally asserts that the Greek literature contemporary with the drama always presupposes an elevated stage. He produces, however, only two or three citations,² all of which admit of a different explanation. His statement, if it has no further support than this, amounts to nothing. It is my belief that the contemporary literature will be found fully in harmony with the

¹ In a review of Pickard's dissertation, *Woch. für klass. Phil.* 1892, 1137.

² (1) Plat. Symp. 194 B *ὀκρίβας*, which he holds to be the *λογεῖον* in the Dionysiac theatre. But see Dörpfeld, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1890, 470, and Rohde, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXVIII, 255. (2) *ἀπὸ* and *ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς* (cf. Arist. Poetics 12), first cited by Richards, *Cl. Rev.* V, 97. For an explanation of these phrases see Reisch's review of Müller's *Bühnenalt.*, *Zeit. für österreich. Gym.* 1887, 270 ff. To these should be added Xen. Cyr. 6. 1, 28, cited by S. Reinach, *Rev. Crit.* 1892, 450, in a review of my article favorable in general to the new theory.

Since the above was written an interesting extract from a paper read by Professor E. Curtius before the Archaeological Society at Berlin, entitled *Orchestra und Bühne*, has appeared in the *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1893, No. 4. The advocates of the new doctrine are cautioned against overhaste in setting aside a well-established tradition, and a few considerations, which Professor Curtius believes to be of weight, are submitted to them. These considerations, however, are almost all of an aesthetical nature rather than logical. It should be remembered that mere theories as to the early development of the drama and subjective ideas as to the poetic and aesthetic significance and value of an elevated stage, however interesting in themselves, have no vital connection with the real question of the existence or non-existence of such a stage.

dramas themselves, and these are distinctly on the side of the new theory.

The most serious difficulty in the way of the acceptance of the new theory is the explicit statement of Vitruvius that the Greek theatre had a stage from ten to twelve feet high. Dörpfeld and most of his followers have contented themselves with the belief that Vitruvius fell into error; that while he was in general a careful writer and followed good authorities, he was led in this instance, through the want of a classical model, into confounding the Greek proscenium or decorated house-front with the Roman proscenium or stage. A confusion of *λογεῖον* with *θεολογεῖον* may have assisted in the error.¹ Höpken showed more respect to Vitruvius's intelligence but less to his writings, cutting out as interpolations all passages in which the terms *scena*, *proscenium*, and *scenae frons* are not used with the meaning of "stage-buildings," "stage," and "scena-wall" respectively, and in which measurements are given in feet and not in terms of other parts of the building. Thus he rejects the objectionable "non minus pedum decem," etc. Haigh,² who believes in a raised stage but recognizes the awkwardness of a very high one during the classical period, assumes a much lower one for that period and makes the directions of Vitruvius refer to the theatre of a later time. Now it is true that Vitruvius was probably writing of the Greek theatre as he saw it in his day, but there is nothing to show that the Greek theatre of any period had so high a stage; whereas it did have a *proscenium* of the height prescribed by him. The difficulty, so far as Vitruvius is concerned, is in no way relieved by Haigh's hypothesis. The most important attempt at explanation is that of Dyer,³ who tries to reconcile the statements of Vitruvius with the facts established by Dörpfeld, by means of a new interpretation of the Roman architect's vexed chapter on the Greek theatre. If such a reconciliation could be effected, those

¹ "Einige Schauspieler (namentlich der *deus ex machina*) traten allerdings oben auf dem *pulpitum proscenii* auf und daher konnte dieser Platz *Theologeion* oder auch kurz *Logeion* genannt werden. Aber Vitruv irrte, wenn er wirklich geglaubt hat, dass *alle* Schauspieler, getrennt vom Chor, oben in der grossen Höhe auftraten." Dörpfeld in the letter quoted on p. 112, note 1.

² *Attic Theatre*, 158.

³ *Vitruvius' Account of the Greek Stage*, *Jour. Hell. Stud.* 1891, 356 ff.

who still oppose the new theory and insist on a high stage would have their main support shattered, and yet would have compelled the defenders of the new theory to make material alterations in their views. Believing, however, that Mr. Dyer has not been successful in his vindication of Vitruvius, I have undertaken in this paper to point out the weakness of his position.

It will be necessary to the following discussion to have before us the text of Vitruvius, and not only the passage which relates to the Greek theatre, but also, for reasons which will appear later, a portion of the chapter on the Roman theatre. I give the text of Rose and Müller-Strübing.

ROMAN THEATRE, V. 6.

Ipsius autem theatri conformatio sic est facienda uti quam magna futura est perimetros imi, centro medio conlocato circumagatur linea rotundationis, in eaque quattuor scribantur trigona paribus lateribus et intervallis, quae extremam lineam circinationis tangant. ex his trigonis cuius latus fuerit proximum scaenae, ea regione qua praecidit curvaturam circinationis, ibi finiatur scaenae frons, et ab eo loco per centrum parallelos linea ducatur, quae disiungat proscaenii pulpitem et orchestrae regionem.

GREEK THEATRE, V. 8.

In Graecorum theatris non omnia isdem rationibus sunt facienda, quod primum in ima circinatione ut in Latino trigonorum quattuor, in eo quadratorum trium anguli circinationis lineam tangunt.

Et cuius quadrati latus est proximum scaenae praeciditque curvaturam circinationis, ea regione designatur finitio proscaenii. et ab ea regione ad extremam circinationem curvaturae parallelos linea designatur, in qua constituitur frons scaenae, per centrumque orchestrae a proscaenii regione parallelos linea describitur et qua secat circinationis lineas dextra ac sinistra in cornibus hemicyclii centra signantur, et circino conlocato in dextro ab intervallo sinistro circumagitur circinatio ad proscaenii sinistram¹ partem,

¹ The manuscripts all give here *dextram* and in the next sentence all but one give *dextram*. Evidently a correction must be made. Jocundus, on the strength of the one inferior manuscript, corrected the second *dextram* to *sinistram* (Dyer's statement on this point, p. 360, is not correct). But Marini's emendation of the first *dextram* to *sinistram* is better. Thus we avoid using the terms left and right now from the point of view of the spectator, now from that of the actor. See p. 107, note 3.



Ita latius factum fuerit pulpitum quam Graecorum, quod omnes artifices in scaena dant operam. in orchestra autem senatorum sunt sedibus loca designata, et eius pulpiti altitudo sit ne plus pedum quinque, uti qui in orchestra sederint, spectare possint omnium agentium gestus.

item centro conlocato in sinistro cornu ab intervallo dextro circumagitur ad proscaenii dextram partem. ita tribus centris hac descriptione ampliorem habent orchestram Graeci et scaenam recessiorem minoreque latitudine pulpitum (quod *λογεῖον* appellant)¹ ideo quod eo tragici et comici actores in scaena peragunt, reliqui autem artifices suas per orchestram praestant actiones itaque ex eo scaenici et thymelici Graece separatim nominantur. eius logei altitudo non minus debet esse pedum decem, non plus duodecim.

Contrasting the diversity of opinion among modern scholars who have attempted to interpret this passage with the agreement of the scholars of the early Renaissance, Dyer raises a presumption in favor of the latter, to whom, he thinks, Vitruvius was easier of approach, because "in those days the centre of interest was in things Roman far more than it is now." Of these early scholars he selects Jocundus, the eminent Florentine scholar and architect, who, in his editions of Vitruvius,² gives on this chapter two figures, accompanied by a key, from which we are to derive his interpretation. Where Jocundus is obscure, Dyer appeals to his pupil, J. C. Scaliger, who, it is assumed, accepted his master's views regarding the theatre and Vitruvius. Interpreting Vitruvius with the help of these scholars, Dyer finds that the term *proscenium* in chapter VIII was applied to the unused space in the Greek theatre lying between the wall of the *scaena* or green-room building (*frons scenae gg*, Fig. I, p. 104), and the decoration wall (*finitio proscenii, ee*). Many scholars, from Perrault³ to Dörpfeld, have used *proscenium* as applying only to the decoration wall erected on the line of the *finitio proscenii ee*. In fact, this

¹ The parentheses are mine.

² Venice, 1511; Florence, 1513; Florence, 1523. The key to the plan in the edition of 1513 is somewhat different from that of 1511, while that of 1523 is identical with that of 1511. But it cannot be claimed that Jocundus abandoned the view taken in the edition of 1513 (see Dyer, note 5), since it is probable that he died circ. 1515.

³ Translation of Vitruvius, second edition, Paris, 1684, note ad loc.



front wall was by far the most important part of the proscenium, but Jocundus used the term in the wider sense. The two accessory arcs are drawn to mark on the finitio proscenii the lateral limits of the *λογεῖον*, — a temporary wooden platform for the use of actors,¹ which projected from the forward line of the proscenium (*e* in Fig. II). In Fig. I of Jocundus the arcs should be extended until they cut the proscenium at the desired points. The Roman theatre was a development of the Greek, and received certain necessary modifications after the disappearance of the chorus from the drama. The pulpitum or stage became much larger in both dimensions, and received the name which had formerly belonged to the narrow unused space lying directly behind it — proscenium. What was originally known as the proscenium in the Greek theatre was now known as the scena. Therefore, when Vitruvius asks us to compare the two types of theatres we must bear in mind this difference in terms. The pulpitum or *λογεῖον* or stage of the Greek theatre, he says, is narrower than the pulpitum or proscenium or stage of the Roman theatre. The proscenii pulpitum of chapter VI does not enter into the comparison. This can be nothing else than a pulpitum projecting into the orchestra from the centre of the proscenium, corresponding exactly to the *λογεῖον* in the Greek theatre. It is not actually found in any Roman theatre, but is suggested by Vitruvius, who is fond of things Greek, as an improvement, “a refinement, in practice not observed by his predecessors nor followed by his successors.”

Such, in outline, is Dyer's explanation of Vitruvius, as derived through the medium of Jocundus. If well grounded, it affords relief to the difficulties in two respects. It acquits Vitruvius of the stupid blunder with which Dörpfeld has charged him — of displaying such ignorance of the architectural purpose of the various parts of the scena-buildings still extant in his day in theatres of the Greek type as to confound the Greek proscenium — the long narrow structure about twelve feet high, with columnated front, which served as the decorative mask for

¹ Many writers have followed Jocundus in assuming a platform of this kind in front of the Greek proscenium, but none but Schneider, *Das attische Theaterwesen* 1835, and Dyer, have tried to bring it within the directions of Vitruvius,

the scena-wall behind—with the large low proscenium-stage of the Roman theatre, and of describing the former structure as the stage for actors. It also provides for a stage in the Greek theatre, for which we have the direct testimony of other ancient antiquarians and scholars besides Vitruvius.¹ Dyer, however, holds that the stage was a temporary wooden structure, thus accounting for the absence of remains which Dörpfeld makes so weighty an argument against the existence of a stage; moreover that it was so low as to be easily accessible, thus meeting the requirements of the plays themselves. On the other hand, he still attributes to Vitruvius the serious error, only less serious than that with which Dörpfeld charges him, of making the *λογεῖον* as high as the proscenium to which it was attached. No very satisfactory explanation of the origin of this error is offered. “We must either suppose, with Dörpfeld,” says Dyer, “that Vitruvius confused the *λογεῖον* with the *θεολογεῖον*, but only so far as the dimension of height was concerned, or we must believe that our author had in mind such a theatre as that at Cuiculum (Djemila), where the level of the orchestra was considerably below that of the scena floor. This last would not be a Greek theatre, but a transitional type between the earlier Greek and the later or Roman theatre.” In answer to the latter suggestion, it should be said that it is altogether improbable that Vitruvius, with good Greek models before him, selected this out-of-the-way theatre in Africa as his type,—a theatre, too, that departed in many respects from the rules that the Roman architect lays down.²

But this subtile and cleverly constructed theory of Dyer is built on weak foundations. In the first place, the presumption in favor of the early scholars falls to the ground when we find that they were as much at variance as modern scholars. The plans of Jocundus are radically different from the curious construction of Caesarianus,³ also an architect of note; and the

¹ Pollux and many of the scholiasts to the dramatists. See Müller, *Bühnenall.*, p. 24, notes 1 and 3.

² Oehmichen, *Griechischer Theaterbau*, p. 89.

³ Earliest translation of Vitruvius, Milan, 1521. Caesarianus was one of the principal architects of the Milan cathedral. His figures, however, are worthless for the interpretation of the passage.

figures of Barbaro¹ are unlike both the others. These are the three most important interpretations of the sixteenth century. In view of this fact we must deny to Jocundus a greater influence in this question than is warranted by the intrinsic merits of his views.

The following figures are taken from Jocundus's edition of 1511,² but are reduced to a uniform scale. I have omitted unimportant details for the sake of greater perspicuity, and have added the extension of the arcs proposed by Dyer in Fig. I (the dotted lines *ox* and *oy*), the chord *xy* and the short arcs *m* and *n* in Fig. II, to assist in the comparison.

The fact is that Dyer was unfortunate in his selection of Jocundus. He is compelled at the outset to do violence to his diagrams in order to gain support for his own views. In order to make out that Jocundus believed the purpose of the two accessory arcs *xp* and *yq* (Fig. I) to be to fix the position of the *λογεῖον* on the finitio proscenii, he is compelled to extend them until they touch the finitio proscenii at the desired points, *n* and *r*. He assumes also that Jocundus drew his arcs *xp* and *yq*, not from the *left* interval to the *right* part of the proscenium and from the *right* interval to the *left* side of the proscenium respectively, as Vitruvius directs, but from the *right* interval to the *right* part of the proscenium, and *vice versa* (i.e., from *p* to *x* and from *q* to *y*). Even if we could accept his explanation of this deviation from Vitruvius's literal directions, — *viz.*, that Jocundus found that he could make it clearer to his pupils by taking the *right* centre *c*, and drawing from the *right* interval at *p* to the *right* part of the proscenium at *x*, and so from the left centre *b*, yet we could not accept an explanation which supposes that any sensible man, much less a Jocundus, who believed that it was the function of the two arcs to designate certain points *nr* on the finitio proscenii would have drawn these arcs only as far as *x* and *y*. Surely Jocundus himself would make a serious protest against such a

¹ Version of Vitruvius, Venice, 1567. His plan is that of Perrault (1674), and, with the exception of the projecting logeion, also of Oehmichen (1886).

² My thanks are due to Mr. F. Saunders for his kindness in verifying for me the measurements I had previously taken from the copy of this edition contained in the Astor Library, of which he is librarian.




FIG. I.




FIG. II.

twisting and wrenching of this diagram by his modern admirer and supporter. If still another objection were needed, it could be obtained by actual measurement of the distance nr in Fig. I and of the length of the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ e in Fig. II. It would be found that the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ is fully 60 per cent. longer than it would be if determined by the arcs as drawn by Dyer, extending from l to m (Fig. I) instead of from n to r . In a theatre as large as that at Epidaurus this difference would amount to about 15 ft. Although we see that Jocundus does not fix the position of the finitio proscenii precisely as directed by Vitruvius (it should be on the line xy , Fig. II), and although his figures in this matter also may not represent his views with absolute exactness, yet we cannot believe that he would have been so inaccurate as this in establishing the lateral limits of the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$, if he conceived this to be the purpose of the two arcs on which the peculiar construction of the Greek theatre so largely depends.

Dyer quotes Scaliger as an exponent of Jocundus's idea of the meaning of proscenium as applied to the Greek theatre: "That space on either side of the pulpitem reaching to the forward wall of the scena which was left vacant was called by the Greeks proscenium. Let no one opine that here were the sides of the scena." But no such statement is found in any work of Scaliger.¹ The original of which this purports to be a translation is by another author, and runs as follows: *Id spatium quod utrinque a pulpito ad extremam scenam vacuum relinquebatur Graeci vocabant proscenium, ne quis existimet fuisse scenae latera.* The phrase 'ad extremam scenam' can mean nothing else than "to the outer limits of the scena." The author of this rather bungling definition evidently had in mind exactly such a proscenium as Jocundus marks dd in Fig. II. We do, however, find two definitions of proscenium in Scaliger's essay: *locus ante scenam, proscenium; in quo erant agentium discursiones: and, ante quas [porticus] proscenium apertum videbatur, in quo*

¹ Dyer quotes this as from Scaliger *De Comoedia ac Tragoedia* in Vol. III (it should be VIII) of Gronovius's *Thesaurus*. It is found, however, on p. 1706 of the same volume in an essay, ascribed to no author, but simply *ex optimis aucloribus collectus*, entitled *De fabularum, ludorum, theatrorum, scenarum, ac scenicorum antiqua consuetudine libellus*. The definitions of Scaliger I take from the essay cited by Dyer, p. 1535.

agebant (ut diximus) e scena egressi. According to Scaliger, therefore, the proscenium was not "a narrow, unused space in front of the scena," but an open space used by the actors. The Vitruvian phrase, *finitio proscenii*, in which 'proscenium' clearly refers to a place with definite boundaries, compelled Jocundus to use proscenium in the restricted sense of Scaliger's definition, *viz.*: as the stage for actors; but he used it also in a larger sense as simply the space in front of the scena—this space naturally ending with the diameter which marked the beginning of the orchestra. This is seen both in the two figures illustrating the Greek theatre (*i*, Fig. I and *dd*, Fig. II) and in the first figure accompanying the chapter on the Roman theatre. In this he marks the space *d* corresponding to *dd* in Fig. II) as the proscenium ubi pulpitum excitatur. The same idea is shown in Fig. II. Jocundus thought of the proscenium in the Greek theatre as an open space, apparently on the level of the orchestra, in which was erected to the requisite height the pulpitum for actors. We certainly find no warrant in Jocundus or Scaliger for such a proscenium as Dyer ascribes to them. In view of the proscenium marked *dd* in Fig. II, we cannot explain away the proscenium *i* in Fig. I as another device of the teacher for illustrating to his pupils the difference between the Greek proscenium and the Roman. The proscenium *ff* Fig. I is abandoned in the edition of 1513 and called the *frons scenae* (see note 2, p. 100). Vitruvius himself, in his chapter on the Greek theatre, uses proscenium for the building bounded by *ee* and *gg* Fig. I, and the evidence of inscriptions¹ clearly limits the term, in its accepted use, to the forward wall of this building.

So much for Jocundus on Vitruvius and for Dyer on Jocundus. It is clear that the Florentine gives us little light on the difficulties that beset this question. But inasmuch as the views expressed in the paper under discussion are in reality Dyer's, for which he is bent on obtaining the support of Jocundus and Scaliger, let us test them by the words of Vitruvius himself.

The language of Vitruvius is obscure in several places, but not so obscure as those have made it who have hinged their whole interpretation upon a rigorous definition of this word and that.

¹ *Практика* for 1886, p. 51.

The disastrous attempt to make *centrum orchestrae*¹ mean something else than the centre of the foundation circle, and the many futile efforts to get some specific local meaning for *intervallum*,² a general term, should warn us against applying to Vitruvius the rigorous rules of modern scientific language. For Vitruvius was not always strictly exact in his use of technical terms. Even the textual difficulty with *dexter* and *sinister*³ is of little consequence to one who follows the general purpose of the writer. So far Dyer is right in his condemnation of the endless quibbling over the strict meaning of these "innocent and every day terms" which has characterized the discussion of this passage. But he himself goes too far in his disregard of the meaning of words. While he himself insists on giving a forced meaning to *proscenii pulpitum* he utterly disregards the only possible meaning of *latitudo*, and thereby goes seriously astray. Schönborn⁴ committed

¹ Rode, in his plates to Vitruvius, Berl. 1801, took *centrum orchestrae* to be the point half way between the *finitio proscenii* and the opposite circumference of the orchestra toward the spectators. He was followed by Schönborn, *Die Skene der Hellenen*, p. 50, and by A. Müller, *Philologus*, 1866, p. 284. The error was pointed out by Wecklein, *Philologus*, 1872, p. 437, and acknowledged by Müller, *N. Jahrbücher f. Philologie*, 1872, p. 332.

² Especially by Schönborn, l. c., p. 53, who held it to mean *παροδος* in this place, and by A. Müller, *Bühnenalt.*, p. 17, who believed that the word refers to one of the twelve "equal intervals" on the circumference of the ground circle. This view he retracts in *Philologus*, 1891, p. 33. Oehmichen, *Gr. Theaterbau*, p. 25, goes back to Schönborn's view.

³ The opinions of scholars on these two words fall into two classes: (1) Those who have first adopted the text either of Jocundus or of Marini and have made their interpretation according to its requirements, and (2) those who have considered the construction of greatest consequence and have adopted the text that allowed this construction. A. Müller furnishes a good example of both. He first adopted Jocundus's text, and holding that the terms "left" and "right" must be from the point of view of the actor, he followed Schönborn in his peculiar interpretation of *centrum orchestrae* (*Phil.* 1866, p. 284). Marini's text then becoming prominent in Müller-Strübing's edition, he adopts it, and so is brought back from the *centrum orchestrae* aberration. He adds, however, that if Jocundus's text be right, *dexter* and *sinister* are used from two different points of view (*Jahrbücher*, 1872, p. 332). In 1891 (*Phil.* p. 32) he argues as follows: (1) In a geometric construction such terms would be used from a single point of view throughout. (2) Vitruvius's usage favors the point of view of the spectator. (3) Drawn in this way, the first arc can touch only the *right* part of *proscenium*. Hence we must reject Marini's and adopt Jocundus's text. Müller's trouble throughout has been his inability to see the true purpose of the construction.

⁴ l. c., p. 54.

the same mistake of giving *latitudo* the meaning of *longitudo*. Müller¹ recognizes that it strictly means width (we should say 'depth'), but claims the right to use it as if it were *longitudo*, on the ground that the greater width of the Roman stage appears only in relation to its length. The Greek *pulpitum*, he would say, is narrower and therefore shorter. Dyer does not discuss the word at all, though it is vital to his position. If *latitudo* does not mean "length," either absolutely or relatively, his theory falls to the ground, for the *width* of the Greek *λογεῖον*, as Dyer understands it, is in no way affected by the construction of Vitruvius, but only that of the *proscenium*; while in the Roman theatre, if *proscenii pulpitum* is what Dyer believes it to be, no directions whatever are given for the construction of the *proscenium*, with which Dyer contends that the projecting Greek *λογεῖον* is compared. But Wecklein² has proved conclusively that *latitudo* cannot mean "length." The language of Vitruvius can admit of no uncertainty here. It is the width (*i.e.* 'depth') only that is affected by the confining of the *pulpitum* between the chord and the diameter in chapter VI; and *minore latitudine pulpitum* of chapter VIII is but the complement of *latius pulpitum* of chapter VI. Moreover, in the latter chapter he gives directions for the length, *longitudo*, of the *scena*.

Another point, vital to the discussion, Dyer takes for granted, — the radius to be used in drawing the accessory arcs. Müller's arguments for the radius of the original circle are strong so long as one does not look beyond the immediate context for the purpose of the two arcs, and does not attempt to apply his plan to the existing ruins. The greatest difficulty that those meet who assume the original radius is to decide what their arcs are for after they have drawn them. Jocundus,³ apparently, used them to determine the position of the supporting wall of the *cavea*; Schneider and Dyer to mark the position of a projecting *λογεῖον*; Müller to determine the length of the *scena*; Oehmichen that of

¹ *Jahrbücher*, 1872, 332; cf. *Bühnenall.*, p. 19.

² *Philologus*, 1872, p. 436.

³ I think we are compelled to suppose that Jocundus followed strictly the directions as to "left" and "right." He therefore drew from *x* to *p* and from *y* to *q* (Fig. I). The terminals *p* and *q*, which lie on the forward line of Jocundus's *proscenium i*, correspond exactly to *o* and *s* (Fig. II). I can see no other purpose in Jocundus's arcs.

the proscenium. Scarcely two of those who have taken this radius agree. But the ancient architect, familiar with the form of Greek theatres, had no such difficulty. The purpose of the arcs was to him so plain that he would not notice the omission of this detail. He would not think of asking "what radius?" but rather




FIG. III. — *Ground plan of theatre at Athens.*

"what centres?" Vitruvius very carefully fixes the centres; the radius follows as a corollary. The best Greek theatres had orchestras of a horse-shoe shape. Fabricius¹ has pointed out that the main point of difference in the construction of the orchestras at Athens and at Epidaurus is in the centres taken




FIG. IV. — *Ground plan of theatre at Epidaurus.*

from which to draw the lines which continue the sides of the semicircle toward the proscenium. At Athens (see Fig. III) the line is straight from the ends of the diameter to the proscenium; the centres lie at infinity. The lines at Epidaurus² (see

¹ *Rhein. Mus.* 1891, 341.

² According to the measurements of Dörpfeld, *Πρακτικά*, 1883, pp. 46 ff.

Fig. IV) leave the line of the original circumference earlier and approach the proscenium in a very gentle curve; the centres lie below the diameter and inside the circumference of the ground circle. Vitruvius gives a fixed rule, easily followed, whereby the arcs leave the original circle at the ends of the diameter and approach the proscenium in lines more curved than at Epidaurus, but much more graceful than at Athens (see Fig. V). The radius is equal in length to the diameter, and the centres lie at the ends of the diameter. The principle is the same for all. If we are not to close our eyes to the knowledge of the ancient ruins which we possess, and which Jocundus did not possess, we must agree that the purpose of the two arcs is thus to widen the orchestra and to spread apart the wings of the auditorium.

In closing his directions for constructing a Greek theatre, Vitruvius sums up the three most important variations from the




FIG. V.—*Ideal plan of Vitruvius.*

Roman type, and these variations are all accounted for in the preceding directions. The scena is farther back because it is on the tangent, not the chord. The pulpitum is narrower because it is bounded by the tangent and the side of an inscribed square, instead of by the side of an inscribed triangle and the diameter. The orchestra is roomier for two reasons, chiefly because very much less of it is occupied by the proscenium, and secondarily because it is widened by the two arcs. To go beyond this in search of the purpose of the arcs is to go farther than Vitruvius has given us a right to go.¹

¹ This application of the two arcs is not a new one. It appeared as early as 1758 in Galiani's edition. More scholars have agreed upon it than upon any other: Genelli, Marini, Gwilt, Leake, Wecklein, Höpken, Petersen, Kawerau, Fabricius, Jebb, Dörpfeld,

As we have seen, Dyer maintains that Vitruvius conceived of the Greek theatre as having a long, narrow proscenium or masked front, and projecting from the centre of this a narrow movable platform for actors, the pulpitum or *λογεῖον*, to which he wrongly gave the same height as the proscenium. In the Roman theatre this *λογεῖον* was made larger and broader, and was five feet above the level of the orchestra, and received the name proscenium. This was the Roman theatre as it actually existed. But Vitruvius in his description insists on engrafting on the front of this proscenium a proscenii pulpitum in imitation of the Greek *λογεῖον* attached to the Greek proscenium. This proscenii pulpitum must be kept distinct from the pulpitum-proscenium or Roman proscenium with which Vitruvius compares the Greek *λογεῖον*. So Dyer; let us see what basis this interpretation has in Vitruvius.

Dyer overlooks the fact that what Vitruvius has to say on the Greek theatre is added to the previous chapter only by way of illustration and commentary.¹ He is writing for the instruction of the Roman architect who may be called upon to construct a Roman theatre. His purpose is practical, not antiquarian. Chapter VIII can be understood only in the light of chapter VI. It aims to bring out the principal points of difference between the Greek and the Roman theatres. The following is a summary of the portions of the two chapters that interest us now.

In the ground-circle of the Roman theatre we are to draw four triangles; of the Greek, three squares. The chord parallel to the proposed scena-buildings in the Roman theatre fixes the scenae frons (the decoration wall in the Roman theatre), in the Greek, the finitio proscenii or forward wall of the proscenium (the decoration wall in the Greek theatre); while in the Roman

and others. Geppert and Donaldson produce the same figure, but not with the purpose of widening the orchestra. Of recent writers Petersen, *Wiener Studien*, 1885-6, 179 ff., has demonstrated most clearly the correspondence of the ruins with this interpretation. It will be noticed that many of these scholars have given special attention to architecture and to the study of the ruins. On the other side are Barbaro, Perrault, Rode, Schönborn, Müller, Oehmichen, and others, who draw their arcs to fix the length of the proscenium or scena, though they do not all agree as to the result. Schneider and Dyer belong to the second list, but are alone in attempting to determine the position of a projecting *λογεῖον*. Jocundus stands alone as regards his figure, and, so far as I understand him, in the purpose of his construction as well.

¹ This important fact is emphasized by Oehmichen, *Gr. Theaterbau*, p. 2.

the forward line of the proscenium rests on the diameter (*linea quae disiungat proscenii pulpitem et orchestrae regionem*). In the Greek the *frons scenae*, which is not, as in the Roman theatres, the decoration wall, but simply a supporting wall before which the decoration wall or proscenium is erected, is fixed on the tangent. Consequently, he adds, the Roman pulpitum is wider than that of the Greek. Now there has been nothing in his description to affect the width of the Roman pulpitum except the fixing of its forward and rear boundaries. A glance at the diagram will show that this is what he means. The Roman pulpitum is wider than that of the Greek, because it is bounded by the diameter and the chord, while the Greek lies in the narrow space between the chord and the tangent. If, when he says that the diameter shall be the line which separates the proscenii pulpitum from the region of the orchestra, he does not mean to give the forward boundary for the proscenium, but of a pulpitum projecting beyond the proscenium, then he has given us no data from which to draw the conclusion that the pulpitum-proscenium or stage is wider than that of the Greeks. It follows that by proscenii pulpitum he means nothing more than proscenium¹ (in its wider and doubtless earlier sense, *viz.*: the whole building in front of the scena, and not merely its forward wall, — a restriction of a later period, see p. 106); and then when in chapter VIII he says that the Greek pulpitum is *minore latitudine* than the Roman, he refers again to the building made narrow by being bounded by chord and tangent, *i.e.* the Greek proscenium, which (or rather whose roof) he understands to be a *λογεῖον* for actors. He certainly does not refer to a projecting platform made *shorter* by the two accessory arcs. It is clear from the whole context that Vitru-

¹ In note 10, p. 359, Dyer says: "If I rightly understand Dr. Dörpfeld's view, which he has kindly communicated to me, he regards the *finitio proscenii* as the forward line of the *proscenium*, then the *proscenii pulpitum* is the *λογεῖον* built in front of this line. So far he agrees substantially with Fra Giocondo." In reply to a letter of inquiry regarding the above statement, which seemed quite out of harmony with his expressed views on the subject, Dr. Dörpfeld, with his accustomed courtesy, writes me that his understanding of *proscenii pulpitum* is not rightly represented in the above, and adds: "Das proscenii pulpitum halte ich vielmehr für *das Dach* des Proskenion, nicht für ein Podium vor demselben."

vius uses the terms *pulpitum*, *proscenium*, *proscenii pulpitum*, and *λογεῖον* for the same portion of the theatre, except that *λογεῖον* is a term peculiar to the Greeks. Furthermore, it can hardly be doubted that the phrase *finitio proscenii* in chapter VIII is only a convenient substitute for the longer but more descriptive phrase of chapter VI, *linea quae disiungat proscenii pulpitum et orchestrae regionem*. Vitruvius believes not only that the Greek *λογεῖον* was of the impossible height of twelve feet, but even that the narrow Greek *proscenium* roof was the *λογεῖον* for actors as much as the broad low Roman *proscenium*. Further proof that there was no projecting *λογεῖον* such as Dyer supposes is furnished by the ruins. At Epidaurus, Athens, and elsewhere, there could have been no *λογεῖον* projecting from the centre of the *proscenium*, for the floor of the orchestra is on a level with the threshold of the central door of the *proscenium*. (See p. 94.)

If my understanding of the passage is correct, we must agree with Dörpfeld in ascribing a very discreditable blunder to Vitruvius. Even Dyer is compelled to acknowledge for him a blunder only less serious. Dörpfeld holds that Vitruvius misunderstood both the name and the purpose of the Greek *proscenium*. Any other conclusion seems unavoidable. The theory of a low movable *λογεῖον* in the classical Greek theatre is attractive as affording a happy compromise between the traditional view and the new; but it can find no support in Vitruvius, and at present it seems to be incompatible with the ruins as we have them.

In conclusion it is interesting to note that the early interpreters of Vitruvius whom Dyer has resurrected for us, Jocundus and Scaliger, both believed that the actors in the Greek theatre stood exactly where Dr. Dörpfeld has placed them, in that part of the orchestra that lies next to the *proscenium*.

THE DIRECTION OF WRITING ON ATTIC VASES.

BY F. B. TARBELL.

THE manuals of Greek Epigraphy have hitherto concerned themselves chiefly with inscriptions on stone or metal, giving but a glance now and then to the inscriptions painted or incised upon pottery. The comparative neglect of these latter is probably due in part to the great uncertainty which has prevailed until lately on the subject of Greek vase-chronology. But we are now better off. Thanks chiefly to the recent thorough excavations on the Acropolis of Athens, the chronology of the most interesting series of Greek vases, the black-figured and red-figured ware of Attica, has been established upon sure foundations. Not that absolute unanimity among authorities has been attained. But at least it is possible at the present day to fix the date of Attic black-figured and early red-figured vases with as close an approach to accuracy as is possible, on grounds of style alone, for works of architecture or sculpture. Even inscriptions on stone, when they do not carry their date in their contents, are subject to fully as much uncertainty.¹ It follows that one who wishes to gain the widest possible acquaintance with the epigraphical fashions which prevailed in Athens in the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries before Christ, must take Attic pottery into account.

Wilamowitz has maintained,² with characteristic positiveness, that the vase-inscriptions do not give us the ordinary chirography of their day, the chirography usual on papyrus or on waxed

¹ The vase-chronology adopted in this paper may be described as that of Furtwängler and Hartwig, who are pretty closely in accord. The period when Leagros was celebrated as *καλός* was, according to Hartwig, 500-490; according to Furtwängler, 510-500.

² *Philologische Untersuchungen*, 7, p. 307.

tablets, but rather a "monumental alphabet." That is not the common view. But, however that may be, one thing is certain; viz. in spite of general agreement, there are numerous differences between the inscriptions of contemporary potters and lapidaries. The two classes of craftsmen were to some extent governed in this matter by different conveniences and fashions. A few illustrations of these differences will suffice.

(1) If we were confined to the evidence of inscriptions on stone, we should have to say that the later form of *theta*, Θ, began to be used in Attic writing¹ near the end of the sixth century B.C., and rapidly supplanted the older form ⊗, so as to be exclusively used after 480. But the François vase, whose date is certainly earlier than 550, and probably a good deal earlier, shows nine or ten cases of Θ against but one or possibly two of ⊗.² From this time on, the older form is exceptional with the Attic potters. Yet a sporadic instance of it occurs about the middle of the fifth century, viz. on the Anesidora cylix³ in the British Museum.

(2) The form Φ, which upon stone begins to supplant the older ϙ about 460, is consistently used on the François vase and is common on later vases of the sixth century.

(3) The form Λ for Δ, much affected by Douris, and used by several other potters, is unknown upon stone.

(4) The practice of writing a doubled consonant but once (*e.g.* ΑΓΟΝΟΝ, Ἀπόλ(λ)ων), universally followed down to the end of the reign of Pisistratus or thereabouts, disappears almost completely from Attic inscriptions on stone after the Persian Wars.⁴ On vases, however, this orthography may be traced down into the period of the "fine" red-figured style; *e.g.* Περσ(ό)φατα for Περσόφατα on a crater⁵ in Naples, Κίσοσ for Κίσσοσ three times on a

¹ To be sure, the inscription CIA. IV, 373², in which ⊙ and ⊞ occur together, and which Kirchhoff regards as the work of some Ionian, would remind us that in the Pisistratic age Athens was resorted to by Greeks from many lands, and that different fashions of writing must therefore have existed there side by side.

² This statement is based on the publication in the *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1888, Pls. 2-4. The old publication in the *Monumenti dell' Inst. Archeol.* IV, Pls. LIV-LVII, gives three cases of ⊗. Klein, in his *Griechische Vasen mit Meistersignaturen*, pp. 32 ff. (2d ed.), prints this form four times.

³ Roscher, *Lexikon der gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, I, 2057-8.

⁴ Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften* (2d ed.), § 34, 5.

⁵ Overbeck, *Atlas zur Kunstmythologie*, Pl. 18, 15; Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, no. 463.

Berlin cylix,¹ no. 2532. These two examples belong to the period 450-440. Somewhat later, apparently, is the crater published in the *Monumenti dell' Istituto*, XI, Pl. XLII, with Λύσα for Λύσσα. It deserves, however, to be added that the disappearance of this orthography after the Persian Wars is not quite so complete as one would gather from Meisterhans' statement on the subject. For besides the common ἐ στήλη, ἐ στήλην, and the like, which seems to be analogous, we find the spellings Ἐμένου for Ἐμμένου and Θεσαλός for Θεσσαλός on two gravestones² in Attica, of which the former may go back nearly to 480, while the latter may be as late as 440, or even later. But, however it may be with the former of these gravestones, the latter, the work of a metic, has no claim to represent standard Attic usage.

So much by way of illustration. The purpose of the present paper is to set forth somewhat more fully the practice of the decorators of Attic vases in regard to the direction of writing. It must be remembered that the Greeks, in adopting the alphabet from the Phenicians, adopted at the same time the Phenician practice of writing from right to left. Another fashion, which was either originated or borrowed very early, was that of writing alternate lines in alternate directions, the so-called βουστροφηδόν method. Accordingly most of the very early Greek inscriptions were from right to left or else βουστροφηδόν. Yet of the Abou-Symbol inscriptions, dating probably from the middle of the seventh century, or, at latest, from early in the sixth, all but one are from left to right. After a long period of fluctuation this last method gained the day, and this direction may then for convenience be called the "normal" direction, and the reverse direction the "retrograde."

Herodotus speaks of the normal direction as if it were the only one in use in his day. His words are³: γράμματα γράφουσι . . . Ἕλληνες μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ φέροντες τὴν χεῖρα, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερά. Presumably he is thinking of writing with a pen or a stilus, and his testimony on this point is of course decisive. Consistently with this, the fifth

¹ Gerhard, *Trinkschalen und Gefässe*, Pls. VI, VII.

² CIA. IV, 491³², 491¹⁴.

³ II, § 36.

century vases¹ which represent papyrus rolls with legible letters upon them show these letters written in the normal direction. But the language of Herodotus is almost equally true, if referred to inscriptions chiselled on stone or bronze. In Attica the *βου-στροφηδόν* style seems to have been abandoned before 550. There is an insignificant number of single-line retrograde inscriptions on stone later than that. The fragment CIA. I, 369, may date from 500–480. But I know of nothing of the sort later than the Persian Wars,² except two or three boundary stones, one of which (CIA. I, 507) shows the Attic alphabet in its most advanced form, and is therefore probably later than 446. The case with other Greek communities is much the same as with Athens. It is pretty safe to say that in all of them, with the possible exception of Crete, retrograde inscriptions were very rarely, if ever, engraved upon stone after the Persian Wars. But when one turns to the Attic vases, one finds a different state of things. Here the practice of retrograde writing died more slowly. Examples are abundant in the second half of the sixth century; they are not rare in the first half of the fifth century; they linger on, though with fast-diminishing frequency, into the third quarter of the fifth century, the very period in which Herodotus penned the unqualified statement quoted above; and a case or two may be picked up from even later times. To investigate with statistical accuracy the gradual decline of the practice in question would be impossible, except by a first-hand examination of the widely scattered vases themselves, for the published material is inadequate in extent, and what there is is often untrustworthy.³ In consequence of this state of things,

¹ A cylix of Douris (*Archäologische Zeitung*, XXXII, Pl. I; Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, no. 1652) and a hydria of "fine" style in Athens (*Museo Italiano di Antichità Classica*, II, Pl. VI) have pictures of rolls with legible words. See also *Monumenti dell' Istituto*, 1856, Pl. XX, and Gerhard, *Trinkschalen und Gefässe*, Pl. XVII.

² The inscriptions on the Naples copy of the Orpheus relief are generally considered modern. If they are genuine,—and I can see nothing decisive against them,—they may imitate the original in direction of writing, as in orthography. In that case we should have in $\Sigma\Upsilon\Xi\Phi\Theta$ evidence of a retrograde name engraved in the latter part of the fifth century. But the names may be an archaizing addition to the copy, without warrant in the original.

³ Klein, in his *Griechische Vasen mit Meistersignaturen* and *Griechische Vasen mit Lieblingsinschriften*, often marks retrograde inscriptions as such. But his indications are so extremely defective as to be almost unusable.

there will doubtless be errors, as well as omissions, in the statements that follow. But the broad facts are accessible enough, and statistical accuracy would perhaps be as useless as it would be difficult to attain.

The great bulk of the inscriptions painted, or less often incised, upon Attic vases by their makers may be classified under four heads :—

(1) Signatures¹ of potters and decorators (ὁ δεῖνα ἐποίησεν, ὁ δεῖνα ἔγραψεν, or the like).

(2) καλός-inscriptions (ὁ δεῖνα καλός, ἡ δεῖνα καλή, or the vague ὁ παῖς καλός, ἡ παῖς καλή, or simply καλός, καλή), not referring, as a rule, to any person figured on the vase.

(3) Words represented as uttered by a person figured on the vase.

(4) Names of persons, or less often of animals or inanimate objects, figured on the vase.

Other inscriptions,² not falling under any one of the foregoing classes, may for present purposes be neglected. The facts in regard to the classes named are as follows :—

(1) The earliest signatures run sometimes one way, sometimes the other. The cases are not numerous enough to warrant an assertion as to which direction prevailed. Thus Oecopheles signs in the normal direction on the only known work of his hand, a cylix³ now in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford. The François vase in Florence has on one side Ἐργότιμος μ' ἐποίησεν and Κλιτίας μ' ἔγραψεν, both retrograde, and on the other side remains of the same inscriptions written from left to right. The only other known signature of Ergotimus⁴ runs likewise from left to right, while Sophilus signs from right to left.⁵ But from the time

¹ It must not be understood that these signatures are always autographs. Those of potters are certainly often not so. See Furtwängler in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, 1894, columns 141–142.

² For a more complete classification see Kretschmer, *Die griechischen Vasen-inschriften*, §§ 49–69.

³ Froehner, *Collection Van Branteghem*, Pl. I; *Burlington Fine Arts Club Exhibition Cat.*, p. 8, no. 1.

⁴ *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1888, Pl. IV, 2^c.

⁵ *Mittheilungen des deutschen arch. Instituts, Ath. Abth.*, 1889, Pl. I; *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1889, Pl. II, 3.

of Execias onward, the normal direction prevails overwhelmingly. Among the hundreds of signatures belonging to the middle and later black-figured style and to the early red-figured style, I have been able to collect only twelve retrograde instances. Execias signs twice in this fashion on an amphora¹ in the British Museum. Paseas,² Andocides,³ Chachrylion,⁴ and Euxitheus⁵ afford one instance apiece, while Phintias (*alias* Philtias) affords two.⁶ A fragment⁷ of early red-figured style from the Athenian Acropolis has -ιος ἔργ[α]ψεν retrograde. The name is perhaps to be restored as Εὐφρόνιος, though Hartwig, assuming an error in the writing, claims the fragment on grounds of style for Peithinos. At any rate, Euphronios has a retrograde signature on a cylix⁸ now in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (no. 388). Finally, the name of the potter Python is written backwards on a cylix⁹ painted by Douris, and Douris's own signature likewise on at least one cylix.¹⁰

(2) Retrograde καλός-inscriptions are proportionally more abundant than retrograde signatures, and they last till a somewhat later day. Thus, of the five καλός-inscriptions which occur on the signed vases of Execias, three are retrograde.¹¹ The gradual decline of this mode of writing may be illustrated by the cases of Leagros and his son Glaucon. Leagros was much celebrated as καλός about 500 B.C. Additional occurrences of his name on vases are continually being brought to light.¹² According to the present state of the record, if I have kept correct account of it, he appears

¹ Gerhard, *Auserlesene griech. Vasenbilder*, Pl. 206; *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1888, Pl. VI, 2^a, 2^b; Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, nos. 2122, 2123.

² Benndorf, *Griech. u. Sicil. Vasenbilder*, Pl. V, 5.

³ *Jahrbuch des deutschen arch. Instituts*, 1889, Pl. IV.

⁴ Hartwig, *Griechische Meisterschalen*, Pl. XIII.

⁵ *Monumenti dell' Instituto*, X, Pls. 23-24.

⁶ *Berichte der k. sächs. Ges. der Wiss., Phil.-hist. Cl.*, 1853, Pl. 5; *Monumenti dell' Instituto*, XI, Pls. 27, 28.

⁷ *Jahrbuch des deutschen Arch. Instituts*, 1888, Pl. II.

⁸ Hartwig, *Meisterschalen*, Pl. XLVIII, 1.

⁹ *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, VII, Pl. 1; Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, no. 2207.

¹⁰ *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, VII, 5. I am obliged to give this reference at second-hand, not having access to the earlier numbers of the *Vorlegeblätter*.

¹¹ *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1888, Pls. V, VI.

¹² For the most recent additions see Hartwig in the *Ἐφημερίς Ἀρχαιολογική*, 1894, col. 125, note 1.

as *καλός* on 37 vases. As the inscription sometimes occurs more than once on the same vase, the whole number of these inscriptions amounts to 46. Of these 46, 6 are retrograde.¹ Glaucôn was popular with the potters about 460. But out of 14 or 15 occurrences of his name on as many vases, not one is retrograde. Only by diligent search can one pick up an instance or two in this period. Thus Lysis, whose *καλός*-period seems to fall a trifle later than Glaucôn's, affords one retrograde example against eleven normal.² A lecythus³ in Berlin (no. 2252), which belongs about this time, has *Ὀλύμπιχος καλός* and *ὁ παῖς καλός*, both retrograde. I can find no example which appears to fall later than 450.

(3) Words represented as uttered by a person figured on the vase are, as a rule, so written as to begin from near the mouth of the person in question. If, therefore, the person faces to right, the writing will be normal; if to left, retrograde. Thus, on the amphora of Execias⁴ representing Achilles and Ajax sitting face to face and throwing dice, the players cry *ΤΕΣΑΡΑ* and *ΑΙΓΤ* respectively. Similarly, on the early red-figured amphora⁵ with the swallow-scene, we find *ἰδοῦ χελιδών* and *νῆ τὸν Ἡρακλέα* written in the normal direction from the mouths of the two men facing to right, but *αὐτή* retrograde from the mouth of the lad facing to left. This rule, however, is not quite invariable. On the St. Petersburg psycter⁶ of Euphronios there is a hetaera playing at the game of cottabos. She is lying upon a couch in such a fashion that she would naturally face to left, but she has averted her head so that she faces to right. The cottabos formula, *τὴν τάνδε λατάσσω, Λέαγρ[ε]*, starts, not from her mouth, but from the back of her head, and is consequently retrograde.

¹ Klein, *Vasen mit Lieblingsinschriften*, s.v. Leagros, nos. 9, 10, 13 (inside), 15 (inside), 20, 29. In Hartwig's *Meisterschalen*, Pl. X, *Λέαγρ[ος]* appears to have been written normally, while *καλός* is retrograde. Such combinations are common enough.

² For this statement I am forced to rely upon Klein, *Vasen mit Lieblingsinschriften*, s.v. Lysis.

³ *Archæologische Zeitung*, 1880, Pl. II.

⁴ *Monumenti dell' Istituto*, II, Pl. 22; *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1888, Pl. VI, 1^a; Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, no. 744.

⁵ *Monumenti dell' Istituto*, II, Pl. 24; Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, no. 2128.

⁶ *Compte rendu de la commission impériale archéologique de St. Petersbourg*, 1869, Pl. V; Klein, *Euphronios* (2d ed.), p. 105.

Klein says¹ that the words "must be thought of as spoken before she turns her head." This seems rather subtle. Is not the explanation of the anomaly simply that the design affords a better space for the inscription to the left than to the right of the face? Again, on at least one vase² of "severe" red-figured style the inscription runs from left to right, toward the mouth of a person facing to left, instead of in the contrary direction away from it. Such an exception to the general rule must be due to the rapidly growing predominance of the normal direction in writing.³

(4) In regard to the direction of writing for names of persons, animals, or things, there was no rule so consistently followed as that just given for inscriptions of the third class. Yet it is impossible to avoid recognizing on many vases a decided tendency, or rather two tendencies, influencing the matter. The first and more pronounced tendency was to make the name run from, rather than toward, the head of the person to whom the name belongs. The second and weaker tendency was to turn the foot of the letters, rather than the top, towards the person. Similarly with the names of animals and the comparatively few names of inanimate objects. The result of these tendencies acting jointly was to make the writing normal when the name was to the right of the person and retrograde when to the left. This method is consistently followed on the François vase, with its 124 names, and on many others. Often, however, one or other of the tendencies named was inoperative. Thus Execias, who doubtless wrote with equal facility in either direction, has several retrograde names either running toward the person named or having the top of the letters toward the person.⁴ And often the direction seems purely capricious, as when we find several names written horizontally above the heads of the persons, some of the names running one way and some the other. So much being premised, a few statistics

¹ Op. cit., p. 110.

² Hartwig, *Meisterschalen Text*, p. 257. Cf. the South Italian vase, Lenormant et De Witte, *Élite des monuments céramographiques*, II, Pl. CXVIII, where the words κλυ]θι πόρνια Σελά]να run in the normal direction towards the mouth of the sorceress.

³ It is interesting to find the old rule adhered to on a late Apulian vase (Kretschmer, *Griech. Vasenschriften*, p. 225), which has the exclamation αἰ τὸν χῆνα written retrograde.

⁴ *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1888, Pl. VI.

may be of interest. The François vase, out of 124 names, has 57 retrograde, or about 46 per cent. The cylix of Archicles and Glaucytes¹ in Munich has a slightly smaller proportion (about 17 out of 41, or about 41 per cent). On the signed vases of Euphronios, the number is 14 out of 35, or 40 per cent. The vases of Hieron show a marked falling off. Most of his signed vases, to be sure, are scantily furnished with names. But nos. 14, 15, 17, and 18 in Klein's list² have 34 names, of which only 3 are retrograde. The cotyle from Hieron's factory, decorated by Macron, has 10 names, of which 3 are retrograde. In the next generation the practice of retrograde writing was in a moribund condition. A convenient means of estimating its rarity in this period is afforded by the list of vases appended to Winter's monograph, *Die jüngeren attischen Vasen* (published in 1885). Winter assigned this group of vases to the period 440-400. This dating is too late, according to present lights; the upper limit must be put back at least twenty years. The list is sufficiently extensive to serve as a basis for generalization. These vases, then, furnish 231 names (excluding *καλός*-names), of which only 6,³ or less than 3 per cent, are retrograde. Among the 6 cases are some in which the retrograde direction seems to be determined by no principle. Take, for example, the *deinos* published by Gerhard, *Auserlesene Vasenbilder*, Pls. CCCXXIX, CCCXXX, in one part of whose design Winter saw a copy or reminiscence of a group on the Parthenon frieze, and which may date from about the time of the completion of the Parthenon. Here, besides several names written from left to right, we find two retrograde, one of which (*Ἀκάμας*) is written horizontally directly above the head of the figure and might just as well have run in the other direction. The same is the case with

¹ *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1889, Pl. II, 2.

² *Vasen mit Meistersignaturen*, pp. 168-171.

³ I have thrown out of this count two names which Winter marks as retrograde (op. cit., p. 70, no. 6). There are three names on the vase in question. In the publication by Gerhard (*Antike Bildwerke*, Pl. LXXI, copied by Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, no. 857), all the names run from left to right. The publication in *Philologus*, XXVI, Pl. 4, 2, erroneously reverses the design, inscriptions and all.

Of course the six cases referred to are not the only ones which could be found. Thus, an *aryballos* in Berlin, no. 2471 (Furtwängler, *Sammlung Sabouroff*, Pl. 55), not included in Winter's list, but dated by Furtwängler about 440 (*Meisterwerke der griechischen Plastik*, p. 40, note 1), has out of thirteen names one retrograde.

the two retrograde names on the pelice published by Gerhard, *Auserlesene Vasenbilder*, Pl. IV. Obviously we have to do here with a meaningless survival. How little accustomed to retrograde writing the vase-painters of this period were, may be illustrated by the writing of the word *Ἀκδμας* on the *deinos* just referred to. Here, if we may trust the illustration given by Gerhard, the sigma is made thus: Σ , as for writing in the ordinary direction. This blunder with regard to Σ may indeed be found earlier. More striking is the case on an Attic aryballos¹ with gilded decoration from Cyprus, where the partly obliterated name of the Sphinx seems to have been written thus: $\Xi\text{N}\text{I}\Phi\Sigma$, with the Σ and probably also the N turned the wrong way. Mr. Murray, who published this vase, thought that "a fair, round date" for it might be 370 B.C. According to the system of chronology adopted in this paper, it would probably be dated about 430.² And this date may be taken as marking the all but complete extinction of retrograde writing on Greek vases.

¹ *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1887, Pl. LXXXI; *Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, 1889, Pl. IX, 9^a. The latter publication gives some of the letters of the word in question more distinctly than the former; whether more accurately, I do not know.

² Cf. Milchhoefer, in the *Jahrbuch des deutschen arch. Instituts*, 1894, pp. 57-82. Milchhoefer, who advocates a very early dating for the red-figured ware, would put the vase in question about 440.

THE OSCAN-UMBRIAN VERB-SYSTEM.

BY CARL DARLING BUCK.

It was originally my intention merely to offer certain detached contributions on points connected with the verbal system in Oscan and Umbrian. But so considerable is the number of points which are still open to discussion, and so involved are they one with another, that I have gradually been led to attempt a systematic treatment of the verb-system as a whole. I hope that the suggestions which are offered for the solution of various difficulties will prove of sufficient value to justify such a comprehensive treatment, even if looked at merely as a framework for the same. But in giving the material in this form, I have also had something else in mind. The great importance of the Italic dialects to the student of the Latin language is coming to increased recognition (note, for example, the words of Stolz, *Zeitschrift für oesterr. Gymnasien* 1892, p. 999: "Ohnehin ist es für den auf dem Gebiete der lateinischen Grammatik thätigen Arbeiter Pflicht, in seinen Veröffentlichungen zu den Ergebnissen der italischen Dialectforschung Stellung zu nehmen, und dies gedenke ich anderenorts zu thun"), and it will not be long before every Latinist, if his interest is to any extent linguistic, will feel the necessity of an acquaintance with the results of Italic dialectology. Within the last few years great progress has been made in the study of Oscan-Umbrian phonology, and the increased precision attained has naturally produced a revolution in the understanding of many verbal forms (e.g. the recognition of *O. fusíd* as a subjunctive rather than as an optative, due primarily to Bronisch, but discovered independently by others also). With the exception of Brugmann's treatment, in the *Grundriss*, of the Oscan-Umbrian verb, which is on the usual high level of the work, but of necessity brief, there is at present nothing of any account whatever on this subject. We may expect

at any time the second volume of von Planta's *Grammatik der oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte*, in which the verb will receive its full share of attention. But as the number of workers in this field is not large, while the problems are numerous, there is ample room for a treatment of the subject from two independent sources. Each should contribute its quota to the final result.

It is then with more especial reference to possible readers among the Latinists that I give a synopsis of the Oscan-Umbrian Verb on the basis of the traditional system of conjugations, and further attempt a general comparison of the Oscan-Umbrian verb-system with that of the Latin.

By means of such a comparison, we may arrive at certain conclusions as to the extent to which the Latin system, as developed from the Indo-European, had assumed its form in the Italic period, and how far it is due to specific Latin development. The differences between the Latin and the Oscan-Umbrian verb-forms are at least sufficiently striking to make such an inquiry pertinent, far more so than it would be in the case of the Greek dialects, in which the differences are of less importance.¹

¹ The following abbreviations may be noted :

Bréal, *Les Tab. Eug.* = Michel Bréal, *Les Tables Eugubines*, texte, traduction et commentaire, Paris, 1875.

Bronisch = Bronisch, *Die Oskischen I- und E-Vocale*, Leipzig, 1892.

Brugmann, *Umbr.-Osk.* = Brugmann, *Umbrisches und Oskisches*, Sitzungsberichte der Königl. Sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1890.

Brugmann, *Umbr.-Samn.* = Brugmann, *Zur umbrisch-samnitischen Grammatik und Wortforschung*, *ibid.*, 1893.

Bücheler, *Umbrica*, = F. Bücheler, *Umbrica*, Bonn, 1883.

Buck, or *Vocal.* = Buck, *Der Vocalismus der oskischen Sprache*, Leipzig, 1892.

Bugge, *Altit. St.* = Sophus Bugge, *Altitalische Studien*, Christiania, 1878.

Pauli's *Altit. St.* = *Altitalische Studien*, herausgegeben von Dr. Carl Pauli, vols. I-V, Hanover, 1883-87.

v. Planta = von Planta, *Grammatik der oskisch-umbrischen Dialekte*, Strassburg, 1892.

Zvet. = Zvetiaeff, *Inscriptiones Italiae Inferioris Dialecticae*.

BzB. = *Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen*, herausgegeben von A. Bezzenberger, vols. 1 ff.

I.F. = *Indogermanische Forschungen*, Zeitschrift für indogermanische Sprach- und Altertumskunde, vols. 1 ff.

I.Anz. = *Anzeiger für indogermanische Sprach- und Altertumskunde*, vols. 1 ff.

K.Z. = *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*, begründet von A. Kuhn, vols. 1 ff.

Rh.M. = *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, vols 1 ff.

FIRST CONJUGATION.				
ACTIVE.		PASSIVE.		
INDICATIVE.		SUBJUNCTIVE.		
		Present.		
Sing. 1.	U. <i>subocanu.</i>			
2.				
3.	O. <i>faamat.</i>			
Plur. 3.	U. <i>furjant.</i>	O. <i>deivaid</i> , U. <i>portaita.</i>	O. <i>sakarater.</i>	O. <i>sakahiter.</i>
		U. <i>etaitans.</i>	O. <i>karanter.</i>	
Sing. 3.		Imperfect.		
Plur. 3.				P. <i>upšaseler.</i>
Sing. 3.		Future.		
Plur. 3.	O. <i>deivast</i> , U. <i>prupehast.</i>			
	O. <i>censaset.</i>			
Sing. 3.		Perfect. ¹		
Plur. 3.	O. <i>prufatted</i> , <i>aamanaffed.</i>			
	U. <i>combiſianši.</i>			
Sing. 3.	O. <i>prufattens</i> , P. <i>coiatens.</i>	O. <i>teremnatu</i> 'st.	O. <i>staflatas</i> set.	U. <i>kuratu</i> si.
Plur. 3.		O. <i>tribarakattins.</i>		O. <i>sakraffir</i> , U. <i>pihagfei</i>
Sing. 3.	U. <i>andirsafust.</i>	Future Perfect.		
Plur. 3.	O. <i>tribarakattuset.</i>			
		U. <i>pihaz</i> fust.	U. <i>šersnatur</i> furent.	
Sing. 2. 3.	O. <i>deivattud</i> , U. <i>pihatur.</i>	Imperative.		
Plur. 2. 3.				
		O. <i>censamur</i> , U. <i>spahamu.</i>		
		U. <i>caterahamo.</i>		
Present		Participles.		
Perfect				
Future	U. <i>spafu</i> , O. <i>deivatuns.</i>	U. <i>pihaz</i> , O. <i>teremnatu.</i>		
Present		Infinitive.		
	O. <i>censam.</i>			
	U. <i>anseriatu.</i>	Supine.		

¹ In the perfect system, I have given for the first and fourth conjugation only such forms as are actually characteristic of the conjugation; that is, such as contain the *ā* or the *io-ī*. For the second conjugation there are no such. Examples of the strong perfects, many of which belong to presents of the first, second, or third conjugation, are cited in the synopsis of the third conjugation.

SECOND CONJUGATION.			
ACTIVE.		PASSIVE.	
INDICATIVE.	SUBJUNCTIVE.	INDICATIVE.	SUBJUNCTIVE.
Present.			
Sing. 1. 2. 3. Plur. 3.	U. tišit, <i>habe.</i> O. pútiad, U. <i>habia.</i> O. putians.		U. <i>tursiandu.</i>
Imperfect.			
Sing. 3. Plur. 3.			
Future.			
Sing. 3. Plur. 3.			
Perfect.			
Sing. 3. Plur. 3.			
Future Perfect.			
Sing. 3. Plur. 3.			
Imperative.			
Sing. 2. 3. Plur. 2. 3.	O. likitud, U. <i>tursita.</i> U. <i>tursitulo.</i>		
Participles.			
Present Perfect Future	U. zečef, <i>seria.</i>		
Infinitive.			
Present	O. fatum.		
Supine.			

THIRD CONJUGATION.				
	ACTIVE		PASSIVE	
	INDICATIVE.	SUBJUNCTIVE.	INDICATIVE.	SUBJUNCTIVE.
Sing. 1.	U. sestu.			
2.	U. seste.			
3.	M. ferat, Vest. didat.	O. aflukad, U. dirsa.		U. ferar, O. kaispatar.
Plur. 3.		O. deicans, U. dirsans.		U. emanur.
		Imperfect.		
Sing. 3.				
Plur. 3.		O. patensins.		
		Future.		
Sing. 2.	U. menes.			
3.	U. ferest, O. didest.		U. ostensendi.	
Plur. 3.				
		Perfect.		
Sing. 3.	O. dedet, U. dede, O. kám-bened.	O. hipid, fefacid.	U. scerho est.	
Plur. 3.	U. eitipes, O. uupsens.		O. scristas set, U. screihlor sent.	
		Future Perfect.		
Sing. 2.	U. kuvurtus.			
3.	O. dicast, U. dersicust, O. hipust.		O. comparascuster, U. covortuso.	
Plur. 3.	U. aersicurent.			
		Imperative.		
Sing. 2. 3.	O. actud, U. fertu, kuvertu.			
Plur. 2. 3.	U. fertuta.			
		Participles.		
Present	U. kutef (?)			
Perfect				
Future			O. scristas, U. screihlor.	
		Infinitive.	U. anferener.	
		Supine.		
Present	O. deicum, edum, U. aferum.			

FOURTH CONJUGATION.

ACTIVE.		PASSIVE.	
INDICATIVE.	SUBJUNCTIVE.	INDICATIVE.	SUBJUNCTIVE.
Present.			
Sing. 1. U. <i>stahu.</i>	O. <i>heri</i> ad, <i>faki</i> ad.	U. <i>her</i> ter.	U. <i>her</i> tei.
Sing. 2. U. <i>her</i> is.			
Plur. 3. U. <i>her</i> i, O. <i>sakru</i> vit.			
Plur. 3. O. <i>fi</i> iet, <i>stah</i> int.			
Imperfect.			
Sing. 3.	O. <i>herr</i> ins.		
Plur. 3.			
Future.			
Sing. 2. U. <i>her</i> ies.			U. <i>her</i> ifi.
Sing. 3. U. <i>her</i> iest, O. <i>sakru</i> vist.			
Plur. 3. U. <i>stah</i> eren.			
Perfect.			
Sing. 2.			
Sing. 3.			
Future Perfect.			
Sing. 2. U. <i>pur</i> tiius.		U. <i>pers</i> nis <i>fust</i> , <i>pur</i> titu <i>fust</i> .	
Plur. 3. U. <i>pur</i> diniust.			
Imperative.			
Sing. 2. 3. U. <i>her</i> eitu, <i>stah</i> itu, O. <i>factu</i> d.		U. <i>pers</i> nihimu. U. <i>pers</i> nihimuno.	
Plur. 3. U. <i>stah</i> itulo.			
Participles.			
Present V. <i>as</i> if(?)		U. <i>pers</i> nis.	
Perfect O. <i>stah</i> ieffuf.			
Future			
Infinitive.			
Present U. <i>fa</i> šiu.			
Supine.			

UNTHERMATIC INFLECTION.			The Verb 'to be.'	SUBJUNCTIVE.		The Verb 'to go.'
			INDICATIVE.			
Sing. 1. 2. 3. Plur. 3.			O. sūm	U. sīr. U. sī. U. sīnt.	Present.	
			O. 1st, est, U. est.			
			O. set, U. sent.			
Sing. 3. Plur. 3.			O. fufans	O. fuf.	Imperfect.	O. amfret (*amfr-ient) ?
Sing. 3. Plur. 3.			O. fust, U. fust		Future.	U. cest, est.
			U. furent.			
Sing. 3. Plur. 3.			O. fufens.	O. fuid.	Perfect.	Pael. afðed (*af-ied) ?
Sing. 2. 3. Plur. 3.			O. fust.		Future Perfect.	U. amprefuus. U. iusi. U. ambrefurent.
Sing. 2. 3. Plur. 2. 3.			O. estud, U. futo.		Imperative.	U. etu. U. etulo (Pad. etile = Lat. ite).
Present Perfect Future					Participles.	peretom (?)
Present Future					Infinitive.	
Present			O. ezum, U. erom.		Supine.	

GENERAL COMPARISON OF THE OSCAN-UMBRIAN VERB-SYSTEM
WITH THAT OF THE LATIN.

The Conjugation-Types.

The conjugation-types are the same. By this is meant that the merging of several Indo-European present stems into a single inflectional system has resulted in the same series of conjugations, as viewed from the standpoint of the existing language, in Oscan-Umbrian as in Latin. What we call in Latin the first conjugation is made up of 1) primary verbs whose roots end in *ā*, as *stō*, *stāre*; 2) primary verbs with so-called suffix *ā*, *snō*, *snāre*, Skt. *snā-ti*; 3) same with *īo* suffix, Skt. *snā-ya-ti*; 4) denominatives with *-īo*-suffix. The inflection is a fusion, of which the verbs of 2) furnish the chief element. In Oscan-Umbrian we have the same fusing of inflection. With the exception of the first singular indicative (U. *subocauu* = **subocāō*, from *-āīō*) and the present subjunctive, the forms show no trace of a *-īo*-suffix. This was undoubtedly the state of things in the Italic period.

In Latin the large mass of verbs which follow the *ā*-conjugation are denominatives, and, *vice versa*, the mass of denominatives belong to this conjugation. So also, in Oscan-Umbrian, most of the *ā*-verbs are of denominative origin (including the iteratives, as U. *etaians* 'itent,' *statitatu* 'statuito');¹ and on the other hand denominatives following one of the other conjugations are rare.

In Latin we often observe that a verb compounded with a preposition follows the first conjugation, while the simple verb follows the third or fourth, as *fligere* : *prōfligāre*, *capere* : *occupāre*, etc.; cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 957, where the phenomenon is explained as due to the aorist-function belonging to the *ā*-forms and to compounds with prepositions as compared with the simple verbs, e.g. Greek *φεύγω* : *καταφεύγω*. Examples of the same interchange are found in Oscan-Umbrian, e.g. U. *anzeriatu*, *aseriatu*, 'observato' : *seritu*, 'servato'; O. *dadíkatted* 'dedicavit' : *deicum*

¹ Examples of primary *ā*-verbs are U. *prusekatu* (Lat. *secāre*; cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, 957), *censamur*, etc. (**censā*) compared with Latin *censeō* (**censē*) (cf. *μνηνέ*, Gr. *ἐμάρην* and *mnā* in Dor. *μἐμᾶται*), U. *spahamu*, *spafu* (**sp-ā*).

'dicere'; U. restatu 'instaurato': *stahitu* 'stato'; U. *andirsafust*¹ 'lustraverit': *dirsans* 'dent' (subjunctive of **dirsom*, **didom*).

In Oscan-Umbrian, as in Latin, the *ā* is not confined to the present system, but normally runs through the whole conjugation. So besides the futures, like O. *deivast*, U. *prupehast*, which, though in origin sigmatic aorists, are to be reckoned to the present system, we regularly find such perfects as O. *prúfatted*, *duunated*, *sakrafir tríbarakattíns*, Pael. *coisatens*, and such participles as O. *teremnatu*, U. *pihaz*, *kuratu*. But just as in Latin we have a few forms like *domuī*, *domitum* to *domāre*, so in Oscan-Umbrian we find O. *upsed* 'operavit,' U. *oseto* 'operata,' beside *úpsannam* 'operandam,' Pael. *upsaseter* 'operaretur,' U. *osatu* 'operato'; O. *prúftu-set* 'probata sunt,' *prúffed* 'probavit,' beside *prúfatted*; O. *ancensto* 'incensa' beside *censamur* 'censetor,' *censazet* 'censabunt' (cf. Lat. *cēnsu-s* to *cēnsēō*), U. *portust*, 'portaverit,' beside *portatu* 'portato'; U. *muieto* 'muttitum,' beside *mugatu* 'muttito' (similarly, also, *frosetom*, *pešeton*, *vašeton*). Most of these forms are, indeed, from denominatives, but *censaum censtom* would be an instance of a primary verb, where alone the interchange must have originated.

The Latin second conjugation is made up 1) of primary verbs in *ē*, with or without the *īo*-suffix, 2) of causatives in *-ē-īo*-, and

¹ Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 967 anm., mentions *andirsafust* in connection with the statement that certain verbs of the reduplicating classes appear in italic in non-present tenses with *ā*-suffix. But in none of the cases cited can it be shown that the present did not also have the *ā*-form in the respective dialects, and such a distribution of *ā*- and *ē/o* forms among the tenses would be without analogy. The forms which Bücheler, Umbrica, p. 113, mentions, are not to the point, for here the presents also are of the *ā*-conjugation. It seems preferable, then, to place *andirsafust* on a line with *aseriatu*, and make the composition responsible for the *ā*-form. The fact that in U. *anferener* the inflection remains the same as in the simplex, is no argument against this supposition, since in Latin, change of conjugation is by no means a necessary consequence of composition. In Volsc. *sistiatens* one may see with Osthoff, Perf., p. 245, a generalization of **si-stā* (ἰσσημι). But if the Faliscan *pipafo* is, contrary to Deecke's opinion, genuine, it would be worth considering whether the reduplicated presents might not, in certain cases, have become associated with presents compounded with prepositions and with the consequent change of conjugation.

Bücheler's doubt as to the connection of *andirsafust* and **dirsom* (Umbrica, p. 113 f.) seems unnecessary. The change of *nd* to *nn* would disguise a compound far more than that of *nt* to *nd*, and it is to be expected that the analogical influence of the simplex would be shown in the former case, though not in the latter.

3) of denominatives in *-e-īō-*. The same varieties and the same inflection resulting from their fusion exist in Oscan-Umbrian. As examples may be taken 1) O. *līkītud* = Lat. *licētō* (cf. Grk. ἐλίσσιν); 2) U. *tursiandu* 'terreantur'; 3) O. *fatium* 'fateri,' from partic. **fa-to-* (Grk. φάτος), O. *turumiiad*, 'torqueatur,' from **tormo*, side-form of *tormen*.

As in Latin the *ē* is not found outside of the present system except in the few cases like *flē-vī*, so in Oscan-Umbrian, as far as the material allows us to judge, the perfect and the passive participle are formed without *ē*.

The Latin third conjugation of regular thematic inflection has its exact counterpart in Oscan-Umbrian, a fact hardly worthy of special notice, as there are no marked peculiarities about this form of inflection in Italic.

The Latin verbs of the type of *capiō*, *faciō*, are in origin more closely connected with the fourth than with the third conjugation, the points of contrast between these verbs and the third conjugation which gave rise to the traditional grouping being in the main secondary; e.g. *legit*, *legitō* from **leget(i)*, **legetōd*, but *capit*, *capitō* from **capit(i)*, **capitōd*.

Likewise in Oscan-Umbrian there are, among the *īō-* presents, certain forms which must originally have had the *ī* ablaut-form, and which here, by reason of the Oscan-Umbrian syncopation of vowels, have become identical with forms of the third conjugation, e.g. O. *factud* from **facitōd* (cf. *fakiiad*): O. *actud* from **agetōd*. We also have an imperfect subjunctive made from the stem without the *īō* suffix, O. *herríns* from **her-es-ēnt* related to *heriiad* as Lat. *caperent* to *capiō*. But we have no reason to believe that such forms had united to form a type distinct from that of the fourth conjugation. The form *herríns* does not necessarily imply an imperative **hertōd*, as Lat. *caperent* would a *capitō*; in fact U. *hereitu* and *herifi* are *ī-*forms. We do well then to class such forms as *factud* as varieties of the fourth conjugation, remembering that even in Latin there are many verbs which show forms of both types (cf. Thurneysen, *Die lat. Verba auf iō*).

We have then in Oscan-Umbrian a *īō-ī* inflection embracing primary verbs and denominatives from *i*-stems, and therefore corresponding to the Latin fourth conjugation (*veniō* : *fīniō*).

In regard to the presence of the *-iō-i* outside the present system, we find the same variation as in Latin. Primary verbs may form the perfect or the passive participle without it, as O. *fefacid* 'fecerit,' U. *fakust* 'fecerit,' to present O. *fakiiad* 'faciat,' U. *fašiu* 'facere'; but denominatives and sometimes primary verbs carry the *i* or *i'* through, e.g. U. *persnis* 'precatus,' to present **persniō* (imperat. *persnihimu*) denominative to **pers-ni*-, and also *herifi* 'oportuerit' to primary **heriō* 'volo' (cf. O. *sakrafir* to **sakrāō*); so Lat. *finivī*, and also *cupivī cupitus* to primary *cupiō*. Moreover, in the forms which show the *iō-i* suffix, whether of the present system or not, there is a variation between the *-iō* and the *i* form, according as the analogy of the thematic primary verbs of the third conjugation, or of the denominatives of the first was most strongly felt. As in the Latin imperfect indicative, we find *audiēbam* regularly formed after the analogy of *ferēbam*, but also in early Latin *audibam*, *hauribam*, etc., after *amābam*, so in the Oscan-Umbrian future we find *heriest* like *ferest*, but also O. *sakrvist* like *deivast*.¹ In the same way the difference between U. *herifi* and O. *staieffuf* is to be explained.

The Modal System.

The modal system is the same.

a) The fusion of subjunctive and optative exists in Oscan-Umbrian as well as in Latin, and the disposition of the two in the formation of the new mode is, except in the perfect, the same. In Latin presents the optative forms are confined to the unthematic inflection, as *siet*, *sit* to *est*, *edit* to *est* (beside *edat* to *edit*), *velit* to *volt*. So in Oscan-Umbrian the only unquestionably optative forms are U. *sir*, *sci* 'sis,' *si* 'sit' *sins* 'sint,' to which is probably to be added O. *dadid* belonging to an unthematic present of **dō*- (Lat. *cedo*). The forms of the first conjugation O. *deivaid*, *sakahiter*, Lat. *amet*, can also represent optatives to the unthematic inflection of the indicative (cf. Grk. *δραίνω*), but may also be *i*-subjunctives of the *iō*- inflection. That is, we may divide *ā-iē-t*, opt. to *-āt*, or *-āiē-t*, subj. to *-āiō*; cf. Brugmann Grd.

¹ That is, as *ferest* is to **ferō*, **ferād*, so is *heriest* to **heriō*, *heriiad*; but as *deivast* is to **deivāl*, so is *sakrvist* to *sakruvit*.

II, 1292. Of optatives of the thematic type ($\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\iota$, Skt. *bharet*) there is not a single trace on Italic soil. The only difference, then, between Latin and Oscan-Umbrian in the choice of optative and subjunctive is in the perfect subjunctive, which in Latin is morphologically an optative, in Oscan-Umbrian a subjunctive.

b) The disposition of the \bar{a} - and \bar{e} -subjunctives is the same in Oscan-Umbrian as in Latin. In the second, third, and fourth conjugations we find the \bar{a} -subjunctive as in Latin, e.g. U. *tursi-andu*, O. *deicans*, O. *heriad*. The \bar{e} -subjunctive is found in the first conjugation, *deivaid*, Lat. *amet* from $\bar{a}i\bar{e}-t$, provided these are subjunctives at all, and in the imperfect subjunctive, e.g. *herrins* from $*heres-\bar{e}-nt$, Lat. *ageremus*. An alleged departure from this normal division is U. *heriei*, which is regarded as an \bar{e} -subjunctive of a $\bar{i}o$ -stem. Of course the Latin future presupposes the existence at some period of an \bar{e} -subjunctive in the third and fourth conjugations, beside the \bar{a} -subjunctive, as does also the U. *hertei* ($*hert\bar{e}r$, cf. below), but the retention of this \bar{e} -subjunctive in a solitary (active) form beside the usual \bar{a} -subjunctive impresses me as so singular that I am tempted to regard the form as a perfect subjunctive; cf. the perfect stem in U. *purtius*. Marrucinian *feret* and *ferenter* would also be unique if subjunctives, but I prefer the view according to which they are indicatives; cf. below, p. 155.

c) There exists in Oscan-Umbrian an imperative mode, the forms of which, like those of the Latin future imperative, are based on the I.-E. $-t\bar{o}d$ type. The plural and passive forms have developed independently and on different lines in Oscan-Umbrian and in Latin. A few forms corresponding to those of the Latin present imperative are found, but they are exceedingly rare.

The Tense-System.

The tense-system is essentially the same, and yet in no other department do such marked differences between Latin and Oscan-Umbrian exist. The system is the same, for, with the possible exception of the pluperfect, of which no traces in Oscan-Umbrian have come to light, the number of syntactical categories is the same and their use is the same; and, furthermore, there are im-

portant coincidences in the formation of these tenses. So, to mention only new formations, the imperfect indicative is the same (*-fans* = Lat. *-bant*), as also the imperfect subjunctive (*herríns* from **heresēnt* = Lat. *agerent*). The Oscan-Umbrian also possesses a conglomerate tense corresponding to the Latin "perfect," and of the various formations here united several are identical with those seen in Latin. We find thematic aorists (O. *kúmbened* 'convenit' O. *fuid* 'fuerit,' like Latin *fuit*, *luit*); *ē* perfects (O. *hipid* 'habuerit,' like Latin *vēnī*, *lēgī*, etc.): reduplicated perfects (O. *deded* 'dedit,' *fefacid* 'fecerit,' like Latin *dedī*, etc.). On the other hand, the Oscan-Umbrian *f*- and *t*-perfects have nothing corresponding in the Latin perfect, and, *vice versa*, there is no good evidence for anything in Oscan-Umbrian corresponding to the Latin *-vī* perfect, or to those forms which are based on the *s*-aorist (*dīxī*). Further, the Oscan-Umbrian future and future perfect are of wholly different origin from the corresponding Latin tenses. The future, which in Latin is either a periphrastic form with *-bō* (from **bhūō*) or an *ē*-subjunctive (*legēs*, *veniēs*), is in Oscan-Umbrian a short-vowel subjunctive of the *-s* (*-es-*) aorist; that is, of the same origin as the Greek future, e.g. U. *ferest* from **feres-e-t*. The future perfect in Oscan-Umbrian is a periphrastic formation based on the union of a perfect active participle with the subjunctive of the verb 'to be,' e.g. U. *benust* for **benus-set*.

The Voices.

Oscan-Umbrian agrees with Latin in the possession of an *r*-“passive,” which is a special characteristic of the Italic and Celtic families. But the formation differs in important respects from the Latin. It may be mere chance that only forms of the third singular and third plural are known to us; and the difference between O. *-ter* and U. Lat. *-tur* is not fundamental. But there are certain forms, such as U. *ferar*, O. *sakrafír*, etc., which differ radically from anything known in Latin and seem to be relics of a more rudimentary stage of development. Cf. below, p. 177 ff.

The Verbum-Infinitum.

The two systems have in common a present active participle (e.g. U. *zeřef* = Lat. *sedēns*); a gerundive, (e.g. O. *úpsannam* =

Lat. *operandam*); a perfect passive participle (e.g. U. *pihaz* = Lat. *piātus*); a supine (e.g. U. *anseriatum* = Lat. *observātum*); a present active infinitive (e.g. O. *ezum*, U. *erom* = Lat. *esse*); a perfect passive infinitive (e.g. U. *erom ehiato* like Lat. *amātus esse*). Except in the case of the present infinitive, the agreement holds also for the formation. The Latin gerund, perfect infinitive active, future infinitives, present infinitive passive, and future active participle are unknown in the extant remains of Oscan-Umbrian. The agreement in gerundive but not in gerund is in harmony with recent theories as to their relative antiquity. On the other hand, there is good evidence for an Oscan-Umbrian perfect active participle, which is wanting in Latin.

The personal endings are not sufficiently characteristic of a verb-system to be worthy of any special attention here. As far as the indicative and subjunctive are concerned, the Oscan-Umbrian endings are in origin the same as the Latin. In the imperative certain new formations exist, made from older forms by the addition of particles or substitution of suffixes.

Differences in system are then only 1) absence of pluperfect in Oscan-Umbrian; 2) disagreement in the number of non-finite forms.

In formation, differences exist in future, future perfect, mode-form of perfect subjunctive, present infinitive, and in some of the forms of the imperative.

It may be confidently asserted that the coincidences (and by these I mean not mere retention of common originals, but community in striking features and characteristics) are far more important than the differences, and that the Latin verb-system is, in the main, also the Italic.

So at least from a morphological standpoint. It remains to be seen whether a study of the syntax confirms this conclusion.

Syntax.¹

Of the uses of the tenses of the indicative, little is to be said. The present, the conglomerate tense we call the perfect, the

¹ I wish to acknowledge my very considerable indebtedness to Professor Hale for consultation on various syntactical points, without however making him in any way responsible for the statements in this chapter.

future and future perfect are used in the same way as in Latin. The one instance of the imperfect occurs in the first sentence of the Cippus Abellanus: "It was agreed between . . . legates of Abella and legates of Nola, who were the legates by the vote of their respective senates (pús senateís tanginúd suveís pútúrúspíd lígat[ús] fufans)." To this remarks Bücheler, *Comment. phil. in honorem Th. Mommseni*, p. 231 "*fufans* verbi positio ea est quam *fuere*, declinatio ea quam *audire* habet." But imperfects (or pluperfects) might perfectly well be used in such a case in Latin (descriptive tenses, or tenses of a past situation), and indeed are much commoner than perfects.¹

To pass to the modal constructions, the most frequently occurring subjunctive is that of command, prescription (in origin partly the volitive subjunctive, partly the prescriptive optative), in independent sentences. So in V. of the Iguvinian Tables, the Atiiedian brothers decreed, "the flamen, whoever he shall be, *shall have the care* (kuraia) of the sacred affair, he *shall furnish* (prehabia) whatever is necessary. He *shall receive* (habia) certain fees. When the brothers shall have been feasted, the magister or quaestor *shall take a vote* (ehvelklu feia) as to whether the matter has been properly looked after. And if the majority pronounce it satisfactory, *it shall be approved* (erek prufe si). If not, the magister or quaestor *shall take a vote* (ehvelklu feia) as to the amount of the penalty, and whatever penalty they demand, so great *shall* the flamen's penalty *be* (etantu mutu aîferture si)." Twice within the limits of this passage the command is expressed by the imperative: sakreu perakneu upetu, revestu . . . 'let him (the flamen) choose(?) the sacrificial animals and see to it . . .' And so, in general, subjunctive and imperative are used indiscriminately. Compare for example Ib, 35 pustru kupifiatu (imp.) rupiname, erus teña (subj.). Ene tra sahta kupifiaia (subj.), erus teña with VII a 43, *postro com-*

¹ Of the well-nigh innumerable examples in Caesar the following may be quoted: *Itemque Dumnorigi Aeauo, fratri Divitiaco, qui eo tempore principatum in civitate obtinebat ac maxime plebi acceptus erat, ut idem conaretur, persuadet.* B. G. I, 3.

Convocatis eorum principibus, quorum magnam copiam in castris habebat, in his Divitiaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeerat, . . . graviter eos accusat. B. G. I, 16.

Ipse, in Carnutes, Andes, Turonesque, quae civitates propinquae his locis erant, ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hibernacula deductis, in Italiam profectus est. B. G. II, 35.

bifiatu rubiname, erus dersa. Enem traha sahatam combifiatu, erus dersa. Or compare O. *molto etanto estud* 'let the penalty be so great' T. B., 27, with the Umbrian example given (*etantu mutu si*).

In classical Latin, the imperative of the third person has given way completely to the subjunctive, but in the early legal inscriptions there is a great preponderance of imperatives. In many the imperative is used exclusively (so *Lex Bantina*, *Lex agraria*, etc.), while in others (as the *Sententia Minuciorum*) a subjunctive of command may now and then appear. I know of no Latin document, however, in which the two forms are used so promiscuously as on the Iguvian Tables. In the Oscan version of the *Tabula Bantina* only imperatives are used for command. The only instance of a present subjunctive of command in Oscan is *sakrim fakiiad* 'sacrum faciat,' Rh. M. 33, 557.

As regards the tense of this independent subjunctive of command, it seems necessary to make a distinction between the positive and the negative form. In a positive command the present is usual, as seen in the example just given, but the perfect is not unknown. A sure example is *sakrafir* Rh. M. 45, 165, following a relative clause with future indicative. No idea of completed action is apparent. It is to be compared to the Latin 'energetic' perfects. Cf., for example, *sit denique inscriptum in fronte unius cuiusque quid de re publica sentiat.* Cic. Cat. 1, 13, 33.¹ In the negative, on the other hand, we have five examples of the perfect and none of the present (*nep putiiad*, *nep heriiad* are subjunctives of wish; cf. below). These examples are: O. *nep Abellanús nep Núvlanús píðum tríbarakattíns* 'neither the Abellani nor the Nolani shall build anything,' C. A. 46 f.; *izic eizeic zicel [ei] comono ni hipid* 'he shall not hold the assembly on this day,' T. B. 8; *ne pim pruhipid* 'he shall not prevent any one,' T. B. 26; *nep fefacid* 'he shall not cause,' in contrast to a positive command in the imperative (*factud*) in the same sentence,

¹ O. *lamatir*, in which I have previously seen with Danielsson and others a perfect subjunctive, I now take with Bücheler as a present (cf. below under 'passive'), but do not understand the latter's statement (Rh. M. 33, p. 21) that the perfect is impossible on account of the occurrence in the phrase *esuf comenei lamatir pr(u)meddixud toutad praesentid* 'he shall be sold ex officio in the presence of the people.' From the syntactical standpoint, the present is simply more probable, not absolutely necessary.

T. B. 9 f.; *nep censtur fuid, nei svae pr. fust* 'one shall not be censor unless he has been praetor,' T. B. 29.

Meagre though our material is, yet it can hardly be mere chance that we find only the perfect in the negative commands. In Latin, in both positive and negative form, the present is more common, but the perfect not infrequent. In the latter the idea of completed action is not necessarily apparent, but, as Elmer, *Am. Jour. Phil.*, 15, p. 115 ff., has shown, the perfect was more energetic. The old idea of a fundamental distinction in tense usage between general and definite prohibitions is demolished by Elmer, *l. c.* So in Oscan-Umbrian it is impossible to see any idea of completed action in the perfect; *nep fefacid* cannot differ in this respect from the preceding *factud*. The evident preference for the perfect after the negative may perhaps be connected with the more energetic character of the perfect in Latin, and one is also reminded of the Greek use of $\mu\eta$ with the aorist subjunctive, but not with the present subjunctive.

The subjunctive of wish, though of different origin, is not always easily distinguished from the preceding. A probable example is U. *fos sei, pacer sei* 'may'st thou be kind, may'st thou be propitious,' VI a, 23, VII b, 7, 26, with which the imperative *futu fos* alternates.¹ Likewise the subjunctives of the Curse of Vibia, *lamatir, krustatar, kaispatar, turumiiad*, and the corresponding negative *nip putiiad*, are rather of optative than of volitive origin. Similarly in the shorter curse (Zvet. Ins. It. Infer. Dial. no. 128) *nep pútfad, nep heriiad*. So the Greek execration-inscriptions show the optative in both positive and negative form. Here belongs also the perfect U. *pihafei*, VI a, 29, 'whatever . . . , may there be an expiation by this,' etc. Compare the numerous examples of the (usually syncopated) perfect subjunctive of wish in early Latin given by Lübbert, *Gramm. Stud.* I, p. 30.

An independent deliberative subjunctive, and without interrogative particle, would be seen in U. *aseriaia* VI a, 2, according

¹ It is noticeable that the subjunctive in each case occurs immediately after the phrase *teio subocau* 'I invoke thee.' Then the phrase is repeated half a dozen times with the imperative. This looks as if the choice of subjunctive here were connected with its exclusive use in dependent clauses.

to the interpretation of Aufrecht-Kirchhoff and Bücheler, but, if we follow Thurneysen's promising suggestion (I. Anz. IV, p. 39) that *stiflo* is imperative, this subjunctive belongs to the dependent clauses.

For the constructions in dependent clauses we have a somewhat greater variety. We may group together here the subjunctives which are ordinarily treated under the head of 'purpose' and 'result' clauses, without attempting to keep the two apart. The dependent clause is usually introduced by O. *puz*, U. *pusi* (= Lat. *ut*), but the verb may also stand without any conjunction. Examples are: U. *carsitu . . . puse erus dersi* 'let him call out that he put on the oil' (?) VII a, 43; (*stiflo aseriaia* 'demand that I observe,' VI a, 2; *eo iso ostendu pusi pir pureto cehefi dia* 'let him apply them in such a manner (*iso*) that (*pusi*) he cause (*dia*) one fire to burn from the other,' VI a, 20. The *pusi* introduces *dia* (cf. Latin *ita, ut*), and further, if *dia* is 'duit,' *cehefi* depends on *dia*; cf. Bronisch, p. 109, foot-note. O. *factud, pous tovtto deivatuns tanginom deicans* 'let him cause the people to declare their opinion under oath,' T. B. 9; cf. Lat. *facito, ut*. Following this and depending on the same *factud* is an infinitive clause *fiom . . . deicum* 'se dicere.' Further in the same sentence stands *nep fefacid pod pis dat eisac egmad mins deivaid dolud malud* 'let him prevent any one from swearing falsely in this matter,' or turned word for word into Latin *ne fuerit quod quis de eo re minus iuret dolo malo*. The phraseology is illogical, either the *nep* or the *minus* being superfluous, but its origin is plain. The *pod . . . mins deivaid* depends not on *fefacid*, but on *nep fefacid* taken together and being equivalent to a verb of preventing. The *pod mins* is plainly the equivalent of Latin *quominus*, although it is very doubtful if *pod* is identical with *quō*. Aside from the fact that Latin *quō* seems to be of instrumental origin, even an ablative form does not furnish a basis for comparison, since *ō* is always represented by *u* on the Tabula Bantina. Unless we wish to suppose an isolated orthographical exception here, we must allow that *pod mins* would be more exactly a Latin *quodminus*.

Examples of this construction from a past point of view, and consequently with imperfect subjunctive, as in Latin, are O. (Cippus Abellanus, 10 ff.) *ekss kumbened: sakaraklúm*

Herekleís . . . puz ídík sakaraklúm ínīm ídík terúm múíní [kum] múíníkeí tereí fusíd 'it was agreed: the fane of Hercules . . ., that this fane and this territory should be common in common territory'; cf. Latin *ita convenit, ut*. After this, the prescriptions are given in the independent construction (imperatives), until in l. 51 ff. we meet patensíns and herríns which must refer back again to ekss kumbened, only that here the conjunction puz is omitted. The same construction, and without conjunction, is seen in the Paelignian: *T. Nounis, L. Alafis Herec fesn upsaseter coisatens*, 'T. Nonius, L. Alfius saw to it that the feast of Hercules was celebrated.' Cf. Latin *iam curabo sentiat*. . . . The gerundive construction is an alternative in Oscan as in Latin. So úpsannam dedet 'operandam dedit.'

It happens that the examples just given, together with a relative clause involved in the same construction, embrace all the occurrences of the imperfect subjunctive in Oscan-Umbrian, and from these it appears that its usage was precisely the same as in Latin.¹

The subjunctive is found with U. tišit 'deceat' in the clause . . . fasia tišit '. . . it is right for him to do it,' II a, 17.

Of the same nature is the subjunctive with *herter* which properly means 'it is desirable (**heriō* 'volo'), proper, necessary.' Following are the passages with Bücheler's translation 1) *dirsans herte* 'dent oportet,' V b, 8, 11, 13, 16; 2) *esunu fuia herter* 'eo divina fiat oportet,' III, 1; 3) *ponne ivengar tursiandu hertei* 'cum iuvencae fugentur oportet,' VII b, 2; 4) *prehabia piře uraku ri esuna si herte* 'præhibeat quidquid ad illam rem divinam sit oportet,' V a, 6; 5) *revestu, puře tešte eru emantur herte, et pihaklu pune tribřišu fuiest, akrutu revestu emantu herte* V a, 8 ff. 'revisito quo dante eas emi oporteat, et piacolorum quom ternio fiet, ex agro revisito emine oporteat.' Preferable is the interpretation of Brugmann, Umbr.-

¹ For this reason I do not follow Brugmann, Grd. II., p. 1196, Bronisch, p. 142, and v. Planta, p. 500⁶, in taking U. *ostensendi* VI a, 20, as imperfect subjunctive rather than as future indicative with Bücheler. The verb stands in a relative clause denoting future time, and not from a past point of view, the verb of the principal clause being the imperative. There is no formal difficulty in the way of Bücheler's interpretation sufficient to warrant such violent treatment of the syntax.

Samn. p. 134, according to which the construction of the first *emantur herte* is the same as that of the last.¹

Among the subjunctives of 'indirect question,' one is an instance of the dependent deliberative subjunctive, namely *enuk fratriu ehvelklu feia fratreks ute kvestur, panta muta arferture si* 'tunc fratrum decretum faciat magister aut quaestor, quanta multa flamini si,' V b, 1.

¹ In all these passages I follow previous interpreters in regarding *herter*, *herte*, etc., as the principal verb of its sentence or clause and the subjunctive as depending on it. Entirely different, however, is the conception of Brugmann, l.c., p. 135. Remarking that the *ei* of *herlei* (cf. citation 3) points to a subjunctive form, he supposes that *herte(r)* as well as the perfect subjunctive *herifi* V b, 6, represents in origin a conditional clause with conjunction omitted. The form sunk to a particle-like word meaning 'nach eventuellen Gutdünken' and was thrown in without affecting the structure of the clause or sentence. By this view the subjunctives *dirsans*, etc., would be the principal verbs of the sentence and clause, and fall under different heads syntactically, as *dirsans*, *fuia* in 1) and 2) under subjunctive of command, *emantur* in 5) under subjunctive of indirect question, etc. But, in the first place, there is one passage which Brugmann seems to have overlooked, and to which his interpretation of *herter* cannot be applied, namely *esuf pusme herter* 'ipse quem oportet' (Bücheler), 'he upon whom it devolves,' II a, 40; *herter* is the only verb of the clause. Furthermore, the recognition that *herlei* is a subjunctive does not force us to any such departure from the former conception of the construction. In the phrase in which this particular spelling occurs (cf. 3) we can just as well suppose that *herlei* is the subjunctive introduced by *ponne*, as *tursiandu*, which would be the principal verb of the clause by Brugmann's view. In 5) Bücheler had already translated *herte* by 'oporteat,' though supposing that it was indicative in form. In 4) *herte* is subjunctive after the indefinite relative, as is the *si* which stands alone in the clause immediately following. If now we see in these phrases a subjunctive *herter*, it does not follow that the *herte* and *herter* of the first two citations are subjunctives. I see in these rather the indicative *herter*, so that *dirsans herte* still remains 'dent oportet.' There still awaits consideration the sentence containing *herifi*, namely *panta muta fratriu Atiieŕiu mestru karu, pure ulu benurent, afferture eru pepurkurent herifi, etantu mutu afferture si*, V b, 6. Bücheler translates 'quantam multam fratrum Atiedium maior pars qui illo venerint, flamini esse peposcerint quantam lubet, tanta multa flamini sit.' Here it has seemed to Bücheler that *herifi* had only adverbial force 'nach Begehr, durch Wahl' (cf. Rh. M. p. 169), so that we would seem to have the choice only between his own unsatisfactory notion that *herifi* is a substantive form, and some such explanation of the subjunctive perfect as Brugmann gives. But it is quite possible (and I believe this is the correct interpretation) that *herifi* depends on *pepurkurent* and itself introduces the infinitive clause *arferture eru*. *herifi* is then subjunctive of purpose without conjunction as in *deitu elaians* quoted above (cf. Latin *poscimus ut sit*, etc.), and the perfect tense is the one to be expected after the future perfect *pepurkurent*. The infinitive clause would depend, not on *peperkurent*, but on *herifi*, as in Latin *servum hercle te esse oportet*, etc. The whole construction would be as if in Latin *quantam multam . . . flamini esse poposcerint oportuerit*.

An unquestionable instance of a subjunctive due to the indirect discourse is *ehvelklu feia . . . , sve rehte kuratu si* 'decretum faciat si recte curatum sit,' V a, 24. The direct question would have the indicative.

The other two examples probably belong to this second class, O. *deicum, pod valaemom tovticom tadait ezum* 'dicere, quod optimum publicum censeat esse,' T. B. 11; *revestu, . . . emantur herte* 'revisito, . . . emine oporteat,' Va. 6 (no interrogative expressed here).

The subjunctive with the indefinite relative, the main verb being in the subjunctive, is seen in *prehabia, piře uraku ri esuna si herte, et pure esune sis* 'præhibeat quidquid ad illam rem divinam sit oporteat, et qui in divino sint,' V a, 5. Cf. Latin, e.g., *cui iussus siet, auscultet*, Cat. Agr. 3, 3. Ordinarily, however (whether the main verb is in the subjunctive, or not), we find the indicative, — present, as in *pisest . . . , eetū* 'quisquis est . . . , ito,' VI b, 53; future, as in *pisi pumpe fust eik-vases e Atiiefier, ere ri esune kuraia* 'quiquomque erit pagis Atiiediis, is rei divinae curet,' V a, 3; future perfect, as in *panta muta . . . pepurkurent, etantu mutu si* 'quantam multam . . . peposcerint, tantā multa si,' V b, 6. The examples of this are very numerous, showing that the indicative is the normal construction, as in Latin.

Here may be mentioned *persei mersei*, VI a, 28, 38, 48, for which appears *persei mers est* in VI b, 31, 55, the main verb in each case being a subjunctive. This passage should be added to the instances given by Brugmann, I. F. IV, p. 232, of U. *persei, pirsi* used as a conjunction like Latin *quod*. The meaning here is clearly 'in so far as it is right,' 'if it is right.' Cf. Lat. *quod opus siet* used by Cato even where the main verb is indicative, e.g. *dominus lapidem, ligna ad fornacem, quod opus siet, praebe*t, Cat. Agr. 16.

In temporal clauses we find in the great majority of cases the future and future perfect indicative. So O. *pon*, U. *ponne* 'quom' occurs over half a dozen times each with the future and future perfect. U. *ape* 'ubi' occurs nearly thirty times with future perfect, three times with future. Similarly in Latin, *quom* and *ubi* when referring to future time are regularly followed by

the future and future indicative. Further, U *puře* = Lat. *quod* is found once in temporal sense and followed by future indicative, *puře nuvime ferest* 'quod nonum feret,' II a, 26.

With the conjunctions corresponding to Latin *priusquam* and *dōnec* 'until,' we find future, future perfect, and perfect subjunctive.

Future. — O. *com preivatud actud, pruter pam medicatinom didest* 'cum reo agito, priusquam iudicationem dabit,' T. B. 17.

Future Perfect. — U. *sersi pīrsi sesust, poi angla aseriato est, erse neip mugatu nep arsir andersistu, nersa covrtust, pōrsi angla anseriato iust*, 'sedens quod sederit, qui oscines observatum ibit, ea nec muttito, nec alis intersidito, donec revorterit qui oscines observatum ierit,' VI a, 6; U. *eam mani nertru tenito, arnipo vestisia vesticos* 'eam manu sinistra teneto, donec vesticiam libaverit,' VI b, 24; *andervomu sersitu, arnipo comater pesnis fust* 'inter rogos sedeto, donicum commolitis precatus erit,' VI b, 41.

Perfect Subjunctive. — *neip amboltu, prepa desva combifianši*, 'neve ambulato, priusquam prosperam mandaverit,' VI b, 52.

This last construction would be the usual one in Latin, where *antequam* and *priusquam* are regularly followed by some tense of the subjunctive. The other examples are to be compared with the relatively rare instances of *antequam* and *priusquam* with future and future indicative, of which examples are found; cf. Hale, Anticipatory Subjunctive, above, p. 92.

The imperfect subjunctive with *pún* is found in C. A. 50, where the verbs of the surrounding clauses are also in the same tense, depending on *ekss kúmbened*; cf. above, p. 142.

There are a few instances of present indicative and present subjunctive in future sense after *pon*, and these must be considered more closely, since some of them are subjects of dispute. Some scholars object to the present indicative, while others, especially Bücheler, find no difficulty with the present indicative, but are loath to admit the present subjunctive. As a matter of fact, we find both; nor should this surprise us in view of what is found in Latin. An unquestionable example of the present indicative is U. *furfant* (first conjugation; cf. *efurfatu*) in *vocucum*

Ioviu, ponne ovi furfant, vitlu toru trif fetu 'ad aedem Ioviam, quom ovis caedunt (?), vitulos tauros tris facito,' VI b, 43 (= vukukum Iuviu, pune uvef furfaθ, tref vitluf turuf Marte Huřie fetu, etc., I b, 1). Likewise seste 'sistis' in the following passage: *vitlu vufu pune heries fašu, eruhu tişlu sestu Iuvepatre. Pune seste, urfeta manuve habetu* 'vitulum votivum cum voles facere, eadem dicatione sistito Iovi patri. Cum sistis, orbitam in manu habetu' (Bücheler), II b, 22. Bréal, *Les Tables Eugubines*, p. 271, objects to this interpretation on the ground that this would be the only instance on the tables of *pune* 'when' construed with the present indicative. Brugmann also, *Umbr.-Osk.*, p. 316, after quoting Bréal with apparent approval, speaks of the syntaktischen Anstoss in Bücheler's (and Huschke's) interpretation, and *Umbr.-Samn.*, p. 13, footnote, says that we probably have only the choice between the future indicative and the present subjunctive. It is, of course, true that the future indicative is the normal tense in such a phrase, but *ponne furfant* proves the incorrectness of Bréal's statement for the Umbrian, and, furthermore, in Latin we have instances of present indicative in future sense in clauses of various kinds which normally show future indicative or present subjunctive; cf. Hale, *Anticipatory Subjunctive*, p. 91. Though an example of this sort after *quom, cum* may not occur, it would be the same in principle as in *priusquam huic respondes temere audi*, Ter. Phorm. 1037, or in conditional clauses like *si id moritur quod fieri oportebit, profanum esto, scelus esto*, Livy XXII 10, 5; *si pereō, hominum manibus periisse iuvabit*, Verg. Aen. 3, 606.

An unquestionable example of the present subjunctive is seen in the following: *pone esonome ferar, puse pir entelust, eru fertu poe perca arsmatiam habiest*, VI b, 50, which Bücheler translates 'cum in rem divinam feretur id in quo ignem imposuerit, is fertu qui virgam imperatoriam habebit,' remarking that he translates by 'feretur' to suit Latin usage. He says (*Umbrica*, pp. 88-89) that we cannot escape the conclusion that *ferar* is a subjunctive, but that this is contrary to the usage both of the Latins and the Umbrians, who indeed vary the tense after *pone* between present, future, and future perfect, but admit only one mode, the indicative. And notwithstanding this passage he insists

(Rh. M. 33, 30 f.) on taking O. *kahad* in the phrase *pun far kahad, nip putiiad edum* 'when he takes food, may he not be able to eat' (Curse of Vibia) as indicative in spite of the *d*, which points clearly to the subjunctive of the third conjugation. He says: "Nun ist nach temporalem *quom*, wenn der Hauptsatz im Conjunctiv steht, durch die Herrschaft dieses Modus über den ganzen Satz ein conjunctivisches Verbum zwar nicht unerhört (example follows from Plautus *Asin.*, 776 ff.), aber für die alte Sprache höchst selten; wo directe Rede und der Modus des Hauptsatzes frei steht, treffen wir in den lateinischen oskischen umbrischen Denkmälern regelmässig, ja bis auf das umbrische *ponesonome ferar*, T. Iguv. VI b, 50, ausnahmslos, bei Geboten aber Verboten den Indicativ. Danach erachte ich für sicher dass auch hier die durch *pon* in ihrer zeitlichen Entstehung dargestellte Handlungen als wirklich und bestimmt im Indicativ auftreten." But if we have one certain instance of subjunctive in U. *ferar*, surely we may have another in O. *kahad*, where the principal verb is in the subjunctive. Nor is the Latin usage such as to demand any scepticism about such a construction in Oscan-Umbrian. Lübbert, *Gram. Stud.* II. p. 229 f., gives thirty instances from Plautus and Terence of subjunctive in future sense after *quom*, when the clause is subordinate to another subjunctive, and the material might be added to from other sources (cf., for example, *caveto, quom ventus siet aut imber, effodias aut feras*, Cat. Agr., 28, 1; *pellem anguinam ubi videris, tollito et condito, ne quaeras cum opus siet*, Cat. Agr. 73; cf. also perfect subjunctive for future perfect after 'ubi' in *olea ubi lecta sint, oleum fiat continuo, ne corrumpatur*, Cat. Agr. 3, 2). Bücheler seems to regard as pertinent only those examples in which the subjunctive on which the relative clause depends is itself independent. It is extremely unlikely that this factor plays any rôle in the phenomenon. It is hard to believe that in the sentence *curata fac sint, quom a foro redeam domum* the *redeam* would have been any less likely to occur had the principal clause been *curata sint* instead of *curata fac sint*.

Furthermore, the situation is precisely the same in relative clauses other than temporal, and in conditional clauses referring to future time; and here, in Latin, the usual future indicative

may be replaced by the present subjunctive, when the verb of the main clause is a subjunctive, infinitive, or even an imperative. So in the following examples from early Latin :

Cui iussus siet, auscultet, Cat. Agr. 5, 3.

Vendat oleum, si pretium habeat, vinum, frumentum quod supersit vendat, . . . et siquid aliud supersit, vendat, ibid. 2, 7.

Siliginem, triticum in loco aperto celso, ubi sol quam diutissime siet, seri oportet, ibid. 35, 1.

Iubeto eum, sei ita pareat, condemnari, Lex. Bant. 10.

Lentim in rudecto et rubricoso loco, qui herbosus non siet, serito, Cat. Agr. 35, 1 ; followed immediately by *hordeum, qui locus novus erit . . . , serito*.

In short, the appearance of a subjunctive in such clauses, when themselves depending on a subjunctive or infinitive, is such a well-known phenomenon in Latin that it would hardly seem necessary to do more than allude to it, were it not that Bücheler, whose name carries so much authority, explicitly represents it as abnormal and unusual in the early language, and so denies its existence for Oscan-Umbrian in the very phrase (pun far kahad, nip putiiad edum) where the construction is simplest and most easily paralleled. Other instances in Oscan-Umbrian of the so-called 'attraction' or 'assimilation' to a subjunctive of the main clause are furnished by the relative clauses quoted above, p. 144, and by the conditional clauses cited below. A temporal clause with subjunctive depending on an infinitive clause is seen in *ponne ivengar tursiandu hertei*, no matter whether one takes *hertei* or *tursiandu* as the main verb of the clause ; cf. above, p. 143, footnote.

In the temporal clause first quoted (*pone esonome ferar*, etc.), where Bücheler does not deny the subjunctive form, the main verb is an imperative. In this case surprise at a subjunctive might seem more intelligible, since assimilation to an imperative is not commonly recognized. But that here, too, a subjunctive may actually occur in Latin is shown by the example quoted above from Cato.¹

¹ Whether this is really assimilation is not material to our argument. In fact it seems to me that this is not a necessary assumption. A subjunctive in a relative or conditional clause is in itself justifiable (in some cases as an anticipatory subjunctive,

In conditional clauses we ordinarily find the future and future perfect indicative (some 16 examples on the Tabula Bantina). Once we find a subjunctive without introductory conjunction, according to the probable interpretation of Bücheler, namely *heriiei fasiu ařfertur, avis anzeriates menzne kurs-lasiu fařia tiřit* 'si velit facere adfertor, avibus observatis mense circulario faciat decet,' II a, 16. *heriiei* is taken as present subjunctive, but as far as the tense is concerned, the perfect would also be possible, just as in independent clauses of command, wish, etc. So in Latin, e.g. *si adfuerit, bene sit* (Allen and Greenough). We have further one probable instance of present subjunctive in O. *svai neip dadid lamatir* (Curse of Vibia) which Bücheler translates 'si me reddit, veneat,' taking it as indicative. But the *d* points to subjunctive, and this is perfectly possible syntactically; cf. just above.

To sum up, we may conclude from the preceding that the agreement between Oscan-Umbrian and Latin in the syntax of the modes and tenses is fully up to the agreement in form. If we make the comparison with early Latin, the agreement is practically complete. Nowhere do we find a modal or tense use which cannot be paralleled in Latin. Old subjunctive and optative uses are retained, and in cases where the Latin subjunctive is supposed to be secondary ('assimilation of mode') Oscan-Umbrian offers parallels. As regards the choice between two possible constructions, the relative preponderance is not always the same in the Oscan-Umbrian remains as in Latin, but we cannot tell how far this may be due to the meagre character of the material.

In regard to Voice, the usage of the *r*-forms in Oscan-Umbrian is in general like that of Latin. We find both 'deponents' (U. *terkantur* 'testentur') and genuine passives (U. *emantur* 'emantur'). But there are certain forms which show a usage (as well as a form) which cannot be completely paralleled in Latin, though the impersonal use of the passive of intransitives may seem closely connected. Zimmer, K. Z. 30, 276 ff., cites U. *ferar*

in others as a potential optative), and assimilation may be a conserving rather than a creative force, may merely tend to preserve an old construction against the inroads of the future indicative. In this case it would not be strange to find occasional subjunctives of this type, even where the force of assimilation is absent.

VI b, 50, and *ier* VI b, 54, as examples of active meaning 'sie tragen, man trägt, es wird getragen,' etc. In this view Zimmer was sustained by Brugmann, Osk.-Umb. p. 214 ff., who discusses some other probable and possible examples of the same use. The clearest instance of all is one which came to light after the appearance of Zimmer's article, namely *iúvilas sakrannas... sakriiss sakrafír avt últiumam kerssnaís* 'the iovilae which are to be consecrated one should consecrate with rites, but the last one with banquets,' Rh. M. 45, 161 ff.; cf. also Conway, Cambridge University Reporter, 1890, p. 334. More recently, Grd. II, p. 1391, and Umbr.-Samn. p. 137, Brugmann is disposed to regard the construction of these forms as in no way different from that of the Latin 'modus impersonalis.' Now Zimmer had also, l.c. p. 286, alluded to the peculiar use of the passive of intransitive verbs in Latin, and explained them as relics of an older active meaning. And, indeed, the use of *ier* is the same as that of Latin *itur*, 'it is gone,' 'some one goes.' But the corresponding use of transitive verbs, such as is seen in the words just cited from the Oscan, must be considered as peculiar to Oscan-Umbrian and foreign to the Latin of the good period. Even the isolated *vivitur vitam* of Ennius is not quite parallel, and the type *legitur Vergilium*, quoted by Brugmann from Weisweiler, Partic. Fut. Pass. p. 70, is, as the latter remarks, from a very late period. The bearing of the forms in question upon the origin of the passive formation will be discussed below, pp. 180 ff.

THE OSCAN-UMBRIAN VERB-SYSTEM IN DETAIL.

The Personal Endings.

A. Endings of the Indicative and Subjunctive.

Sing. 1. A sure example of the I. E. secondary ending *-m* is seen in O. *súm*, *sum*=Lat. *sum*, an injunctive form; cf. Brugmann, Umbr.-Osk., p. 230, Grd. II, p. 905. Further, the perfect form *manafum* of the Vibia Curse is, as I now believe, better

taken with Bücheler as first singular than with Bugge as first plural (i.e. **manafuo-m* to third singular **manafue-d*, a *manaffed*).

In the primary forms there is no difference from the Latin, except in the first conjugation, where we find *-āō* in U. *subocauu*; cf. Bartholomae, Studien z. idg. Sprachgeschichte, II, p. 141, Buck, p. 131, Bronisch, p. 102. This *-āō* may perfectly well be regarded as the regular representative of I. E. *-āiō*, with loss of *i* and remaining hiatus. It is true that Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1338, on account of U. *stiplo*, *anserio*, considered as the contracted forms of O. *censaum*, etc., thinks that in *subocauu* we have not the unchanged *-āō*, but a formation after *stahu*, where, by reason of the accent, contraction did not take place. But, as we have seen, U. *stiplo*, *anseriato* are now plausibly explained by Thurneysen as imperatives. And even for those who still prefer to view them as infinitives, the alternative remains of regarding these as due to the analogy of *aferom*, etc., and seeing in *subocauu* the regular development of *-āō*.¹

Sing. 2. For the second singular we have, aside from the future forms like U. *heries* (where the *s* is the tense sign, not the ending), only the Umbrian forms *heris*, *heri*, and *seste*. I follow Huschke and Bücheler in reckoning the last-named form here. The syntactical objection raised by Bréal (Les Tables Eugub.,

¹ A related question exists in regard to the Latin *amō*, etc. It is commonly assumed that the Latin *-ō* is the regular result of contraction from *-āō*, but Bartholomae, Studien z. idg. Sprachgeschichte, II, p. 142, is right in calling attention to the fact that there is no other evidence for such contraction (the most nearly analogous case would be *sōl* if Solmsen's explanation, Studien z. lat. Lautgeschichte, were certain), and that the *-ō* may have come in from the analogy of simple verbs like *legō*. Our knowledge of the Latin laws of contraction is in reality very meagre. In all the *certain* instances of vowels brought together by the loss of *i*, the dialects are in agreement, showing either hiatus (*ea*, *eo*), or contraction, dating from Ur-Italic times (so *ē* from *eie*; cf. v. Planta, 272, Buck, p. 169, and especially the form *trīs* I. F. IV, p. 259). On the other hand, if we suppose that Latin *amet* is the phonetic equivalent of Osc. *deivaid*, and not after the analogy of *feret*, we have an instance of specifically Latin contraction of *āē* to *ē*, and may equally well believe in *ō* from *āō*.

However this may be, it is unlikely that the *ō* of *stō*, etc., where the accent was on the *ā*, is the result of contraction. Here at least we are safe in assuming that *stō* has usurped the place of an earlier **stām*. Whether the vulgar forms *stao* and *dao*, to which the Romance languages point (cf. Gröber, Archiv für lat. Lex. V, p. 478), have any connection with an original **sta(i)ō* (U. *stahu*), or are of secondary origin, is a question to which I venture no answer.

p. 271) is, as we have seen above, p. 146, not a valid one, nor do I consider the formal objection raised by Brugmann, Umbr.-Osk., p. 216, as conclusive. Brugmann urges that we should expect *sests* with syncope as the equivalent of Latin *sistis*, and that we have no right to go back to the primary ending *-e-si* as long as there is no trace of it elsewhere. I believe on the contrary that there is no objection whatever to regarding the *s* of the Latin present as the representative of the primary ending, but that this would not affect the question of syncope. It is altogether probable that the apocope of the final *i*, whatever may have been the conditions under which it took place, is to be referred to the Italic period; cf. Vocal., p. 199. In many cases there were sentence-doublings of which one would survive in one dialect, one in another. For the verb we find only the forms with apocope, and perhaps this is due to the conditions of the process; cf. v. Planta, p. 565. If, now, the *i* of *-ti* and *-si* was lost in the Italic period (and before the change of intervocalic *s* to *z*), what trace could we expect to find of the primary ending of the second singular? The only proof that *-t* of the third person represents the primary ending lies in the differentiation effected by the change which the *secondary* ending had undergone, and the *s* of the secondary ending of the second singular suffered no change. I believe, then, that we should have a right to resort to *-e-si* as the original ending for *seste*, but that this would not help us. If *i* was lost in Ur-Italic, we cannot set up with Brugmann, l.c. foot-note, an Osc.-Umbr. **di-d-e-ti* to explain the preservation of the vowel in Vest. *didet*, nor an Osc.-Umbr. **si-st-e-si* to explain *seste*. At the time when the Osc.-Umbr. syncope-law was in action, the *e* stood in the final syllable in primary just as in secondary tenses. But the forms of the perfect (O. kúmbened) teach us that syncope was not universal, even in final syllables before dentals (depending perhaps on character of preceding syllable), or else that the full form was often restored under some analogical influence; cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, 1236¹, v. Planta, p. 231.

And so, when we have the perfect forms like O. kúmbened, prúfatted, etc., and presents like V. *didet* (and M. *feret*), we are justified in accepting *seste* as the equivalent of Latin *sistis*.

Plur. 1. There is no certain example of the first plural, *manafum* being more probably singular; cf. above, p. 150.

Plur. 2. No unquestionable example of the indicative or subjunctive occurs. In the present imperative Pael. *eite* = Lat. *ite* we see the old secondary ending, and we should not be surprised to find this outside of the imperative. In *lexe* of the same Paelignian inscription, we seem to require a second plural form; cf. Thurneysen, Rh. M. 43, p. 352. But I see no satisfactory way of explaining the phonetic development of **lexte* to *lexe*. The alleged parallel, Lat. *ipse* from *is-pte*, is altogether improbable.

Sing. 3 and Plur. 3. In the case of the third persons singular and plural, a distinction between primary and secondary endings exists, which has been lost in Latin. The primary endings, appearing in the present, future, and future perfect of the indicative, are *-t*, *-(n)t*; the secondary, appearing in the imperfect and perfect indicative and in all tenses of the subjunctive, are *-d*, *-ns*. Contrast pres. indic. O. *faamat* with pres. subj. O. *deivaid*, perf. indic. O. *kúmbened*; and pres. indic. U. *furfant*, fut. indic. O. *censazet* with pres. subj. O. *deicans*, perf. indic. O. *prúfattens*, Pael. *coisatens*. In the third singular the distinction is less obvious in Umbrian than in Oscan, since final *d* is dropped and final *t* is so weakened as not always to be designated. Still the variation *t* : *d* is evidenced by the fact that in secondary tenses the dental is invariably lost, as in *dirsa*, *portaia*, etc., whereas in the primary tenses the orthography varies, as *tišit*, but *habe*.

There are in Oscan a few alleged instances of confusion. The two forms *kahad* and *dadid*, of the Curse of Vibia, are regarded as subjunctive by Bücheler, Rh. M. 33, pp. 31 and 19, and Bugge, Altit. Stud., pp. 34 and 25, but, as noted above, p. 146 ff., Bücheler has gone too far in claiming that the syntax demands this. As for *kahad*, the connection with Latin *incohāre* by no means compels us to reckon it with the first conjugation. It may well be the primary verb to which *incohāre* is in the same way related as Latin *occupāre* to *capio*, etc. For the root, cf. Thurneysen, Freiburger Festgruss an Osthoff, pp. 5 ff. For *dadid*, the formal explanation given by Bücheler, l.c. p. 19, who makes it equivalent to Latin *dēdit*, is impossible on account of the *i*, which, however, would be in order if we reckoned the form with Bronisch, p. 109,

as belonging to the fourth conjugation. But there is no objection to Brugmann's view that the form is the optative of the old unthematic inflection.¹

The form *tadait* of the Tabula Bantina is almost certainly a subjunctive, but rather than regard it with Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1348, as an isolated instance in Oscan-Umbrian of the subjunctives with primary ending, I prefer to class it with those cases of inaccurate orthography, occasioned by the interchange of final *t* and *d* in sentence-combination, of which *pocapit* of the same inscription against the *púkkapíd* of the Cippus Abellanus is an example. So also v. Planta, p. 578.

The *-nt* of the plural appears in Oscan without the *n* except in *stahínt*, *eestínt*. V. Planta, p. 311, accounts for this variation by supposing that the *n* was retained when otherwise a confusion between singular and plural would arise. But it is quite possible that the character of the preceding vowel may be itself the cause. For in interior syllables also *n* must have been specially weak in the combination *-ent*, as in *aragetud*, *Freternun*, etc.; cf. Vocal., p. 137. In Umbrian, the nasal always appears in the ending except in *furfaθ* I *b*, 1. In *staheren*, 'stabunt,' I *b*, 19, the absence of the *t* is plausibly explained by v. Planta, p. 574, as due to the fact that the following word begins with *-t*. This brings the form into line with all other futures and is far preferable to Brugmann's suggestion, Grd. II, p. 1366, that its *n* may be the same as in Latin *dan-unt*, etc. For this last has to be explained as a development of the *secondary* ending. For the secondary ending we find in Umbrian *-s* beside *-ns* (*dirsas*, *dirsans*), a mere orthographical variation due to the reduction of the nasal.

All the forms, then, of Oscan-Umbrian are readily explained on the basis of *-t*, *-nt* for primary, *-d*, *-ns* for secondary endings. The explanation of these was long since given by Bugge; to wit, that I. E. final *-t*, *-nt* became *-d*, *-ns*, and that, after this, I. E. *-ti*, *-nti* lost their final vowel, leaving *-t*, *-nt* as primary endings. In the case of the singular, the secondary ending *d* is also seen in early Latin, marking the phonetic change as Ur-Italic. Of *-ns* as a

¹ In my *Vocalismus*, p. 84, I have cited *dadid* among the *z*-subjunctives, but in view of the disposition of optative and subjunctive forms elsewhere observed, I regard this as an error.

verbal ending there is no trace, but it is intrinsically probable that here too a change of some sort took place in the Italic period, and, if Thurneysen's explanation of Latin *totiēns*, *noviēns*, etc., be accepted, we may place the complete change to *-ns* in that period, although this seriously adds to the difficulties in the almost hopeless task of arranging a satisfactory chronology for the changes which *-ns* suffered in Oscan-Umbrian.

Noteworthy is the spread of *-ent*, *-ens* (I. E. *-enti*, *-nti*, *-ent*, *-nt*, cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1360) at the expense of *-*out*, *-*ons* (I. E. *-onti*, *-ont*), of which there is no trace, compared with the opposite result in Latin (*sunt* after *legunt*). We have, to be sure, no actual example of the third plural indicative active of the third conjugation, but the Marrucian *ferenter*, if, as I suppose, a third plural indicative passive,¹ stands in evidence for an active **ferent*, and, moreover, the future and future perfect forms in *-ent*, as well as the perfect in *-ens*, are plainly encroachments on the domain of the thematic endings.

The passive endings will come up for discussion below under 'Passive,' p. 177 ff.

B. Endings of the Imperative.

The Oscan ending *-tud*, Umbrian *-tu*, is equivalent to the Latin *-tō*, Grk. *-τω*, Skt. *-tād*, I. E. *-*tōd*. The ending was originally unrestricted in person and number. The Oscan examples happen to be of the third singular, but Umbrian, like the Latin, shows the double usage as second and third persons; Umbrian shows a secondary plural formation, which is, however, not like the Latin, and is not even Oscan-Umbrian. After the loss of the final dental in Umbrian a particle was added to distinguish the plural from the

¹ The Marrucian forms *feret* and *ferenter* have been taken as present indicative (Corssen, so also Bronisch, p. 151), as future indicative (Bücheler), and as present subjunctive (Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1393, "*ferenter* 'ferantur'"), not to speak of Huschke's impossible view that *ferenter* is an imperative. The future indicative is out of the question. It is not conceivable that a dialect which belongs so clearly to the Oscan-Umbrian branch should show radically different future formations. As present subjunctives they would also differ from the normal formation; cf. above. The forms are on their face present indicatives, and though the mode and tense may seem strange after *lixs*, they are not inexplicable. It is not then, "the law (is that) the 'assignas' shall be brought," but "the usage (is that) the 'assignas' are brought."

singular. This particle is written *-tu*, *-to*, *-ta* with the same variation of orthography as is found in the nominative singular of *ā*-stems and the neuter plural of *o*-stems. This points unmistakably to *-tā*; cf. Vocal. p. 39, v. Planta, p. 81, Brugmann, Grd. II, 1327. Brugmann suggests in explanation that the *-tā* is an old dual ending found elsewhere only in Slavic. It is worth considering, however, whether the particle is not the same as in the post-positive *-tu*, *-ta*, *-to* used to express the ablative relation. For both, the original form may be *tād*, ablative of a feminine stem *tā*- (cf. O. dat 'de,' i.e. *dā-d*, O. ehtrad, Lat. *exstrād*, etc.)¹ Now, according to the most widely accepted view (cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1323), the *-tōd* of the imperative is nothing but the ablative of the stem *to*-, the use of which is explained by the special function of this imperative, as best exemplified in Sanskrit (cf. Whitney, § 571) and Italic. So we should be brought back to the old theory of doubling (cf. Brugmann, M. U. I, p. 169, and the literature cited), only that it was not a conscious doubling involving an actual repetition of the same sound-group.

For the passive imperatives, O. *censamur*, U. *-mu*, plural *-mu-mo*, the correct explanation was long since given by Brugmann, M. U. I, p. 168 ff. The Umbrian pluralizing particle is plainly after the

¹The opinion seems to be gaining ground that the ablative of *o*-stems ended originally in *-ād*. This theory of Mahlow's is upheld by Kretschmer, K. Z. 31, 457, Hirt. I. F. I, 24, Streitberg, I. Anz. III, 190, the two last-named scholars regarding Latin *exstrād*, *contrā*, *intrā*, etc., as a strong, if not indeed the chief argument. If I still abide by the older view, it is because their reasons for departing from it have not impressed me as valid. There is nothing to show that the Lith. *o*, Lett. *ā* in the genitive singular (old ablative) cannot stand for I. E. *ō* as well as in Lith. *tvord* 'hedge,' Lett. *tvāre* to *tverīti*, Lith. *į-toka* to *tekū* and hundreds of other noun — and verb — derivatives of the *e*-series. And I do not agree with Hirt. l.c. that until the conditions for the appearance of I. E. *ō* as Lith. *o* are known, we cannot operate with such a change. One might as well maintain that until the laws for the appearance of I. E. *ō* as Lith. *ā* are settled, we cannot operate with this representation. And the Italic forms? Are we to deny utterly the existence of adverbs and particles formed from *ā*-stems? And if not, if we still regard as such Gr. *μακράν*, *σχεδόν*, Lat. *quam*, *tam*, Gr. Dor. *κρυφά*, *ταυρά*, and numerous other formations, why must we view otherwise the Latin form *-ād*? And as *al* is regarded as loc. of an *ā*-stem in contrast to *el* of an *o*-stem, why not understand in the same way the difference between Lat. *contrā* and O. *contrud*? The preponderance of the *-ād* forms in Italic may be due to the fact that in many cases *viā* was understood, e.g. in *suprad*, *extrad*, just as in *sexlā*, *rectā*, *sinistrā*, for which cf. Delbrück, Idg. Syntax, I, p. 565. In favor of the derivation of Lith. gen. sing. *-o* from *-ōd*, cf. now also Zubaty, I. F. IV, p. 476.

analogy of *-to* (*-tād), and the *-mu* itself is probably formed from the suffix *-mo-* after the analogy of *-tu*, as if this were from the suffix *-to*. The *r* of *O. censamur* is a further modification, after the other passive forms in *-r*. The Umbrian forms never had this *-r*.

The Conjugations.

The general features of the conjugations have already been treated above, p. 131 ff. It remains here to add a few remarks on the attribution of this or that form to a given conjugation. In general the present stem forms the basis of classification, but in the case of the first and fourth conjugation, as in Latin, the 'perfect stem' may be equally good evidence. That is, while a simple preterit in *-ed* or a participle in *-eto* may belong to a present of any conjugation, forms in *-afed*, *-atted*, *-ankied* (U. *-anšiust*), or *-āto* are sure marks of conj. I, and *-ifed* (U. *-ifi*), *-iefed*, *-inkied* (U. *-inšiust*) of IV. There can never be any difficulty in recognizing forms of I, nor, in general, of III. But here the syncope of vowel in the imperative forms is not an absolute criterion. The lost vowel may have been *i*, and the verb therefore of the fourth conjugation, as in *O. factud* to *fakiiad*; and, again, a form like *kanetu* may, notwithstanding its vowel, belong to III, if v. Planta, p. 215, is right in supposing that after *n* vowels did not suffer syncope. It is in the choice between II and IV that the chief difficulty lies. In some cases the orthography is decisive, as for example in *O. līkītud* and *U. persnihimu*, which could belong only to the second and fourth respectively. More often, however, and especially in case of the Umbrian, there is room for a difference of opinion as to the proper classification. In the long series of Umbrian imperatives, II b, 60 ff., *tursitu*, *tremitu*, *nepitu*, *sonitu*, *savitu*, the *-itu* is ambiguous. The *i* may represent *ē*, and reasoning from the Latin we need not hesitate to class *tursitu* (Lat. *torred*) under II, as we do also *sersitu* (Lat. *sedeō*), *tenitu* (Lat. *teneō*), etc. But *-itu* is also regular in IV, e.g. *purdovitu*; and in the case of *sonitu* the comparison of Lat. *sonō* and of U. *kanetu* might lead one to think of III, though *i* for *e* is rare. An *-etu* of the Umbrian national alphabet is equally ambiguous. A spelling *ei* points, though not conclusively, to *ī*, as in *hereitu*, *stahmeitei*, *peihaner*, etc. Hence for *trebeit* the

probability is in favor of conjugation IV, rather than of II. If we classify *tišit* under II, it is solely on account of the Latin. An *ii* is evidence for IV, as in O. *fakiiad*, *heriiad*, U. *heriiei*. But in previously regarding *putiiad*, *putiians*, *turumiiad* of the Vibia inscription in the same light (Vocal. p. 53) I have gone astray. V. *Planta* aptly compares with *putiiad* : *pútíad* the form *iiuk* of an early inscription corresponding to the ordinary *íúk*, *íoc*, in which *í* represents an original *e*. This *ii* for *e* is restricted to the earliest inscriptions, such a spelling being ordinarily good evidence for *-iġ-* (cf. *pútíad* : *heriiad*, Zvet. No. 128).

But it does not follow, on the other hand, that the spelling with one *i* in the epichoric alphabet is proof that the form does *not* belong to IV. And here I differ very widely from the conclusions reached by Bronisch, pp. 94-116. I acknowledge with pleasure his brilliant work in the treatment of the Oscan proper names, and the light which is thus thrown upon the distinction between *i* and *ii*. After testing the matter independently (in Umbrian, in words which show variation between *ii* and *i*, we find *ii*, never *i*, in national alphabet, *i*, never *ii*, in Latin; *ii* 31 times, *i* 15 times, 46 instances with not a single irregularity!), I accept his conclusion that an *iġ* is always designated in the epichoric alphabet by *ii*, and that where we find *i* in epichoric as well as Latin alphabet, it must rather be *ġ*. But this does not warrant his further assertion that U. *heriest*, *heriest* must be for *herē-est*, U. *purtuvies* for *pordovē-est*, or again that O. *fakiiad* must be a demonstrative in distinction from U. *fasiu*. Matters lie somewhat as follows. The I.-E. suffix *-iō-*, both substantive and verbal, had two strong forms, *-iō-* and *-iġō-*, and two weak, *i* and *ī*. Originally the use of *iō* or *iġō* depended on the character of the preceding syllable, and, further, *i* belonged to *iō*, *ī* to *-iġō-*. All these forms existed in Italic, but in promiscuous use; *iō* and *-iġō-* might occur after the same root syllable, and *ī* was used as much in connection with *-iō-* as with *-iġō-* (so in the Oscan praenomina the *i* of the nominative must be *ī*, though oblique cases show *ġ*). In the case of the adjective suffix *-iō-*, when used to form proper names, a secondary suffix *-iġō-* arose, forming patronymics; cf. Bronisch, p. 67. But what becomes of the old by-form *-iġō-*? There is nothing to show that it had become *-iō-* by phonetic change, except in the case of the

dialect of Bantia. It must have continued in use, merged with the *-iō-* of later origin and following the function of the latter. A new and unoriginal distinction between *-iō-* and *-iō-* had arisen by reason of the formation of adjectives in *-iō-* from those in *-iō-*, and the old *-iō-* was drawn into it. In the verb the case is quite different. Though in individual cases a denominative may be based on a noun in *-iō-*, itself formed from a noun in *-iō-*, in general there was no such sharp distinction in function, and the promiscuous use of *-iō-* and *-iō-* in both primary and derivative verbs continued. When we find U. fašiu beside O. fakiiad, there is no necessity for regarding the latter as denominative, nor need we with Bronisch separate heriad from the old primary verb *gher-(i)iō. And further, if Bronisch himself admits a *-iō-* stem in U. fašiu, what is the logic of saying that heriest must be from *herē-est on account of the single i? Why reject the stem heriō- for a stem herē- for which there is no other evidence?¹ So for putuvies there is no difficulty in the usual derivation from *doviō.

With *habiest*, O. *hafiest*, the matter is more complicated. The other Umbrian forms, *habe*, *habia*, *habitu*, might equally well be attributed to the second or the fourth conjugation, the analogy of the Latin favoring the former. It is doubtless on account of the Latin analogy that v. Planta (p. 96), in this case, favors the *ē*-stem. I am still inclined, though with more hesitation than formerly (Vocal., p. 53), to follow Osthoff in comparing at least *hafiest*, U. *habiest*, with Old Saxon *hebbiu*, etc. An analogical formation in *-ē-est* for *-ēst*² is of course not inconceivable, but since heriest and putuvies are *more naturally* taken as belonging to the *-iō*-present, and as this view is at least possible for *hafiest*, *habiest*, there does not seem sufficient ground for admitting such a formation.

Whatever view one may prefer to take of *habiest*, the analogies which Bronisch, p. 100, brings forward by way of introduction to his explanation of *-ē-est* are certainly incorrect. His complicated

¹ The imperative *hereitu*, *heritu*, and the participle *eretu* are not such; *ei* is a more common designation of *ē* than of *ē*, and *e* in the national alphabet for *ē* is seen, for example, in *prupehast*.

² One is tempted to find this *-ēst* in *kukehes* beside *cehefi*, but as v. Planta, p. 368, remarks, this would be the only instance of the designation of *ē* by *e* in the national alphabet.

explanation of a subjunctive form such as *pútíad* (**poteiēt* to **potēt*, then by analogy to **potēād*) is, like his theory as to the pronominal forms *ionc*, *íúk*, etc., made unnecessary by the recognition of the simple fact that *e* in hiatus had a closer sound than elsewhere, so that it was designated by the *i*-character (so Buck, p. 93, and v. Planta, p. 175 f.); *pútíad* represents simply **poteiāť*.

Of similar nature is the explanation which Bronisch, p. 185 f., advances for O. *staít*, *stahínt*. He starts from a form **stā-s* with subjunctive also **stās*. In avoidance of this confusion arose, after the analogy of **fēs*, an indicative **stēs*, **stēt*, etc., preserved in *eestínt*. In place of the subjunctive **stās* the optative **staēs* now comes into use, but after the analogy of **potēs* : **potēās*, **staēs* becomes **staēās*. Then to this subjunctive was formed an indicative **staēs*, etc., appearing in *staít*, *stahínt*. Such an unceasing sparring for position between indicative and subjunctive is simply incredible.

A stem **staiē-* has also been seen in *stahínt* by Bechtel, Hauptprobleme, p. 251, and Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1066, in both cases with comparison of O. B. *stojati*. This stem **staiē-*, which cannot be original, is explained by Brugmann as a compromise of **stē-* and **staiō-*. It is not necessary to suppose the actual existence of a stem **stē-*, but it is plain that *stojati* could easily arise in Slavic by analogy of the numerous verbs in which the suffixes *īō* and *ē* have united to form the verb-system. (As far as I can see, it is not even necessary to suppose a stem **staiē-*. The infin. *stojati* may have been formed to the present *stojā* directly after the analogy of *běžā* : *běžati*, etc. (outwardly *běž-ā*, *běž-ati*, in reality **bēg-īā*, **bēg-ē-ti*.) But a stem **staiē* in Italic, where there is no other confirmatory evidence of a combination of *īō-* and *ē-* forms in the same system is far less easy of explanation. The facts all point to a levelling, so that the verbal stem was either *īō-* or *ē-* throughout. I therefore regard even Brugmann's justification of a stem **staiē-*, though infinitely more plausible than that of Bronisch, as not wholly satisfactory, and abide by the explanation of *stahínt*, etc., given in Vocal., p. 61 f. Bronisch, p. 187, claims to have established the fact that the Oscan-Umbrian forms, except *eestínt*, belong to a single paradigm. I believe that my explana-

tion meets this desideratum, and in a much stricter sense. I regard all the forms, including *eestínt*, as belonging to the ordinary type of *-iō-* verbs. One form, U. *stahu*, is universally recognized as such, and compared with O. B. *stojā* and *stajā*; cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1060. Further, O. *staieffuf* (on the reading, cf. below p. 184 f.) can be explained only on this basis, since O. *e* cannot represent *ē*.¹ U. *stahitu* may perfectly well be parallel with Latin *venītō*, etc., and U. *staheren* may stand for **sta(ǵ)es-ent* corresponding to a singular *heriest*, as O. *censazet* to *deivast*. The laws of vowel-syncope are by no means so simple that from O. *herríns* and U. *ostensendi* we can conclude that the syncope would have taken place in the second syllable of **staiēs-ent*. The character of the preceding consonant and the quantity of the surrounding syllables have to be taken into account. And *stait* and *stahínt*, upon which the stem **staiē-* has been chiefly based, are just the forms to be expected from a stem *iō : ī*. *Stait* may be compared to Latin *facis* or *venīs*. The *í* would in itself point to short *i*, and in view of U. *didet*, etc., the lack of syncope does not stand in the way of this view, but in case of *stait* the *í* after *a* may be attributed to the habitual orthography of the diphthong *ai*. We may then compare the form directly with O. B. *stojiti*. *stahínt* is the precise equivalent of O. B. *stojētē*, *velētē*, etc., the *-ētē* of which Brugmann also now (Grd. II, p. 1006 anm.) derives from *-int(e)*. Brugmann, to be sure, supposes that the third plural of this type originally ended in *-iōnti-* (Grd. II, p. 1057), so that by this theory there could be no historical connection between the Slavic and Oscan forms, but only a coincidence due to similar levelling in both cases. The comparison would still be just as valuable. Moreover, there is other evidence for the weak ablaut in the third plural in Italic, namely in Latin *nequínunt*, *solínunt*, *prodínunt*, *obínunt*, *redínunt*, which presuppose earlier forms **prodint*, **solint*, etc. The vowel is shown to be long in the case of *prodínunt* by the verse quoted by Festus from Ennius, and is doubtless the same in the others, including *solínunt* (as if *sol-eō*, like *prōd-eō*). The length is due to the *ī* of *īmus*.

For *eestínt* we avoid the necessity of setting up a stem different from that seen in *stahínt* by the simple supposition

¹ The *i* is of course due to analogical influence, as in U. *feia*, *fuia*, *fuiest*.

of syncope from **eestahínt*.¹ The restored eh[stit or ee[stit² of the Cippus Abellanus is to be judged in the same way.

The form *staíet*, of which a second example is furnished by one of the inscriptions recently published (I. F. IV, 258 ff.), is peculiar as a (dialectic?) by-form of *stahínt*. It may be due to the analogy of such a form as *fíiet* (**fít : fíiet* = *staít : staíet*).

A few other words, whose stem-form deserves special notice, may be treated conveniently here.

O. íst. This form occurs seven times on the Cippus Abellanus, while *est* has come to light on a Capuan inscription. This last is of course identical with U. *est*, Lat. *est*, but it is equally clear that the íst must be regarded as a distinct form. The explanation which I have previously given (Vocal., p. 95), and which is also approved by Bartholomae (Literarisches Centralblatt, 1892, col. 1101, I. F. III, 17, 63), namely, that íst represents *ēst*, I still maintain as the only one of any plausibility yet offered. The same is given as an alternative explanation by Bronisch, p. 127. V. Planta (p. 84) also has thought of this as the simplest solution, but rejects it because of the uncertainty of Lat. *ēs*, which alone, as he thinks, could make such an explanation probable. My respect for the orthography of the Cippus Abellanus would cause me to believe in an *ēst*, even without the support of a Lat. *ēs*, but on the other hand, I am not yet completely convinced of the correctness of the now current view that the metrically long *es* of Plautus is *ess* rather than *ēs*.

O. U. *fust*, O. *fusíd*. The analogy of *ἐφύσα*, Lith. *būsme*, Old Bulg. *bychz*, *bystz*, favors a long vowel in the last syllable. In this case direct identification of *fusíd* with Latin *foret* would be impossible, and Brugmann's derivation of the latter from **fu-es-et* would prove the correct one. It would also be an additional argument for my denial of the commonly assumed Umbrian change of *ū* to *ī* (Vocal., p. 111). And in *futu* we surely have *ū*; cf. *ἐφύv*, *φύvαι*, Skt. *abhūt*, *bhūtu*, etc. But in O. *fuid*, which I had cited among the instances of *ū*, the vowel was

¹ So **stāiō*, not **stāiō̄*. In Old Bulgarian also it is *stojā*, not *stajā*, which shows the *iō-i* inflection.

² This latter is what we should expect from the analogy of *eestínt*, and is moreover favored by Zvetaieff's facsimile, which, however, is quite different from Mommsen's.



probably short; cf. on Lat. *fui*, *fūi*, Solmsen, Studien z. lat. Lautgeschichte, p. 168 ff.

U. *cetu*, *etu* and *eest*, *est*. The imperative form represents **ei-tōd*, as does Lat. *itō*, and it is natural to see the same form of the root in *eest*, i.e. **ei-s-et(i)*, cf. Lat. *irem* from **ei-s-ēm*. Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1194, derives *eest* from **ei-es-et(i)*, which, I think, is far less likely. V. Planta, p. 175, also prefers **ei-s-e-t(i)*. In the periphrastic formation *ambrefurent*, we also have the strong ablaut form; cf. Lat. *ibam*.

O. *amfret* remains a difficult form; cf. v. Planta, pp. 167, 210, Buck, p. 14, Bronisch, p. 105. If we give up all hope of justifying the derivation from **amfr-ient*, of the various alternatives offered, that of Bronisch seems on the whole the most probable, namely derivation from **amfer-sent*. But I am by no means convinced.

U. *feitū*, *feetū*, *fetū*; *feta*, *aanfehtaf*. Conway, Am. Journ. Phil. X, p. 307, v. Planta, p. 358, and Bronisch, p. 187 f., have all seen that the above forms contain the strong form *fē*, but vary in the precise application of this idea. I favor Bronisch's explanation, starting from *fēk*, not *fē*, as better accounting for the orthography *feitū*. On the other hand, *feia* is not easily derived from **fēk-iō*, and here we must either see the original *fē*, *dhē* without the *k*-suffix, or else suppose that the form arose under the influence of *feetū*, in which the *k* had regularly disappeared.

O. *fifikus* is better taken with Bugge as 'feceris' than with Bücheler as 'deficeris.' So Bronisch, p. 189. The absence of labialization had aroused some scepticism as to Bücheler's interpretation in both v. Planta, p. 556, and the writer, Vocal., p. 55, though not sufficient to cause its rejection.¹ The decisive argument with me now is the reduplication. The analogical process which gave rise to the Latin *i*-reduplication in *sci-cidī*, etc., is specifically Latin, as is evident from its conditions and, further, from U. *pepurkurent*, etc.; cf. Osthoff, Perfect, 271 f., Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1237. Rather than suppose with Osthoff, l.c. p. 274, that *fifikus* is an isolated instance of the same process, working

¹ In *fiktu* the *k* is regular. The difference between *fiktu*, *vinctu*, *anstintu* and *feitū*, *deitū*, *arveitū* depends not, as Bronisch, p. 188, supposes, on the variation of surd and sonant, but on that of velars and palatals. So both Buck, pp. 145, 205, and v. Planta, p. 359.

independently in Oscan-Umbrian, we should see in *fi* the old present reduplication, carried outside the present as in O. fut. *didest*, U. *andirsafust*.

We find an almost alarming variety of forms of this root, **fak(i)ḡō* (O. *fakiiad*), *fak-* (U. *fakust*, O. *avafaker*¹) *fēk-* (O. *feitn*), *fifēk-* (O. *fifikus*), and *fefac-* (O. *fefacid*, *fefacust*). There is nothing to show whether in the last-named forms we have the original short vowel, or a long vowel after the analogy of roots of the *a*-series.²

In regard to the forms of the root *her*, I do not agree wholly with the classification of Bronisch, p. 107. As shown above, p. 159, a stem *herē-* is unnecessary, and I do not assume the stem *hero-* for so many forms as does Bronisch. The *herest* of the Tabula Bantina may perfectly well belong to the stem **her-(i)ḡō-*, as *r* for *rḡ* would be natural in the dialect which shows *ll*, *l*, for *lḡ* (*allo*, *famelo*). I consider O. *herest* and U. *heriest*, *heriest* as identical. In *herter*, *hertei*, etc., the syncopated vowel may have been an *i*

¹ For this reading in place of *avazaker* cf. Conway, Camb. Phil. Soc. Trans. III, p. 223.

² In regard to Lat. *vhevhaked*, Solmsen, Stud. z. Lat. Sprachgeschichte, p. 153, reads *Numāsioi vhevhaked* and comments "unrichtig beurteilt von Brugmann, Grd. 2, 1239, Buck voc. d. osk. 27." Likewise, Stolz, Zeitschrift f. oesterr. Gymnasien, 1892, p. 998, argues that *Numasioi* instead of **Numisioi* shows that the date of the inscription is prior to the weakening of short vowels in unaccented syllables. And it surely would show this if the identity of *Numasius* and *Numisius* were certain. Now we have record of a number of names in *-asius*, *-isius*, *-esius*, *-usius*. As the *s* shows, these are not genuine Latin forms, but intruders from some of the dialects; cf. Jordan, Krit. Beiträge, p. 104 ff. There is no evidence for a form in *-āsius* (Lat. *-ārius*, O. *asio-* points to *ā*), and, if there were, how should we account for a change of *-āsius* to *-isius* in the non-Latin dialects from which the names come? *Numasius* and *Numisius* are then not identical, but by-forms, as *Ferasius*, *Feresius*. It is possible that we have *vhevhaked* with unchanged short vowel, but *Numasioi* does not prove it.

Since writing the above, I note that Stolz, I. F. IV, p. 239 f., in broaching the question again, says: "Natürlich hat die thatsächlich überlieferte Form *Numisius* nichts mit unserem *Numasius* zu thun, sondern repräsentiert eine selbständige auch im Etruskischen und Oskischen vertretene Namensform vgl. Deecke Die Falisker, 215, no. 86, und Fabretti Glossarium." It appears then that, at least in the case of Stolz, I have misunderstood the reasoning which led to the supposition that the *a* of *Numasioi* must be short, and am now at a loss to know what his actual grounds are. There can be no doubt that the Lat. suffix *-āsius*, though in part based on *-āri-*s with original *r*, also in a large measure corresponds to the suffix of O. *sakrasias*, U. *plenasier*, etc. (cf. Planta, 529 f., Buck, p. 33 f.), and so presupposes an *-āsio-*. Where is there equally good evidence for an *-āsio-*?

as in O. *factud*; cf. Lat. *capitur*. Only for herrins need we suppose absence of *-io-* suffix, and in this tense it may be absent also in Latin, as in *caperem*. The form *her* in *pisher* 'quilibet,' which Bronisch also groups under **hero-*, is more often taken as unthematic, like Lat. *fert*; cf. v. Planta, p. 575. Notwithstanding Vest. *didet*, U. *feret*, it is not impossible that in the enclitic *-her* syncope has taken place, but in this case the original form may have been **herit* as well as **heret*.

O. *hipid*, *hipust*. Of the various attempts to explain the *p*, there is none which can be considered satisfactory or has met with general approval. I offer another for consideration. I see in these forms the *p* of Latin *capiō*, *cēpi*, and suppose that the two roots which appear in Latin in *capiō* and *habeō*, having a partial similarity in form and close relationship in meaning, have become fused, resulting in a secondary root, *hap*. Special attention has been recently directed to this sort of assimilation among roots as a means of explaining many instances of root-variation for which the theory of root-increments had been called into requisition; cf. Bloomfield, I. F. IV, p. 66 ff., and Thurneysen, *Freiburger Festgruss an Osthoff*, p. 6 f. The case brought forward by the latter is especially in point here. Thurneysen supposes that the Britannic root *catb*, appearing in the verb meaning 'to take, receive,' is the result of a confusion of the two Celtic roots *kag* and *gab* (I. E. *kagh*, *ghabh*), of closely connected meanings. And since the above explanation of *hipid* occurred to me, I note that Osthoff, *Perfect*, p. 182 f., had thought of a connection of the *p* with that of Latin *apiō*. If my conception is a more plausible one, it is because we have collateral evidence that in Oscan-Umbrian the usages of Lat. *capiō* and *habeō* were actually merged together. So in Umbrian Bücheler translates *haburent*, VII a, 52, by 'ceperint,' not 'habuerint,' and *hahtu* regularly by 'capito.'¹

It is well to point out how insignificant is the evidence in

¹ So too in Germanic the destinies of the roots appearing in Gothic *haban* and *hafjan* are interwoven in the historical period; cf. Kluge, *Etym. Wörterbuch s.v. heben*. And may it not be that there was a prehistoric assimilation, so that we should return to the old view that both *haban* and *hafjan* correspond to Lat. *capiō*, as far as the form is concerned? The formal identity of Goth. *haban* and Lat. *habeō* is by no means universally acknowledged; cf. Gustav Meyer, *Alban Stud.* III, p. 6, Fick, *Etym. Wtb.*⁴ p. 387, Thurneysen, l.c. p. 7. The last two connect *habeō* with Irish *gabim* 'I take.'

Italic for a root with final *bh*. Lat. *habeō* and U. *habia*, etc., can be united only on a basis of Italic *hab*. For U. *hahtu*,¹ older **haftu*, the *f* may come from *p* (as O. *scriftas*, U. *screihtor*), and this *p* may be the same as in O. *hipid*, or may stand for the *b* of *habia* by assimilation. The Oscan forms show *p* with one exception, so that the whole sum of Italic evidence for *f*, I. E. *bh*, resolves itself into the solitary *hafiest* of the Tabula Bantina. And I must agree with Conway, Am. Jour. Phil. X, p. 309, that little reliance is to be placed on this, as the engraver is guilty of at least one mistake in this same word (*hafiest* or *hafieit* is on the stone), and in another line has written *fepacust*, which all agree in emending to *fefacust*. Under these circumstances, one would not think of setting up a root with final *bh* without strong evidence from other languages. If we reject Gothic *haban* and replace it by Irish *gabim* as a cognate, the evidence for *bh* disappears, unless, with Thurneysen and others, we also bring in Gothic *giban*. But in this and Lith. *gabėnti* 'bring,' the meaning diverges too much for the connection to be binding.

The Tenses.²

1. Present Indicative.

There are no peculiarities of formation here which are not discussed under other heads, but the extant forms (including passives) may be enumerated here for convenience.³ U. *subocaunu*, O. *faamat*, Pael. *incubat*, U. *furfant*, *furfaθ*, O. *karanter*;

¹ The more usual spelling is *hahtu*, *hatu*. Is the troublesome U. *subator*, frequently regarded as equivalent in form to Lat. *subacti* (Bréal, Les. Tab. Eug. p. 80; cf. also v. Planta, pp. 352, 354), to be reckoned here? The lack of *h* is no objection; cf. *an-ostatir* beside *an-hostatir*, etc. This would give a means of connecting the imperative *subahtu* with *subator*, which is impossible by the other view, since we should expect **subaitu*. It is impossible to connect *subahtu* with *subotu* as Bücheler wishes, nor is it necessary. The words occur in wholly different phrases. As for the meaning, those who think 'omitted,' 'neglected' possible for a compound of *sub* and *agō*, cannot object to the same development for *sub* and *capitō*. The relation of this meaning to that seen in Lat. *suscipiō* would be somewhat similar to that of *subdūcō* 'remove,' to *subdūcō* 'raise, draw in.' *Subahtu*, according to Bücheler, refers to the removal of the objects placed on the altar.

² A special section on Mode-Signs is unnecessary after what has already been stated as to their disposition; cf. above, p. 134 f.

³ Here and in the following pages no attempt is made to cite all the various spellings of each word, though occasionally more than one form is given.

U. tišit, *habe*, O. *lovfir*; U. sestu, seste, O. staft, sakruvit, U. *trebeit* O. stahint, stalet, fiiet; O. sũm, sum, O. 1st, est, U. est, O. set, U. sent, O. amfret, U. *ier*.

2. Present Subjunctive.

The forms are: O. *deivaid*, *tadait*, U. *portaia*, *kuraia*, *aseriaia*, *kupifiaia*, *etaians*, *etaias*, O. putiad, putians, turumiad, U. habia; O. *deicans*, kahad, aflukad, U. *dirsa*, *dirsans*, Pael. *dida*, U. neiřhabas; O. heriiad, fakiiad, U. fařia, feia, fuia; O. dadid, U. *sei*, si, *sins*. The passive forms, though discussed below in connection with others of the same voice, may be cited here for the sake of completeness: O. sakahiter, lamatir, sakraitir; U. *tursiandu*, emantur, terkantur, *ferar*, O. *kaispatar*, *krustatar*; -niir; U. -so(r).

In the first conjugation, the Umbrian has departed from the original type presented in Oscan and Latin, and has created new forms after the analogy of the fourth conjugation; cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1291. As heriiad: **herit*, so *portaia*: *portat*. Perhaps the forms feia, fuia, in which the preservation of the *i* was due to the heriiad-type, were of special importance in the extension of the -ia- form to the first conjugation.

3. Imperfect Indicative.

One solitary form has come down to us to show that the Oscan-Umbrian formation was identical with the Latin; namely, O. *fufans* 'erant.' This form also shows that the extension of the periphrastic formation from the forms -ā- *bhuā*-, -ē- *bhuā*-, which were associated with the first, second, and third conjugations, to unthematic verbs (cf. Lat. *dābam*) had taken place in the Italic period.

4. Imperfect Subjunctive.

O. herrĩns, patensĩns, fusĩd, Pael. *upsaseter* agree precisely both in form and usage with the Latin Imperfect Subjunctive. They are ē- subjunctives to the s- (es-) aorist: Pael. *upsaseter* from **opsā-s-ē-ter*, as Latin *amārēs* for **amās-ē-s*; herrĩns for *heres-ē-nt*, as Latin *caperent* for **capēs-ē-nt*. The correct understanding

of these Oscan forms, and consequently of the Latin formation, is due to the recognition that Oscan *í* may represent either *i* or *ē*, but not *ī*, that *fusíd*, for example, cannot be an optative, as was held by Brugmann in the first volume of the *Grundriss*. This, perhaps the most important result of recent studies in Italic dialectology, was reached independently by several, but first of all by Bronisch, as appears from Brugmann, *Grd.* II, p. 1293, Bronisch, p. 141. Cf. also v. Planta, p. 90; and Buck, p. 88, where the appearance of the *ē*-subjunctive in the *s*-aorist is compared with the Greek λύσῃται for λύσεται. On U. *ostensendi* as an alleged imperfect subjunctive, cf. above, p. 142¹.

5. Future Indicative.

The forms are: O. *deivast*, U. *prupehast*, O. *consazet*; O. *didest*, *pertemest*, U. *ferest*, *menes* (for *benes*?), *anpenes*, *ostensendi*; U. *heries*, *heriest*, *purtuvies*, *fuiest*, *habiest*, *kukehes*, *staheren*, O. *herest*, *hafiest*, *sakrvist*; O. *fust*, O. *fust*, *furent*, *eest*.

The derivation of this tense from the short-vowel subjunctive of the *s*- (*es*-) aorist is clear; cf. Brugmann, *Grd.* II, p. 1184. On the form U. *heriest*, *habiest*, O. *herest*, cf. above, p. 159, 164.

6. Perfect Indicative.

Following is the material, including future perfect and subjunctive forms, as equally well illustrating the various stem-formations.

a) reduplicated forms: O. *deded*, U. *dede*, also *teřust*, *dirsust* U. *fefure*, O. *dersicust*, O. *fefacid*, O. *fifikus*, U. *peperscust*, U. *pepurkurent*.

b) Simple thematic forms: O. *kúmbened*, *cebnust*, U. *benust*, O. *avafaker*, U. *fakust*, O. *dicust*, U. *covortus*, O. *aflakus*, Volsc. **atahus*, U. *procanurent*, O. *angetuset*, O. *comparascuster*, U. *eiscurent*, U. *portust*, O. *urust*, O. *prúffed*.

c) *ē*-perfect: O. *hipid*, *hipust*, U. *eitipes* (?), U. *prusikurent*, O. *sipus* (Festus).

d) *f*-perfect: O. *aikdafed*, *sakrafír*, *fufens*, *aamanafed*, *manafum*, *staieffuf*, U. *andisafust*, *amprefuus*, *ambrefurcnt*, *herifi*, *cehefi*.

e) *t*-perfect: O. *prúfatted*, *dadikatted*, *teremnattens*, *tríbarakattuset*, *tríbarakattíns*, *duunated*, *dervatuns* (cf. below, p. 185), Pael. *coisatens*, Marruc. *amatens*, Volsc. *sistiatiens*, Pael. *sestatíns*, Pael. *locatin*.¹

f) *l*-perfect: U. *entelust*, *apelust*.

g) *nki*-perfect. U. *combifiansi*, *combifiansiust*, *purdiñsiust*, *disleralinsust*.

The forms cited under *a*) are the descendants of genuine perfects and in part perhaps of reduplicated aorists. There is no way of distinguishing these latter, nor is their existence necessary to the explanation of the thematic inflection which has ample basis in the forms of *b*). But they may help to account for the predominance of the weak ablaut form, which, in the genuine perfect, would have less of a foundation than in Latin, where the middle forms play a role. There is never any ablaut variation within the perfect system in Oscan-Umbrian (cf. O. *kúmbened*, U. *benust*, O. *avafaker*, U. *fakust*), so that we may safely assume **dersicud* from *dersicust*, etc. There is no instance of the old perfect singular ablaut (*o*) unless it be *pepurkurent*, which is for this very reason better taken as weak.

In regard to the syllable of reduplication, it is plain from Latin itself that the type represented by *momordī*, *tutudī*, *didicī* is of specifically Latin origin (cf. Osthoff, Perf. 272), and so we are not surprised to find the *e*-reduplication retained in *dersicust*, *pepurkurent*, *fefure*. On O. *fifikus*, cf. above, p. 163.

The forms of *b*) are thematic aorists of the type of Greek *ἐφύγον*. Weak ablaut form, in contrast to strong ablaut in the present, is seen in O. *dicust* (pres. subj. *deicans*), U. *covortus* (pres. imperat. *coverto*), O. *aflakus* (pres. subj. *aflukad*). In U. *purtius* the *ii* belonged originally to the present suffix *-(i)ḡo-* (O. *fakiiad*, so U. *dia* from **dḡiḡo-* or **diḡo-*; cf. Bronisch, p. 109).

For O. *upsed* and U. *portust*, cf. above, p. 132. Of the same nature is O. *urust*, if, as is probable, the word is borrowed from or

¹ Doubtful, but I do not agree with all of Pauli's objections (Altst. St. V, 41). We certainly need a verbal form here as well as at the end (e.g. *profatens*). Pauli's interpretation supposes an order of words as unlikely as that of Deecke and Bücheler, to which he rightly objects.

cognate with Latin *orare*; cf. P. Persson, *Wurzelerweiterung*, p. 244, Buck, p. 124, v. Planta, p. 520.

The existence of the \bar{e} -perfects in Oscan-Umbrian, taken in conjunction with the fact that *zd* remains unchanged in Umbrian, practically disposes of the theory that the corresponding Latin formation is founded on *sēdī*, itself from **sezdai*; cf. Brugmann, I. F. 111, p. 302.

The explanation of the *f*- and *t*-perfects is difficult. The most recent discussion is that of Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1242 f. The *f*-perfect is viewed as a periphrastic formation of the same nature as the imperfect and future in *-fām*, *-bām*, *-bō*, and the *t*-perfect as an analogical formation based on the *t*-participle. The connection of the *f*-perfect with the other Italic *f*-tenses, also advocated by Thurneysen, BzB. 8, 281, Danielsson, Pauli's *Altit. St.* IV, p. 143, Bartholomae, BzB. 12, 91, can hardly be called in question. The second element is an injunctive form **bhū-e-t*, the same which is found in the Latin future. In the Oscan-Umbrian perfect it is the indicative value, in the Latin future the subjunctive value, which has predominated. Preceding this element we have *-ā* as in Latin *amābo*, also *ī* (U. *herifi*) as in early Latin *audībo*, and *īe* (U. *cehefi*, O. *staieffuf*). The relation of *īe* to *ī* is the same as in the future (U. *pur̄tuvies*, but O. *sakrvist*), and similar to that of Latin *audiēbam* to *audibam*; cf. above, p. 134. It may be mere chance that we have no forms representing *-ē*-*bhūet*, but it seems to me more probable that such forms, though they must have played an important part in the original periphrastic *f*-formations (cf. Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1267), were not retained in the function of preterits, just as the futures of this type were eventually lost in Latin. The *-īe-* (not *īē*) of the fourth conjugation is more easily understood, if we suppose that there were no *ē*-forms of the third conjugation. As for the explanation of the *t*-perfect also, the forms like U. *entelust*, *combifiansi* furnish incontrovertible evidence that a purely substantive formation may, through the medium of a future perfect, become the basis of a perfect type. The development is traced by Brugmann, l.c.

The real difficulty in these perfects lies in the orthography with *tt* or *ff*. Brugmann suggests two possibilities. Either the *ff* is to be attributed to the *fu*, or else, supposing *fu* had already become *f*,

we have to do with a secondary process of consonant intensification, and the *tt* is either due to the same cause as the *ff* (this would be the case if *ff* is secondary) or is simply after the analogy of the *ff* (this view would be the one to accord with the explanation of *ff* from *fʰ*). By either view it is strange that the evidence for *tt* is much stronger than for *ff*, that, in fact, the normal orthography was *tt*, but *f*. If we leave out of account forms of Umbrian and the 'Sabellian' dialects, also of the Tabula Bantina, and the Curse of Vibia, in all of which cases no reliance is to be placed on the orthography in this respect, we find that for the *t*-perfect, out of five verbs in sixteen occurrences, there is only one instance of single *t* (duunated from Bovianum). Of the *f*-perfect, the occurrences of *f* and *ff* are even in number, but of the latter, four fall to one word (aamanaffed on Pompeian dedications) and, further, staieffuf stands on the same inscription as sakraffr. For *f* speaks also the imperfect fufans of the Cippus Abellanus, which contains tríbarakattuset (twice) and tríbarakattíns. Yet we can hardly discredit the *ff* entirely. Even if staieffuf could be understood otherwise than as an *f*-perfect (cf. below, p. 184 f.), aamanaffed would still remain, and a ground-form *manfefed (cf. Osthoff's *profefed for prúffed) has no probability for me.¹

As regards the suggestion that we may, with Danielsson, see in the *tt* and *ff* instances of consonant intensification or gemination, objection has already been raised by Bartholomae, RzB. 12, 81, and since v. Planta's exhaustive treatment of the Oscan consonant-gemination (p. 537 ff.), it is more than ever clear that the conditions under which this takes place are *not* found in those perfect forms.

Turning now to Brugmann's other alternative, that *tt* is simply after the analogy of the *ff*, it must be noted that, the orthography being as we have seen, this is far more difficult than it would be to explain the occasional *ff* as an imitation of the *tt*. But of the

¹ In regard to the connection with Latin *mandō*, I have formerly accepted Osthoff's view (Perfect, p. 242), but now prefer v. Planta's explanation that *n* stands for *nn* = Latin *nd* as in *eehiianasúm*. Such instances furnish what is by far the best of v. Planta's arguments for a secondary accent in Oscan-Umbrian similar to that in Latin. One would like, however, a more infallible indication before accepting his position as proven.

various theories for the *t*-perfect, none accounts for the double *t* except that of Bartholomae. This seems a strong argument for just this theory, but notwithstanding its advocacy by Conway, *Classical Review*, VIII, p. 464, and more doubtful acceptance by Bronisch, p. 144, I have not been able to bring myself to accept the equation Oscan *tt* = Latin *ss*. There is absolutely nothing outside of these perfects to support it, especially since v. Planta and Bronisch have explained úíttiuf without the aid of Osthoff's *oit-i-tiō. And a change of *ss* to *tt* (or *pp*) is not one to be accepted without pretty definite proof; Greek ττ (cf. v. Planta, pp. 475-6) is not analogous, as it never comes from original *ss*. We are brought back again, then, to the *f*-perfect as the only one in which there can be any etymological justification for the double consonant. But even here, things are far from simple. One other instance of *ff* for *fɥ* seems to be furnished by prúffed (on prúfatted cf. v. Planta, p. 545). From this, together with staieffuf, we might reason that the double consonant was retained after short vowels while after long vowels a reduction had taken place, but, to judge from aamanaffed, not a complete simplification. In Latin we seem to have simple *b* after short vowels (*probus*, *dubius*) as well as long, though, if v. Planta is right in his derivation of forms like *lippus* and *obba*, we should expect *bb*. But it is possible to explain *probus* as a compromise between **probbo*- and **probu*- (Skt. *pra-bhu*-) or *prōbo*- (from **prō-bhūo*-) and *dubius* as based on **du-bho*- with the suffix *-bho* (rare in Italic, to be sure) rather than as a compound **du-bhūio*-. If, on the other hand, one holds the theory that for original labial + *ɥ* we have everywhere in Latin simple labial (cf. Brugmann, *Ausdrücke für d. Begriff d. Totalität*, p. 23, footnote), the most natural view would be that the *ɥ* was lost in Ur-Italic without affecting the quantity of the labial. For simplification of a genuine double consonant after a short vowel is unknown in Latin. From this standpoint, then, we could hardly understand the Oscan *ff* as from *fɥ*.

I have not succeeded in finding any clear path amid these difficulties, and believe that until the relation of the *tt* and *ff* is better understood, the discussion of the *t*-perfect cannot be considered as closed.

The *l*-perfect is made from verbs in *-endo* (*tendō*, *pendō*). It

is based on a participial form with *-lo-* suffix ; cf. Bechtel, BzB. 7, 7, and Brugmann, Umbr.-Osk., p. 224. As *nd* was changed to *nn* in Oscan-Umbrian (cf. gerundive *úpsannam*), so *ndl* to *nnl*, *nl*, and then *nl* to *ll* as in Latin.

The forms mentioned under *g*), *purdin̄siust*, etc., are unquestionably connected with adjective formations ending in *-ankio*, *-inkio*, but the latest attempt to explain the origin of this compound suffix, that of Johansson, Beitr. zur griech. Sprachkunde, p. 86, is more ingenious than probable. Johansson has accurately traced the origin and development of the Greek *κ*-perfect, but gone too far in claiming the existence of *k*-forms with preterit function in other languages. And doubly improbable is the supposition that this element was added to the stem of the present participle, giving rise to **combifian(t)-c-*, **combifian(t)-cio-*. Johansson does not show that such a combination exists either in Latin or elsewhere, but at most that it is conceivable. Can we not form a theory which shall be more in the realm of known facts? We do know that a diminutive *-ko-* suffix exists and that this has in Latin frequently made its way into verb forms (e.g. in derivatives from adjectives in *-ico-*). We further know that this suffix was added to *-en-* stems. Aside from *iuventu-s*, Goth. *jugg-s*, where the combination was Indo-European, we find, in Latin, e.g. *homunciō*, *homunculus*, based on **homunco-* formed from *homō*, *hominis*; similarly from a *-ien-* stem, *ratiuncula* to *ratiō*, *ratiōnis*. The Oscan-Umbrian type corresponding to the intermediate **ratiunco-* from *ratiōn-*, would be **leginko-* to *legin-* (O. *leginum*). From this *-inko-* with *io-* suffix we get the requisite *-inkio-*, and after this had become associated with the verbs of the fourth conjugation, there arose by analogy the forms like *combifian̄siust*.

It will be noticed that among the constituents of the Oscan-Umbrian perfect, no mention has been made of *s*-aorists or *v*-perfects. Any satisfactory evidence of their existence seems to me lacking. Bronisch, p. 144, footnote, says that *upsed*, etc., are *s*-aorist forms to a verb **úpúm*, appearing as *opē* in Umbrian *upetu*, etc. Not to dwell on the uncertainty of the existence of any such verb **úpúm* (or of an *opē-* in *upetu*), what possible objection is there to regarding *upsed* as belonging to **opsāō* in the same way as U. **ported* (*portust*) to **portāō*, and other

such cases? Again, v. Planta, p. 390, explains U. *sesust*, *ander-sesust* as coming from *set-s-* like Sanskrit *satsat* or Latin *cessī* to *cēdō*. But there is no objection to the explanation of H. Kern, given by Brugmann, Umbr.-Osk., p. 224, and Grundriss, p. 1242, according to which the participle **sesso-s* forms the basis. There would remain then only the questionable Pael. *lexe*; cf. above, p. 153.

Bronisch, p. 124, footnote, sees in *tríbarakavúm* the infinitive of a *v-* perfect. The form is usually, and, I believe, rightfully, regarded as differing only orthographically from the *censaum* of the Tabula Bantina. Bréal's explanation of *-affed* from *-ayed* has met with no acceptance. v. Planta, in various parts of his book (cf. especially p. 10 and p. 190 ff.), operates with a *v-* perfect, always somewhat doubtfully, however. He says on p. 193 that if *tu* gives *tt*, the O. patt[ens receives a simple explanation as *u-* perfect to Latin *pandō*, i.e. from **patuens*. The restoration of the patt to pattens was also suggested by Bartholomae, BzB., 12, 85, who explained it in accordance with his theory as an *s-* aorist. Why not look for a restoration which would not require for its explanation the setting up of such problematical phonetic laws? Outside of the *tt-* perfect, a *tt* is found only as the result of doubling before *i* and *v*. Why not read patt[rafens = Latin *patravērunt*, which would give a suitable meaning? That there is room for this may easily be seen from Zvetaieff's facsimile. The first line ends with Gaaví, which must have been Gaavíeís on the stone when whole. The first *t* of patt stands under the *g* of the first line, so we may read

gaavieís
patttrafens.

 V. Planta believes, to be sure, that the doubling of *t* before *v* took place only when preceded by a nasal or liquid (punttram, alttram), but since even here the orthography varies (Entraf), it is unsafe to reason from Maatreís, etc., that it did not occur also after vowels.

As for O. *hipid*, I do not see that the *p* (cf. above, p. 165) is made any the less of a riddle by setting up a ground-form **hēbyūd*, as v. Planta proposes.¹

¹ Nor do I admit the correctness in itself of such a ground-form as Oscan-Umbrian **hēbyūd*. The Latin perfects in *-uī* are, according to any acceptable theory of the *v-* perfect, derived in the first instance from *-ouī*, and this from *-e-yī*, so that the spread of

Still less evidence is there for a *k*-perfect. It is useless to discuss the alleged *λοκακειτ* 'locavit' of the Anzi inscription, since not even the word division, still less the meaning, is known.

7. Perfect Subjunctive.

O. *sakrafir*, *trībarakattīns*, *hipid*, *fefacid*, O. *combifiansi*, *pihāfei*, *herifi*, *cehefi*.

the *u*-forms from the original type (represented, I believe, not merely by *iūvī*, *mōvī*, but also by *plē-vī*, *crē-vī*, etc.) must have taken place in the Italic period before the change of *eu* to *ou*. But that in Oscan-Umbrian, *ou* in unaccented syllables sometimes became *uu* and even *u*, is a proposition which the arguments of v. Planta and Solmsen (Stud. z. lat. Lautgeschichte, p. 151 ff.) have not sufficiently established. In the first place we find *ou* preserved in unaccented syllables, whether we take the old Italic accent as the norm (so Solmsen, and rightly) or with v. Planta a secondary accent similar to the Latin. So in Umbrian *anovihimu*, *purdovitu*, *Iiovinur* the *ov* stands after the Italic and before the Latin accent. Of v. Planta's examples of *uu* from *ou*, the most striking would be *prinuvatus*, *prinuvatur*, if Bücheler's interpretation as 'praenovati' were correct, but this is properly doubted by Solmsen, p. 153², on account of the form of the preposition. For *Puemune*, cf. Thurneysen, K. Z. 22, 560, and Solmsen, l.c., p. 156. Further, the *u* of *bue*, *buo* is plausibly explained by Solmsen as representing *ū*, as in *bum*, *buf*. As for the forms like O. *suveis* beside *súvad*, U. *tuer* beside *tover*, there can be no objection to my comparison with Vedic *suva*, etc. (Vocal, p. 99 f.). This does not meet the approval of Solmsen, who thinks we ought to refer the forms to the same stem. Why is it more unnatural to have a stem-variation in Italic than in Greek (*ός: έος, ός: σέος*)? The necessity of referring U. *saluvom*, O. *salavs*, O. *Kalaviis*, *Heleviis* to ground-forms with suffix *-euo-* exists only for those who consider the change of *ly* to *ll* in Italic as established. In the neuter plurals U. *vatuva*, *pequo*, etc., Solmsen says we may see the strong form *'eu* of the *u*-stems. But why should we expect the strong form any more than in the *i*-stems as U. *triia*? When Solmsen further remarks that we have the right to regard the suffix *-uv*, *-u*- and *v*, as in U. *mersuva*, O. *eitiuvam*, etc., as everywhere the equivalent of *-ov*, Indo-European *-eu-*, we are constrained to ask, Why this prejudice against the simple *-uo-*, *-uuo-* suffix, which in other languages is more common than the strong *-euo-*? The main argument to both v. Planta and Solmsen seems to be furnished by the proper names. Beside forms in *-ovio-s* like Mars. *Cantovios*, U. *Grabovie*, O. *Kalúvieis*, we find forms like Mars. *Pakvies*, U. *Piquier*, O. *Akviiāi*, *Kavkvis*, *Kalaviis* (from *Kalv*-). The Oscan forms like *Akviiāi* show that we have to do with *u*, not *uu*, so that the change supposed is not merely of *ou* to *uu*, but further to *u*. And the argument against the natural view that these latter forms show the suffix *-uo*, *uia*, is that we ought to bring these names under one head rather than suppose that the Italic kept up an Indo-European variation without levelling. But we have in Latin proper names in *-eio-* (*Marcio*, *Asreio*, etc.) and others in *-io-*, and surely no one would maintain that all these latter forms must be identical in origin with the former. When we see the role which the suffix *-io-* played in proper names, why should we rule out the corresponding *-uo-* suffix?

The mode sign is the \bar{z} . The various stems to which this is added have already been discussed.

8. Future Perfect.

The forms, such as O. *dicust*, trībarakattuset, O. *benust*, *benurent*, have already been enumerated above, under 6. The origin of the *-us-* is to be sought in the suffix *-ues-*, of the Indo-European perfect participle, as seen by Schulze and more clearly by Bronisch. The question of the advisability of starting from *-uōs-*, as Bronisch prefers, or from *-us-*, is discussed in detail by Brugmann, Umbr.-Samn., p. 137 ff. I continue to follow him in his preference for *-us-*. A form like *benust*, then, represents a periphrastic **benus set*. The plural with O. *z*, U. *r*, rather than *ss*, is due to the influence of the *s* futures like *furent*, O. *censazet*, etc.; cf. Brugmann, Umbr.-Osk., p. 223. Since the suffix belongs properly to the Indo-European perfect, forms like U. *dirsust* (i.e. **de-d-us-t*) or O. *hipust* are among the prototypes. After the analogy of *dedust* to *deded* were formed *benust* to *bened*, *-afust* to *-afed*, etc. In cases like *entelust*, *combifiansiust*, however, the future perfect has been made directly on the basis of an adjective formation, and then the analogy has led from the future perfect to the indicative, rather than *vice versa*. *Entelust* represents **entendlus*, a compromise from **entend-lo-* and **entend-us*.

From *a-* verbs we have *-afust* and *-attust*, and also the simple aorist form like *portust*. A fourth type, in which the suffix is added directly to the *a*, would have to be set up, if the usual derivation of U. *vesticos* from **vestikaust* (Bücheler, Umbrica, p. 195; Bréal, 360; v. Planta, 210) were certain. Such a form would not be inexplicable, especially to those who suppose a direct connection between the Oscan-Umbrian *-us-* and Latin *-uer-* forms (v. Planta sets **vesticaust* from **vestikāueset* = Latin *vesticāverit*). But in view of the fact that there is no other example to set against the usual forms in *-afust*, *-attust*, it is worth considering whether *vesticos* does not stand for *vesticos fust* (for the form cf. *pihos fust* VI b, 47, *-os* from *-at(o)s*), the deponent future passive seen in *pesnis fust* VI b, 41 (here after *arnipo* as in the case in question: *arnipo vestisia vesticos* : *arnipo comatir pesnis*

fust). It will be objected that in case of *pesnis fust*, the other forms, *persnihimu*, etc., also show the deponent form, while beside *vesticos* we find the active *vestikatu*. But who shall say that this verb is not to be classed with the Latin 'neutropassiva,' enumerated in Neue, Formenlehre, III³, pp. 108 ff.? *Vesticos* : *vestikatu* would be paralleled by Latin *cēnātus* 'having dined' : *cēnō*.

For the future perfect passive and deponent we find three types. One is represented by the periphrastic forms just mentioned to which are to be added *sersnatur furent* V a 21, and *purtitu fust* V a, 19, both after a p e. A second is seen in O. *comparascuster*, formed from the active with the regular passive ending, of which more below. Thirdly, we have the U. *covortuso* and *benuso*,¹ explained by Brugmann, Umbr.-Osk., p. 224, as periphrastic forms from *-us so(r)*. This is preferable to Bréal's view that they are simply side-forms to *-urent*. They are to be reckoned with the *r*-impersonal forms, to be treated together below.

9. Present and Future Imperative.

Since the endings, which are the only characteristic features of imperative forms, have already been treated, no further discussion is necessary, and for the material, suffice it to refer for the Umbrian to Bréal, Les. Tab. Eug. p. 359 (several omissions), and for the Oscan to my Vocalismus, p. 128 (add *deivatud*). Many of the Umbrian forms are isolated and of doubtful etymology.

The Passive.

The Oscan-Umbrian 'passive,' though agreeing with the Latin in its chief characteristic, the *r*, stands, in the details of its formation, in marked contrast to the uniformity of the latter. We find:

1. Forms in which *r* alone appears as personal ending. U. *ferar* and *ier* were the first to be recognized as such. *ferar* is a present subjunctive corresponding to active **ferā-t*, **ferā-nt*. *ier* is an indicative form; according to Zimmer, a present. Brugmann, Umbr.-Osk., p. 214 f., prefers a future, believing that the

¹ *furo*; *furu* is best taken with Bücheler as a substantive.

syntax demands this. The word occurs in a conditional clause referring to future time, but a present indicative is possible here just as in Latin; cf. above, p. 145 f. The formal explanation as a future is not easy (according to Brugmann, *ier* for **ier-er*, this for **ejes-er* to *ees-t*; but *eest* is more probably **eis-t* than **ejes-t*; cf. above, p. 163), while as the 'passive' correspondent of active **ient* (i.e. **ient* : Skt. *yanti* = *sent* : Skt. *santi*, or less probably **eient* : Lat. *eunt* = *sent* : Lat. *sunt*), it is perfectly simple. Brugmann, l.c., has discussed a number of possible parallels to *ferar*, *ier*, and of these may be considered reasonably certain 1) the perfect subjunctives O. *sakrafir*, U. *pihafei*, *herifi*, 2) the future perfects *covortuso*, *benuso*, being periphrastic formations with *-so-r*. To these is to be added the present indicative *lovfir* of the Tabula Bantina, if this, rather than *lovfit*, is the correct reading. Further, we seem to have a form of this character in the *-niir* of the inscription published by v. Planta I. F. II, 434 ff. If so, it can only be for *-niēr*, an *ē*-subjunctive in the fourth conjugation, which, as v. Planta remarks, is unique. But it may have been preserved in the passive beside the *-ār* form, without necessarily continuing to exist in the active. What is more striking is that this would be the first instance of this formation in the function of an ordinary personal passive (*-niir kulupu* apparently 'puniatur culpa'). All the others show the peculiar impersonal use described above, p. 150.

2. Forms in *-ter* and *-tur*, answering to the Latin formation with *-tur*. Indicatives O. *vincter*, *sakarater*, *karanter*, *comparascuster*, M. *ferenter*, U. *herter*, *teṛte*, *ostensendi*; subjunctives O. *sakahíter*, U. *emantur*, *terkantur*, *tursiandu*.

3. Modal forms in which the subjunctive-sign stands between the *t* and the *r*. The subjunctives cited under 2. are precisely parallel to Lat. *amātur*, *legātur*, etc., in formation. But in *hertei*, the *ei* of which points to a long vowel, Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1393, and Bronisch, p. 141, see a form *hertēr*, the *ē* of which has, by some process of analogy, come from the type **ferēr*. We can explain this process without recourse to forms of the first and second person, the existence of which in Oscan-Umbrian or in Ur-Italic is problematical. A subj. **fer(e)tēr* may be formed to indic. **fer(e)ter* (cf. *vincter*) after the analogy of subj. **ferēr* (cf. *ferar*) to

indic. **ferer* (cf. *ier*). In the same way might have arisen a **fer(e)tār* to **fereter* after *ferar* to **ferer*. This type once created, the contrast of **fer(e)tēr* to indic. **fer(e)ter* might give rise in the first conjugation to a subj. *-ātēr* beside indic. *-āter*, and such a formation is actually to be seen, I believe, in the much discussed O. *lamatir*, *lamatir*. Bücheler, Rh. M. 33, 21 ff., argued vigorously for a present subjunctive as against a perfect, but as it was impossible to follow him in supposing that *-tur*, *-ter*, *-tei*, *-tar* were simply varieties of one and the same ending, due to the indefinite character of the vowel, most writers have taken the form as the subjunctive of the *t*-perfect (so Danielsson, Pauli's *Altit. Stud.* IV, p. 151, Bronisch, p. 143, Buck, p. 84). Now, as noted above, p. 139¹, Bücheler has overdrawn the syntactical argument, and O. *sakrafīr* offers a parallel in syntax as well as in form. But it remains true that the present is more usual in this construction, and **hertēr* once admitted, there is no difficulty in explaining *lamatir*, as standing for **lamātēr*. Moreover, *lamatir* is used in the personal construction, while the forms of type 1., to which *sakrafīr* belongs, are, as indicated above, impersonal.¹

4. Modal forms in which the mode-sign appears both before and after the *t*. Such forms could arise by a fusion of types 2. and 3. That is, we might have in the third conjugation an *ātār* as a compromise-form of **fertār* and **ferāter* or **ferātur*, or in the first conjugation an *āētēr* from *-ātēr* and *-āētēr* (cf. *lamatir*: *sakahīter*). For the actual existence of such a mixed type, three forms are in evidence: O. *krustatar*, *kaispatar*, and *sakrafīr*. The first two, taken by Bücheler as present subjunctives, but with the dubious explanation referred to above, are left severely alone by most writers. I have previously, in pure desperation, classed them as subjunctives of the *t*-perfect (*Vocal.*, p. 38). But the *ā*-subjunctive in the perfect is wholly anomalous.

¹ Here under 3., and not under 2. as given, would belong U. *emantur*, *emantu*, *tursiandu*, according to the theory of Mr. Turner, published by Conway, I. F. IV, p. 217. It is held that a long vowel is proved by the invariable orthography with *u* and by the dropping of the *-r*, and that therefore we have a form **emalōr* which took the place of **emater* under the influence of the imperative **emelōd*, **emelōr*. But it is hardly fair to apply the term "konstante Schreibung" to the solitary example in the Latin alphabet, *tursiandu*; and the *r* is dropped also in *henuso*, *covortuso*. I believe that the Umbrian forms represent *-tor*, and the Lat. *-tur* necessarily comes from *-tor*, not *-lōr*.

As for the third form, this seems to be the only possible reading of sakra||ler, Rh. M., p. 557 f., and is the one which Bücheler gives, with the comment "dass ersteres [i.e. sakra|tir] lat. *sacretur* sei, getraue ich mich kaum auszusprechen. Dabunt securos tempora fructus?" A reading sakratiir would also be possible according to Bücheler's facsimile, but ii for *ē* in final syllables is unknown. Bronisch, p. 33, wishes to read sakrafter or sakratir, but it is due to Bücheler to suppose that if he does not give either of these simple readings, it is not because he has not thought of them, but because they are incompatible with the signs on the stone.

We have now to consider the relation of these types to one another. It is clear that 3. and 4. are secondary. But are 1. and 2. of independent origin or is 2. derived from 1.?¹ Brugmann, Grd. II, 1391 f., holds the former view, Zimmer, K. Z. 30, p. 274 ff., the latter. A renewed consideration of the arguments has led me to incline to Zimmer's conception, at least in its main features. That is, I believe with him that type 1. represents a relatively primitive formation, one that was the starting-point for the whole Italic system. In the first place, his recognition of such forms as originally third plural active furnishes a plausible explanation for the presence of an *r* in the verb-system. I have a fair amount of prejudice against the more remote 'glottogonic' speculations, but the interchange of final *r* with non-final *n*, *nt* in the noun-formation (Skt. *ahar* : *ahnas* ; Skt. *vasant-a-* : Grk. *ēap*, Zimmer, l.c. p. 230 f.) seems too pointed to be neglected.

Secondly, Zimmer's syntactical arguments, though perhaps overdrawn, are not without weight. Brugmann, though at first following Zimmer in regarding the forms as originally third plural active (Umbr.-Osk., p. 214 f.), now thinks this unnecessary (Grd. II, p. 1391). He connects their use with that of the 'modus impersonalis' in Latin. Now it is true that the impersonal use of passive forms of intransitive verbs would in itself prove little. We have the same thing in Sanskrit, as, for example, *tvayā tatrāi 'va sthīyatām*, lit. "let it be stood by you right there," Whitney, Skt. Gram.², § 999 a, *kesarinā . . . kutra cid agami*, lit. "it was gone somewhere by the lion," Speijer, Skt. Syntax, § 8. The lateness

¹ It is, of course, out of the question to derive 1. from 2.

of this construction and the use of the instrumental indicate that the usage arose under the influence of the genuine passive ('let it be done by you' and then 'let a standing be effected by you'), and that the connection with the originally simple intransitive force of the *ya*-formation is only remote. So the mere existence of intransitive impersonals would at the most only show what is a matter of course; namely, that the *r* forms are ultimately based on either active or middle forms. But in Oscan-Umbrian there are two features which make probable, if they do not actually prove, a different and more direct connection with the active formation. One is the impersonal use in the case of transitive verbs, as in O. *sakrafír últiumam*. The impersonal of intransitives may arise after the analogy of the genuine passive of transitives, but a corresponding transitive construction would be in direct conflict with the personal passive, and therefore less likely to arise. And, as a matter of fact, we do not find it in Sanskrit, nor in Latin of the good period; cf. above, p. 150. The corresponding use of the gerundive is not quite in point, owing to its different origin (cf. the impersonal use of transitives in the Greek verbal adjectives in -τέος), and even here is rare.

The other and more striking feature is the evident connection between the impersonal meaning and the formation of type 1. All the forms mentioned under 1., with the exception of the fragmentary *-niir*, are used impersonally, and *vice versa* all other forms are used personally either as passives or deponents,¹ except U. *herter*.

Thirdly, Zimmer's hypothesis accounts for the variation of *-er* and *-or*. I have previously (Vocal., p. 79) argued against his suggestion (l.c. p. 277²) that *-ur* was changed to *-er* in Oscan-Umbrian under the influence of *-ent*. For while *-ent* has completely displaced *-ont*, *-ur* exists in Umbrian beside *-er*. But viewed in the light of a variation coming down from the Italic period, there would be no objection on this score. In Ur-Italic there were presents **senti* and **feronti*, and, with levelling, **sonti*, **ferenti*. The by-forms in *r* would then end in *-er* and *-or*, such as are preserved in U. *ier* and *so(r)* (*benuso*).

¹ My citing of O. *vincler* as an example of the impersonal construction (Vocal., p. 79), was an unfortunate slip. The subject is plainly *pis*; "if any one . . . and is convicted of it."

And the forms in *-ter* and *-tor*? Brugmann's explanation of *-tor*, as coming from the middle ending *-to + r*, is attractive and has been widely adopted, but one shrinks from following him in explaining *-ter* on the basis of a middle ending *-te* for which there is no collateral evidence. It seems clear that we must connect this variation in some way with that observed in forms of type 1. But there is a weakness in Zimmer's explanation of the transfer (*vehitur* as a compromise-form of *vehur* and *vehit*), and unless this is overcome, it may be preferable to take a view which would be a compromise of his own with that of Brugmann. We might suppose that after the analogy of forms in *-or*, *-er*, there arose a form *-tor*, based on a still existing middle ending *-to*, and that after this a *-ter* arose beside *-tor* after the analogy of *-er* to *-er* in the forms of the older type.

The Non-Finite Forms.

1. Present Infinitive Active.

The examples are:

O. *tríbarakavúm*, *censaum*, *moltaum*; O. *fatíum*; O. *deikum*, *edum*, *acum*, *menvum*, *aserum*, *pertumum*; U. *aferum*, *afero*, Volsc. *ferom*; U. *fašiu*; O. *ezum*, U. *erom*. I still regard these forms as accusatives (cf. Vocal., p. 123, so also Brugmann, Grd. II, p. 1414, v. *Planta*, p. 111). Bronisch, p. 191, takes them as instrumentals in *-ōm*. His claim that the orthography points to this is, however, unfounded. Nothing stands in the way of supposing a modification of the quality of the *o*-vowel before final *m*, and this is supported by *píd-um*, *pieis-um*, etc. Only an undue zeal for the instrumentals in *-ōm*, *-ēm* can find them in this *-um* and the Latin *-em* of *idem*, etc., in the face of Sanskrit *id-am*. *A priori*, we rather expect an accusative than an instrumental, serving as infinitive, and there is surely nothing in the usage of these Oscan-Umbrian infinitives which could lend special support to the instrumental theory.

The forms of the first conjugation I regard as regularly developed from *-āiōm*, the *v* in *tríbarakavúm* being simply the glide, introducing the vowel, which as *censaum*, *moltaum* show, was close to an *u*-sound. On *stíplo*, *anserio*, ordinarily taken as infinitives, cf. above, pp. 141, 151.

2. *Passive Infinitive.*

This is represented by *kuratu eru* and *ehiato erom*. There is no form corresponding to the Latin present infinitive passive, and it is possible that the periphrastic form performed this function as well as that of the perfect infinitive; cf. English 'I wish it to be done.' Indeed, *ehiato erom* occurs where in Latin a present infinitive would be natural, though, as Bücheler shows, the perfect would be possible.

3. *Supine.*

There is only one certain example, U. *aseriato*, showing the same formation and use as the Latin supine in *-tum*.

4. *Present Active Participle.*

Probable examples are: U. *zeřef*, *serse*, *restef*, *kutef*, *frehtef* (?); *ařetus* (dat. pl.), Volsc. *asif*. Two other forms are classified here by Bücheler, *teřte* and *vestis*. For the former, cf. Brugmann, *Umbr.-Samn.*, p. 134. The latter is rather the passive (deponent) participle, like *pesnis*.

The examples from the second and third conjugations are identical with the Latin in *-ens*. The Volscian *asif*, if we are right in taking this form with Bücheler and others as a present participle, would correspond to a hypothetical Latin **audiens* standing in the same relation to *audiens* as *audibam* to *audiēbam* and O. *sakruvist* to U. *heriest*; cf. above, p. 134.

5. *Passive Participle in -to-.*

Examples of clearly verbal character are: O. *teremnatu*, *staflatas*, *ehpeilatas*, U. *pihos*, *conegos*, *stakaz*, *vesticos*, *anzeriates*, *pracatarum*, *kuratu*, *ehiato*, U. *tařes*, *muieto*, *frosetom*, *oseto*, *maletu vaseto*, *virseto*, *proseseto*, *vufetes*; O. *censtom*, *scriftas*, U. *screihtor*, *ortom*, *anfehtaf*, *fato*, *comatir*, *subator*, *řihitu*, *comohota*, *daetom*; U. *purditu*, *statita*, *řito*, *pesnis*, *vestis*. The comparatively large number of examples with *-eto-* is noticeable; cf. Buck, p. 80.

6. *Gerundive.*

The examples are: O. úpsannam, sakrannas, eehiian-asúm, U. *pihaner, anferener.*

It is not necessary here to discuss the numerous explanations of the Latin gerundive, but the Oscan-Umbrian forms furnish, in my opinion, conclusive evidence for original *nd* rather than *ndh*.

7. *Perfect Participle Active.*

The existence of such a syntactical category in Latin is shown by the use of the *-to-* participle of deponent verbs, but an active form of this nature does not exist. There is, however, evidence of such a form in Oscan-Umbrian. I do not refer to the old perfect participle upon which the future perfect is based, for this seems not to have continued as an independent verbal element, though a stereotyped form with simple adjective force is probably to be seen in *sipus* 'sciens.' The formation in question belongs to the thematic aorists in origin, and is to be classed with Greek *λιπών*, *φυγών*, etc. The first and, up to this time, the only form recognized by any one as a perfect active participle is *staieffuf* on the Capuan inscription, published by Bücheler Rh. M. 45, p. 161 ff. This is the reading and the understanding of the form which Bücheler, after repeated examination (cf. p. 167), has adopted. Bronisch, p. 90, footnote, proposes the emendation *staieffuss* (dat. pl. of an *u*-stem), but this does not help him to any theory as to the form as a whole, and, besides, it is evident from the texts of Sogliano and Bücheler that the final *f* is absolutely certain. Conway takes *staief* as a present participle and *fuf* as an abbreviation for **fufid*, subjunctive of *fufens*. I know Professor Conway's theory only through the citation in Bronisch, and so may not do it justice; but, aside from the improbability of such an abbreviation, I fail to find any possible interpretation in which this *fufid* would find a place. It is not possible to take it after *pún* and suppose that *fust* belongs only to the *pís*, since the shorter inscription, No. II, with its *pún medd. pís úíníveresím* *fust* shows conclusively that there is nothing but *fust* to serve as the verb for *pún*, and that *pís* must be taken as the simple

indefinite (so Bücheler, 'aliquis') not as the indefinite relative.¹ Nor could we, in the absence of any connective particle, take *fufid as parallel in construction with sakrafir. V. Planta vacillates between staief fuf as two participles (rejected by Bücheler as improbable) and staieffuf. I believe that Bücheler's understanding of the form as participle to the *f*-perfect is the only plausible one.

The final *f* might naturally be regarded as original *nts* like that in U. restef, etc., though this would be the first example in Oscan. But an *u* points to *ō*, and we seem to have the same ending -*ōns* as in úíttiuf, tríbarakkiuf.

If, now, we suppose that this participle has come to follow the inflection of the stems in -*ōn*-, we are enabled to bring under the same head two other forms which have given much trouble. The first is *deivatuns* 'iurati' of the Tabula Bantina. Bréal proposes the emendation *deivatuus*, but as such an orthography would be without parallel in two respects, 1) because on Tabula Bantina, 2) because in final syllable, I have previously (Vocal., p. 127) supposed an -*ōn*- stem formed from the passive participle in -*to*-. Far simpler is it to take the form as the active participle

¹ Brugmann, I. F. IV, p. 231, footnote, seems to attribute the differentiation of *quis*, *quid* and *qui*, *quod* to the specifically Latin period of development. But the usage is substantially the same in Oscan-Umbrian as in Latin. *Pis* and *pid* are interrogatives, indefinites, and, usually with an added particle, indefinite relatives, while the definite relative is expressed by *poi*, *pod*. The examples cited by Brugmann (in the main text) for the relative use of *pis*, *pid* in Oscan-Umbrian are, with the exception of the conjunction *pirsi*, 'quod,' instances of the indefinite relative idea. The contrast between the definite and indefinite relatives is seen in the following sentence from the Cippus Abellanus: Avt thesaurúm púd eseí tereí íst pún p atensíns, múní-kad tanginúd patensíns íním píđ eseí thesavreí púkkapíd eh[stít a]íttífúm alttram alttr[ús h]erríns. 'At thesaurum quod in eo territorio est quom aperirent, communi sententia aperirent et quidquid in eo thesauro quandoque exstat, portionum alteram alteri caperent.' And in Latin too the *indefinite* relative was originally expressed by *quis*, *quid*, as is clear from *quisquis*, *quisque* (in its early, relative use), and the early use of *quis* alone as indefinite relative (for examples cf. Neue, Formenlehre II,³ p. 430). Only *quīquomque*, as against the U. *pisi* . . . *pumpe*, is an innovation; and here Cato's *quīsquomque* is in evidence for an earlier *quisquomque*. If, then, we group the indefinite relative with the interrogative and indefinite, rather than with the ordinary relative, the agreement in usage between Oscan-Umbrian and Latin is too great to be accidental, and may safely be attributed to the Italic period. All this applies merely to the forms of the nominative singular. In the oblique cases there is apparently the same absence of differentiation in Oscan-Umbrian as in Latin.

of the *t*-perfect. The verb is elsewhere used in the active, *deivaid*, *deivast*, *deivatud*, so that there is no objection on this score (also no great support; cf. Lat. *iūrātus* in same sense as *iūrō*, and above, p. 177).

Umbrian *spafu*, Va, 20, belonging to the imperatives *spahatu* and *spahamu*, has always been taken as the neuter of the passive participle. It cannot of course come from **spā-to-m*, which would be the form to be expected, but rather from a form **spandso*, **spansso-m*; cf. Bréal, Tab. Eug. p. 244, v. Planta, p. 503, Brugmann, Umbr.-Samn. p. 143. Brugmann supposes that this is a formation after the analogy of participles like Latin *-tenso* to *tendō*, etc. The possibility of this is not to be questioned. But we may keep within the limits of the first conjugation if we take *spafu* as nominative singular masculine of the *f*-perfect. The *u* would be parallel to that of the one example of the nominatives of an *n*-stem in Umbrian, namely *karu* (dat. *karne*; cf. Latin *carō*, *carnis*). *Spafu fust* would then be a periphrastic future perfect active. There is an interchange in the sentence of personal and impersonal (passive) construction, and *spafu fust* would with this interpretation be parallel to *ape apelust* rather than to *ape purtitu fust*.

I am not unaware of the somewhat daring character of the foregoing hypothesis, and offer it only tentatively. Such a complete transfer of the *nt*- to the *n*-declension cannot be paralleled in the other I. E. languages. And yet evidences of mutual influence and confusion in one or another case-form are not lacking. In Sanskrit and Avestan the confusion between *van*- and *vant*-stems is well known; for examples cf. Bartholomae, K. Z. 29, p. 540 f. In Greek we find *φέρων* like *ἄκμων*. In Lithuanian a dialectic form of the participle, *sėdun*, occurs, plainly parallel to the dialectic *szūn* (= Grk. *κύων*). In Old Bulgarian *vezy* is in form like *kamy*. In this last-named instance the resemblance is usually held to be purely accidental, the *y* of *vezy* not representing *-ōn*, but *-onts*. This may be true, though I cannot regard the development of *y* from an original short *o* + *n* as so absolutely established; but leaving the Old Bulgarian out of account, the other forms are evidence for a partial confusion of stems, either arising within the individual languages, or of earlier date. So

Grk. $\phi\epsilon\rho\omega\nu$ is regarded by Brugmann as formed to $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\nu$ after the analogy of $\acute{\iota}\delta\mu\omega\nu$ to $\acute{\iota}\delta\mu\omega\nu$, by others as representing an I. E. *-ōnt*. Taken in connection with the Lithuanian and Lettic forms, which, notwithstanding Brugmann's remark, Grd. II, p. 536¹, cannot be denied all weight, and further, with the *-uf* of *staieffuf*, the most probable hypothesis is perhaps that in Indo-European the nominative singular of *n*-stems served also as the nominative of thematic participles beside the regular formation in *-onts*.

It is not a serious obstacle to the theory of an *n*-inflection in the perfect participle in Oscan-Umbrian that the *nt*-inflection is preserved in the participle of the present. In the latter the *-ent* form was generalized. If we suppose that in the perfect participle, on the contrary, the *ont*-form was generalized, we can see how this and only this was subject to the influence of the *-ō(n)*, *-ōnes* inflection.

THE IDEA OF GOOD IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC:

A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF SPECULATIVE ETHICS.

BY PAUL SHOREY.

"Mysticism consists in the mistake of an accidental and individual symbol for an universal one." — EMERSON.

"Mysticism is the abuse of abstract language." — MILL.

Plato's Idea of Good has stood for two thousand years as the type of an inspiring but mystical and incomprehensible speculation. "The good, my master, that you'll get from her I apprehend less than the Good of Plato," exclaims a slave of the Middle Comedy. A somewhat apocryphal tradition relates that a large audience assembled to hear Plato lecture on the Good, but gradually melted away as he plunged deeper and deeper into transcendental mathematics, until Aristotle remained the solitary auditor. The Neo-Platonists followed the master in assigning the Good a place beyond Being in their hypostatic hierarchies, but variously debated its relation to the One and other denominations of the Absolute.¹

Not less baffling has this nebulous entity proved to modern commentators. German scholarship still ponderously debates the idle problem of the identity of the Idea of Good with the Divinity.²

¹ Cf. Ar. Met. 1091 b, 14; Plotinus, Enn. II, 9, 1; V, 12; VI, 9; Proclus, Inst. Theol. CXIX, CXXXIII; Iamb. de Myst. I, 5; VIII, 2; Jul. Or. IV, 132 C. Damascius, § 46, says that the ἀρχὴ ἐπέκεινα is variously symbolized by ξν, θεός, χρόνος, καιρὸς ἢ τὰγαθόν.

² It would be easy, after Zeller and Susemihl, to present a learned résumé of this debate. But the question is an unprofitable one. (Cf. my Dissertation de Platonis Ideis, p. 55.)

God and the Good were naturally associated in Plato's mind, and we can plausibly identify them, if we will, through the intermediate concept νοῦς (Phileb. 22 C; Laws, 631 C; Phaedo, 97 C sqq.). "The only wonder is," as Martineau naively says (Types of Ethical Theory, I, p. 51), "that Plato himself betrays so little consciousness of this." That wonder vanishes for those who follow the windings of Plato's thought instead of tessellating his technicalities, and note that he reaches the τὰγαθόν by a wholly different

Grote¹ dismisses the entire doctrine as a poetical evasion of difficulties which Plato started in the negative dialogues, and from which, being unable to solve them, he "makes his escape in a cloud of metaphor." Mr. Archer-Hind's explanation is that "blueness is the mode in which the idea of Good reveals itself to the faculty which perceives blue." And Professor Jowett, after comparing the Idea of Good to the modern conception of a law of nature, to the subjective process of dialectic, and to the divinity, tells us prettily that Plato is aware of the vacancy of his own ideal: "Looking into the orb of light he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated."

Despite this discouraging tradition, I hope to show that the paragraphs of the Republic which treat of the Idea of Good, whatever their higher symbolic and poetic significance, present a perfectly simple and definite meaning in relation (1) to the minor ethical dialogues of Plato, (2) to some of the chief problems of the modern so-called "Science of Ethics." If that meaning has been generally missed, it is due not to any intrinsic obscurity of the text, but to the simple fact that few Greek students are interested in the dialectic of speculative ethics, few readers of the Republic care to study the minor ethical dialogues except as charming dramatic sketches of Athenian life, few critics not themselves under the spell of the mysticism which consists in the abuse of abstract language have the patience to seek the serious underlying meaning of the symbols in which great thinkers of the poetical temperament persist in veiling their thought.

The passage in question occupies the last five or six pages of the sixth book of the Republic and the larger part of the seventh. For the convenience of the reader, I shall give my main interpretative argument in the text and relegate as much as possible of the indispensable illustrative commentary to footnotes.

train of ideas from that which leads him to God. The subsequent identification of the two in an ultimate metaphysical principle will do no harm if it does not prevent our tracing their origin and meaning. Philebus 22 C, cited as conclusive in this connection, is a mere bit of rhetorical by-play. "If pleasure is not the Good," says Philebus, "neither is that mind of yours." "That may be true of my mind," retorts Socrates, "but not of the divine mind."

¹ Vol. I, p. 353; Vol. III, p. 371.

Socrates is about to treat of the higher special education of the men who have been selected from the dominant military caste to be the true rulers and guardians of the state. These men must not acquiesce in the partial and approximate definitions of the cardinal virtues which answered the purpose of the previous discussion, nor in the inadequate dialectic which produced such definitions. They must pursue the "longer way," and bestow the greatest pains and the minutest accuracy on that knowledge which is of most worth.¹ This is the knowledge of the Idea of Good by

¹ 504 D sqq. *τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ἔφην, περυτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ κ.τ.λ.*

This "longer way" has occasioned commentators much needless difficulty. It is first mentioned in 435 D, where Socrates exclaims: *καὶ εὖ γ' ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὥς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἷαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβωμεν· ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλεον ὁδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀγούσα.* It has been assumed that the "longer way" refers primarily, as *τοῦτο* undoubtedly does grammatically, to the tripartite division of the soul (Krohn, *Plat. Staat*, p. 128), and interpreters have accordingly lost themselves in conjectures as to the precise character of the higher dialectic which would solve that problem of the soul's essential unity or multiplicity, for the definitive answer to which the Timaeus declares we should need the assurance of a God (*Tim.* 72 D; cf. *Alc. I*, 130 D). Schleiermacher, for example, thinks the "longer way" refers to the doctrine of the formation of the world-soul in the Timaeus. Jowett, in his Introduction to the translation of the Republic, conjectures that it is perhaps an intimation of a metaphysic of the future, that will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction.

Jowett and Campbell (*ad loc.*) suggest that "he might have gone on to speculate on the identity of the ego and the universal." But if we take the passage together with the context of the reference to it in 504, we see (as my subsequent argument, here partially anticipated, will show) that Plato's meaning here, as often, is much simpler than that discovered by his expounders. The trichotomy of the soul, a doctrine in which he feels no great scientific confidence (cf. *Laws*, 863 B *εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος*), interests him only as supplying a basis for his approximate (504 D *ὑπογραφὴν*, 534 C, D) definitions of the cardinal virtues, — definitions as much superior to those hazarded in the dialogues of search (Grant, *Ethics of Aristotle*, Vol. I, p. 186) as they fall short of the profounder insight attained by those who have taken the longer way. This longer way (504 C, D, E, 505 A) will define the virtues, not as the harmonious, orderly working of certain plausibly assumed faculties of the soul, but in their relation to the Idea of Good, by means of which they are made truly useful and profitable, and abstracted from which they cannot really be understood. The longer way, then, is simply the entire intellectual discipline about to be sketched, which will enable the Platonic guardians, in modern phraseology, to substitute for the psychological definition of courage, e.g., as a particular manifestation of temperament, a sociological definition consisting in a rational deduction of the virtue from the general conditions of social vitality, well-being, or "good." It is characteristic of Plato's reserve to speak of the painful discipline that will give us the power rather than to hazard a description of the faculty itself. Compare 533 A and the language of Phaedrus 274 A: *εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος μὴ θαυμάσης· μεγάλων γὰρ ἔνεκα περι-*

use of which justice and the other virtues are made helpful and profitable. For it is a truism, surely, that no knowledge or possession profits anything unless it is accompanied by the Good.¹

How difficult of attainment is this knowledge appears from a glance at current controversies. There are two chief parties, one sect maintaining that pleasure, the other that knowledge, is the supreme good. But neither side is able to defend its position consistently. The advocates of pleasure are obliged to admit that some pleasures are bad.² The advocates of knowledge, when asked to define and distinguish from the arts, sciences, and professions the special knowledge of which they speak, fall into the vicious circle of replying, the knowledge of the "good."³ And yet it is evident that, though men might rest satisfied with the semblance of the just and honorable, when it comes to the good, they demand the reality.⁴

τέον, where he is not committing himself to a description of the rhetoric of the future, but indicating the discipline that it will demand of its neophytes. The words *μεθόδων οἷαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα*, 435 D, refer primarily of course to the methods employed in the previous discussion, but they contain probably also a suggestion of the later polemic (498 A, 539 A, B) against the mistaken educational method of entering at once upon the most difficult problems of dialectic, instead of approaching dialectic gradually through mathematical propaedeutic.

¹ 505 B; cf. Charm. 174 C; Alc. II, 144-5; Euthyd. 291-2; Phileb. 20 D: *πλήν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἀμα ἀγαθοῖς*. This dimly divined postulated "good," whose unity Protagoras is disposed to deny (Protag. 334 B, C: *οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν*), must be distinguished from "goods" in the popular sense, *τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ*, Rep. 491 C, 495 A; Charm. 158 A; Euthyd. 279 A, B, 280 D; Gorg. 467 E; Meno, 78 C, of which Plato offers frequent ironical lists, but which he sometimes conventionally adopts.

² E.g., Gorgias, 499 B; Philebus, 13 B, 41 A. But extreme partisans or the depraved may deny this: Philebus, 12 A, 27 E; Rep. 561 C.

³ Charm. 174 B, C; Laches, 199 B and E; Lysis, 220 A, B. Jowett and Campbell, on Rep. 505 B, say: "In the first sentence Plato appears to be speaking of the Cynics, or perhaps of the Megarians: in the second of the Cyrenaics and of people in general." But, as usually in such passages, Plato is thinking of typical arguments dramatically illustrated in his own minor writings. So the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* in Sophist. 248 A (cf. 246 B, C) simply represent the doctrine of ideas in its extreme paradoxical form unqualified by the exigencies of mundane logic.

⁴ The meaning of this appears from Theaet. 167 C: *ἐπεὶ οἷα γ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ*; 172 B: *καὶ οὐκ ἂν πᾶν τολμήσειε φῆσαι ἂν θῆται πόλις ξυμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ ξυνοῖσεν κ.τ.λ.*; 177 D: *ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ . . . περὶ δὲ*

Of this good, then, the goal of all effort, the dimly apprehended desire of every living soul, the rulers of our state must not be ignorant. For no man will be a fit custodian of the virtues who does not know just how and why they are "goods."

Before proceeding with the interpretation of the Republic, it may be well to dwell for a moment on the significance of these ideas for modern ethical theory, a significance disguised but not suppressed by the fact that modern ethics is generally stated in terms of right or duty rather than of the good. To the "Good," however, as Professor Sidgwick (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 393) admits, our ethical ideas must ultimately be referred. "In short, the only so-called virtues which can be thought to be essentially and always such, and incapable of excess, are such qualities as Wisdom, Universal Benevolence, and (in a sense) Justice; of which the motives manifestly involve this notion of Good, supposed already determinate. If then we are asked what is this Good which it is excellent to know, to bestow on others, to distribute impartially, it would be obviously absurd to reply that it is just this knowledge, these beneficent purposes, this impartial distribution."

It has become a commonplace of criticism to affirm that Plato contradicts himself with regard to the nature of this postulated ultimate basis of ethical ideas, and that he evades the reconciliation of his contradictory statements by means of poetical metaphor. The inconsistency, however, like most alleged examples of

τάγαθού οὐδένα ἀνδρείον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἐαυτῇ θῇται κ.τ.λ.

It was from these passages, and the argument of Thrasymachus in Rep. I, that Mr. Spencer derived his singular notion that Plato, like Hobbes, makes state enactments the ground of right. It is the opinion of the ethical sceptics who set nature and law in harmful antithesis. And, since extremes meet, it would be true, in a sense, in the Platonic state, where all state enactments would be deduced by benignant wisdom from an ultimate ideal of good. But because the good and the profitable and the pleasant are the primary realities toward which human nature inevitably tends (*Laws*, 732 E, 733 A), and because of the widespread deleterious opinion that opposes them to the just, the Platonic statesman must be able to relate the one to the other in argument and deduce the one from the other in practice. Professor Jowett's suggestion that the argument of the passage is in some degree like that of St. Anselm and Descartes, that the highest perfection involves existence, is one more illustration of the way in which the infinite suggestiveness of Plato's style stimulates the commentator's fancy to the disguising of the main thought.

Platonis inconstantia, is apparent rather than real. In the Protagoras Socrates maintains against Protagoras the hedonistic thesis that pleasure *qua* pleasure is always the good,¹ while in the Gorgias he eloquently protests against this way of speech as subversive of morality. But the purpose of these dialogues is largely dramatic, their arguments make no claim to finality,² and they must be interpreted in the light of his maturer constructive writings. The Philebus points out the psychological limitations to the principle of the Protagoras arising from the inevitable implication of pleasure and pain, and develops the hint of the Gorgias that what men generally take for pleasure is a negative state, the cessation of a preconditioning uneasiness. The Republic and Laws, while conceding that pure pleasures are good,³ and that mankind will inevitably follow the lure of pleasure, enlarge on the social considerations that forbid our speaking of individual pleasure or even happiness as the direct aim of private effort or public legislation.

Modern utilitarians like Grote condemn this procedure as irrational, and affirm that the Protagoras contains the only positive definition of the Good that Plato has vouchsafed to us.⁴

But the attitude of modern evolutionist ethics toward this crude hedonism is precisely that of Plato. The proposition that pleasure *qua* pleasure is the Good is unmeaning or tautologous in its abstract generality. *ἡ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν*; asks Socrates in the Protagoras. The question is an idle one. It ignores the essential limitations of human life. Pleasure and pain, as Socrates observes in the Phaedo (60 B), are so related that he who pursues and wins the one is almost inevitably compelled to accept the other also. We cannot disentangle pleasure and pain from their mutual implication, and their complicated psychical and social concomitants, so as to weigh them against each other in the scales of the hedonistic calculus of the Protagoras⁵ or exchange them as the current coin of happiness

¹ 351 C, 354 C.

² Cf. Protag. 361 A, and *infra*, p. 214-15.

³ Rep. 357 B; Laws, 732-3.

⁴ Grote II, p. 208. But cf. the definition in Republic, 608 E: *τὸ μὲν ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σώζον καὶ ὠφελοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν*.

⁵ 356 B: *ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος*.

and virtue.¹ The direct hedonistic calculus is impracticable, and its attempted abstract verbal application constrains us to essentially harmful and unedifying modes of speech, as when the consistent hedonist avers (Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 361) that in our estimate we must set off the pleasure of the murderer against the pain suffered by his victim, or (Philebus, 55 B) that a man is better in so far and so long as he experiences pleasure.

But an indirect hedonistic calculus is practically the substitution of another criterion. The Utilitarian Ethics differs from the Evolutionist, says Leslie Stephen (*op. cit.*, p. 366), in that "the one lays down as a criterion the happiness, the other the health of the society." This is precisely the difference between the Ethics of the Protagoras as interpreted by Grote and the Ethics of the Gorgias and Republic.² Mr. Stephen adds, "the two are not really divergent," and this is the thesis which Plato strains every nerve to prove throughout the Republic and Laws.

The Platonic ethic, then, does not reject hedonistic utilitarianism in favor of a mystic intuitionism. It maintains only that the utilitarian calculus must be worked out through larger laws established by the consensus of the highest wisdom of society.³ It is not safe to start with pleasure and evolve the virtues, and so pass on to formulate political and social ideals. We must deduce the virtues from some higher law of the world and man, and then prove the coincidence of virtue and happiness. A passage from Mr. Spencer's *Data of Ethics* (§ 21) will bring out more clearly the close analogy that obtains between the ethics of evolution and the Platonic ethics. Mr. Spencer complains that ordinary utilitarians persistently "disregard the fact that empirical utilitarianism is but a transitional form to be passed through on the way to rational utilitarianism. . . . It is supposed that in future as now utility is to be determined only by observation of results, and that there is no possibility of knowing by deduction from fundamental principles what conduct must be detrimental and what conduct must be beneficial." And in a footnote he adds: "And

¹ Phaedo, 69 A: ὥσπερ νομίσματα.

² Gorgias, 479 B, C; Rep. 444 D, E; 445 A; 589-90.

³ Cf. Republic, 607 A: ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσεται ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῆ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery."

With these words we may compare the statement in the Republic that happiness, whether of individuals or classes, is not to be the guiding principle of legislation, but rather the right performance of his specific function by every member of the community, and so much happiness as may consist therewith.¹ And on the necessity of deducing pleasure and pain from higher laws rather than of inferring higher laws by direct estimate of pleasures and pain, we may compare a noteworthy passage of the Laws (733 E, Jowett): "Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous another, and the healthful another; and to these four let us oppose four other lives, — the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures and placid desires and loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in number and frequency. Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily² more pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately."

The difference between Plato and the evolutionist is that Plato as a practical moral teacher prefers to start with the traditional virtues of popular morality and demonstrate that by the laws of life they necessarily produce happiness, while the evolutionist, as a disinterested scientific student of life, starts with the laws of life and endeavors to deduce from them both virtue and happiness. The one attempts to define happiness in terms of virtue, the other

¹ 421 B, C.

² ὅθεν ὁ μὲν ἡδίων ἡμῶν τῶν βίων, ὁ δὲ λυπηρότερος ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι.

virtue in terms of happiness. And thus it results that the language of Plato sometimes appears profoundly unscientific, the language of the evolutionist grossly unethical. In maintaining the essential identity of their methods as against empiric utilitarianism I would not ignore this difference. No fine-spun cords of dialectic can ever bridge the gulf of feeling that divides such utterances as Mr. Spencer's saying that "along with the greater elaboration of life produced by the pursuit of more numerous ends, there goes that increased duration of life which constitutes the supreme end," from the noble words of Socrates in the *Gorgias*: "Nay, dear friend, have a care lest the noble and the good be something else than survival and being preserved. Life is sweet, they say. But the true man will not be concerned for its length, nor cling to the fleeting breath, but will permit this to heaven, and, believing with the women that no man can escape fate, he will consider rather how he may best spend his appointed term."¹

But it is time to return from this unavoidable digression to the interpretation of the *Republic*. Socrates' interlocutors pray him to decide the question for them and pronounce whether knowledge or pleasure be the Good. But Socrates declares that he is not winged for so lofty a flight to-day. In place of the Good itself he will reveal to them the offspring and analogue of the Good in the visible world. There are two worlds,—the visible world of things apprehended by sense, and chiefly by the noblest organ of sense, the eye, and the invisible world of thought seen only by the mind. Lord of the visible world is the sun, the cause at once of visibility in the object and of vision in the organ of sight, and, more than this, the ultimate source of existence, life, and growth in both. His light is the medium in which the eye beholds all things, and, though not itself vision, is the source of the stream of vision that goes out from the eye to meet him.² By an exact analogy the (Idea of) Good, lord of the intelligible world, is the source both of knowledge and existence there. The realities of this world owe to it both their being and their being known. Yet just as the sun, though the source of vision, is not vision, so the Idea of

¹ 512 D, of *Laws*, 707 D.

² 507 C, D, E; cf. *Timaeus*, 45 C, 67 C, and Hegel's apocalyptic saying: "Das subjective Sehen herausgeworfen ist die Sonne."

Good, though the wellspring of knowledge and Being, is not Being but something beyond and above it in dignity and power.¹ The practical ethical outcome of all this, as Plato hints in the words *ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν*,² is merely that goodness is more precious than any knowledge or intellectual faculty—a thought which became a fixed idea with Plato in his later period, and which he expresses in the Laws by averring that virtue is wisdom and that intellectual keenness and quickness divorced from goodness is blind and arrogant folly.³

But the task of our interpretation is to find the implied meanings of all the diverse branches of the allegory, and relate them if possible (1) to the minor Platonic dialogues, (2) to the permanent problems of speculative ethics. The current explanations are purely verbal, and offer little more than an amplification of Plato's own phraseology. The Good, says Ficinus, is "Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans." Stallbaum's florid Latin paraphrase is a type of them all. The Idea of Good is a "species perfectionis atque bonitatis summae unde cum ceterae ideae, tum etiam res generatae prouti eius capaces sunt vivam essentiam virtutemque nanciscuntur." They are all based on that literal and mechanical interpretation of the doctrine of ideas from which the familiar criticism of Aristotle takes its start.⁴ And the critics of the one school, down to Stallbaum and Mr. Archer-Hind, continue to paraphrase Plato's poetical description of this absolute Good, while their opponents, down to Grote and Herbert Spencer, never grow weary of insisting that no such absolute entity exists. Now, undoubtedly, by the letter of Platonic doctrine, the Idea of Good is the cause of the goodness of all good things, as the idea of three is the cause of the threeness of all triads, the idea of white the cause

¹ 509 A, B.

² 509 A. Stallbaum renders: "boni ipsius ratio et natura (*ἕξις*)"; and similarly Jowett and Campbell: "=*τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει*, the state or nature of the good." But the associations of Philebus, 11 D (*ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν . . . τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν*), lend the passage a practical moral coloring amid all its transcendentalism.

³ Laws, 689.

⁴ Some have supposed, he said, that besides phenomenal goods there exists an absolute Good which is the cause of their goodness.

of all whiteness. And if we read into Plato the Neo-Platonic or modern fancy that evil is purely negative and that things exist only in so far as they are good,¹ we may make the Idea of Good the cause of all existence. But causality through the indwelling presence of the Idea (as I have elsewhere shown and shall explain more fully in a subsequent paper) is for Plato a mere blank check, of universal dialectical application, but intended to be filled up whenever possible with concrete ethical and physical meaning. This simple method, as Plato himself not obscurely hints, explains everything formally and nothing substantively.²

Much the same may be said of the interpretation that the Idea of Good is the summum genus of the logical tree, the ultimate abstraction equivalent to pure being from which all other general and abstract terms derive their essences by participation.³ Any formal truth that may be contained in this explanation requires to be supplemented by observation of the dynamical movement of ethical and cosmical forces whereby we pass from the supreme abstraction to its concrete embodiments. That the transition cannot really be effected with absolute consistency when once we have posited the Idea in its transcendental isolation is no objection, or rather it is an objection to be made once for all to the entire Platonic metaphysics and to any philosophy of the absolute yet devised by the wit of man. It may be impossible to pass by a continuous bridge of dialectics from the Idea of Good as a metaphysical entity to the concrete world of man, but this does not absolve criticism from the task of detecting the definite relations of that world to the general conceptions and ideals of which the Idea of Good is the symbol. The interpretation here offered has been given to my classes several times in recent years, and I

¹ Plotinus, Enn. I. 8. 3: *λείπεται τολύνη εἴπερ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι οἷον εἰδός τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὄν*. Archer-Hind, Introduction to Timaeus, p. 17: "Hence good is identified with existence, evil with non-existence, and, as I have said, each thing exists just in so far as it is good and no further."

² Phaedo, 100 D, E.

³ Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 28: "In fact, if you take the logician's account of the predicamental line, with its summum genus including secondary genera, and coming down through species and sub-species to the individual, and, applying this pedigree of notions to the objective universe, accept it as a true history of the development and relations of real being, you will approach very near to the Platonic system of ideas."

should hardly have thought it worth while to write it out for publication if I had not observed that it is altogether missed by such leading exponents of Plato as Jowett and Zeller, for example. Zeller enumerates under the rubric ethics a number of passages from the minor dialogues in which the Good is mentioned, but he makes no attempt to connect them with the ἀγαθόν of the Republic, which he treats in another place as a distinct unrelated metaphysical conception equivalent to the Divinity. Jowett explicitly says:¹ "It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the Idea of Good as the first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings except in this passage." Now, whatever truth of the letter this statement may contain,² it is utterly misleading in spirit. The verbal and logical analogies between the treatment of the Good in the Laches, Charmides, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Meno, and other tentative dialogues, and the statements of the Republic, are so numerous and precise that no interpretation of the Idea of Good that does not take them into account has even a *prima facie* case for hearing. To these dialogues, then, we must first direct our attention. Our guiding thread shall be Plato's explicit statement that a completely adequate definition of the virtues and a true insight into their nature is possible only to one who knows the "Good," because it is only through their relation to the Good that the virtues are beneficial and helpful. Translated into the terminology of modern ethical theory, this means that the descriptive classification of human actions under the rubrics of the conventionally accepted virtues does not yield a science of ethics. A truly scientific definition of courage or temperance must set forth the relation of courageous or temperate actions to some end assumed as ultimate,—the will of God, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the survival of the species, the development of personality, perfection, the harmony of the world, etc., etc. It is enough for the mass of men to be reasonably brave and temperate, in unthinking conformity to types and ideals imposed upon them by society and its rulers.³

¹ III, XCVIII.

² The phrase occurs in a slightly different sense, Cratyl. 418 E.

³ Rep. 389 D; 429 C; cf. Leslie Stephen, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-90: "And this general principle may operate through an unreasoning or a reasoned instinct; that is, through the instincts of a being conscious or unconscious of their value."

But the moulders and guiders of opinion in Calvin's state must clearly perceive how and why the conduct they ordain profits us because it conforms to the will of God; in the state of Bentham they must be prepared to prove that it augments the sum of pleasures and diminishes pain; and in the completely evolved society of Spencer and Leslie Stephen they will know how and why it tends to favor "survival."¹

From this ultimate conception of the Good is derived all the authority by which conduct is sanctioned; and it is the final source and canon of the knowledge of right conduct for all who go back of instinct and tradition. A brief survey of the minor ethical dialogues will show that this seemingly modern idea is the central thought to which they all point. These dialogues are mainly occupied either with attempts to define absolutely and by sheer force of dialectical manipulation of traditional notions the cardinal virtues, or with problems and paradoxes immediately arising out of such crude definitions, as, for example, the unity of the virtues, their identity with wisdom, the possibility of teaching virtue, the involuntariness of vice.

The dialogues in question are tentative or negative, in so far as no definite conclusion acceptable to both disputants is ever reached. And this failure is indicated either by a glaring paradox or contradiction, or by the inability of Socrates and his interlocutors to show how the proposed definitions, if accepted provisionally, represent the Good. The habitual method of procedure, repeated with wearisome monotony, is to start from the assumption that the virtue in question, the *definiendum*, must at any rate be "good" and felicitic, and to overthrow the proposed definition as failing to conform in extreme cases to this test. Perhaps the Meno offers the clearest preliminary outline of the method of these dialogues, as it bears on the ethical problem of the Republic. To know whether virtue can be taught, we must know what virtue is.²

¹ This is what Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 176, calls "the deduction of courage from the general conditions of social vitality." Cf. p. 189: "The ultimate guiding principle is in all cases the utility of the quality, in the sense in which utility means fitness for the conditions of life."

² 71 A; cf. Republic, 334 C; Laches, 190 B; Gorgias, 462 D; Phaedrus, 237 C; Protag. 361 C.

There are many virtues, but there must be one *εἶδος* or form which causes them to be virtues — *δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί*.¹ Meno, lacking the patience to investigate this *εἶδος*, Socrates falls back on the method of hypothesis which is illustrated by mathematics. If virtue is a form of knowledge, it can be taught, otherwise not.² A further fundamental hypothesis is *ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν*, and if *ἀγαθὸν, ὠφέλιμον*.³ But wisdom or intelligence (*φρόνησις*, 88 C) is the only thing that makes all the activities and endurances of the soul truly profitable and felicitous.⁴ Virtue, then, it would seem, is knowledge, and comes by teaching, not by nature.⁵ But as a matter of fact there appear to be no teachers; our statesmen are unable to transmit their wisdom.⁶ From this dilemma the discussion is rescued by the distinction between right opinion and science. Right opinion is in practice often a no less efficient, though a less infallible, guide than knowledge.⁷ The virtue based on sound opinion comes neither by nature nor through teaching, but by grace divine.⁸ But should a statesman arise who could impart his skill, make others good, and train up his own successors,⁹ he would be to those we know as substance to shadow. In this paragraph the *ἀπορίαι* of the minor dialogues bring us very near to the solution of the Republic. There, too, it is affirmed that those who are saved under the present régime of chance are preserved *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*, by grace divine.¹⁰

But in the Republic Plato proposes to substitute for the casual and accidental virtue which is neither the gift of nature nor the product of teaching, a virtue based on both natural endowment

¹ Cf. Hipp. Maj. 300 A: *ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι*.

² 87 C.

³ 87 D; cf. Laches, 192 C; 193 D; Protag. 349 E; Hipp. Maj. 284 D; Rep. 332–33.

⁴ Cf. Euthydemus, 281 D; Charmides, 174 B.

⁵ 89 A. In the Republic this superficial notion that if virtue is insight it must be acquired by formal teaching is rejected. The ethical virtues, we learn there, are imparted by habit and discipline, but intelligence is an inborn divine gift which may be guided or misdirected, but cannot be implanted where it does not exist. 518 C sqq.

⁶ 89 D sqq.

⁷ Cf. also Politicus, 301 B.

⁸ 99 E.

⁹ 100 A; cf. Protag. 348 E; Euthyphron, 3 C, D; Alc. I, 118 C.

¹⁰ 493 A; cf. 366 C. Cf. Laws, 642 C, D; 951 B. Cf. also Rep. 520 B, *αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται*, with Meno, 92 E, *ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*.

and systematic education, and for the existing tribe of empiric statesmen, a breed of philosophic statesmen who will converse with realities, not with shadows, and will know how to train their own successors.

With some variations, a similar line of argument recurs in the Laches. We must know what virtue is in order to advise about its acquisition. The tentative definition of courage as temperamental hardihood (*καρτερία*, 192 B) is rejected because, becoming foolhardiness in its extreme manifestations, it fails to conform to the fundamental hypothesis that bravery is *τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων* (192 C, 193 D), and is always honorable and profitable. But only prudent or wise hardihood is that. Hence it would appear that courage is a form of knowledge (194 D, E). But what knowledge? Not any form of special technical proficiency. For the skilled physician may heal those who were better left to die,¹ unless his professional skill is subordinated to some higher art of its judicious application. The knowledge that constitutes the virtue of true courage must be knowledge of things really terrible or the reverse; that is, knowledge of future good and evil (199 B). But real knowledge is independent of time, and he who truly knows future good and evil will have knowledge of all good and evil, and will possess all the virtues and not merely courage.

The points to be noted here are, the conception which will recur in the Charmides, Euthydemus, and elsewhere, of a higher felicitic knowledge or art of life distinguished from the special arts and sciences; the explicit recognition that a knowledge of the good would involve all the virtues; the fruitless issue of the investigation in a paradox which can be removed only by the distinction taken in the Republic between the higher philosophic virtue of insight and the popular virtue of faith and habit.

Similarly in the Charmides, after the popular definitions of *σωφροσύνη* as identical with *τὸ κόσμιον* or with *αἰδώς* have been rejected, because repose and shamefacedness are not always and everywhere "goods," the definition that temperance is self-knowledge shatters on a similar difficulty. If we waive the objection that self-knowledge would seem to be a psychological contradic-

¹ 195 C, D. Cf. Charmides, 173-74; Gorg. 511-12; Euthyd. 281 B, C.

tion,¹ and admit that self-knowledge means knowledge of what one can or cannot do, it yet remains to show how self-knowledge is a good that will make us happy, which by hypothesis the virtue we are seeking to define must be.² Let us grant that self-knowledge in this sense will guard us against incompetence in all the special professions and will provide us with skilled generals, physicians, tailors, engineers. But who will warrant us that victory, scientific therapeutics, well-cut garments, and ingeniously constructed machines are goods that will always make us happy? Only knowledge of the "good" can do that.³

The sceptical spirit might seem to have overshot itself here, for the right performance by each of his specific function or service is the ruling principle of the ideal social organization of the Republic, which is assumed to yield the maximum attainable happiness. But the idea is conceived here in a purely mechanical, and external way. And to ask, in the manner of Grote, why it was not deepened and enriched by the psychological and sociological interpretation of the Republic is to ask why Plato did not write the Republic instead of the Charmides.

A few other examples of the method we are illustrating may be briefly enumerated. In the Protagoras the paradox of the unity of all the virtues in *σοφία* is maintained against Protagoras by means of the hypothesis *τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν τι εἶναι* (349 E). In the Gorgias the paradox that the typical rhetorical politician, though he does as he likes, has no real power, is sustained by the hypothesis (or *ὁμολογία*, 468 E) that *τὸ δύνασθαι* is *ἀγαθόν τι*.⁴ And, though the dialogue is on its face a polemic against crude hedonism, the identity of the "good" with the profitable and with happiness is expressly affirmed.⁵

In Republic, 333 E, a proposed definition of *δικαιοσύνη* is controverted on the ground that it does not exhibit justice as a *σπουδαῖον*; and in 367 B Adeimantus insists that Socrates shall make plain by what intrinsic quality and operation justice proves itself an *ἀγαθόν* for its possessor.

In the Hippias major (284 D), the hypothesis being that law

¹ Cf. also Rep. 430 E, and Laws, 696 D.

² 169 B.

³ 174 C, D.

⁴ 466 B.

⁵ 470 A; 507 B, C.

is good, laws which do not work good are paradoxically denied to be laws at all. In 296 D *δύναμις*, as in the Gorgias, is reduced to the conception of good.

Perhaps the most explicit exposition of this train of thought is that found in Socrates' protreptic discourses in the Euthydemus. All men desire happiness (278 E). The presence of goods will make us happy, or rather the beneficial operation and right use of goods (280 B; 280 E). For many so-called goods prove harmful rather than profitable when wrongly employed. Get wisdom, get understanding, then, is the first lesson of philosophy (282 A). But does this mean every form of knowledge, or is there some one art or science the acquisition of which will make us both good and happy?¹ We seek a science that will profit us, *ἥτις ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει* (288 E). It is not the art of discovering gold, nor of attaining immortality (288 E; 289 B), for these would profit us nothing² without their right employment; nor yet the art of manufacturing musical instruments, which is distinct from and subordinate to the art of using them;³ nor the art of the rhetorician and speech writer for the courts,⁴ which is a branch of the great art of incantation or charming;⁵ nor the art of the general who is a mere huntsman, and must hand over his prey to the statesman who alone knows how to use it.⁶ Perhaps, then, it is the political or royal art that sits at the helm of state, directing all things and converting them to profitable uses.⁷ But if this is the art which we seek, by hypothesis *ὠφέλιμον αὐτὴν δεῖ εἶναι* (292 E), it must accomplish some specific good. But knowledge is the only good that never fails. And this brings us around in a circle to the old problem: What kind of knowledge? Surely not the special arts and professions, but rather the knowledge that will make us good. Good in

¹ 282 E.

² 288 E *οὐδὲν πλεόν*. Cf. Rep. 505 B *ἢ οἶε τι πλεόν εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθὴν*;

³ 289 C; cf. Rep. X, 601 D.

⁴ Cf. Politicus, 304 A *καὶ ὅση βασιλικῇ κοινωνοῦσα ῥητορεία πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον ξυνδιακυβερνᾷ τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις*.

⁵ Cf. the soothing of the many-headed beast, Rep. 493 A, B; Gorgias, 501 A, B.

⁶ Cf. Ion, 540 D.

⁷ 291 D *χρήσιμα ποιεῖν*. Cf. Rep. 505 A *χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται*. Politicus, 292 C.

what respect? in the political art of making others good, and so on indefinitely? We are moving in a vicious circle, and are as far as ever from apprehending the knowledge that will make us happy (292 E).

There is apparent justification for Grote's contention that Plato's negative criticism here, as at the close of the Charmides, outruns the answer to these puzzles proposed in the Republic. The solution of the Republic for the riddles of the Euthydemus and Charmides can be taken as adequate only with the aid of certain arbitrary assumptions and distinctions. We must assume that the final good, humanly speaking, is embodied in the social organization of the Republic, with its blending of the ideals of health, harmony, and happiness for the individual and the community. This assumption is virtually made in 427 E, in the words *οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ᾤκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι*; and in 576 E sqq.: *καὶ δῆλον παντί, ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθλιωτέρα, βασιλευμένης δὲ οὐκ εὐδαιμονεστέρα*.

We must accept, furthermore, the distinction of the Meno between right opinion and knowledge and the tripartite psychology of mind, passion, and appetite. Then, on the assumption that "making others good," as the function of the political art, bears a double sense, and means, with reference to the multitude, making them good through habit, discipline, and instinctive conformity to models set them from above, while for the élite it means the training up of a succession of philosophic statesmen to maintain and perpetuate the ideally best social organism and education—within these limits the Republic may be held to provide a sufficient answer to the problems of the tentative dialogues as resumed in the Euthydemus.

The attempt to define friendship or love in the Lysis (220 A, B) brings us to the good by another path. Gold and silver and other objects of desire are *φίλα*, not in themselves, but because of their service in relation to something else. That something else, the absolute end for the sake of which all other things are nominally dear, is the real and ultimate *φίλον*. The good, then, it would seem, is the *πρῶτον φίλον*. But at this point, instead of acquiescing in the good as the synonym of happiness and the final object of desire, Plato pushes the inquiry

further into the metaphysics of will and desire, and asks why it is that we covet the good. Of course there can be no answer except that of the Symposium, 205 D τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὁ μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς ἔρως παντί. The blank logical form of the good in which the discussions of the minor dialogues terminate, that "title and postulate, but nothing more, of a comprehensive teleology," as Grote calls it (Vol. II, p. 32), can be filled up in perhaps three ways. (1) By the portrayal, as in the Republic, of an ideal of social and educational organization, conformity to which shall be assumed to be "good." (2) By defining the good negatively, as the remedy of evil regarded as the positive element. (3) By hypostatizing the good as the objective reality corresponding to subjective desire and enthusiastic love. The first method we have already glanced at. It is with the last two that we are concerned here. Of these, the former would take us deep into the metaphysics of the will. Is good or evil, pleasure or pain, the positive term? Is Locke right in maintaining that it is not the greatest positive good that determines the will, but the most insistent uneasiness? Plato is content merely to suggest these problems by his analysis. The irreclaimably evil does not yearn for the good, for it is not aware of its badness. The perfectly good has no need of its like.¹ There remains, then, the supposition that what is neither absolutely good nor bad, owing to the presence of evil, loves and desires the good as a purifying remedy.² But Socrates is loth to acquiesce in a conclusion which deprives the good of all positive content in the absence of evil. The question what would happen if all evil were suppressed transcends our faculties.³ But we may safely affirm that harmless desires would subsist though all evil disappeared. And wherever there is desire, there is love, yearning, friendship.⁴

This conclusion that ἐπιθυμία is the source of the φίλον is also subtly impugned in the subsequent course of the discussion, which we need not follow. Our concern is merely to note that we have

¹ 218 A sqq.

² 218 C; 220 D.

³ 221 A ἡ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; cf. Theaet. 176 A.

⁴ 221 B.

here one typical method of lending a seemingly positive content to the "good"—it is the object of passionate desire. This thought, which is the world-affirming, as the *Phaedo* presents the world-negating, aspect of the Platonic Ethics, is worked out more fully in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. There are some suggestions of it in the *Republic* and elsewhere,¹ and it is one of the two chief grounds of the constant association of the *καλόν* and the *ἀγαθόν* in Plato.

The soul of man, the *Phaedrus* teaches, yearns for a glimpse of the ideas once beheld in prenatal vision. But the idea of beauty alone possesses a clearly discernible visible embodiment in this lower world.² For this reason, the enthusiastic love it excites is the best guide to the associated ideas of goodness, truth, and righteousness. Similarly in the *Symposium* we are told that all men strive after good or happiness, and desire that it shall be eternally present with them.³ But mortal man can put on immortality only through generation, and so, desiring good, all men desire generation. Now the birth goddess and presiding divinity of generation is beauty, for which men yearn that they may produce in it fair offspring after the spirit and the flesh. And so the gradual ascent of the soul from the love of beautiful persons and things to the contemplation of the absolute idea and infinite ocean of beauty is at the same time a struggling upwards toward the Good.

There is another reason for the attempted identification of the good and the beautiful in Plato which we must not overlook. One of his chief concerns is the establishing by valid or even by merely plausible arguments⁴ the coincidence of virtue and happiness. Now the virtues, to normal Greek feeling, are admittedly *καλά*. If, then, the *καλόν* can be identified with the *ἀγαθόν*, virtue is an *ἀγαθόν*. This argument, which may be called Socrates' short way with the sceptics, is repeatedly employed in the minor dialogues.⁵

¹ Cf. *Rep.* 475 B, C, 485 C sqq., 490 A, B, 519 C, D; *Leges*, 688 B, 711 D; *Phaedo*, 66 E.

² 250 D *οὐν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν κ.τ.λ.* Cf. *Politicus*, 285 E: *τοῖς δ' αὖ μεγίστοις οὐσι καὶ τιμωτάτοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδωλὸν οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς.*

³ 206 A sqq.

⁴ *Laws*, 663 B, C, 664 A, 887 B, 890 D.

⁵ Cf. *Hipp. Major*, 297 B; *Symp.* 201 C; *Alc.* I. 115-16; *Rep.* 452 E; *Gorgias*, 477. Cf. also *Laws*, 860 A.

And modern critics never grow weary of insisting that it is a fallacy. But that Plato was well aware of its purely conventional character is abundantly evident from the position assigned in the first book of the Republic to Thrasymachus, who is made of sterner stuff than Callias or Callicles. He refuses to make the conventional admission that justice, though disadvantageous to the individual whom it restrains, is nevertheless intrinsically fair and honorable by the law of nature, and thereby necessitates the more serious discussion of the problem that follows in the subsequent books.

We have thus glanced at all the suggestions of the minor dialogues needful for the understanding of the treatment of the Idea of Good in the Republic. We have learned to know the "good" as a regulative ethical concept or ideal, the postulated objective correlate of that happiness which is the ultimate end of every man's desire, be his immediate pursuit pleasure, honor, power, or wisdom.¹ As it is the final and inclusive object of all partial aims,² so the activities that lead to its attainment are summed up in an ideal art of life or political art,³ to which all special and minor faculties and dexterities are ancillary and subordinate.⁴ And as the ultimate if imperfectly apprehended motive of all human action, it stands above and beyond the ethical virtues, which lack motive and significance for concrete human life until they are brought into definite intelligible relation to this supreme reality. But this alleged reality is a poetical figment, an hypostatized abstraction, Aristotle urges.⁵ And, moreover, if we grant the existence of such an entity, it is impossible to say what practical benefit in the exercise of his craft the carpenter or cobbler would derive from knowledge of a transcendental Good.⁶

It is essential to the argument of this study to make plain, even at the cost of some repetition, just why these criticisms do not lie in the mouth of the author of the Nicomachean Ethics, and just

¹ Gorgias, 468 A, 499 E; Lysis, 219 C; Symp. 204 E, 205 D; Phileb. 20 D, E.

² τέλειον, ἰκανόν.

³ Gorgias, 503 D, 501 A, B, C; Protag. 319 A; Rep. 428 D; Charm. 170 B; Euthyd. 282 E, 290, 291 C.

⁴ Politicus, 289 C συναλττοι, 303 E; Euthyd. 290 C.

⁵ Eth. Nic. I, 6.

⁶ Eth. Nic. I, 6, 16.

wherein the *ἀγαθόν* as conceived by Plato is a more helpful concept for ethical theory than Aristotle's *εὐδαιμονία*. Briefly, the reasons are: (1) That every ethically serviceable idea found in the Aristotelian *εὐδαιμονία* is involved in the Platonic *ἀγαθόν*, and was as a matter of fact thence derived.¹ (2) That the Platonic *ἀγαθόν* supplies religious and emotional suggestions which the moral life cannot do without, and provides at the same time for the indispensable theoretic conception of an independently established law or end from which happiness, virtue, and all other ethical ideas may be deduced. The first point is readily established by a comparison of the first eight or ten chapters of the Ethics with the Platonic dialogues. The vocabulary, the distinctions, the metaphors, the illustrations, are all borrowed from Plato.² Only, in-

¹ Cf. Stewart on Aristotle's Ethics, I, 7, 6-8. "In this section Aristotle virtually maintains all that Plato contended for in his doctrine of the Idea of Good. As the Idea of Good is the unity of good things and that by reason of which they are good, in other words, as it is that definite system or order, by belonging to and subserving which, particular things are said to be good rather than pleasant or otherwise attractive to mere sense, so happiness is that orderly and beautiful life in relation to which, and only to which, man's powers and opportunities have any significance." These words contain, as we shall see, only a part of the truth, but they express it most excellently.

² 1. 1. 1 *ἀγαθοῦ τίνος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ*. Cf. Gorgias, 468 B.

1. 1. 2 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰ ἔργα τινά*. Cf. Charm. 164 E; Gorg. 450 D; Polit. 258 D.

1. 1. 3 *πολλὰ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ τέλη· ιατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια*, etc. Cf. Charm. 165 C; Gorg. 452 A.

1. 1. 4 *ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἢ χαλικοποικὴν*, etc. Cf. Rep. 601 C.

ibid. *ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν*. Cf. Euthyd. 290 B; Laches, 198 E; Ion.

ibid. *τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη*. Cf. Polit. 259 E.

1. 2. 1 *πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον*, etc. Cf. Lysis, 219 C.

1. 2. 2 *καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες*. Cf. Rep. 519 B.

1. 2. 3 *τίνας τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων*. Cf. Hipp. Minor, 375 D ἢ *δικαιοσύνη οὐχὶ ἡ δυνάμεις τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀμφοτέρα*;

1. 2. 5, 6 *τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται . . . ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν, οἰκονομικὴν, ῥητορικὴν . . . ὥστε τοῦτ' ἀν εἶη τὰνθρῶπιον ἀγαθόν*. Cf. Politicus, 260 E, 304 E; Euthyd. 291 D, E.

1. 2. 8 *μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως . . . ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ*, etc. Cf. Rep. 359 D, E, 496 E, 497 A.

1. 3. 1 and 4. Cf. Tim. 29 B.

1. 3. 2 *τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ*. Cf. Phaedrus, 263 B; Euthyphron. 8 B sqq.; Gorgias, 484 sqq.; Laws, 889 C, D, E.

1. 3. 3 *τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας*

stead of employing *εὐδαιμονία* and the possession of goods as synonyms, Aristotle limits himself to *εὐδαιμονία* as the technical denomination of the supreme end, and in his definition of it descends from the idealistic heights of the Gorgias in order to

ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Cf. Protag. 334 B, C; Gorgias, 511-12; Euthyd. 281 B, C; Laches, 195 C, D; Charm. 173-74.

1. 3. 4 *μαθηματικὸν πιθανολογούντος.* Cf. Theaetetus, 162 E.

1. 3. 6 *τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις.* Cf. Politicus, 258 D.

1. 4. 2 *οἱ χαρίεντες.* Cf. I. 5. 4 and Rep. 505 B *τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις.*

1. 4. 2 *τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν.* Cf. Charm. 172 A; Gorg. 507 C.

1. 4. 7 *ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ δεῖν καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνεται ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διώτι.* Cf. Charm. 159 A, 176 A.

1. 5. 1, 2, 3. The three types of life. Cf. Rep. 581.

1. 5. 3 *βοσκημάτων βίον.* Cf. Phileb. 67 B *οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες;* Rep. 586 A *βοσκημάτων δίκην.*

1. 5. 4 *τάγαθόν δὲ οἰκίδν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντεύμεθα.* Cf. Charm. 163 D, 169 B; Lysis, 216 D, 222 D.

1. 5. 8 *βίαιός τις,* etc. Cf. Phaedo, 66 C; Rep. 581 E; Tim. 42 A.

1. 6. 1 *ἀμφοῖν γὰρ δυτοῖν φίλοις δυσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.* Cf. Phaedo, 91 A, C; Rep. 591 C.

1. 6. 9 *διττῶς λέγεται ἂν τάγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.* Cf. Rep. 357.

1. 7. 1. Cf. I. 1. 3.

1. 7. 4 *τελειώτερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον.* Rep. 357-8.

1. 7. 6 *φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν.* Cf. Phileb. 20 C.

1. 7. 7 *τὸ δ' αὐταρκές τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον.* Cf. Phileb. 21.

1. 7. 10 *καὶ ὅπως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τάγαθόν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ.* Cf. Nettleship in Hellenica, p. 173; Grant, Aristotle's Ethics, Vol. I, p. 192; Rep. 352-3.

1. 7. 13. The λόγον ἔχον twofold: τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ. τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον. Cf. Rep.

1. 7. 21. Some ἀρχαὶ apprehended αἰσθήσει. Cf. Charm. 159 A.

ibid. *δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμῖν παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή.* Cf. Leges, 753 E.

1. 8. 2. Tripartite division of "goods." Cf. Leges, 727-9; Alc. I, 131.

1. 8. 9 *διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν.* Cf. Euthyd. 280 D.

1. 8. 10 *ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιμούτος.* Cf. Lysis, 212 C, D; Rep. 475 sqq.

1. 8. 11 *τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα.* Cf. Phileb. 51-2.

1. 8. 13 *καθ' αὐτὰς ἂν εἴεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι,* etc. Cf. Leges, 653 C.

1. 8. 15 *οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον εἶναι.* Cf. Rep. I, 330 B, for concrete embodiment of this idea.

1. 8. 17 *ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτ' ἀττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.* Cf. Euthyd. 279 E.

1. 9. 1 *πύτερόν ἐστι μαθητόν,* etc. Cf. Meno.

make certain concessions to common sense. Aristotle, however, it will be said, explicitly recognizes that *eὐδαιμονία* is merely a verbal expression, a blank form, requiring to be filled up with concrete meaning.¹ But does he so fill it up? His final definition of happiness surely is a pitiful bathos, a woful moral anticlimax: "We may then safely define a happy man as one whose activity accords with perfect virtue and who is adequately furnished with external goods, not for a casual period of time, but for a complete or perfect lifetime. But perhaps we ought to add that he will always live so, and will die as he lives."² This formula is certainly less elevating than the noble description of the health and harmony of the virtuous, happy soul in the Republic.³ And it will hardly be claimed that it offers more definite practical guidance. Nor can it be seriously maintained that the Ethics presents a greater wealth of delicate ethical observation and moral suggestion than the dialogues. In what sense, then, is Aristotle's treatment of ethics more real, less mystic, than Plato's? From the point of view of Spencerian evolution, it is exposed to the same criticisms as the Platonic ethics. "Aristotle's doctrine of virtue and happiness," says Mr. Spencer (Data of Ethics, § 13, p. 36), "is allied to the Platonic belief that there is an ideal or absolute good, which gives to particular and relative goods their property of goodness. An argument analogous to that which Aristotle uses against Plato's conception of good may be urged against his own conception of virtue."

And, on the other hand, the Platonic *ἀγαθόν* performs services which the Aristotelian *eὐδαιμονία* can never render. First, in that it is an emotionally higher term, and the emotional associations of words cannot with impunity be disregarded in ethical discussion. It is not for nothing that a thinker like Arnold insists that pleasure is a bad and joy a good word to express the truth which "utilitarianism" crushes beneath a mountain of pedantry, or that a teacher like Carlyle avers that not happiness but blessedness is our being's end and aim. But it is the other advantage resulting from the use of the term *ἀγαθόν* that concerns the student of

¹ I, 4. 2.

² Eth. Nic. I, XI, Welldon.

³ 443 E, 591 D, E, 605 B.

speculative ethics. *Εὐδαιμονία* can yield only an immanent ethic, one that deals with moral phenomena unrelated to any larger including laws of life and nature. But a final philosophy of ethics must go outside of itself to secure a basis and fulcrum in some positively assumed ideal or law, by means of which the purely ethical terms pleasure, happiness, virtue, may be subjected to definite scientific estimates. It must be, in Martineau's language, heteronomous.

One of the chief objects of this study is to show that the Platonic doctrine of *ἀγαθόν* is an expression of this principle, in the recognition of which Plato differs from Aristotle and the modern utilitarian ethics, while agreeing with the ethics of evolution.¹ We do not thereby read modern ideas into the Platonic text. We are simply following the windings of his thought and noting the things on which he actually lays most stress. If these things are missed in some ambitious modern interpretations, it is because the usual method of studying a philosopher is to extract and isolate from their context a certain number of his technicalities and metaphors, and then inflate or juggle with them according as the bent of the interpreter is to rhetoric or dialectic. The religious emotions awakened in Plato's mind by the Idea of Good he expressed in beautiful and impressive imagery, to which due place must be assigned in a total estimate of his philosophy, but which it is a mistake to isolate and stiffen into rigid ontology. He had too much tact to attempt a technical definition or to confine his ideals within the compass of a formula necessarily subject to manifold misinterpretations. The good for man can be defined only through its embodiment in an ideal social organization. No manipulation of technical terms, then, will enable us to apprehend his thought. We must note the problems that preoccupy him most and the relative weight he attaches to them. In ethics these were: (1) What way, ideal, or conception of life tends to true happiness?² (2) Is there any verifiable law of God, nature, or of

¹ We may find an obscure and mystical expression of the thought in Proclus' argument (Inst. Theol. VIII) that the *ἀγαθόν* is *ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων*, because if it were identical with Being, or with any form of Being, it would no longer be true that every form of Being aspires after the good,—an interesting illustration of the final ontological transformation of a simple Socratic ethical thought.

² Gorgias, 472 C, 492 D, 500 C; Euthyd. 293 A; Rep. 344 D, E, 352 D, 484 B, 578 C; Laws, 702 A, B.

human life that associates happiness indissolubly with the practice of the common virtues?¹ "The good which he investigated persistently and profoundly we must conceive as something of which the manifestation in concrete human life involves the attainment of the greatest real pleasure of which human nature is capable, as well as the realization of virtue," says Sidgwick truly.²

Now, in this persistent affirmation of the necessary identity of virtue and happiness, Plato combined moral exhortation with disinterested speculation. The former predominates in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*, the latter in the *Philebus* and *Republic*, where an attempt is made to rest the all-important principle on verifiable psychological and social laws. But even in these dialogues he is unable to refrain from eloquent rhetorical outbursts directed against the view he is combating, and at the close of the *Republic* he appeals after all to the supernatural sanction which he had affected to disdain at the beginning.³ The insistence with which he recurs to these ideas in the *Laws* shows the intensity of his feeling and at the same time betrays a sense of uneasiness as to the scientific character of his proof.⁴ He probably perceived as clearly as do Grote, Leslie Stephen, Guyau, and Sidgwick that the absolute coincidence of virtue and happiness in extreme cases is not susceptible of geometrical demonstration. But he could not command the moral indifference, or, to put it otherwise, the scientific disinterestedness, that enables these writers to acquiesce in the assumption of a "general coincidence between the dictates of morality and prudence."⁵ On this point he demanded an adamantine faith. He was as certain of it as of the existence of the island of Crete.⁶ He was persistently haunted by a sense of the awful danger⁷ of tampering in any way with the securities of

¹ *Laws*, 660 E, 661 A, B, 964 C.

² *Methods of Ethics*, p. 106 n.

³ *Phileb.* 28 A, D, E, 51 D οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κήσεων προσφέρεις. Cf. *Gorgias*, 494 D, E; *Philebus*, 67 B; *Rep.* 612 B νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστι.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 207, n. 4.

⁵ Leslie Stephen, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

⁶ *Laws*, 662 B.

⁷ *Protag.* 314 A; *Laches*, 187 B; *Rep.* 608 B μέγας ὁ ἀγών κ.τ.λ.; 451 A ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἀμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ νομίμων περί.

the moral life, of the fatal discords that one jarring word might introduce into the complicated harmonies of the soul.¹

The belief in a "general coincidence between prudence and morality" would not prevent the ingenious sophist-bred youth of Thucydidean Athens from asking Pindar's embarrassing question: Whether by righteousness or by crooked guile can I scale the stronger tower of defence and guard myself against the chances of life? And Plato was not willing, like our modern moralists, that the legislators and teachers of youth should leave this question unanswered.

Professor Sidgwick holds that the peculiar excellence of Aristotle's system "is due to the pure air of scientific curiosity in which it has been enveloped," and he prefers this method for the reason "that a treatment which is a compound between the scientific and the hortatory is apt to miss both the results that it would combine: the mixture is bewildering to the brain and not stimulating to the heart."²

Perhaps few readers have attained that austere scientific unimpressionability which Plato's eloquence would fail to stimulate. But it has certainly proved bewildering to the brains of a majority of his commentators. The one group present a paraphrase of his preaching as his essential contribution to ethical theory, the other neglect his serious thought because it is contaminated with rhetoric, and because, in the exposition of it, Plato refuses to employ the indifferent, ethically colorless, phraseology affected by purely scientific inquirers.

"The ethical argument of the *Gorgias*," Professor Sidgwick thinks, "has a singularly mixed effect on the mind. Partly it seems to us more or less dexterous sophistry playing on a confusion of thought latent in the common notion of the good: partly a noble and stirring expression of a profound moral faith."³

This is undoubtedly the impression of a hasty perusal of the *Gorgias* on many minds, and it is just here that a discriminating criticism is of service by removing this stumbling-block to our appreciation and pointing out that Plato was conscious of the

¹ *πλημμελές*, *Phaedo*, 115 E. Cf. *Rep.* 443 E, 591 E, 605 B.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 404, n. 2.

partly fallacious character of his arguments, and employed them for legitimate dialectic and dramatic ends. "It will not do," writes Mr. Sidgwick, "for us to say that 'General Good' consists in general virtue;—at least if we mean by virtue conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main part of the morality of Common Sense." Possibly not in a scientific ethical treatise; but to maintain just this at all times and against all comers was one of the chief duties of the Platonic philosopher-statesman. He indeed was to possess the speculative insight that would enable him to rectify the traditional morality when it errs. But, after all, the traditional morality is substantially sound. And, if right conduct is three-fourths of life, at least three-fourths of right conduct for the average man consists in abstention from picking and stealing, control of his appetites, and conformity to the commonplace precepts of morality learned in youth.¹ The Platonic sage is to possess an adamant scientific faith that happiness cannot be dissociated from such conduct, and he is furthermore to have always at hand enough rhetoric and dialectic to impress this salutary conviction on the multitude, and to put down any dexterous sophist who endeavors to unsettle the mind of youth. We can understand the *Gorgias* only when we recall to mind how much of this superficial anti-ethical dialectic was current in Thucydidean Athens, how many of the wits of the time affected to despise the restraints of the morality of the vulgar, and to what a flame of vehement eloquence Plato's spirit was kindled by these dangerous tendencies of the age. For the Socrates of the *Gorgias* is the philosopher-statesman of the *Republic* fallen among wild beasts.² And he is dramatically presented as the wise man who does not think his intellectual superiority is a charter of license to his lusts, and is yet able to put down in argument the ingenious wits who flatter themselves that they have penetrated the shams of commonplace morality and have found a higher law of nature in the right of the stronger. This purpose is not obscurely indicated in the words of Socrates (527 A, B, Jowett) at the close: "Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale which you will condemn. And there might be reason

¹ τὰ φορτικά, *Rep.* 442 E.

² Cf. *Rep.* 496 D; *Gorgias*, 511 A, B; 521 C.

in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of your day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life save the one that will avail us in that other world as well as in this. And of all that has been said nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice."

The arguments by which Callias and Calicles are refuted are directed *πρὸς δόξας* and conducted *κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα*. They serve their purpose as a sufficient answer to the crude scepticism which they combat. But Plato's real opinion of them is plainly indicated in a notable passage of the Republic. Thrasymachus (348 C), on being asked if he admits that justice is virtue and injustice vice, replies: "It is likely, is it not, when I affirm that injustice is profitable and justice the reverse?" Whereupon, after some further explanations, Socrates admits that he is at loss what to say: "For," he continues, "if you had laid it down that injustice is profitable, but had admitted it to be base and ugly, as do some others, one might have found some arguments from the conventional point of view," etc.¹

Now the position which Thrasymachus is too wary to take up is exactly that which brings about the confutation of Polus in Gorgias 474 C-475 E; and there is no reason to suppose that Plato regarded such reasoning as really conclusive at any time. It serves merely, like Socrates' sophistry in the Apology, to show that these sophists have never thought out a consistent ethical philosophy of any kind and are helpless in the hands of a skilled dialectician.² Even in the Gorgias there are hints of Plato's deeper ethical thought. They are not to be found in the formal argumentation, however, but rather in the suggested contrast of two opposed ideals of life that runs through the dialogue, and in

¹ *εἰ γὰρ λυσitteλεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι, ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἰχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες.*

² Cf. Apology, 25 C; 26 A, B. Cf. also the recognition in Politicus, 306 A, of the purely popular character of the reasoning of the Protagoras. *τὸ γὰρ ἀρετῆς μέρος ἀρετῆς εἶδει διάφορον εἶναι τίνα τρόπον τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἀμφισβητικοῖς καὶ μάλ' εὐεπίθετον πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας.* And for a similar allusion to the purely dramatic and dialectical character of much of his earlier work, cf. Laws, 627 D *οὐ γὰρ εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης ῥημάτων ἕνεκα τὰ νῦν σκοπούμεθα πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον.*



the "strange" imagery which Socrates employs to enforce it. The comparison of the few pure pleasures of the temperate life to jars of milk and wine and honey that require but little tendance when once filled, while the feverish pleasures of sense resemble leaky vessels which the owner is constrained to replenish with constant toil under penalty of intolerable pains,—this image and the others "from the same gymnasium"¹ are distinct anticipations of the demonstration of the negativity of sensual pleasures in the *Philebus* and *Republic*. It was here that Schopenhauer found the suggestion of his comparison of the lust of life to Ixion pinioned to his revolving wheel, or the Danaids filling their perforated urns in vain. The part played by Socrates as a layman in the *Gorgias* and in the corrupt Athenian state will be taken professionally by the trained guardians of the *Republic*. To accomplish this they must in the first place be past masters in ethics and social science and in all their propaedeutic and auxiliary disciplines, and they must have formed for themselves by means of this knowledge definite ideals of life, happiness, and social organization, which will serve them as patterns in practice, and which will lend to all their enactments that converging unity of purpose which is wanting even in the best of those clever ministers to the people's desires who now pass for statesmen.² Secondly, they must combine with this deeper ethical and political insight a dialectical and rhetorical skill that will enable them to relate all their scientific measures consistently to their ultimate ideals, to defend these ideals against unsettling criticism, and above all to confirm the multitude by argument or exhortation in their faith in that ordinary commonplace morality which is, after all, the most essential element of happiness and good government.

All this Plato sums up in the postulate that the guardians of the state must know the Idea of Good, a statement whose meaning is to be sought first in the minor ethical dialogues already surveyed, and second in the triple allegory that describes the discipline and the pilgrimage which will lead the soul to the very vestibule and doorway of the Good.³

¹ *Gorg.* 493.

² *Gorg.* 517 B. Cf. *Rep.* 484 C; 519 C; 555 B; *Laws*, 693 B; 705 E; 962 A.

³ *Phileb.* 64 C.

In applying these thoughts to the interpretation of the Republic, I shall not follow Plato's order of topics, but shall first discuss the general significance of the close connection between mathematics, abstract dialectic, and the Good, and then only proceed to the detailed exposition of the allegories of the Sun, the quadripartite line, and the cave. There are three distinguishable, if not altogether separable, reasons for that blending of the Idea of Good with abstract mathematical conceptions which has blinded interpreters to its simple ethical meaning. In the first place, then, mathematics suggest those ideas of order, measure, harmony, fitness, limit, dear to Plato as to every artistic Hellene.

Plato delighted to sport with mathematical analogies in the Pythagorean manner. He derived a keen aesthetic pleasure from the mere contemplation of pure geometrical forms.¹ If he cannot be proved to have said, he at least thought, that "God geometrizes." He loved to conceive the creative operation of the good, *mundi melioris origo*, as the imposing of forms, types, and ratios on the unformed, rebellious matter of a primeval chaos.² Though he rejected the doctrine that the soul is in substance a harmony,³ he habitually spoke of the health, happiness, and virtue of the soul in terms borrowed from music.⁴ It gratified his imagination and his religious instincts to associate, as Wordsworth does, the *κόσμος*, or beautiful order which temperance and virtue create in a body subject to influx and outflux (Tim. 43 A) among the war-ring propensities of the soul, to the *κόσμος* which the philosophic eye discerns in the universe about us, and to confound in studiously ambiguous language the power that preserves the stars from wrong and that which establishes the law of right in the soul of man.⁵ And he cherished the belief that the study and contemplation of these larger external harmonies quiets the agitation of the spirit, and assimilates its motions to their nobler rhythms.

But these beautiful imaginings belong to the domain of poetry

¹ Phileb. 51 C; Tim. 53 E; 54 A.

² Tim. 53 B.

³ Phaedo, 94 C.

⁴ Phaedo, 61 A; Laches, 188 D; Laws, 689 D; Rep. 411 C; 548 B; Laws, 653 E; Rep. 424 D, E; 443 D; 549 B; Laws, 591 D; Protag. 326 B.

⁵ Gorg. 506 E; 504 D; 507 E; 508 A; Phileb. 30 C; Rep. 540 A, B; Laws, 906 C; Rep. 359 C; 430 E; Politicus, 273 C; Tim. 47 C; 50 D; Rep. 500 C.

and religion. They enrich and adorn the ethical analysis we are studying, but form no part of the logical warp and woof of its texture.

In the second place, mathematics was the dominant, the only definitely constituted, science of the day, and in every age ethical speculation has always borrowed its imagery, its analogies, and its terminology from the leading contemporary science. In our own time, for example, all the familiar facts, distinctions, and definitions, relating to our moral experience, have to be restated in language colored by biological metaphor, and ambitious systems of sociology are based on the most venturesome hypotheses of metaphysical embryology. And we can readily conceive Mr. Spencer or Mr. Huxley contending that the statesman of the future ought to receive his preparatory training through biology rather than from the study of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Ethics. For the human life which he is to guide is ultimately governed by biological laws, and the decisions of expediency, or even of right, which he must make, are in the last resort sanctioned by their tendency to promote or hinder "survival." The efficient statesman, then, must know what conduces to "survival," in order that all his measures may be consistently directed to one end, and he must be a master of biological dialectic in order that he may be able to confute sceptical opponents and retain the confidence of the multitude.

I will not labor the analogy further. For here again we are dealing, not with Plato's essential thought, but with the temporary fashion of its literary garb; and philosophic criticism, while noting such fashions, will not attach undue importance to them, whether in the past or in the present.

This brings us to the third and more serious reason for the association of mathematics with the Idea of Good—the reason explicitly assigned by Plato himself.¹ Temperamental health, instinctive disdain of baseness,² habit and right opinion, suffice for the production of ordinary virtue in the average man. They are blind guides³ for him who is to formulate ideals and prescribe rules of

¹ Rep. 525 B; 521 D; 524 B; 525 D; 526 A; 526 D, E; Laws, 747 B.

² *θελὴ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν.* Rep. 366 C.

³ Rep. 506 C; 520 C; Meno, 98 A sqq.

conduct for an entire society. It is not enough for him to feel and divine; he must know and be ready to assign reasons.¹ Ethical, social, and political problems appear very easy to the undisciplined mind,² which is for solving them with offhand dialectic ingenuity supported by common sense, citations from the poets, proverbial morality, old saws, and modern instances.³ But the failure of this light-hearted procedure is sufficiently illustrated by the discussions dramatically portrayed in the tentative dialogues and by the breakdown of Athenian statesmanship. 'Cleverness, rhetorical volubility, versatility, practical knowledge of men and affairs, are all unavailing here. What is required is the dry light of the intellect, the ability to form legitimate inductions, the synoptic yet discriminating vision of the one in the many, the many in the one, the power to follow long trains of abstract reasoning, to distinguish, define, classify, relate, generalize, the multifarious objects of sense without losing oneself in irrelevant details, or mistaking the accidental for the essential.

The unsystematic dialectic skirmishing and logic-chopping practised at Athens, as dramatically illustrated in the minor dialogues, supplies no proper discipline of these faculties. This kind of dialectics is a game for young men,⁴ who acquire from it a certain superficial eristic knack of manipulating general terms, which encourages them to worry their elders and rush in fearlessly to the attack of the most complicated problems, for the solution of which they lack both training and practical experience. But the fire of their enthusiasm is soon quenched as the futility of it all is borne in upon them. They speedily abandon this dialectical sport, which they take for philosophy, for the more serious ambitions of manhood. They become misologists, sceptics of the existence of pure reason and truth,⁵ retaining only the conviction that there is a good deal to be said on both sides of every ques-

¹ Rep. 534 C, D.

² Gorgias, 448 A; Xen. Mem. IV, 2, 36; Alc. I, 113 C, D, E; Hipp. Maj. 286 E; Euthyphron, 4 E; 5 A; 7 C, D; Meno, 70-71 E; Protag. 328 E; Politicus, 302 B. Compare Phaedrus, 263 B, with Politicus, 285 D, for the necessity that the multitude should go astray in dealing with ethical abstractions.

³ Rep. 331 D, E; Lysis, 214 A; Apology, 23 C.

⁴ Phileb. 15 D, E; Rep. 539 B.

⁵ Phaedo, 89 C; Laches, 188 C, E.

tion, and that it is very convenient to be able to state your own side forcibly and carry your points in the assembly or the courts of law. Such men, at the best, may make estimable practical hand-to-mouth statesmen, incapable of imparting their empiric skill, of taking long views, or of instituting large reforms.¹ At the worst we have a Callicles or an Alcibiades, scoffers at all moral restraints, who recognize no law save that of the cunning and the strong.

On the feebler spirits the effect is simply a general unsettlement of the moral principles imbibed in childhood.² Plato himself had shared in the youthful intoxication of philosophy, and sometimes speaks of it not without sympathy. But in his soberer retrospective mood he affirms that the wise man will not willingly participate in any such madness.³ In the Republic he proposes to substitute for this régime of accident a systematic breeding of statesmen grounded in principles and ideas which they are able to defend against all comers and transmit to their successors. These men will not be permitted to approach the difficult and unsettling problems of dialectic until, in addition to the normal Greek education in gymnastic and music, and a competent experience of affairs,⁴ they have had their powers of abstract reasoning awakened and disciplined by some suitable preparatory training. This propaedeutic is to be sought in mathematics, (1) because it is the only definitely constituted science as yet extant, and has many valuable practical applications; (2) because it fixes the wandering attention, sharpens the wits, and constitutes the best-known gymnastic of the mental powers generally;⁵ (3) and chiefly, because mathematical conceptions first call into activity those faculties of abstraction and generalization that are afterwards to be exercised on the more delicate problems of ethics and human life. The very conception of an indivisible mathematical unit, for

¹ Rep. 426 C *τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην μὴ κινεῖν. κ.τ.λ.* Gorgias, 515-518.

² Rep. 538 D, E.

³ Contrast Symp. 218 B *πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνήκατε τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας*, with Rep. 539 C *ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος . . . τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν.*

⁴ Rep. 484 D; 487 A; 539 E.

⁵ Laws, 747 B, C; Rep. 526 B.

example, demands no inconsiderable effort of abstraction. There are no such units in nature. "I mean," says Socrates,¹ "that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity in his reasoning, but if you break it up into fragments they multiply, taking care that the one may never appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts." This is substantially the same thought that is thus picturesquely expressed by Professor James (*Psychol.* Vol. II, p. 655): "How could our notion that one and one are eternally and necessarily two ever maintain itself in a world where every time we add one drop of water to another we get not two but one again? in a world where every time we add a drop to a crumb of quicklime we get a dozen or more? had it no better warrant than such experiences?—That confident tone is due to the fact that they deal with abstract and ideal numbers exclusively."² The same holds of other pure mathematical conceptions,—the straight line, the circle. Their visible symbols are so inadequate and contradictory that they lead the mind upward to the contemplation of the pure ideas which the eye of the mind alone is able to apprehend, and thus they form the best preparatory training for the apprehension of those higher ethical abstractions for which no visible and tangible symbols can be found.³

This, then, is the ground of the necessity of mathematics for the philosopher, that without it he can never rise out of the world of generation into the world of being and become an adept in the calculations of the higher reason.⁴

¹ Rep. 525 D, Jowett modified.

² Cf. Rep. 526 A ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχαυρεῖ κ.τ.λ. It is from the opposition of these unities to concrete unities that the paradoxes of the Parmenides are for the most part deduced. Cf. 526 A μὲν ὅν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν.

³ Politicus, 286 A τοῖς δ' αὖ μεγίστοις οὐσι καὶ τιμωτάτοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῶλον οὐδὲν . . . διὸ δεῖ μελετᾶν λόγον ἐκάστου δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι.

⁴ Rep. 525 B φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτόν εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι ἢ μὴδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι. Jowett and Campbell, *ad loc.*, correct the error in Jowett's translation pointed out by me in A. J. P. XIII, 3, but they still render "never become an arithmetician," which yields the lame sequence: "a philosopher must study arithmetic and rise out of the region of change, or he can never become an arithmetician." The

That this and no mystic Pythagorean ontology is Plato's essential meaning is confirmed, were confirmation needed, by the more prosaic statement of the same doctrine in the closing paragraphs of the *Laws*. The anchor of the state is to be made fast in a nocturnal council of wise men, who are to know scientifically the saving truth which the multitude accept on faith. Their actions are to be directed to one consistent mark, owing to their power of surveying and unifying by reason the confused multitude of particulars. More especially they are to know just what constitutes the ideal unity of the virtues as distinguished from their apparent concrete diversity, what is the inherent operation of virtue and vice, and in what sense the good and the beautiful are both one and many. And to attain to this knowledge they must supplement the normal Greek education by a discipline in which mathematics and mathematical astronomy will hold the chief place.

In view of these explicit statements, it is not necessary to dwell any longer on the element of Pythagorean mysticism in Plato's exaltation of mathematics, nor to pause to discuss his interesting observations on the progress of the mathematical sciences, his proposition for the endowment of mathematical research, his lament over the deplorable state of "solid geometry," his prophetic anticipations of modern mathematical physics and astronomy. These things are not essential to the understanding of the allegory of the sun as the visible symbol of the Good, to which we are now ready to turn.

The religious and poetical significance of Plato's allegory of the sun hardly requires explicit commentary. To the primitive imagination the great life-and-heat-dispensing luminary seemed the least inadequate symbol of the goodness of Him who causes his sun to rise upon the just and the unjust alike, and to the analysis of modern science he still remains, in Dante's words, —

"Lo ministro maggior della natura
Che del valor del cielo il mondo imprenta."

The adoration of the sun was among the first, the most widely diffused, the noblest of the religions of nature, by which the soul

key to the true meaning, of course, is the fact that Plato is playing on the double meaning of *λογιστικός*. Cf. the play on *παρὰνομία* and its paronyms in 424 D, E.

of man was touched to finer issues and raised to loftier spiritual ideals than fetichism or ancestor-worship could embody.

“Son of God, the shining son of Time, they called thee,
Who wast older, O our father, than they knew.”

During the early Christian centuries this religion of the sun in its popular and in its idealized Neo-Platonic form was the most vigorous rival of Christianity. And in every age passionate poetic spirits yearning for a visible symbol of the divine will find it here, and will be ready to “kneel adoring Him the timeless in the flame that measures time,” with the myriads of Xerxes on the march to Greece, with Socrates in his watch at Potidæa (Symp. 220 D), with the philosophic emperor Julian at the head of his legions, with St. Francis of Assisi in his sweet, unconscious paganism.

A genuine religious fervor warms and vivifies the quaint allegorical mysticism of such documents as Julian's Oration to the Sun, or Proclus' Hymn. *ἐντέτηκέ μοι δεινὸς ἐκ παίδων τῶν αὐγῶν τοῦ θεοῦ πόθος*, the emperor writes. This instinctive yearning toward the fountain of warmth and light is the fundamental impulse that constrains him to make it the central symbol of all religion and of all philosophy. “O highest and best of Gods, fair and blessed divinity,” sings Proclus, “image of the great God who made all things, uplifter and purifier of our souls, hearken to my prayer and cleanse me from all sin and pollution.” And similar expressions, in part spontaneous, in part derived from the Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, can be found in mediaeval and modern poetry. Dante makes the sun the image and symbol of supreme goodness and power. Guido Guinicelli writes, perhaps with conscious Platonism, —

“God in the understanding of high heaven
Burns more than in our sight the living sun.”

And St. Francis, who had probably never heard of Plato, but who loved the bright sun of Umbria, employs the same imagery. “Praised be my Lord God with all his creatures, and specially our brother the sun, who brings us the day, who brings us the light; fair is he and shines with a very great splendor. Of thee, O Lord, he is the symbol.”

It is a far cry from St. Francis to Goethe, the apostle of many-sided culture. But Goethe too finds in the Platonic figure the aptest expression of our highest intuitions:—

“Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Die Sonne könnt' es nie erblicken;
Läg' nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnt' uns Göttliches entzücken?”

And Tennyson, who has given utterance to every fancy or aspiration of the modern spirit, after essaying all philosophies and all symbols, recurs in his final volume to this:—

“Let the sun,
Who heats our earth to yield us' grain and fruit,
And laughs upon thy field as well as mine,
And warms the blood of Shiah and Sunnee,
Symbol the eternal!”

But, abandoning these obvious and easy if more attractive reflections, let us ask ourselves what is the precise meaning of the statement that the Good is not identical with knowledge and truth, but is their source,—nay, that it is not essence or existence, but something above or beyond existence, operating as its cause. Have these propositions any definite significance for Plato's moral and metaphysical philosophy, or are they merely *δαιμονία ὑπερβολή*, pious ejaculations thrown out at an object, forms of emotional expansion; and must interpretation find its limits in Jowett's pretty saying that “the intense reality of all beauty and all truth, when seen according to the divine idea, is perhaps as near an approach as we can make to the meaning of Plato”? I think we can carry our analysis a little further. In its external aspect, Plato's meaning is at once given by a reference to well-known passages of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. In the *Philebus* we learn that the Good, though nearly akin to knowledge, is not mere knowledge any more than it is mere pleasure, but is a mixture of many elements, owing its acceptability to a causal principle which combines these in due proportions. This power of the cause is closely allied to if not identical with beneficent mind.¹ In the *Timaeus*² the Demiurgus creates the world because he is good and wishes to impart his goodness. Goodness,

¹ 67 A.

² 29 E.

then, in a sense is the cause of all things, whether we identify the Demiurgus with the Idea of Good or not.

A brief consideration of Plato's conception of causation will enable us to pass beyond these obvious but superficial analogies. Typical causal action in Plato is moral, not mechanical. The true cause of Socrates' remaining in his prison cell is his idea of what is best, *i.e.*, his idea of the good, not the fetters that shackle his limbs or the physical structure of his body.¹ The chief cause of a manufactured object, as a shuttle,² is the type or pattern of the instrument in the mind of the maker.³ But that type is defined by its use, its end, the good it effects.⁴ And, on the principle that the works of nature are really the products of divine art,⁵ the ultimate cause of all natural objects will be the goodness of the creator fashioning them after a pattern to answer his great idea. But this study is not primarily concerned with the material world, and the thought becomes much clearer and more significant when applied to the world of the life and institutions of man. For Plato regarded the social tissue as so much plastic material in the hands of the true artist in statesmanship and education.⁶ And he everywhere speaks of the statesman as an artist working from a pattern or model. "And if a necessity be laid upon him" (the philosopher), says Socrates (Rep. 500 D), "to practise to impress the forms which he beholds in the world of ideas on the morals and manners of men in private or public life, and not merely to mould himself, do you think he will prove an unskilful artificer of temperance and justice and every form of ordinary citizen virtue?"⁷ Similarly in Gorgias, 503 E, speaking of rhetoric as

¹ Phaedo, 99 A ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου. Cf. Phileb. 23 D; 27 A; 33 E.

² Cratyl. 389 B. Cf. Rep. 596 B.

³ Cf. Ar. Met. 1032a, 32 ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

⁴ See, for an application of the same analogy in modern ethics, Spencer, Data of Ethics, § 12: "We allege imperfection of any inanimate thing, as a tool, if it lacks some part needful for effectual action, or if some part is so shaped as not to fulfil its purpose in the best manner," etc. And on the whole doctrine of the ἔργον, cf. *supra*, p. 210 n.

⁵ Sophist, 266 D, E θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιῆσθαι θεῖα τέχνη.

⁶ Cf. the imagery of Leslie Stephen, *op. cit.*, p. 368: "And if, as I have said, human nature is regarded as in some sense a constant, the science of morality, which should be rigidly deducible from its properties, can hardly be realized when the human material is capable of being worked up into indefinitely varying forms."

⁷ Cf. *eis τὸν σίδηρον . . . τιθέναι* Cratyl. 389 C, with *eis ἀνθρώπων ἦθη . . . τιθέναι* Rep. 500 D.

the handmaid of the political art, Socrates asks: "Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random, just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other, look all of them to their own work and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a definite form to it?" (Jowett.)

And as the "good of them," the purpose, the *ἔργον*, or the type is the chief cause of things in both the physical and the moral world, so it is their best explanation. "Coleridge's mode of treating any institution," says Mill, "is to investigate what he terms the idea of it, or what in common parlance would be termed the principle involved in it," that is to say, as the context shows, the good it is intended to accomplish. Now, given a Platonic republic governed by the omnipotent Platonic guardians, it becomes literally true that the ideals of human life, the "opinion of the best," the idea of good in the minds of these men, would be the cause of the institutions, the habits and morals, and, through the marriage lots, of the very life and existence of the citizens. And it would further hold that to comprehend, to attain to science and truth concerning any given institution or practice, however trivial, one would need to trace it back link by link to the purpose or idea of intended benefit and good in the mind of the ordaining ruler. The Idea of Good, then, is literally the cause of knowledge, truth, and existence, though distinct from them and above them. This holds true to a large extent of the seemingly accidental and casual arrangements and institutions of existing societies. "Vernunft wird Unsinn, Wohlthat Plage, weh dir dass du ein Enkel bist," says Goethe. But no institutions are altogether irrational in their conception; and the *why* of the apparently most senseless custom will always lead us back to an idea of good in the mind of some personality strong enough to enforce his conception on others.¹ The practice is not understood, we do not know the

¹ I trust no critic will suspect me of maintaining that the Platonic ideas, including the Idea of Good, are mere conceptions of the mind. They are practically that for ethical purposes, but in metaphysics they are hypostatized, in poetry they are personified. Contradictions of this sort are as inevitable in metaphysics as in mythology. They should be discussed when we are treating of metaphysics *ex professo*, not dragged in to confuse ethics and politics. Cf. *supra*, p. 198.

truth about it, till we have done this. "A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious," writes Bagehot,¹ "a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favorite and detested types of character." Such types are ideas or rather opinions of good in the minds of the multitude, they are λόγοι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ οἶον χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ᾧ ἐπιτηδεύειν.² What is to determine these types? In the Athens of Plato they were in large measure the product of such conversations in agora or palaestra as the Socratic dialogues depict. In the Platonic state they were to be moulded by the resistless pressure of consistently organized education, law, art, and amusement, in the control of a group of wise rulers, who should have seen and apprehended the type of good themselves. If you ask him to define further the vision of the good, he replies that it is the vision that comes to men of the happiest temperamental endowment who have been subjected to a severe selective discipline in youth, whose bodies have been rendered obedient servants by gymnastic, whose tempers have been softened and refined by music and culture, who have borne themselves well through fifteen years' tests in practical affairs, and who have supplemented all this by systematically acquired mastery of the severest and most advanced science of their time. In what sense is this doctrine less definite or precise than the teaching of modern evolutionist ethics? Mr. Herbert Spencer virtually follows Plato in postulating an ideal social organism as the ultimate test and type of ethical truth. "Ethics," he says, "has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution."³ And again: "Of course the implication is that the man, who thus reaches the limit of evolution, exists in a society congruous with his nature."⁴ Mr. Leslie Stephen, after working out the doctrine of functions and types in imitation of Plato,⁵ when brought to the test question,

¹ Physics and Politics, p. 206.

² Symp. 209 B.

³ Data of Ethics, § 7.

⁴ Ibid, § 28. Cf. Republic, 497 A ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτὸς τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει. Cf. 592 B.

⁵ Science of Ethics, pp. 74 sqq.

what idea of good determines the best type, replies "a man is virtuous or the reverse so far as he does or does not conform to the type defined by the healthy condition of the social organism." And this too, as we have seen, is a return, "after the argument has gone a long and weary way," to the doctrine of Plato.¹ Unless, indeed, we limit the meaning of health to fitness for survival, as Mr. Stephen probably intends, in which case we may legitimately ask which is the more definite and practically applicable test of ethical truth—tendency to survival or consensus of opinion of the members of society who have received the Platonic education?

As we have already seen, the Idea of Good becomes the cause of all natural objects of the physical world only on the hypothesis of a divine art and a divine artisan, and such a teleology can be fully elaborated only by those who possess a complete, final, and consistent philosophy of theism. Plato, despite his strong theistic leanings, had no such philosophy, and teleology for him assumes the form of poetic myth. But, detached from its mythical environment, the Idea of Good retains a definite and serviceable meaning for ethics, which it was perhaps worth while to have explicitly stated for once.

Plato next proceeds in the image of the quadripartite line² to establish a partly fanciful analogy between the world of sensible objects, whose lord and king is the sun, and the world of intelligibles, governed by the Idea of Good. The lower and lesser section of the line represents the sensible world, which falls into two divisions,—ordinary objects of sense, natural or manufactured, appealing to *δόξα* or opinion in the soul, and their reflections on water or mirrored surfaces, corresponding to *εἰκασία* or conjecture, a term of disparagement playfully thrown in to secure symmetry of subdivision in the two worlds and to suggest a depth below the lowest depth.³

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 194.

² 509 D sqq.

³ Professor Campbell (Jowett and Campbell, *Republic*, Vol. II, p. 16) thinks there is a deeper reason. He says, plausibly enough: "Plato is engaged in bringing out a twofold distinction, (1) between nature and the ideas, (2) between appearance and reality in nature. This, and not merely the requirement of a fourth term for his analogy, was his motive for separating *πίστις* from *εἰκασία*." I should say rather that

The divisions of the upper and major section of the line are denominated, not by any definitely demarcated classes of objects, but by the subjective faculties of *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* and the methods they employ. The typical activity of the lower faculty *διάνοια* is best observed in the mathematical sciences, which are inferior to pure dialectic by two limitations. (1) They reason from hypotheses which they assume arbitrarily, and refuse to subject to scrutiny, as, *e.g.*, the axioms and definitions of geometry. (2) They employ visible types (diagrams and the like) to stand for the pure ideas with which they are in reality concerned.¹

The entire passage has been correctly enough translated and explained by Jowett, Grote, and others. There are two points, however, so frequently misapprehended as to require explicit emphasis. (1) The relativity of the distinction between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια*. (2) The fact that these faculties have no precise objective correlates like *δόξα* and *εἰκασία* in the lower half of the line. The pure dialectician differs from the mathematician, says Plato, in that he proceeds *ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον*; he treats his hypotheses as (mere provisional) hypotheses, as stepping-stones to be removed; as rungs of the ladder, to be spurned when he has attained the summit. What is this *ἀνυπόθετον*? Modern interpreters have often been tempted, after Mansel, to translate it the Unconditioned or the Absolute; but this is to introduce a long train of alien metaphysical associations in which the true meaning of the passage disappears as in a mist. Grote (Vol. II, 412) and others say more especially that it is the Idea of Good. And this is a half truth which it will be well to illustrate further before supplementing it by the other neglected half. Ultimately, then, the *ἀνυπόθετον* is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. One thing is loved for the sake of another, argues the Socrates of the *Lysis*; but we cannot proceed thus in an infinite regress. We must finally come *ἐπὶ*

Plato borrows the distinction between appearance and reality in nature as an imaginative symbol for the distinction between completely and imperfectly rationalized apprehension of the ideas, in which alone he feels serious interest in this passage.

¹ 510 B-511 B.

τινα ἀρχήν, and that ἀρχή is the ἀγαθόν or πρῶτον φίλον. As regards the attainment of all subordinate ends, Diotima instructs Socrates,¹ men ask "why?"—ἵνα τί; but with respect to happiness (or the Good) they no longer ask this question. And similarly as regards the problems of physics, the Socrates of the Phaedo² mocks at those who look for a stronger Atlas than the Good to bear up the universal frame of things. If any natural philosopher will prove to him that it is best for the earth to occupy a certain position, or for the heavenly bodies to move in a certain orbit, he will ask for no further reasons, but acquiesce in that.³ The Good, then, is an end of controversy, both in physics and politics. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed *axioma medium*, but to its relation to ultimate Good,—that is to say, in ethics and politics back to the laws of human health, happiness, and perfection broadly and nobly conceived, in physics back to the benevolent designs of creative intelligence. Ultimate dissidence with regard to the ἀρχή or primal Good makes discussion of ethical problems futile and impossible. The only argument available in such cases is: "you that way, we this." On this point the words of Socrates in the Crito are very significant and furnish strong confirmation of our contention that the ἀρχή of the Republic is to be taken in an ethical and methodological rather than in an ontological sense. "Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they observe the difference of their counsels. Tell me whether you agree with and assent to my first principle (ἀρχώμεθα), that neither injury nor

¹ Symp. 204 E–205 A.

² 97 E sqq.

³ Cf. Wallace, Kant, p. 183: "The idea of a supreme intelligence as regulative of the universe serves as a clue to suggest the discovery of new relationships in the objects of nature."

retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. Or do you stand off and refuse to join in this ἀρχή?" (Jowett modified.)

The ἀρχή twice mentioned in this passage is evidently the ἀρχή of the Republic, but it is not an ontological ἀνυπόθετον. It is beyond hypothesis only in the sense that it is an ultimate hypothesis for this kind of ethical discussion. It is not practicable to push inquiry further; we can only accept or deny. It is the hypothesis to which Socrates has anchored his whole life with adamant faith; but Callias and Callicles do not accept it. In the Platonic state, however, the hypothetical character of this and similar truths is disguised. The guardians know them with scientific certainty, and permit no hint of dissension from them. They are the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή of all the institutions and all opinions in the state. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, the attainment of the ἀνυπόθετον is an unrealized methodological ideal. In physics, obviously so. The Socrates of the Phaedo admits his inability to explain the universe on teleological principles,¹ and the attempt at such an explanation in the Timaeus is avowedly a tissue of poetic probabilities.² And even in ethics and politics, Plato has little to offer in his own person beyond the somewhat gray austere life of the Republic and the Laws, the impressive dramatic exhibition of Socrates' ability to make the moral scepticism of the cleverest sophist look poor and silly, and his own adamant faith that happiness can never be disassociated from virtue. The only positive definition or criterion of the Good that he announces is that it is that which will commend itself to the men who have received the perfect education.

But, though the pursuit of the absolute baffles us here as everywhere, the methodological significance of the distinction between the dialectician and the mathematician remains unimpaired. On this point I wrote in another connection a few years ago (A. J. P., X, 45):—

"Plato, except in mystical passages, has no absolute ἀρχαί. Logic is for him dialectic, and the ἀρχαί of dialectic are always conventions agreed upon by the disputants. All Platonic arguments are in a sense relative and *ad hominem*. The dialectician

¹ 99 D.

² Tim. 44 D; 48 D; 56 A; 59 C; 68 D.

differs from the professor of a particular science, not in that he goes back to the absolutely unconditioned (as Mansel renders the *ἀνυπόθετον* of Rep. 511 B), but in that he is not tied to any particular set of *ἀρχαί*, the validity of which he refuses to examine. He is willing to push the argument back until some common ground is reached. The proposition thus found acceptable to both disputants, be it a definition, an axiom, or a wide generalization in some special field, becomes an *ὑπόθεσις* or an *ἀρχή* which must be allowed unconditioned validity while the consequences that flow from it are being examined; cf. Phaedo, 101 D–E, where the *ικανόν* of *ὥς ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις* is the logical equivalent of the *μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου* of the somewhat mythically expressed passage of the Republic.

In the dialogues these *ἀρχαί* or *ὑποθέσεις* are frequently fundamental Platonic doctrines (cf. *ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέχασθαι*, Phaedo, 92 D), as the theory of ideas in the Phaedo, or the hypothesis of the Republic and Timaeus that all human purpose and all the larger purpose that determines the process of the suns is directed towards one definite goal of good. And such passages have obscured the purely relative and logical significance of the method. A good example of the latter is afforded by the argument *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* (86 E) in the Meno. Unable to formulate a satisfactory definition of virtue, Socrates and Meno agree that if *ἀρετή* is *ἐπιστήμη* it is a *διδασκόν*. From this point the arguments of Socrates are directed to (*πρὸς*) the relation of *ἐπιστήμη* to *ἀρετή*. A second hypothesis that *ἀρετή* is an *ἀγαθόν* is invoked, and the *ἀγαθόν* is referred through the concept *ὠφέλιμον* to *φρόνησις* and *ἐπιστήμη*. Similarly in the Protagoras, it having been agreed that good and bad are equivalents of pleasurable and painful, Socrates concludes the argument by substituting the one pair of terms for the other. 355 E *μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα*."

It is a welcome confirmation of these views that they are accepted by Professor Campbell (in the Jowett and Campbell Republic, Vol. II, pp. 335–6) in language closely resembling my own. One implied criticism in Professor Campbell's remarks has perhaps been anticipated above, but may be touched upon here to avoid a possible misconception. He writes, p. 335: "For example, though it is by no means clear that by the *ικανόν τι* of

Phaedo, 101 D, Plato means the same thing with the *ἀνυπόθετον* or the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, yet the description of the progress from the lower to the higher hypothesis is parallel to the ladder of ideas in VI, 511 B," etc. No one who has followed the preceding argument, or who notes the qualifications in the statement that the *ἰκανόν* of *ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἰκανὸν ἔλθοις* is the logical equivalent of the *μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου* will suspect me of attempting to establish mechanically a literal equation between *ἰκανόν* and *ἀγαθόν*, however plausible such an attempt might be made. My contention is briefly (1) that the *ἀνυπόθετον* is not the metaphysical Unconditioned with a capital letter, (2) that in ethical and physico-teleological discussion it is the Idea of Good so far as that is attainable, (3) that methodologically and in its most important sense for the Platonic dialectic it denotes the habit of the flexible disciplined intelligence which is able and willing to revise, correlate, and unify its opinions through a virtually infinite receding series of hypotheses, or, at any rate, to the point where for the solution of the question in hand some unconditionally accepted hypothesis is reached.

The second point to be noticed in the allegory of the quadripartite line was the absence of an objective correlate corresponding to *διάνοια* as *εἰκόνες* answer to *εἰκασία*. This would require no comment if it had not been so frequently misunderstood. All abstract general notions are alike "ideas" in Plato, and there is no ground for assigning mathematical abstractions an intermediate place between ideas and the concretes of sense except a misapprehension of the passages in which the mathematical habit of mind is spoken of as intermediate between mere opinion concerning the things of sense, and the highest forms of intelligence.¹ *Νοῦς* and *διάνοια* are equally conversant with ideas. The difference is one of method. Hence the subdivisions of the upper half of the line are denoted in somewhat embarrassed language² by a description of these methods, while it is explicitly stated that the objects of *διάνοια* are intelligibles, *νοητά*, when viewed in relation to an *ἀρχή*.³ But the mere technical mathematician is not able to

¹ Cf. my *Dissertatio de Platonis Ideis*, pp. 31 sqq.

² Rep. 510 B ἡ τμητέον. Πῃ; *Ἡ δὲ μὲν κ.τ.λ.

³ 511 D καὶ τοὶ νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς.

view them in this way; he cannot reason back to the ultimate psychological presuppositions of mathematical definitions and postulates. He is a sort of huntsman keen to discover and track down particular geometrical constructions and demonstrations which he is obliged to turn over to the dialectician if they are to be rightly used or correlated by any general conception of method.¹

Plato is evidently thinking here not merely of the general principle which he wishes to illustrate, but also of his own peculiar position as the philosophic teacher of mathematical specialists.²

The relation indicated between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* is the explanation of the generally misunderstood passage (534 A, B) in which Plato, resuming the classification, says: "But let us omit the ratios (or relations) that obtain between the objective correlates of these faculties and the bipartite division of either, *i.e.*, of the opinable and the intelligible, lest it involve us in a discussion many times as long as that we have labored through."³ That is to say, he avoids drawing out the proportion — *εἶδη* : to objects of *διάνοια* = *σκευαστά*, etc. : *εἰκόνες*, because he is aware that the second member of the proportion is a blank and the fourth is largely fantastic. In the third edition of Jowett's translation this passage is rendered: "let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect." In the notes to the recently published Jowett and Campbell Republic, it is translated (the italics are mine): "The exact proportion to each other of the things *to which these terms apply*, and the divisions of the spheres of opinion and reason severally." At first blush, this might seem to be a sufficiently correct version in Professor Jowett's well-known genial manner. But the commentary shows that the loose translation involves a distinct misapprehension of the thought. It is: "The line (VI, 509 D, E) was

¹ ἄτε οὖν χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεῦσαι μόνον, παραδιδάσκει δὴπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὐρημασιν, Euthyd. 290 C.

² Cf. the remarks of Grote, Vol. I, p. 349 n; the position of Theodorus in the Theaetetus, and the note of personal feeling in the words (Rep. 519 B) ἐπιστάτου τε δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἀνευ οὗ οὐκ ἂν εὖροιεν· ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα καὶ γενομένου, ὥς νῦν ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθοιντο οἱ περὶ ταῦτα ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι.

³ τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ ἐῷμεν.

proportionally divided. Plato seems to hint that the proportionate division of the line and of each of the subdivisions was not a mere arbitrary fancy." But there is no suggestion in the Greek of the misleading "exact" inserted in the translation. The antithesis implied in the *δέ* of *τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα* is that of the ratio between the faculties *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* and that which must be supposed to obtain between their objective correlates. *ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα* does not mean "the things to which these terms apply," but the objective entities to which these subjective faculties are related, and which fall within their sphere.¹ Failing to perceive this, scholars have sought the missing member elsewhere. Mr. Henry Jackson, for example,² thinks that it is represented by the *λόγοι* of the *Phaedo*, which he interprets as concepts of the understanding and therefore imperfect reflections of the idea. It is hardly necessary for me to repeat here that the distinction between concepts of the understanding and ideas of the reason is foreign to Plato, and that, even if we grant the distinction, the strained meaning assigned to *λόγος* fits neither the passage of the *Phaedo* nor that of the *Republic*.³

But the theory offers useful hints for the interpretation of the allegory of the cave, which, though it adds nothing of significance to the substantive doctrine of the Idea of Good, must be briefly considered for the formal completion of our exposition.

The allegory may be assumed to be familiar to all readers of this paper. The general parallelism between the image of the cave and that of the divided line is, as Socrates says,⁴ obvious enough. The cave is the world of sense and visible things symbolized by the shadows cast on its walls. The fire before its entrance answers to the sun, the release of the prisoners in the cave, the toilsome upward ascent to the light of day, the bewilderment and painful dazzling of the eyes at the first view of real objects in the sunlight;—all this corresponds to the education in abstractions of the mind immersed in the concrete, the rise of the

¹ Cf. 477 D *δυνάμεις δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω, ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι*; 480 A *ἐφ' οἷς δόξα*; 511 E *καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχειν κ.τ.λ.*

² Eng. *Journal of Philology*, 19, 136 sqq.

³ Cf. Rep. 490 D for the natural Greek meaning of *λόγος* in such a connection. Cf. A. J. P., Vol. IX, pp. 303-4.

⁴ 517 B.

soul to the intelligible world, as Plato calls it,—and to the various processes by which this education is achieved, the corybantic sophistic initiation,¹ the Socratic dialectic with its attendant ἀπορία and νάρκωσις,² the sober gradual propaedeutic of the mathematical arts and sciences. But is there any one element of the myth that we can definitely equate with the objective correlate of διάνοια the missing second member of the divided line? The shadows on the wall represent the things of the sensible world, the objects of δόξα and εἰκασία, which are not discriminated here. The objects in the sunlight stand for the εἶδη. The objects of διάνοια, then, must be found, if anywhere, in the mediating terms. But there are several intermediates: the images, the men who carry them past the mouth of the cave, and, after the upper air has been reached, the reflections of real things on mirrors of watery surfaces. There is, moreover, no continuous proportion. Complete quadripartite symmetry would require the shadows of the upper world to be themselves the realities reflected as shadows on the walls of the cave. The παραφέροντες, then, and the objects they bear are merely a part of the mythological machinery for establishing a connection between the ideas and the world of sense—always an embarrassing problem for Plato.³ This does not forbid our looking for hints of further meanings with which Plato may have charged his imagery, but it warns us not to press them when found. The mediating function of the περαφέροντες suggests to Professor Campbell⁴ that they answer to the δαίμονες, or created Gods, who in the Timaeus (43) mediate between the supreme creator and his world and undertake the minor works of creation. This would be plausible were it not that the entire context and Plato's use of εἰδωλα and similar terms elsewhere show that he is thinking not of imperfect and intermediate types of ideas in nature, but of ethical and social ideas. Thus he says of the sophists⁵ that they exhibit εἰδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, and calls pretenders to statesmanship, in the Politicus,⁶ εἰδώλων

¹ Euthyd. 277 D seq.

² Charm. 169 C; Theaetet. 149 A; Meno, 80 B seq.

³ Tim. 50 C; 51 A; Phaedo, 100 D.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 16.

⁵ Sophist, 234 C.

⁶ 303 C.

μεγίστων προστάτας.¹ Now the objects borne past the mouth of the cave are expressly denominated εἰδωλα in 532 B,² and in 517 D there is a contemptuous allusion to those who wrangle περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί. If, then, we must find a definite meaning for the παραφέροντες and the objects they exhibit, the dominant suggestion is that of the sophists and the false or inadequate ideals they set up of ethical and social truths. They exhibit these artificial εἰδωλα of moral truths because, as we learn from Politicus, 286 A, these truths have no εἰδωλον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς. But we must not press this thought. Sophistic and Socratic dialectic are akin in their awakening effect upon the mind.³ And these εἰδωλα suggest inadequate Socratic definitions as well as misleading sophistical conceptions, as appears from the language of 515 C: ἀδυνατοὶ καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα ὧν τότε τὰς σκιάς ἑώρα, and cf. 532 B, where the μεταστροφή ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰδωλα is educational rather than sophistic. In fact, in these passages and in the phrase ἅπερ ὀρῶεν,⁴ the objects borne past the cave represent the ideas in relation to the shadows in the cave. Thus the imagery in the cave supplies no definite term to take the place of the missing objective correlate of διάνοια in the divided line. And in his final résumé of his meaning, Plato dwells solely on methods and not on objects, and treats the entire process without discrimination of its various stages, the release from bonds, the conversion to εἰδωλα, the gradual ascent, the contemplation of images in water, as a symbol of all the propaedeutic disciplines by which the mind is led upwards from the transitory things of sense to the permanent realities of abstraction. And his chief interest in this discipline is that he deems it indispensable to the acquisition of the power to reason soundly about the supreme moral and social concerns of man.

¹ Cf. also Symp. 212 A εἰδωλα ἀρετῆς; Phaedr. 250 B δικαιοσύνης . . . καὶ σωφροσύνης . . . εἰκόνας; Meno, 100 A; Phaed. 69 B σκιαγραφία.

² μεταστροφή ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἰδωλα. Here they are relatively to the σκιαί realities; but in 520 C καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ εἰδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν; διὰ τὸ τἀληθὲς ἑωρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν περὶ they are virtually confounded with the σκιαί in antithesis to the real objects of the upper world.

³ Sophist, 230 D, E; 231 A; Euthyd. 277 E.

⁴ 515 B. Cf. Parmen. 130 D.

I have written thus at length on this well-worn passage, because to my knowledge it has never been interpreted in its true and simple meaning, and because experience proves that condensed statements of Platonic doctrine are ignored or misunderstood. For lovers of brevity, however, I will sum up in a word my chief positions. The mythical and poetical aspect of the Idea of Good in the Republic is secondary and subordinate to its significance for the logic of ethics. The Idea of Good is not a new ontological principle introduced in the Republic and related primarily to the Demiurgus of the Timaeus and the ideas of beauty and symmetry in the Philebus, Phaedrus, and Symposium. It is rather the fulfilment of the treatment of the *ἀγαθόν* in the minor ethical dialogues. It means essentially, when stripped of its poetic vesture, a rational, consistent conception of the greatest possible attainable human happiness, of the ultimate laws of God, nature, or man that sanction conduct, and of the consistent application of these laws in legislation, government, and education. Plato further believed that the true statesman must be in possession of such a controlling general conception, that he can attain to it only by prolonged and laborious discipline of the abstract reasoning powers, and that, in his time, mathematics and the mathematical sciences afforded the best instrument of such a discipline. In the allegorical working out of these thoughts, there is much religious poetry colored by sun-worship, much idealistic disparagement of the shams of sense in comparison with the realities of intelligence, much rhetorical glorification of Plato's favorite pursuits, mathematics and dialectic, many interesting glimpses of the condition of the sciences in Plato's day, many beautiful cosmological fancies. No lover of Plato would willingly miss these things, but it was necessary to disregard them for once in order to apprehend the true form and pressure of the body of Plato's thought, which sentimental Platonists are forever losing in rapt contemplation of its gorgeous vestment.

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